SHAH v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND PREPAREDNESS et al
Filing
53
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 3/29/2018. (mmh)
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
______________________________
:
JIGNESH SHAH,
:
Civil Action No.: 15-3233(FLW)
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
OPINION
NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF HOMELAND :
SECURITY AND PREPAREDNESS,
:
:
Defendant.
:
______________________________:
WOLFSON, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff Jignesh Shah (“Plaintiff” or “Shah”) brings this
employment discrimination suit against the New Jersey Office of
Homeland
Security
and
Preparedness
(“Defendant”
or
“NJHSP”),
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, et seq., alleging race and national origin discrimination.
More specifically, Plaintiff claims that based on his race and/or
national
origin,
Defendant
1)
failed
to
promote
him,
2)
discriminated and retaliated against him, and 3) created a hostile
working environment.
summary
judgment
on
In the instant matter, Defendant moves for
all
counts
of
the
Amended
Complaint
(“Complaint”), arguing that some of Plaintiff’s claims, including
hostile work environment, should be dismissed because he failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies.
As to the failure to promote
claim, Defendant maintains that even after discovery, Plaintiff
has come up short in proving his case.
For the reasons set forth
below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Shah, a South Asian of Indian descent, is currently working
at NJHSP as a Principal Tech MIS, a position for which he was hired
in December 2006. Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Def.
Statements”), ¶ 1. Prior to his employment with NJHSP, Shah worked
as a Senior Technician MIS at the New Jersey Commerce and Tourism
Commission from 2005 to 2006, and from 1999 to 2005, Shah was a
Technical Support Analyst at Liz Claiborn.
Id. at ¶ 19.
As a
Principal Tech at NJHSP, Shah was responsible for troubleshooting
server issues and providing desktop support. See Pl’s Dep., 46:1848:5.
In that position, Shah initially reported to his supervisor
James
Rankin,
who
later
became
the
acting
manager.
Charles
Pietzsch was hired to replace Rankin, and therefore, became Shah’s
direct supervisor during the relevant period.
Id. at 12:9-20.
Shah’s Department consisted of seven employees, each with
varying job titles, but all had the same supervisors and managers
as Plaintiff.
Plaintiff worked closely with two other employees,
Ronald Niehaus and John Kiczek.
At the time Plaintiff was hired,
Niehaus was a Senior Tech MIS, who was promoted to the position of
Network
Administrator
Statements, ¶ 80.
1
(“NA
1”)
in
April
2007.
See
Def.
According to Defendant, there are two methods
2
by which employees receive promotions at NJHSP.
One is through
NJHSP’s formal interview process, and the other is by way of
submitting a request to New Jersey’s Civil Service Commission
(“CSC”) to reclassify the employee’s job title, which occurs when
CSC determines that an employee performs job duties outside of
his/her job description.
Id. at ¶ 72.
In 2007, upon NJHSP’s
request, Niehaus’s Senor Tech MIS job title was reclassified by
CSC, with the approval of the Governor’s Office.
80; see Governor’s Memorandum dated April 10, 2007.
Id. at ¶¶ 79Subsequently,
in October 2014, Niehaus was promoted to Network Administrator 2
(“NA 2”) though NJHSP’s formal interview process.
Niehaus Cert.,
¶ 5.
A.
Plaintiff’s Work History
According to Shah, since the inception of his employment, he
has encountered hostility from co-workers and managers.
For
example, Shah testified that in 2008, Niehaus told him that he
looked like a “terrorist” and referred to Plaintiff as a “Paki.” 1
Shah Cert., ¶¶ 34-36.
At that time, Shah testified that although
he reported the incident to his then-supervisor Rankin, no remedial
action was taken by management.
Id.
In addition, Plaintiff
maintains that both his direct supervisor, Pietzsch, and his
1
According to Plaintiff, “Paki” is a pejorative
associated with terrorist activity. Shah Cert., ¶ 35.
3
term
manager, Anita Bogdan, had referred to Plaintiff, on at least one
occasion, as a “Paki” and “terrorist.”
Id. at ¶¶ 33, 37.
Pietzsch and Bogdan all deny this claim.
Niehaus,
See Bogdan Cert., ¶ 49;
Pietzsch Cert., ¶ 75; Niehaus Cert., ¶ 68.
In January 2013, Shah arranged a meeting with Steven Gutkin,
who at the time served as the Bureau Chief/NJHSP Equal Employment
Coordinator, 2 regarding the level of network and server access
granted to Shah.
See Gutkin Cert., ¶ 17.
At that meeting, Shah
expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that Niehaus had
greater server access, and he complained that such a disparity was
racially motivated.
See Shah Cert., ¶ 46.
Although, pursuant to
HR policy, Gutkin asked Shah to file a formal complaint, Plaintiff
did not do so.
Gutkin Cert., ¶ 23.
Shah also met with Pietzsch on several occasions to express
his dissatisfaction that Niehaus had greater server access, and
that he was being excluded from information technology decisions.
See Shah Cert., p. 11.
According to Shah, however, based on his
conversation with management, Pietzsch had instructed Niehaus to
provide Shah with access to a certain SharePoint server, Shah never
received such access.
See id. at p. 12.
As a result, Shah claims
that he was unable to perform some of his job duties.
2
Id.
In that role, Gutkin received potential Equal Employment
Opportunity (“EEO”) complaints from NJHSP employees and forwarded
them to the state’s EEO office. Gutkin Cert., ¶ 1.
4
In February 2013, Shah met with Pietzsch to discuss Shah’s
2012 performance review.
Shah Cert., ¶ 43.
During that meeting,
Shah expressed his disagreement with certain negative comments
made on his review by management.
Id.
Pietzsch responded by
commenting that Plaintiff’s co-workers did not trust Plaintiff’s
work product, because Plaintiff was not always thorough and often
relied upon others to complete his assigned tasks. Moreover, it
was Pietzsch’s view that Plaintiff’s mistakes created added work
for his coworkers, who were called upon to correct those mistakes.
Pietzsch Cert., ¶¶ 52-53.
Despite these apparent shortfalls, on
numerous occasions, Plaintiff expressed to Pietzsch that he was
entitled to a promotion because he essentially performed the
functions of a Network Administrator 1.
Shah Cert., ¶¶ 40-41.
In June 2013, another co-worker of Shah, Kiczek, accused Shah
of misrepresenting his entries on timesheets, and in doing so,
taking unauthorized time from work.
Plaintiff met with Pietzsch
about the allegation and expressed concern that the accusation was
borne out of racial discrimination.
Shah Cert., ¶ 51.
That
concern was then reported to Gutkin, and an investigation ensued.
At the conclusion of the investigation, Gutkin drafted a memorandum
outlining his findings.
In that memorandum, Gutkin noted that
Shah had previously complained to Gutkin regarding his level of
access to servers, as well as Plaintiff’s view that the decision
to restrict access was race related.
5
Gutkin further noted that
Shah believed that the timesheet accusation was also motivated by
race.
See Gutkin Memo, p. 3.
Gutkin concluded, however, that the
timesheet incident was a misunderstanding, and Shah testified that
he was satisfied with that explanation at the time.
¶ 56.
Nonetheless, Gutkin advised Shah that he could pursue a
formal complaint against NJHSP for discrimination.
¶ 29.
Shah Cert.,
Gutkin Cert.,
In that connection, Gutkin forwarded his memorandum to the
Deputy Director of EEO.
Id.
ultimately
complaint,
file
a
formal
investigate the matter.
However, because Shah did not
the
EEO
did
not
further
Id. at ¶ 30.
Shah next claims that, in October 2013, he suffered disparate
treatment when Pietzsch changed the computer storage/closet lock,
without providing Shah with an access key.
Shah Cert., ¶ 57.
Shah
further testified that he became aware that the lock was changed
because other coworkers had accused him of committing theft.
However, no formal complaint was lodged against Shah.
Id.
According
to Shah, in order to gain access to the closet, he had to request
a key, which required him to wait a few hours at a time.
that
regard,
Shah
complained
to
Pietzsch,
Bogdan
Id.
and
In
other
administrators. NJHSP maintains that the master key to the storage
closet was made available to all employees, including Shah.
Pietzsch Cert., ¶ 48.
6
See
B.
Plaintiff’s Candidacy for Network Administrator 1 and 2
In June 2014, NJHSP posted a job opportunity for the NA 2
position.
Def. Statements, ¶ 12.
This position was for a senior
network administrator who developed, implemented, and maintained
multinetwork, multiuser Local Area Networks (LAN), Metropolitan
Area Network (MAN) and or Wide Area Network (WAN).
Id. at ¶ 13.
The NA 2 also served as an Information Security Officer, ensuring
network and data security.
Id. at ¶ 14.
Shah and Niehaus both
applied and were interviewed for the position. The interview panel
consisted
of
Pietzsch,
Bogdan
and
Joy
Vitoritt,
who
was
the
Director of Information Technology at the State New Jersey, Office
of the Attorney General, Department of Law and Public Safety.
See
Vitoritt Cert., ¶¶ 14, 27. Indeed, to provide an added perspective
on potential candidates, NJHSP routinely included interviewers
from
other
knowledge.
departments
who
possessed
the
relevant
technical
Def. Statements, ¶ 8.
The interviews consisted of asking the candidates identical
questions
regarding
Administration,
and
the
then
technical
rating
selection criteria categories.
each
aspects
candidate
Id. at ¶ 9.
of
in
Network
several
The interviewers
recommended for promotion the candidates who rated highest on the
percentage scale in the selection categories and demonstrated the
strongest competency in Network Administration.
7
Id. at ¶ 11.
The interview panel scored Shah average to below average in
a majority of the categories comprising the selection criteria for
a NA 2 position.
Id. at ¶ 20.
Each interviewer documented Shah’s
performance on a Contemporaneous Interview Report, and the final
reports were completed between one and five days from the date of
the interview. Id. As stated in her Report, Vitoritt’s assessment
was that Shah lacked the knowledge base necessary to perform the
duties of a NA 2:
[Shah] does not possess the required experience in the
development implementation and maintenance of multinetwork, multi-user LAN, MAN or WAN environment.
Examples of some basic network questions that could not
be answered were: What is ARP? What is DHCP and DNS, How
do they differ? Explain the difference between a Hub,
Switch and Router?
See Vitoritt Cert., ¶ 16.
Vitoritt further noted that Shah “did
not have the required background in networking to answer the
questions
correctly.”
Id.
at
¶
17.
Additionally,
it
was
Vitoritt’s opinion that Shah lacked the requisite experience to
perform the duties of a NA 2. Id. Pietzsch and Bogdan echoed
Vitoritt’s conclusions.
See Def. Statements, ¶¶ 23-25.
Indeed, the entire panel concluded that Shah lacked the
necessary experience and knowledge for the NA 2 position. In fact,
according to each of the interviewers, Shah acknowledged during
the interview that he was not the best candidate for the position
and Shah stated that he would like to be considered for the
8
position of NA 1, once Niehaus 3 was promoted to NA 2. 4 See Vitoritt
Cert., ¶ 18; Vitoritt’s Report dated July 11, 2014; Def. Statement,
¶ 25.
Ultimately, the panel unanimously recommended against
promoting Shah to the position of NA 2, based on Plaintiff’s
failure
to demonstrate
that
he
necessary to perform that job.
had
the
knowledge
and
skills
Rather, Niehaus was promoted to
the NA 2 position. 5
Thereafter, Shah applied for the position of NA 1 in September
2014. The position of NA 1 was subordinate to NA 2, and it required
experience in the development, implementation, and maintenance of
multi-network, multi-user LAN, MAN and/or WAN environments.
Statements, ¶ 40.
Def.
According to Defendant, when NJHSP’s secretary
compiled the resumes of individual candidates who would be given
a formal interview for the position of NA 1, it was initially
3
As noted earlier, at the time of this interview, Niehaus was
the Network Administrator 1 at the NJHSP.
4
As explained more
testimony is consistent
interview.
fully below, Plaintiff’s deposition
with his concession made during the
The interview panel unanimously scored Niehaus in the top 5%
in almost all of the categories comprising the selection criteria
for the NA 2 position, and the interviewers all indicated that he
performed exceptionally well. Def. Statements, ¶ 32. For example,
in her Contemporaneous Interview Report, Vitoritt noted that
Niehaus “demonstrated an advanced knowledge of all aspects of
network technology” and “answered all questions accurately and
completely using examples from his work experience.”
Vitoritt
Cert., ¶ 23; Vitoritt’s Report dated July 11, 2014. Vitoritt rated
Niehaus “outstanding” on NJHSP’s interview rubric. Id.
5
9
determined that Shah’s resume did not meet the minimum requirements
for the position.
Id. at ¶ 41.
Despite the apparent shortfalls
in his candidacy, management determined that Shah should be given
an interview in order to provide him with an equal opportunity to
compete.
Id. at ¶ 43; Pietzsch Cert., ¶ 30; Niehaus Cert., ¶ 19.
The interview panel consisted of Vitoritt, Pietzsch, Niehaus,
and William Kelly, the fiscal resource manager at NJHSP.
Statements, ¶ 44.
Def.
For this interview, Shah scored “average”
(middle 50%) in virtually all of the categories comprising the
selection criteria.
Id. at ¶ 45.
Like the NA 2 interview, each
of the interviewers completed a contemporaneous interview report
to document the interviewees’ performance.
the
Reports,
Shah
did
not
Administration satisfactorily.
answer
Again, according to
questions
about
Network
Vitoritt noted that Shah “does not
possess the base technical knowledge of the network equipment that
is installed within the [NJHSP] office.”
Vitoritt Cert., ¶ 30.
She further noted that Shah “justifies his failure to answer
questions about the currently installed technology by claiming he
does
not
have
access
to
the
equipment
nor
the
training
to
seamlessly transition to the Network Administrator 1 position.”
Vitoritt Report dated September 30, 2014, p.3.
Vitoritt concluded
that Shah required additional training before he could be promoted,
a conclusion with which Shah agreed.
10
See id. at p. 3.
The rest of the panel concurred with Vitoritt’s opinion.
Def. Statements, ¶¶ 49, 51-53.
See
Pietzsch explained in his Report
that Shah “does not have the experience the other candidates have.
When questioned about his resume [Shah] was unable to answer
questions about things he claimed he did.” Pietzsch’s Report dated
September 29, 2014, p. 1.
Pietzsch also commented that Shah “very
much wants to be a Network Admin, but . . . he has done nothing on
his own to improve his knowledge.
He continues to believe that he
has some entitlement to the position.”
Id. at p. 2.
Further,
Niehaus also reported that Shah was “unable to answer clearly all
of the questions/scenarios posed during the interview,” and that
his “resume claimed administration and deployment of exchange when
that [was not] the case at all.”
Niehaus Cert., ¶¶ 21-22; Niehaus
Report dated September 26, 2014, p. 1.
As a result, the panel
unanimously did not recommend Shah for promotion to NA 1, because
he lacked the requisite knowledge and skills necessary to perform
the duties of NA 1.
Id. at ¶ 55.
The panel also interviewed Eric Burd for the same position.
It was the opinion of the panel that Burd was more qualified than
all the candidates who applied.
In that regard, Burd scored in
the top 5% and top 25% in all the selection criteria.
Statements, ¶ 57.
See Def.
Burd was subsequently recommended for the
position of NA 1 by the panel.
11
However, Burd was ultimately
rejected by the Governor’s office, and the NA 1 position was
subsequently closed.
C.
Id. at ¶ 63.
Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge
In November 2014, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging
race and/or national origin discrimination based solely on NJHSP’s
failure to promote Plaintiff to the positions of NA 2 and 1.
See
Pl.’s EEOC Charge dated November 24, 2014. Plaintiff also alleged
that Defendant retaliated against him for filing an informal
complaint of discrimination with the State’s EEO.
Shah stated the following in his Charge:
I
have
been
denied
the
promotion
of
Network
Administrator 1. I applied for the position once it was
posted. I meet all the requirements. I was interviewed,
but I was not selected. The position was given to an
employee with less experience than I. I believe I was
not selected due to my race and national origin.
I
believe I have been discriminated against in violation
of Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act, as amended.
Id. at p. 1.
Shah reasoned that he was not chosen for the NA 1
position because he was denied the “equal training opportunities
and experience on the job.”
Id. at p. 2.
Furthermore, Shah went
on to allege that he was also improperly denied the promotion for
the NA 2 position.
Due
to
Id.
Plaintiff’s
EEOC
Charge,
NJHSP
investigated
Plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination and the alleged failure
to promote. NJHSP responded to Plaintiff’s Charge on January 15,
12
2015, in a six-page letter by Deputy Attorney General Steven Hahn.
Based on his investigation, Hahn concluded that Shah “simply was
not qualified to be a network administrator.
Any decision not to
hire him as a NA 2 or NA 1 was based only on his lack of technical
ability . . . .”
NJHSP Response dated January 15, 2015, p. 6.
After receiving the State’s response, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a
right to sue letter on April 13, 2015.
D.
Filing of this Suit
Plaintiff filed the instant action in May 2015.
In his
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts three causes of action: 1)
intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII based on his
race
and/or
national
origin;
2)
hostile
work
environment
in
violation of Title VII based on race; and 3) retaliation in
violation
of
Title
VII
based
on
race.
After
the
close
of
discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment on all counts.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
Summary
Judgment
is
appropriate
“if
the
pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual
dispute is genuine only if there is “a sufficient evidentiary basis
on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party,”
13
and it is material only if it has the ability to “affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher v. County of
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputes over
irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of
summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “In considering a
motion
for
credibility
summary
judgment,
determinations
or
a
district
engage
in
court
any
may
not
weighing
of
make
the
evidence; instead, the non-moving party’s evidence ‘is to be
believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.’” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.
2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255)); see also Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2002).
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden
of showing the basis for its motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “If the moving party will bear the burden of
persuasion at trial, that party must support its motion with
credible evidence . . . that would entitle it to a directed verdict
if not controverted at trial.” Id. at 331. On the other hand, if
the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving party,
the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy Rule 56’s burden
of production by either (1) “submit[ting] affirmative evidence
that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim”
14
or (2) demonstrating “that the nonmoving party’s evidence is
insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s claim.” Id. Once the movant adequately supports its motion
pursuant to Rule 56(c), the burden shifts to the nonmoving party
to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Id. at 324; see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; Ridgewood
Bd. of Ed. v. Stokley, 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999). In deciding
the merits of a party’s motion for summary judgment, the court’s
role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the
matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are
the province of the factfinder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N.
Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
There can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact”;
however,
if
a
party
fails
“to
make
a
showing
sufficient
to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. “[A] complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323; Katz
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992).
15
II.
EEOC Charge
At the outset, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to
exhaust
his
administrative
remedies
as
to
his
hostile
work
environment claim, as well as any discrimination and retaliation
claims not based on Defendant’s alleged failure to promote.
In
his opposition, Plaintiff does not offer any reason as to why he
failed to submit an EEOC charge regarding those allegations.
Indeed, Plaintiff admits that, in his EEOC Charge, he did not
allege any acts of discrimination beyond failure to promote and
retaliation for protected activity under Title VII.
Response to Def. Statements, ¶ 5.
See Pl.’s
Rather, Plaintiff argues that
he should be excused from exhaustion, because he filed informal,
internal complaints of discrimination with the State’s EEO for
incidents not alleged in his EEOC charge.
Plaintiff’s argument is
without merit.
Title VII provides strict guidelines for bringing an action
against an employer for employment discrimination, requiring that
claimants first file a timely action with the EEOC within 180 days
of any alleged discriminatory conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1).
It is only after the EEOC charge has been filed, an investigation
completed and a “right to sue letter” issued, that a claimant is
considered to have exhausted his or her administrative remedies.
Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470
(3d Cir. 2001).
16
This framework was established “to resolve discrimination
claims
administratively
through
cooperation
and
voluntary
compliance in an informal, noncoercive manner.” Id. As such, “the
aggrieved party is not permitted to bypass the administrative
process” and “the parameters of the civil action in the district
court are defined by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can
reasonably
be
expected
to
grow
out
of
the
charge
of
discrimination.” Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 263
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d
394, 398 (3d Cir. 1976)). Stated differently, a plaintiff is only
excused from exhausting his administrative remedies when “the acts
alleged in the subsequent ... suit are fairly within the scope of
the
prior
EEOC
complaint
[charging
dis
crimination],
or
the
investigation arising therefrom.” Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291,
1295 (3d Cir. 1996)(quoting Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237
(3d Cir. 1984)(per curiam)); see also Barzanty v. Verizon PA, Inc.,
361 Fed. Appx. 411, 413-14 (3d Cir. 2010)(“Before filing a lawsuit,
a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a
timely discrimination charge with the EEOC. The EEOC will then
investigate the charge, and the plaintiff must wait until the EEOC
issues a right-to-sue letter before she can initiate a private
action. The ensuing suit is limited to claims that are within the
scope of the initial administrative charge.”)(citations omitted).
17
Here, as noted above, the EEOC Charge filed by Plaintiff only
contained allegations that Defendant failed to promote Shah based
on his race and/or national origin, and that Defendant retaliated
against Shah for filing an informal complaint of discrimination
with the State’s EEO. In fact, Plaintiff clarifies in his briefing
that his discrimination claim is solely based on a theory of
failure to promote, unrelated to allegations that Defendant denied
him certain training opportunities or server access. See Pl. Opp.,
p. 19.
Instead, Plaintiff argues that the sum of Defendant’s alleged
wrongful conduct constitutes a hostile work environment, and that
he
should
be
excused
from
exhaustion
with
respect
to
those
allegations, as a result of his prior complaint to the state EEO
officer regarding the same alleged misconduct.
Plaintiff misses
the point.
Under
allegations
the
based
applicable
on
a
exhaustion
hostile
work
standard,
environment,
to
assert
either
1)
Plaintiff must have directly alleged such claims in his EEOC
Charge; or 2) Plaintiff’s hostile work allegations must reasonably
fall
within
the
scope
of
Plaintiff’s
condition is met in this case.
failed
to
include
EEOC
Charge.
Neither
First, it is clear that Plaintiff
allegations
concerning
a
hostile
work
environment in his EEOC Charge; simply making internal — and
informal — complaints do not suffice.
18
Second, the Court cannot
find that Plaintiff’s hostile work environment allegations — which
involve complaints of a disparity in access to network servers and
equipment closets — are fairly within the scope of Plaintiff’s
EEOC Charge, particularly since the Charge solely complained of
Defendant’s failure to promote.
Indeed, without making a formal EEOC charge regarding the
hostile
work
environment,
Defendant
had
no
notice
of,
or
opportunity to oppose, such a claim during the EEOC investigation.
Because the Court must limit claims to those reasonably expected
to grow out of, or those fairly within the scope of the EEOC
Charge, Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim is dismissed
for failure to exhaust.
See Rowan v. City of Bayonne, 474 Fed.
Appx. 875, 877-878 (3d Cir. 2012)(finding that because plaintiff’s
EEOC charge only addressed defendant’s failure to promote and
retaliation based on first amendment grounds, plaintiff’s hostile
work environment claim is not fairly within the scope of the EEOC
charge).
II.
Failure-to-Promote
An employee bringing a failure to promote claim under Title
VII proceeds under the burden-shifting framework established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). In
that regard, as his initial burden, the plaintiff must establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
411 U.S. at 802. In order to do so, the employee must demonstrate:
19
(1) that he was a member of a protected class; (2) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (3) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (4) that another, not in the protected class, was treated more
favorably. Id.; Fuentes v. Borough of Watchung, 286 Fed. Appx.
781, 784 (3d Cir. 2008).
Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a
prima
facie
case
of
discrimination
because
he
has
failed
to
sufficiently show that he was qualified to be promoted to the
positions of NA 1 or NA 2.
Defendant does not otherwise dispute
that Plaintiff has satisfied the remaining elements of his failure
to promote claim. 6
And, to the extent the Court concludes that a
prima facie case has been established, Defendant contends that it
has presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
Plaintiff's
rejection.
Defendant
further
maintains
that
the
Plaintiff has failed to come forth with evidence proving that the
reason was pretextual. For the reasons stated below, the Court
agrees with Defendant in all regards.
6
Although Defendant argues in passing that Plaintiff also
cannot meet the fourth element because the position of NA 1 was
never filled and ultimately closed, Defendant did in fact made an
initial decision to hire Burd, a nonmember of a protected class.
So long as Plaintiff can show that he was treated less favorably
than Burd, Plaintiff can satisfy his prima facie burden as to the
last element. See Fuentes, 286 Fed. Appx. at 784. Defendant has
not made any argument in that regard, and thus, I find for the
purposes of this motion, Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing
on this element.
20
A.
Whether Plaintiff was Qualified for Promotion
The Third Circuit Court has made clear that within the Title
VII context of assessing a prima facie case of failure to promote,
a district court must view a plaintiff's “qualifications” based on
objective criteria. See Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc.,
228 F.3d 313, 320 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating “we have held that . .
. objective job qualifications should be considered in evaluating
a plaintiff's prima facie case . . . .”)(citation omitted); Sempier
v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729 (3d Cir. 1995)(“[W]e
determine a plaintiff's qualifications for purposes of proving a
prima facie case by an objective standard.”)(citation omitted).
Thus, a plaintiff's own subjective opinion that he was qualified
for a given position is immaterial. See Kepple v. GPU Inc., 2 F.
Supp. 2d 730, 741 (W.D. Pa 1998)(“[T]he employer is entitled to
establish the job requirements and the plaintiff must offer more
than his own opinion that he is qualified”) (citing In re Carnegie
Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 293 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is unqualified for the
NA 1 and NA 2 positions because he did not have the adequate
network administration experience.
submits
that
satisfactorily
during
answer
the
In that connection, Defendant
interviews,
objective
network
Plaintiff
failed
technology
questions,
which led the panel to score Plaintiff poorly.
to
In response,
Plaintiff maintains that his qualifications are evidenced by his
21
employment
history,
performance
evaluations,
and
“Defendant[]
intentionally denying him access to [NJHSP] network and servers.”
Pl. Opp. Br., p. 23.
As a preliminary matter, while much of Plaintiff’s Opposition
focuses on how management, including Niehaus, sought to limit his
access to servers and training opportunities due to racial bias,
that alleged misconduct, however, does not relate to Plaintiff’s
objective qualifications.
Indeed, Defendant’s alleged misconduct
in precluding Plaintiff from accessing certain network servers or
training opportunities does not relate to any objective criteria
for the purposes of assessing Plaintiff’s qualifications, and
thus, bears no relevance in assessing the prima facie case for
failure to promote.
Further,
although
Plaintiff
boasts
that
his
employment
history and positive evaluations clearly establish his eligibility
for promotion to the positions of NA 1 and NA 2, those evaluations
also do not show that, objectively, Plaintiff was qualified to
perform the duties of a NA 1 or NA 2.
Stated differently,
regardless of Plaintiff’s performance as a Principal Technician
MIS, as his prima facie burden, Plaintiff must proffer sufficient
evidence that he was objectively qualified for the positions of NA
1 and NA 2, and he has not done so. See Williams v. R.H Donnelly
Corp., 368 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2004)(holding that in determining
whether a plaintiff has met his prima facie burden of demonstrating
22
that he was qualified for a position, “being ‘qualified’ refers to
the criteria the employer has specified for the positions,” and a
plaintiff’s subjective belief he is qualified will not suffice);
Visnikar v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 02-963, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3645, at *28 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2004)(“[a]s the unrefuted
evidence demonstrates that the Plaintiff simply does not meet the
objective
criterion
required
for
the
position
of
Licensed
Professional Geologist, the [court] concludes that the Plaintiff
is not ‘qualified’ and therefore has failed to establish a prima
facie case.”);
Matczak, 136 F. 3d at 938; Smith v. Twp. of E.
Greenwich, 519 F. Supp. 2d 493, 507 (D.N.J. 2007).
Tellingly, each of the panelists who interviewed Plaintiff
for the positions of NA 1 and NA 2, concluded that Plaintiff did
not
correctly
answer
network
administration
and
technical
questions. According to Vitoritt, Plaintiff could not answer basic
network inquiries.
Plaintiff
lacked
See Vitoritt Report, p. 1.
the
required
experience
in
More importantly,
the
development,
implementation and maintenance of multi-network, multi-user LAN,
MAN or WAN environments.
Id; see Notices of Vacancy NA 1 and NA
2(“experience in the development, implementation, and maintenance
of
multi-net-work,
multi-user
Local
Area
Networks
(LAN),
Metropolitan Area Networks (MAN), and/or Wide Area Networks (WAN)
environments.”).
A review of Plaintiff’s own resume reveals that
he lacked the type of experience required for both positions. See,
23
generally, Pl. Resume.
work
experience,
as
As Plaintiff indicated on his resume, his
a
Principal
Technician
MIS,
centers
on
troubleshooting server issues and providing IT support for agency
users.
Id. at p. 1.
Moreover,
while
Plaintiff
points
to
his
prior
work
experiences to show that he qualified for promotion, based on
Plaintiff’s own testimony and his resume, objectively, Plaintiff
has failed to substantiate that claim.
First — like his current
position — Plaintiff’s prior work as a Senior Tech MIS consisted
primarily of maintaining and troubleshooting networks and servers
for the New Jersey Commerce and Tourism Commission. See Pl. Resume
p. 2.
In that position, Plaintiff also assembled and installed
computer systems, workstations, and other hardware.
types
of
experience,
however,
are
not
technical requirements of NA 1 and NA 2.
Id. Those
commensurate
with
the
Likewise, Plaintiff’s
former experience at Liz Claiborne did not qualify him.
Indeed,
with respect to this prior employment, Plaintiff testified that he
lacked experience in developing networks — a necessary criterion
for both the NA 1 and NA 2 positions:
Q.
And so developed a multi network multi user
Local Area Network at Liz Claiborne?
A.
I didn’t develop it.
Q.
Did you implement –-
A.
Implemented some of the systems.
24
I troubleshooted issues.
Q.
But you don’t have experience in developing
these sort of networks?
A.
Developing a network is a total different ball
game. No, I have not developed any networks,
no.
Q.
And you also do not have experience in
developing
Metropolitan
Area
Networks,
correct?
A.
Correct.
See Pl. Dep., 182:5-19.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to present any
genuine issue of material fact that he is objectively qualified to
be promoted to the positions of NA 1 or NA 2, he cannot satisfy
his burden of establishing a prima facie case. While Summary
judgment is appropriate on this basis alone, as explained below,
Defendant had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for denying
Plaintiff the requested promotions, and more importantly, he has
failed to show that those reasons were pretextual. The Court turns
to that inquiry next.
B.
McDonnell-Douglas Burden Shifting
If the employee succeeds in establishing a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the failure to promote. Id. “The
employer
satisfies
its
burden
of
production
by
introducing
evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that
there
was
a
nondiscriminatory
25
reason
for
the
unfavorable
employment decision.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d
Cir. 1994). “The employer need not prove that the tendered reason
actually
motivated
shifting
paradigm
its
the
behavior,
ultimate
as
throughout
burden
of
this
proving
burden-
intentional
discrimination always rests with the plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis in
original). This is a “relatively light burden.” See id.
Relevant in a failure to promote case, “[a]n employer must be
granted substantial discretion to exercise subjective judgment in
the rendering of employment decisions . . . .” Johnson v. Penske
Truck Leasing Co., 949 F. Supp. 1153, 1172 (D.N.J. 1996). “Unless
there is evidence of discrimination, the court is neither permitted
to
get
involved
in
the
subjective
business
decision
of
the
employer, nor set its own employment standards for the employer.”
Jones v. Temple University, No. 12-5349, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
94253, at *28 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 10, 2014)(citing Ezold v. Wolf, Block,
Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 527 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Stated
differently, a plaintiff’s subjective comparison of qualifications
does not cast sufficient doubt on the defendant’s stated legitimate
reasons for its selection. Luta v. State of Delaware, Dept. of
HSS, 847 F. Supp. 2d 683, 691 (D. Del. 2012) (citing Bennun v.
Rutgers State University, 941 F.2d 154, 170 (3rd Cir. 1991) (“This
Court has held that more than a denial of promotion as a result of
a dispute over qualifications' must be shown to prove pretext.”)).
26
Next, once the employer meets its burden, the burden of
production shifts back to the employee who must then show that the
proffered reason is merely a pretext for actual discrimination.
See Fuentes, 286 Fed. Appx. at 784. “[T]o avoid summary judgment,
the
plaintiff's
evidence
rebutting
the
employer's
proffered
legitimate reasons must allow a factfinder reasonably to infer
that each of the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons
was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually
motivate the employment action (that is, the proffered reason is
a
pretext).”
Fuentes,
32
F.3d
at
764
(emphasis
and
internal
citations omitted).
“To discredit the employer's proffered reason, however, the
plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was wrong
or
mistaken,
since
the
factual
dispute
at
issue
is
whether
discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the
employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” Id. at 765.
Rather,
the
plaintiff
implausibilities,
“must
demonstrate
inconsistencies,
[]
weaknesses,
incoherencies,
or
contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for
its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them
‘unworthy of credence,’ and hence infer ‘that the employer did not
act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.’” Id. (emphasis
omitted). “While this standard places a difficult burden on the
plaintiff, ‘[i]t arises from an inherent tension between the goal
27
of all discrimination law and our society's commitment to free
decisionmaking by the private sector in economic affairs.’” Id.
Here, as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting
Plaintiff for both NA positions, Defendant proffers evidence that
it selected Niehaus for the position of NA 2 based on the merits
of Niehaus’ superior experience and knowledge as compared to those
of Plaintiff.
Defendant submits that it offered the position of
NA 1 to Burd for similar reasons.
According to Defendant, both
Niehaus and Burd were far more qualified than Plaintiff, and more
compellingly, based on the interviews, Plaintiff simply did not
demonstrate
that
he
was
competent
requirements of the NA positions.
in
performing
the
job
Because Defendant’s burden of
production is “light,” I find that Defendant had a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for denying Plaintiff’s request for a
promotion.
Having made that finding, the burden shifts back to
Plaintiff to demonstrate that Defendant’s stated reasons were
pretextual.
To
discredit
Defendant’s
seemingly
legitimate
reasons,
Plaintiff argues, first, that his supervisors had taken certain
actions against him that impacted his employment opportunities,
such as the denial of access to NJHSP network servers and the lack
of training.
Plaintiff goes on to provide specific details of the
types of training that he was forbidden to participate in, while
other
co-workers
were
permitted
28
to
so
participate.
Indeed,
Plaintiff’s argument boils down to that, management, including
those managers and supervisors who interviewed him, subjected
Plaintiff to a pattern of discriminatory conduct that ultimately
impacted his chances of being promoted.
In addition, Plaintiff
also accuses the interviewers of harboring racial animus that
resulted
in
performance.
their
negative
evaluation
of
his
interview
While Plaintiff asserts that all of the employment
issues that arose during his time at NJHSP were presumably based
on race and/or national origin, his argument in this regard is
belied by his own testimony; in the end, Plaintiff simply has
proffered little evidence that Defendant’s decision to reject his
candidacy for promotion was racially motivated, such that he has
demonstrated some inconsistencies or implausibilities to discredit
Defendant’s legitimate reasons.
The Court need look no further than Plaintiff’s own words to
sum up the lack of evidence of discrimination in this case.
the issue of access:
Q.
Why do you believe that your restriction of
access was due to your race or national
origin?
A.
What else could it be? I’ve been doing every
single thing that I would ask for, if not more
than what I was asked for. And despite that,
my level of access was restricted based off my
race.
Q.
And why do you believe it was based upon your
race?
29
On
A.
Because there is no other factual basis.
I
always did my job duties as I was asked of, or
if not, I’ve gone over and above and beyond,
whether it was during business hours or after
hours.
Pl. Dep., 35:1-14. When asked why Plaintiff believed that Pietzsch
discriminated against him, Plaintiff answered that it was his
opinion that unfavorable employment decisions made against him by
Pietzsch were due to Plaintiff’s race; however, other than citing
to those very decisions with which Plaintiff disagreed, Plaintiff
was
unable
to
proffer
discriminatory intent.
any
other
evidence
to
demonstrate
a
See id. at 40:19-41:25.
For example, on the issue of mistrust of Plaintiff among
management, including Pietzsch, Plaintiff stated the following:
A.
. . . [T]here has been many times stated to me
by Charles Pietzsch himself that there is a
trust issue between me and the rest of the
group.
Q.
And what is that trust issue?
A.
You can ask him. I’ve been at [NJHSP] for 10
years. I’ve done my job honestly. I’ve gone
over and beyond. Besides my IT duties, I have
functioned many other things . . . .
Q.
Is the trust issue connected to your race or
national origin?
A.
. . . I think it’s definitely connected to my
race because what else could there be? I’ve
been there for 10 years, and why would
somebody keep repeatedly bring it to me saying
that there’s a trust issue? If it’s not a race,
then what else is it?
30
Id.
at
23:24-24:21.
Indeed,
without
any
concrete
evidence,
Plaintiff insists that race was the only reason why his coworkers
him. 7
mistrusted
However,
at
the
summary
judgment
stage,
Plaintiff’s own testimony is insufficient to demonstrate that
Defendant’s
stated
reasons
for
denying
Plaintiff’s
promotion
requests were pretextual.
Without delving into all of the details regarding certain
acts that Plaintiff perceived to be discriminatory, none of those
acts
are
probative
inconsistencies,
in
demonstrating
incoherencies,
or
“implausibilities,
contradictions
in
the
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of
credence.’”
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.
Simply put, the relevant
inquiry here is whether Defendant’s stated reason — that Plaintiff
was unqualified for the NA positions and that Niehaus and Burd
were more qualified — was implausible.
And, on that issue,
Plaintiff’s case falls short.
In sum, outside of his own, subjective beliefs, Plaintiff
fails
to
Plaintiff
adduce
a
evidence
promotion
was
that
Defendant’s
motivated
7
by
decision
race,
rather
to
deny
than
a
Tellingly, while it is Plaintiff’s position that he did raise
his bias concerns to the EEO Officer, Gutkin, Plaintiff never took
the step of formally filing a complaint against management for its
alleged acts of discrimination, even when prompted to do so by
Gutkin.
31
determination that Plaintiff was unqualified to perform the job
duties of a NA 1 or NA 2.
Plaintiff thus lacks the requisite
evidence of pretext to defeat summary judgment.
See Jones v. Sch.
Dist., 198 F.3d 403, 414 (3d Cir. 1999)(affirming summary judgment
for insufficient evidence of pretext where plaintiff's allegations
were based solely on his beliefs and no record evidence); Pineda
v. Phila. Media Holdings LLC, 542 F. Supp. 2d 419 (E.D. Pa.
2008)(finding that summary judgment cannot be defeated simply
based on plaintiff’s own subject belief of discrimination); James
v. Allentown Bus. Sch., No. 01-857, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12046,
at *41 n.14 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2003)(finding that plaintiff cannot
survive summary judgment based on his own deposition testimony
alone); Player v. Motiva Enters. LLC, No. 02-3216, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2288, at *40 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2006)(same); Lawrence v. Univ.
of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 163 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir.
1999)(“It is well-settled in employment discrimination cases that
the plaintiff's subject belief that he has been discriminate
against is insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination
and does not allow the plaintiff to survive summary judgment.”);
Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Company, 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.
1996)(affirming summary judgment on sexual discrimination claim
where plaintiff produced no “specific, substantial evidence of
pretext” to rebut defendant’s explanations for termination and
relied primarily on her subject beliefs as to her competence);
32
Fadia v. New Horizon Hosp., 743 F. Supp. 2d 158, 168 (W.D.N.Y.
2010)(“[T]he Plaintiff's subject belief that he was discriminated
against is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact.”); Kloss
v. Ball State Univ., No. 06-0833, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85790, at
*23 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 19, 2007)(“A plaintiff's [subjective] belief
that she is the victim of unlawful discrimination does not raise
a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial.”).
Even taking as true Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegations
that the discriminatory environment at NJHSP shows that the NJHSPaffiliated interviewers did in fact harbor racial animus towards
Plaintiff, the fact remains that Vitoritt, a non-NJHSP-affiliated
and impartial
against
promoting
Plaintiff, due to Plaintiff’s lack of qualifications.
As noted
earlier,
interviewer,
pursuant
to
also
NJHSP’s
recommended
standard
practice,
Vitoritt
was
brought in as an outside interviewer to ensure the integrity of
the
process.
impartial,
Plaintiff
or
that
she
does
not
possessed
dispute
the
that
technical
adequately assess candidates for the NA positions.
Vitoritt
knowledge
was
to
Significantly,
Vitoritt clearly opined that Plaintiff was not qualified for either
NA position.
Indeed, as I have set forth in detail above, Vitoritt
concluded that Plaintiff did not possess the basic network and
technological
skills
to
succeed
as
a
Network
Administrator.
Rather, Vitoritt, like the rest of the panel, found, based on
objective and subjective criteria, that Niehaus and Burd were more
33
qualified for the positions of NA 2 and NA 1, respectively. 8
Plaintiff has not shown — or even alleged — that Vitoritt’s
opinions were somehow tainted by discriminatory means.
Accordingly, for all these reasons, no reasonable jury could
find that Defendant’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons for not
promoting
Plaintiff
were
pretexual.
Summary
judgment
is,
therefore, granted on Plaintiff’s failure to promote claim under
Title VII.
III. Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title
VII, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) [he] engaged in a protected
activity under Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse action
against [him]; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
employee's participation in the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.” Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch.,
Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2008).
Here, on his claim of retaliation, Plaintiff argues that
“[b]ut
for
[P]laintiff’s
complaint
to
Defendant
about
the
hinderance to perform his employment duties it is arguable whether
8
Plaintiff argues that because his experience exceeded those
of
Niehaus
and
Burd,
Defendant’s
hiring
decisions
were
discriminatory.
Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit.
As I have
already
stated,
Plaintiff’s
own
subjective
comparison
of
qualifications does not cast sufficient doubt on Defendant’s
stated legitimate reasons for its selections. Luta, 847 F. Supp.
2d at 691; Bennun, 941 F.2d at 170.
34
[NJHSP] would have stepped up the hostility to grant his access to
the
network
and
opportunities.”
servers
and
ultimately
Pl. Opp. Br., p. 33.
deny
promotional
In a conclusory fashion —
without citing evidence or making any legal arguments — Plaintiff
asserts that “[t]here is no other causation between the protected
activity and the retaliatory conduct that [culminated] in the
denial of promotional opportunities for Plaintiff.”
Id.
At the outset, I note that to the extent that Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim is premised on adverse employment actions other
than the alleged failure to promote, those allegations cannot be
the bases for retaliation, because, as I have already explained,
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on
those bases.
here,
is
Rather, the only adverse employment action relevant
the
allegation
that
Defendant
retaliated
Plaintiff by denying him employment advancements.
against
But, on that
issue, for the same reasons that Plaintiff has failed to establish
discriminatory animus for his failure to promote claim, Plaintiff
has failed to show that there is a causal link between the denials
of promotions and his protected activity of submitting his informal
complaints
to
Gutkin.
Accordingly,
summary
judgment
is
appropriate with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, as
well.
35
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed.
Dated: March 29, 2018
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Hon. Freda L. Wolfson
United States District Judge
36
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?