PLACE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 16

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Brian R. Martinotti on 1/25/2017. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
:
JEANNETTE PLACE,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civil Action No. 15-4084-BRM
:
v.
:
:
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, acting
:
Commissioner of Social Security,
:
OPINION
:
Defendant.
:
____________________________________:
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court is an appeal filed by Plaintiff Jeannette Place (“Plaintiff”) from the final
decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Carolyn W. Covlin (“Defendant”),
denying Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security
Act. After reviewing the Administrative Record, and for the reasons discussed below, the decision
of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is AFFIRMED.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.

Procedural History

On November 15, 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”), under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) 1, alleging disability beginning
January 1, 2001 due to hip pain and dystonia (the “DIB Application”). (See Transcript (“Tr.”) at
14, 117-24.) Plaintiff’s DIB Application was initially denied on May 17, 2012. (Tr. 14, 70-72.)

1

Title II of the Act appears in the United States Code as §§ 401-433, subchapter II, chapter 7, Title
42.
1

Reconsideration of Plaintiff’s DIB application was also denied, on November 1, 2012. (Tr. 14, 7678.) On December 13, 2012, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.929 et seq., Plaintiff filed a written
request for a hearing before an ALJ. (Tr. 14, 79.)
On October 29, 2013, a hearing was held before ALJ Dennis O’Leary in Newark, New
Jersey. (Tr. 14, 25-48.) Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, John Forte, Esq., appeared and
testified at the hearing. (Id.) In a decision dated January 14, 2014, the ALJ determined Plaintiff
was not disabled. (Tr. 14-19.) Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision.
(Tr. 8.) On May 1, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr. 1-6.)
Plaintiff then filed this civil action seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s January 14, 2014 decision.
B.

Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on July 17, 1960, and was 40 years old at the alleged onset of her
disability. (Tr. 30.) Plaintiff has a Bachelor’s degree. (Id.) She worked at Verizon for sixteen (16)
years, until 1999 when she took an early retirement buyout package. (Id.) Plaintiff’s last position
at Verizon was executive director. (Id.) Based on Plaintiff’s earnings records, she acquired
sufficient quarters of coverage to remain insured through December 31, 2006 (the “date last
insured”). (Tr. 14.)
Plaintiff’s alleged disability results from a hip injury and dystonia, together with resulting
pain in her hip, leg and lower back. (Tr. 17, 159.) In an April 18, 2012 Function Report, Plaintiff
reported spending her day washing, dressing, making the bed, doing computer work, feeding the
dog, making phone calls, doing physical therapy, grocery shopping, cooking dinner, reading, and
watching TV. (Tr. 17, 169-73.) Plaintiff also reported caring for her elderly mother. (Tr. 17, 169.)
At the hearing before the ALJ, however, Plaintiff testified she performs these tasks “slowly” due
to pain. (Tr. 17, 38-41.) During the hearing, Plaintiff also testified her condition has progressively

2

worsened. (Tr. 17.) She conceded performing a wide range of daily activities and routine tasks like
laundry and housework prior to her date last insured, but did so at a reduced level. (Id.) Plaintiff
also stated she was able to drive, run errands, prepare meals for her sons, grocery shop, and
otherwise function, but did so with pain and some difficulty. (Id.) Plaintiff also conceded her
condition has severely worsened, to the point where she now takes heavy pain medication that she
was not taking in 2006. (Id.)
C.

Review of Medical Evidence From the Relevant Time Periods 2
i.

1998-2001 Medical Evidence

Plaintiff began experiencing back and leg pain following a total colectomy in March 1998.
(Tr. 830.) Plaintiff initially sought treatment for pain in her right hip and lower lumbar region at
Kaiser Permanente in late 2000. (Tr. 463.) A November 2000 MRI of the lumbar spine revealed
mild degenerative disc disease at L4-5 and a tiny central disc bulge at L5-S1. (Id.) Plaintiff was
prescribed a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory (“NSAID”) and several pain agents. (Id.) A whole
body scan was performed in March 2001, showing mild focal abnormalities from the right greater
trochanter likely due to trochanteric bursitis. (Id.) Plaintiff’s primary care physician also referred
her for a neurological evaluation. (Id.)
Plaintiff saw David Lipps, M.D., for an initial neurology consultation on April 20, 2001.
(Tr. 463.) Dr. Lipps’ report, dated May 1, 2001, indicates that, since starting medication, Plaintiff’s
back and hip pain was largely resolved; she no longer had numbness or weakness in her right leg;

2

As Plaintiff concedes, “to qualify for [Social Security disability benefits], one must be both
disabled and insured for benefits. The last date that [Plaintiff] meets these requirements is . . .
December 31, 2006. Therefore, to qualify for benefits her disability must have begun on, or before
this date.” (ECF No. 12 at n.1 (citations omitted).) In his decision, the ALJ likewise found
Plaintiff’s date last insured was December 31, 2006. (Tr. 14, 16.) As Plaintiff does not appeal this
finding, the Court will only review the record for evidence of Plaintiff’s medical condition on or
before December 31, 2006.
3

and she had no difficulty walking. (Id.) On examination, Plaintiff had full lumbar range of motion;
normal strength; negative straight leg raising test; normal gait and stance; intact sensation and
reflexes; and no tremor, atrophy, or fasciculations. (Tr. 464.) Dr. Lipps’ impression was Plaintiff
had a history of right sciatica with right hip pain, noting imaging evidence of mild degenerative
disc disease in the lumbar spine and radiologic evidence of trochanteric bursitis on the right. (Id.)
However, Dr. Lipps also noted Plaintiff’s symptoms were currently resolved and there was no
evidence of radiculopathy, peripheral neuropathy, or myelopathy. (Id.) Dr. Lipps recommended
Plaintiff follow-up with her primary care physician for further care. (Id.)
On July 9, 2001, Plaintiff was evaluated by Thomas Krisztinicz, M.D., an orthopedic
surgeon, for pain and numbness in her right buttock, leg, and foot that she reported experiencing
since 1997. (Tr. 451.) Dr. Krisztinicz assessed Plaintiff with sciatica and recommended an epidural
steroid injection, which he administered on July 23, 2001. (Tr. 449-51.)
On August 29, 2001, Plaintiff was evaluated by Cathy Russo, M.D., a pain management
specialist. (Tr. 443.) Dr. Russo’s examination of Plaintiff was consistent with L5 radiculopathy
and noted myofascial pain but no obvious trigger points. (Tr. 445.) Dr. Russo recommended
Plaintiff continue with epidural steroid injections and prescribed Nortriptyline to assist with sleep.
(Id.)
On October 17, 2001, Plaintiff began seeing a physical therapist, Kim H. Moy, for low
back and right hip pain. (Tr. 437.) An examination revealed Plaintiff had a mild antalgic gait, pain
at end range of flexion in the lumbar spine, pain in the bilateral hips with internal rotation, positive
straight leg raising and Faber’s sign on the right. (Tr. 438.) The examination also revealed Plaintiff
had normal lumbar range of motion, 5/5 strength throughout, and intact sensation and reflexes.
(Tr. 437-38.) Plaintiff was started on a physical therapy and home exercise program. (Tr. 438.)

4

Plaintiff continued to attend physical therapy on an intermittent basis through September 2003.
(Tr. 339, 345, 349, 352, 359-64, 366, 373-76, 399-414, 435-36.)
On November 28, 2001, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Lipps for ongoing right hip and leg pain.
(Tr. 432.) Dr. Lipps’ examination revealed Plaintiff had pain with hip range of motion and
tenderness over the region of the piriformis muscle, but noted full lumbar range of motion, negative
straight leg raising test, normal strength in her upper and lower extremities, normal gait, and no
neurological abnormalities. (Tr. 433.) Dr. Lipps assessed Plaintiff with right sciatica secondary to
piriformis syndrome and referred her for a series of piriformis injections. (Id.)
Plaintiff underwent the piriformis injection on December 18, 2001, which provided partial
relief, but caused some itching. (Tr. 430.)
ii.

2002 Medical Evidence

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Lipps for a follow-up on February 5, 2002. (Tr. 427.) Plaintiff
reported partial, but not 100%, relief from the piriformis injection and stated that chiropractic
treatment and home exercise had helped significantly. (Id.) Plaintiff stated she continued to
experience a pinching pain in her right hip and leg while sitting, but denied weakness or numbness
in the legs, back or radicular pains. (Id.) Dr. Lipps’ examination revealed normal gait, full back
and hip range of motion, 5/5 strength bilaterally, and no evidence of atrophy. (Id.) Plaintiff was
referred for an EMG to confirm the absence of damage to her sciatic nerve. (Id.) The results of the
EMG were normal. (Tr. 425.)
On April 15, 2002, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dominique Vinh, M.D., an orthopedist, for
further evaluation of her sciatica. (Tr. 419.) Dr. Vinh assessed Plaintiff with right greater
trochanteric bursitis. After noting Plaintiff’s chiropractor was “actually employing [physical
therapy] techniques for strengthening,” Dr. Vinh re-referred Plaintiff to physical therapy with

5

specific goals for her treatment. (Tr. 419-20.) Plaintiff experienced some relief with physical
therapy. (Tr. 399-402, 411-14.)
On October 3, 2002, Plaintiff was evaluated by Sidney G. Chetta, M.D., an orthopedic
surgeon, for right shoulder pain. (Tr. 394.) An examination revealed decreased range of motion in
the neck with external rotation to less than 45 degrees bilaterally; tenderness to palpation at the
sternoclavicular joint; acromioclavicular joint and clavicle; and mild instability. (Id.) Dr. Chetta
discussed Plaintiff’s right shoulder pain with her, noting that her “injury [was] certainly not
violent” and ruled out rotator cuff, impingement syndrome, and instability with secondary
impingement. (Id.)
iii.

2003 Medical Evidence

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Vinh in February 2003 with complaints of ongoing tightness in her
right piriformis muscle that was being treated with chiropractic intervention. (Tr. 387.) Dr. Vinh
assessed Plaintiff with right piriformis spasm and pelvic floor weakness and prescribed Vioxx, a
type of NSAID. (Id.) After a follow-up appointment in May 2003, Dr. Vinh added Neurontin to
Plaintiff’s medication regimen. (Tr. 370.)
Plaintiff presented to physical therapy on May 5, 2003, reporting 80%-90% improvement
in her hip pain since receiving a right hip injection in April 2003. (Tr. 373.) Plaintiff reported
walking more frequently, and was advised to slowly progress with her exercise program. (Tr. 374.)
On September 9, 2003, Plaintiff was seen by Leigh S. Boldt, M.D., a board certified
internist, for fatigue that lasted all day and hair loss. (Tr. 346.) Dr. Boldt diagnosed generalized
fatigue with hair loss, history of right hip/buttock pain radiating down the right leg status post
injections of the piriformis region, and status post injections with corticosteroids. (Tr. 347-48.)

6

iv.

2004 Medical Evidence

Plaintiff saw Dr. Vinh for a repeat examination in May 2004. (Tr. 319.) Dr. Vinh referred
Plaintiff for radiographic imaging of her lumbar, thoracic, and cervical spine, which showed no
more than minimal degenerative disc disease and mild central canal stenosis with ventral cord
impingement at C4-5 and C5-6. (Tr. 315.) Plaintiff returned to Dr. Vinh on June 8, 2004. (Id.) Dr.
Vinh diagnosed right piriformis spasms, pelvic floor weakness, and mild cervical cord
impingement on MRI. (Id.) Dr. Vinh recommended repeat para-sciatic injections and physical
therapy. (Tr. 315-16.)
On June 10, 2004, Plaintiff had a follow-up appointment with Dr. Lipps. (Tr. 314.) Plaintiff
demonstrated full back range of motion, negative straight leg raising, 5/5 strength in her upper and
lower extremities, and normal gait. (Id.) Dr. Lipps assessed Plaintiff with chronic sciatica and
increased her dosage of Neurontin. (Id.) Plaintiff did not seek any further treatment for her sciatica
until December 3, 2004, when she returned to Dr. Lipps reporting the increased Neurontin helped
with the pain, but not the stiffness and aches in her right hip. (Tr. 303.) Plaintiff indicated she was
doing cross-training daily, but her pain increased when performing these activities. (Id.) Dr. Lipps
again increased Plaintiff’s dose of Neurontin and also prescribed Flexeril to her medication
regimen. (Id.)
v.

2005 Medical Evidence

On February 23, 2005, Plaintiff was evaluated by Spencer Tseng, M.D., a physical
medicine and rehabilitative specialist, for sciatica and groin pain that was aggravated by
movement. (Tr. 295.) An examination revealed mild tenderness to palpation in the back, soft scars
from prior surgeries in the abdomen with mild tenderness to palpation on the right, and tenderness
to palpation of the gluteus region, greater trochanter, and inguinal region as well as adductors. (Tr.

7

296.) Dr. Tseng assessed Plaintiff with pain and advised her to continue her home exercise
program. (Id.)
On May 27, 2005, Plaintiff saw rheumatologist Margaret Fisher, M.D., for chronic right
hip/buttock pain. (Tr. 289.) Dr. Fisher’s examination noted tenderness in Plaintiff’s right buttock,
greater trochanteric bursa, and the medial fat pad of the right knee. (Tr. 290.) Dr. Fisher assessed
Plaintiff with myofascial leg pain, and recommended she try swimming and maximizing her dose
of Neurontin. (Id.)
On November 3, 2005, Plaintiff saw Dr. Boldt for a follow-up for poor sleep secondary to
pain in the right hip and buttock. (Tr. 287.) An examination revealed pulling and tightness with
flexion at the right hip. (Tr. 288.)
On December 5, 2005, Plaintiff was evaluated by Greg Morgan, M.D., a neurologist, for
insomnia. (Tr. 271.) Dr. Morgan diagnosed sleep-maintenance insomnia, likely caused by chronic
right hip and leg pain, and prescribed Amitriptyline, an anti-depressant. (Tr. 272.)
vi.

2006 Medical Evidence

On February 6, 2006, Plaintiff presented to John Ergener, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, for
back and right buttock/leg pain. (Tr. 259.) Plaintiff reported difficulty walking for more than ten
(10) minutes and rated her pain as 6/10, which flared with activity. (Id.) On examination, Plaintiff
had positive Faber’s sign on the right, but normal gait, negative straight leg raising, intact
sensation, and 5/5 strength. (Id.) Dr. Ergener assessed Plaintiff with sciatica. (Id.)
Plaintiff also returned to Dr. Lipps for a repeat evaluation in February 2006. (Tr. 256.)
Plaintiff had a normal neurological examination without evidence of lumbar radiculopathy or
neuropathy. (Id.) Dr. Lipps recommended that Plaintiff re-start chiropractic treatment. (Id.)

8

On May 24, 2006, Plaintiff was evaluated by Greg Fischer, M.D., due to persistent pain.
(Tr. 239.) An examination revealed tenderness over the right greater trochanteric bursa and L5-S1
facet joints. (Tr. 240.) Dr. Fischer diagnosed lumbar spondylosis, and administered a right L5-S1
facet block, a right L4-5 facet block, and right greater trochanteric bursa injections. (Tr. 239-41.)
On June 9, 2006, Plaintiff was evaluated by pain management specialist Arthur Bergh,
M.D. (Tr. 233.) An examination revealed tenderness over the right posterior superior iliac spine
(PSIS) and mild tenderness in the left PSIS. (Tr. 234.) Dr. Bergh administered a right
transforaminal epidural steroid injection. (Id.)
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Lipps on June 23, 2006, reporting increased pain and only partial
relief from the epidural steroid injection. (Tr. 230-31.) An examination revealed tenderness to
palpation in the right lumbar L4-5 facets and right hip piriformis pain with extension and hip
rotation, and an antalgic gait on the right. (Tr. 231.) Dr. Lipps again increased Plaintiff’s dose of
Neurontin and continued Flexeril. (Tr. 230.)
On June 27, 2006, Dr. Bergh administered a right lumbar paravertebral facet joint block.
(Tr. 226-28.) Plaintiff reported continued improvement with the injections. (Id.)
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved to New Jersey and began treating with Michael
Rudman, M.D., a pain management physician. (Tr. 830.) Plaintiff presented to Dr. Rudman on
November 14, 2006, for back, buttock, and right leg pain. (Id.) During an initial evaluation,
Plaintiff rated her sciatica and right hip/leg pain as 4-5/10 (mild-to-moderate pain), and
demonstrated non-antalgic gait and no gross motor or sensory deficits. (Tr. 831.) Dr. Rudman
assessed Plaintiff with right low back pain and right leg radicular symptoms, possibly consistent
with nerve root irritation or compression. (Id.) Dr. Rudman prescribed a pool therapy regimen and
referred Plaintiff for a repeat lumbar MRI. (Id.)

9

A December 2, 2006 MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine was normal except for minimal
lumbar degenerative changes, very minimal bulging of the annulus fibroses at multiple levels, and
facet joint hypertrophy. (Tr. 629-30, 831.) A follow-up examination with Dr. Rudman, on
December 5, 2006, revealed tenderness of the midline bilaterally in the paraspinous muscles and
decreased range of motion in flexion, but normal gait, full strength throughout, no neurological
abnormalities, and full painless range of motion in her lower extremities. (Tr. 826-27.) Dr. Rudman
diagnosed unspecified thoracic/lumbar neuritis/radiculitis, hypothyroidism, and osteoarthrosis,
and prescribed Plaintiff Flexeril, Neurontin, and Skelaxin. (Tr. 827.) On December 7, 2006, Dr.
Rudman administered a right L5 and right L5 2-level lumbar transforaminal epidural steroid
injection. (Tr. 815-16.)
Plaintiff continued to treat with Dr. Rudman throughout 2007 and 2008. (Tr. 750-822.)
During that time, she participated in physical therapy and pool therapy, and received several
injections which generally improved her symptoms. (Tr. 791, 798, 801, 807-18.) On January 9,
2007, Plaintiff stated her right leg symptoms had improved for one (1) week following a
transforaminal injection. (Tr. 822.) Dr. Rudman added Cymbalta to Plaintiff’s medication regimen
and continued physical therapy. (Tr. 823.) On March 16, 2007, Plaintiff stated she had some
improvement following a sacroiliac (“SI”) joint injection. (Tr. 818.) She also reported
improvement with Cymbalta. (Id.) After a follow-up examination, Dr. Rudman diagnosed lumbar
radiculitis and neuritis, and right sacroiliitis, and continued Plaintiff on Cymbalta. (Id.) On April
3, 2007, Dr. Rudman administered a paravertebral injection at the L5 level. (Tr. 812-13.)
D.

Review of Disability Reports
i.

Dr. Rudman

On November 17, 2011, Dr. Rudman completed a multiple impairment questionnaire for
Plaintiff. (Tr. 593.) Dr. Rudman described treating Plaintiff “monthly-quarterly” since November
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2006 and estimated Plaintiff could sit less than twenty (20) minutes and stand and/or walk up to
one (1) hour in an eight (8) hour workday, but had to change positions “very often” or “every 1015 minutes.” (Tr. 593, 595.) Dr. Rudman also estimated Plaintiff could lift and carry up to ten (10)
pounds occasionally, and opined she had “significant limitations in doing repetitive, reaching,
handling, fingering [and] lifting” as well as moderate limitations (i.e., “significantly limited but
not completely precluded”) using her upper extremities. (Tr. 596-97.) Dr. Rudman indicated that
Plaintiff’s symptoms would increase if she were placed in a competitive work environment, as
Plaintiff could not keep her neck in a constant position and her pain constantly interfered with
concentration and attention, although he noted Plaintiff could tolerate moderate stress. (Tr. 59798.) Dr. Rudman concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments rendered her totally disabled beginning in
October 2006. 3 Thereafter, on February 14, 2013, Dr. Rudman wrote a letter “To Whom It May
Concern” describing Plaintiff’s treatment history and opining that Plaintiff had been permanently
disabled “since her initial presentation in 2000.” (Tr. 750-51.)
ii.

Dr. Alexianu

Marie Alexianu, M.D., completed a neuromuscular disorders impairment questionnaire for
Plaintiff on January 10, 2012. (Tr. 601.) Dr. Alexianu described treating Plaintiff “about every 23 months” since her first treatment on September 17, 2010, and most recently on September 26,
2011. (Id.) Dr. Alexianu opined that Plaintiff could sit and stand/walk for less than one (1) hour in
an eight (8) hour workday, having to change positions every ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes, and
was unable to lift or carry any weight. (Tr. 603-04.) Dr. Alexianu further opined that Plaintiff had

3

Both the questionnaire and relevant medical records indicate Plaintiff began treating with Dr.
Rudman in November 2006. Nevertheless, Dr. Rudman states “the earliest date that the description
of symptoms and limitations in this questionnaire applies” is “my first [appointment] 10/06”. (Tr.
599.)
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marked limitations (i.e., she was “essentially precluded” from) reaching, fingering and handling,
could not perform postural maneuvers, and should avoid wetness, noise, fumes, gases, temperature
extremes, humidity, dust, and heights. (Tr. 607.) Dr. Alexianu opined Plaintiff’s symptoms and
limitations began in “2000.” (Id.)
E.

Review of Disability Determinations
i.

State Agency Physicians (Drs. Rizwan and Golish)

On May 4, 2012, Mohammed Rizwan, M.D., a state agency physician, reviewed the
medical evidence in connection with Plaintiff’s DIB Application. (Tr. 53-56.) Dr. Rizwan opined
that Plaintiff had a severe spine disorder, but found “[t]here is insufficient evidence to evaluate the
claim.” (Tr. 54-55.) Based on his review of the medical evidence, Dr. Rizwan determined Plaintiff
was “not disabled.” (Tr. 55.)
In connection with Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, on August 24, 2012, a second
state agency physician, Melvin Golish, M.D., reviewed Plaintiff’s medical history, which included
updated medical evidence from the relevant period. (Tr. 58-67.) Based on his review, Dr. Golish
opined Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform the full range of light work and concluded she
was “not disabled.” (Tr. 64-66.)
F.

Review of Testimonial Record
1.

Plaintiff's Testimony

At the October 29, 2013 hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified she stopped working as
an executive director for Verizon in 1999 “because [she] was having medical problems and could
not keep up [her] job.” (Tr. 30.) In 2003, Plaintiff attempted to return to work as a consultant, but
was unable to “make any kind of work commitments” because she was not “able to keep up that
kind of work sitting at a computer.” (Tr. 31-33.) Plaintiff was also employed part-time at a travel

12

agency in 2010, but only “did it for six months, [and] with a lot of pain” so she had to stop. (Tr.
33.)
Plaintiff described a history of “acute” low back and hip pain, and spasms in her right thigh
beginning in the early 2000s. (Tr. 36, 41-42.) She also described experiencing neck pain, eye
twitching, and a facial tic, beginning in 2002. (Tr. 37.) Around that time, Plaintiff “noticed that
[she] couldn’t type or drive [or do] anything with [her] hands forward without” her hands going
numb. (Id.) Plaintiff testified she “would have to stop doing whatever I’m doing especially
computer, but now even chopping vegetables, talking on the phone . . . my ability to write, type,
basically use my right arm, I would get interrupted after about 10/15 minutes of doing any one
thing so I could not continue to do things with my right arm.” (Id.) Plaintiff described experiencing
a “shooting pain in [her] neck and then numbness down . . . into [her] hand.” (Tr. 38.) As a result,
Plaintiff testified she cannot reach or carry any weight, and is forced to rely on “other people”. (Tr.
40-41.)
G.

The ALJ’s Findings

In a decision dated January 16, 2014, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements of the Act, and would continue to meet them through December 31, 2006. (Tr. 14.)
After reviewing the record and applying the relevant law, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not under a
disability, within the meaning of the Act, from January 1, 2001 through the date last insured. (Id.)
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ applied the standard five-step evaluation process to determine
if Plaintiff satisfied her burden of establishing disability. 4
At step one, the ALJ determined (i) Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the
Act on December 31, 2006, and (ii) Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity during

4

See Part III, infra.
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the period from her alleged onset date of January 1, 2001 through the date last insured of December
31, 2006. (Tr. 16.)
At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s sciatica was a severe impairment “because it is
a medically determinable impairment that significantly limits [her] mental and physical abilities
to do one or more basic work activities.” (Tr. 16.) The ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s “impairment has
lasted at a ‘severe’ level for a continuous period of more than 12 months.” (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ determined that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff did not have
an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of
the listed impairments included in the Impairment List. (Tr. 16.) The ALJ explained, “[t]he medical
evidence does not establish the requisite evidence of nerve root compression, spinal arachnoiditis
or lumbar spinal stenosis as required under listing 1.04” of the Impairment List. (Id.) The ALJ
further noted that “there is no evidence that [Plaintiff’s] back disorder has resulted in an inability
to ambulate effectively, as defined in 1.00(B)(2)(b).” (Id.)
At step four, the ALJ found that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full range of light work, as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b). (Tr. 17.) In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ “considered all symptoms and the
extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective
medical evidence and other evidence,” as well as the opinion evidence in the record. (Id.) In
considering Plaintiff’s symptoms, the ALJ followed a two-step process. The ALJ first determined
whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) – i.e., an
impairment(s) that can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques – that could reasonably be expected to produce Plaintiff’s pain or other symptoms. (Id.)
Second, finding an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) had been shown, the ALJ

14

evaluated the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Plaintiff’s symptoms to determine the
extent to which they limit the claimant’s functioning. (Id.) As the ALJ explained in his decision,
“[f]or this purpose, whenever statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting
effects of pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by objective medical evidence, the [ALJ]
must make a finding on the credibility of the statements based on a consideration of the entire case
record.” (Id.)
In his decision, the ALJ noted Plaintiff alleges disability due to a hip injury, hip pain, and
dystonia. (Tr. 17 (citing Exhibit 1E).) The ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s function report(s), in which
she reported spending her day washing, dressing, making the bed, doing computer work, feeding
the dog, making phone calls, doing physical therapy, grocery shopping, cooking dinner, reading,
watching TV, and helping her elderly mother. (Id. (citing Exhibit 5E).) He noted, however,
Plaintiff “reported that she does [these] things slowly.” (Id.) The ALJ’s decision explains that, at
the hearing, Plaintiff testified she worked at Verizon as an Executive Director until she took an
early retirement buyout package in 2000. She also testified that her condition has progressively
worsened. Specifically, Plaintiff testified she was, in fact, able to do routine tasks like laundry and
housework prior to her date last insured, but she did so at a reduced level. Plaintiff testified she
was able to drive, run errands, prepare meals for her sons, grocery shop, and otherwise function,
but did all this with some pain and difficulty. Plaintiff also conceded her condition has severely
worsened, to the point she now takes heavy pain medication that she was not taking in 2006. (Id.)
After considering the medical evidence and Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing, the ALJ
found Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff]’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

15

limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in [his]
decision.” (Tr. 17.)
Specifically, in terms of Plaintiff’s alleged disabling conditions, the ALJ found “the
objective medical evidence fails to support [Plaintiff]’s allegations of complete disability.” (Tr.
17.) The ALJ “note[d] that [Plaintiff]’s date last insured is December 31, 2006 and therefore she
must establish a disabling condition prior to this date.” (Id.) However, the ALJ found “[t]he record
contains only minimal evidence prior to her date last insured of December 31, 2006.” (Id.) The
ALJ noted Plaintiff’s testimony that she was receiving treatment prior to her date last insured
through her HMO of Kaiser Permanente, and that “[t]he records from Kaiser Permanente do note
that she received sciatic nerve blocks in 2003 and then facet joint injections for her lumbar
spondylosis in May of 2006. She reported her pain was only 5/10.” (Tr. 18 (citing Exhibit 1F).)
The ALJ also discussed Dr. Rudman’s treatment notes from November 2006, which “noted that
[Plaintiff] had full but painful range of motion and nerve blocks were noted to provide minimal
relief.” (Id.) In addition, “[c]hiropractic care was noted to improve [Plaintiff’s] walking and
Prednisone was also noted to help. She reported her pain as 4-5/10.” (Id. (citing Exhibits 18F, 21F
and 23F).) Finally, the ALJ explained “X-rays and an MRI were performed on her lumbar spine
in December of 2006 and revealed an intact lumbar spine with only minimal degenerative changes.
No stenosis or herniations were found.” (Id. (citing Exhibit 11F).)
Based on the evidence, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s condition was totally disabling prior
to her date last insured of December 2006. Rather, the ALJ found “[o]bjective imaging failed to
confirm any more than minimal degenerative changes and [Plaintiff] testified that she was able to
perform many activities of daily living, albeit at a slower pace and with some pain.” (Id.) “As for
the opinion evidence, although her treating physicians opined that her condition prohibited her

16

from performing even sedentary work, these assessments were all made well after [Plaintiff]’s date
last insured of 2006.” (Id.) Specifically, “Dr. Rudman opined that her condition was debilitating
but he did not begin treating [Plaintiff] until November of 2006 and his notes at that time failed to
show any limitations which would preclude the claimant from performing sedentary work.
Likewise, the assessments by Drs. Shariati and Alexianu are also made in 2012 and 2013 are [sic]
well after the claimant’s date last insured.” (Id. (citing Exhibit 9F).) Accordingly, the ALJ
“afford[ed] these assessments no weight.” (Id.) Rather, the ALJ found that, “[a]lthough
[Plaintiff]’s condition may have progressed, there is no evidence prior to December of 2006 to
support an assessment that she cannot perform light work.” (Id.) In reaching this conclusion, the
ALJ specifically “note[d] that the State agency physicians opined that [Plaintiff] was capable of
performing light work and [the ALJ] concur[ed] with their findings.” (Id. (citing Exhibits 2A and
4A).)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,

a district court “shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security,
with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Matthews v. Apfel,
239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001). The Commissioner’s decisions regarding questions of fact are
deemed conclusive on a reviewing court if supported by “substantial evidence in the record.” 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); see Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). While the court must examine
the record in its entirety for purposes of determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978), the
standard is highly deferential. Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004). Indeed,

17

“substantial evidence” is defined as “more than a mere scintilla,” but less than a preponderance.
McCrea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004). “It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427
(3d Cir. 1999). A reviewing court is not “empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its
conclusions for those of the fact-finder.” Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 924 (1993). Accordingly, even if there is contrary evidence in the record
that would justify the opposite conclusion, the Commissioner’s decision will be upheld if it is
supported by the evidence. See Simmonds v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 54, 58 (3d Cir. 1986).
Disability insurance benefits may not be paid under the Act unless Plaintiff first meets the
statutory insured status requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(c). Plaintiff must also demonstrate the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A);
see Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427. An individual is not disabled unless “his physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work
but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Eligibility for supplemental security income requires the same showing of disability. Id. at § 1382c
(a)(3)(A)-(B).
The Act establishes a five-step sequential process for evaluation by the ALJ to determine
whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the ALJ determines whether
the claimant has shown that he or she is not currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” Id.
at § 404.1520(a); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 n.5 (1987). If a claimant is presently

18

engaged in any form of substantial gainful activity, he or she is automatically denied disability
benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140.
Second, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has demonstrated a “severe impairment”
or “combination of impairments” that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); see Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n.5. Basic work activities
are defined as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b).
These activities include physical functions such as “walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing,
pulling, reaching, carrying or handling.” Id. A claimant who does not have a severe impairment is
not considered disabled. Id. at § 404.1520(c); see Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428.
Third, if the impairment is found to be severe, the ALJ then determines whether the
impairment meets or is equal to the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 (the
“Impairment List”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates that his or her
impairments are equal in severity to, or meet those on the Impairment List, the claimant has
satisfied his or her burden of proof and is automatically entitled to benefits. See id. at §
404.1520(d); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n.5. If the specific impairment is not listed, the
ALJ will consider in his or her decision the impairment that most closely satisfies those listed for
purposes of deciding whether the impairment is medically equivalent. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a).
If there is more than one impairment, the ALJ then must consider whether the combination of
impairments is equal to any listed impairment. Id. An impairment or combination of impairments
is basically equivalent to a listed impairment if there are medical findings equal in severity to all
the criteria for the one most similar. Williams, 970 F.2d at 1186.
If the claimant is not conclusively disabled under the criteria set forth in the Impairment
List, step three is not satisfied, and the claimant must prove at step four whether he or she retains

19

the RFC to perform his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); Bowen, 482 U.S. at
141. If the claimant is able to perform previous work, the claimant is determined to not be disabled.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141-42. The claimant bears the burden
of demonstrating an inability to return to the past relevant work. Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428.
Finally, if it is determined the claimant is no longer able to perform his or her previous
work, the burden of production then shifts to the Commissioner to show, at step five, that the
“claimant is able to perform work available in the national economy.” Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47
n.5; Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. This step requires the ALJ to consider the claimant’s residual
functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). The ALJ
must analyze the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in determining whether the
claimant is capable of performing work and not disabled. Id.
III.

DECISION
Plaintiff raises two arguments on appeal. First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in his decision

by failing to properly weigh the medical opinion evidence. (See ECF No. 12 at 24.) Second,
Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s credibility. (Id. at 31.) The Court
will address both arguments in turn.
A. Whether the ALJ Failed to Properly Weigh the Medical Opinion Evidence
In making a disability determination, the ALJ must consider all evidence before him. See
e.g. Plummer, 186 F.3d at 433; Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1986). Although the ALJ
may weigh the credibility of the evidence, he must give some indication of the evidence which he
rejects and his reasons for discounting such evidence. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220
F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981). In Burnett, the
Third Circuit held that the ALJ had not properly decided an evidentiary issue because he “fail[ed]

20

to consider and explain his reasons for discounting all of the pertinent evidence before him in
making his residual functional capacity determination.” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121. “In the absence
of such an indication, the reviewing court cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not
credited or simply ignored.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705. Consequently, an ALJ’s failure to note if
evidence that contradicts his findings was considered, or to explain why such information was not
credited, are grounds for a remand. Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 435
(3d Cir. 1999). However, this rule does not require an ALJ to explicitly discuss every piece of
relevant evidence in his decision. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001). For
example, an ALJ may be entitled to overlook evidence that is neither pertinent, relevant, nor
particularly probative. Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2008); Hur v.
Barnhart, 94 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004).
Additionally, when the record presents inconsistencies with a physician’s ultimate opinion
or where the physician’s notes actually undermine his own opinion, an ALJ may appropriately
discount the physician’s opinion. See Burke v. Comm’r of Social Security, 317 F. App’x 240, 24344 (3d Cir. 2009). Although the ALJ must not “reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong
reason, [he] may choose whom to credit when considering conflicting evidence.” Kerdman v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 607 F. App’x 141, 144 (3d Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). A reviewing
court “may not re-weigh the evidence.” Id. Thus, even if there is contrary evidence in the record
that would justify the opposite conclusion, the ALJ’s decision will be upheld if it is supported by
substantial evidence. See Simmonds, 807 F.2d at 58.
In his decision, the ALJ afforded “no weight” to the assessments of Drs. Rudman, Shariati
and Alexianu because “these assessments were all made well after the [Plaintiff]’s date last insured
of 2006. (Tr. 18.) In reaching this determination, the Court finds the ALJ provided reasonable

21

justifications to discount these opinions. Specifically, the ALJ noted that, although “Dr. Rudman
opined that her condition was debilitating[,] he did not begin treating [Plaintiff] until November
of 2006 and his notes at that time failed to show any limitations which would preclude [Plaintiff]
from performing sedentary work.” (Tr. 18 (citing Exhibit 9F).) Similarly, the ALJ found “the
assessments by Drs. Shariati and Alexianu are also made in 2012 and 2013[,] well after [Plaintiff]’s
date last insured.” (Id.) After noting “there is no evidence prior to December of 2006 to support an
assessment that [Plaintiff] cannot perform light work,” the ALJ “afford[ed] these assessments no
weight.” (Id.) As the ALJ explained, “the State agency physicians opined that [Plaintiff] was
capable of performing light work and [he] concur[ed] with their findings.” (Id. (citing Exhibits 2A
and 4A).)
Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues “the ALJ erred by finding the opinions from the treating
specialists were not entitled to any probative weight because they are retrospective in nature.”
(ECF No. 12 at 26.) Plaintiff further contends the opinions from Drs. Rudman and Alexianu are
consistent with evidence that pre-dates Plaintiff’s date last insured and the ALJ made “no more
than a conclusory finding that the[se] opinions . . . are inconsistent with unspecified findings in
the treatment notes from prior to the date last insured.” (Id. at 27 (citing Tr. 18).) According to
Plaintiff, “[t]his requires remand as in order to reject a treating source’s opinion entirely, the ALJ
must base his rejection on contradictory medical evidence, and ‘not due to his or her own
credibility judgments, speculation or lay opinion.’” (Id. (citing Morales, 225 F.3d at 317-18).)
Essentially, Plaintiff argues the opinions from Drs. Rudman and Alexianu are based on appropriate
clinical and diagnostic testing, are uncontradicted by other substantial evidence in the record, and
should have been given controlling weight. (Id. at 30.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that, even if the
ALJ did not err by refusing to give controlling weight to the opinions from the treating specialists,

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the “ALJ failed to comprehensively consider any of the factors enumerated in the Regulations . . .
before assigning the treating source opinions no weight.” (Id. at 31.)
In opposition, the Commissioner argues the ALJ appropriately afforded no weight to the
extreme opinions rendered by Drs. Rudman and Alexianu more than four (4) years after the
relevant period. (ECF No. 13 at 12-13.) With respect to Dr. Rudman’s November 2011 opinion,
the Commissioner argues “it was made well after Plaintiff’s insured status expired and [his]
treatment of Plaintiff prior to her date last insured does not include significant objective findings
that would support a conclusion that Plaintiff had a physical impairment as of December 31, 2006.”
(Id. at 13 (citing Tr. 18).) The Commissioner also contends “the ALJ appropriately found Dr.
Alexianu’s extreme opinion unpersuasive because it was rendered in 2012, more than five years
after Plaintiff’s date last insured” and, “as the ALJ noted, there is no evidence prior to December
31, 2006 to support an assessment that [Plaintiff] cannot perform light work. (Id. at 14.) In short,
the Commissioner argues “the medical evidence demonstrated that Plaintiff was not as limited as
suggested by Dr. Rudman and Dr. Alexianu” and “the ALJ sufficiently articulated his reasoning
based on the substantial evidence contained in the record.” (Id. at 15-16.) The Court agrees.
“Although treating and examining physician opinions often deserve more weight than the
opinions of doctors who review records, ‘[t]he law is clear . . . that the opinion of a treating
physician does not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity.’” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 197 n.2 (3d Cir.
2011)). As such, the ALJ is authorized to give minimal weight to treating physician opinions that
are internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other evidence in the record, as well as opinions
that are conclusory or unsupported by medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see Jones v.
Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). In determining the appropriate weight to give a treating

23

physician’s opinion, an ALJ weighs the opinion against several factors, including treatment
relationship, the doctor’s specialty, the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and
the decree to which an opinion is supported by relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(4)
and (d). Because the ALJ need not undertake an exhaustive discussion of the record, Knepp v.
Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000), as long as the ALJ articulates his reasoning and bases it in
the evidence, a written analysis of every piece of evidence in the record is not required. Phillips v.
Barnhart, 91 F. App’x 775, 779 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004). The ALJ did so here and, accordingly, the
Court defers to the ALJ’s decision to afford “no weight” to the opinions of Drs. Rudman and
Alexianu.
Specifically, the ALJ explained Dr. Rudman’s November 2011 opinion was made well
after Plaintiff’s insured status expired and he did not even begin treating Plaintiff until November
2006, one (1) month prior to her date last insured. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i) (identifying
length of treatment relationship and frequency of examination as relevant factors when weighing
opinion evidence). In his decision, the ALJ found Dr. Rudman’s notes from November and
December 2006 failed to show any limitations which would preclude Plaintiff from performing
light work. (Tr. 18.) Specifically, Dr. Rudman’s treatment records show Plaintiff rated her pain as
mild-to-moderate, and had normal gait, full strength throughout, no neurological abnormalities,
and full painless range of motion in her lower extremities. (Tr. 826-27, 831.) Likewise, a repeat
lumbar MRI from December 2006 showed only minimal degenerative changes. (Tr. 629-30.) The
ALJ was within his discretion to determine these findings do no support Dr. Rudman’s subsequent
November 2011 opinion that Plaintiff’s physical impairments would have rendered her unable to

24

work as of December 31, 2006. 5 See Matullo v. Bowen, 926 F.2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
that, in order to be entitled to DIB, a claimant must show she was disabled prior to the date on
which her insured status expired); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (providing for greater weight where
an opinion is supported by relevant evidence such as medical signs and laboratory findings).
The ALJ also found Dr. Alexianu’s opinion unpersuasive, in part, because it was rendered
in 2012, more than five (5) years after Plaintiff’s date last insured, and because Dr. Alexianu did
not begin treating plaintiff until September 2012, nearly four (4) years after the relevant period.
As the ALJ noted, there was no evidence prior to December 31, 2006 to support Dr. Alexianu’s
opinion that Plaintiff cannot perform light work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (directing the
ALJ to give more weight to an opinion, the more consistent it is with the record as a whole). Here,
the ALJ reviewed the treatment notes from Kaiser Permanente, over a five (5) year period from
2001 to 2006, and found they demonstrated Plaintiff generally had normal gait, negative straight
leg raising, full strength throughout, and no neurological abnormalities, and continued to report
partial relief of symptoms with treatment. (See Tr. 225, 233, 256, 259, 296, 314, 373, 427, 430,
433, 437-38, 464.) The ALJ also noted diagnostic testing failed to produce objective findings to
support Dr. Alexianu’s assessment. The Court finds the ALJ had sufficient basis, and sufficiently
explained his decision, to afford no weight to these opinions. See, e.g., Welch v. Heckler, 808 F.2d
264, 270 (3d Cir. 1986) (explaining that a claimant need not be pain-free or experiencing no
discomfort to be found not disabled).

5

The ALJ was also within his discretion to find Dr. Rudman’s treatment notes from 2007 and 2008
do not document that her impairment significantly worsened. (See Tr. 750-822.) To the contrary,
even after Plaintiff’s insured status expired, throughout 2007 and 2008, she continued to report
increased activity and had unremarkable physical examinations. (Id. at 791, 809-10, 817-18.)
25

Likewise, the Court finds the ALJ was not bound to accept the opinions of Plaintiff’s
treating physicians and was within his discretion to assign significant weight to the state agency
physicians’ opinions. See Chandler v. Comm. of Social Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding “the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional
capacity” and “State agent opinions merit significant consideration as well”).
In sum, the Court finds the ALJ sufficiently explained his reasons for giving “no weight”
to the opinions of Drs. Rudman and Alexianu, and his decision to do so is supported by substantial
evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(ii); Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 557 (3d Cir.
2005). The ALJ’s decision detailed Plaintiff’s medical history and the opinions of both Plaintiff’s
treating physicians and the state agency physicians. The ALJ explained that he gave “no weight”
to the opinions of Drs. Rudman, Shariati and Alexianu because they were all made well after
Plaintiff’s date last insured of 2006, and “there is no evidence prior to December of 2006 to support
an assessment that she cannot perform light work.” (Tr. 18) In doing so, the ALJ clearly considered
and evaluated the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians even though they purported to make
the ultimate disability determination, which is reserved to the Commissioner. The ALJ properly
evaluated the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians and had substantial evidence to “afford
these assessments no weight” and instead rely on the opinions of the State agency physicians that
Plaintiff was capable of performing light work. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1185 (3d Cir.
1992).

26

B. Whether the ALJ Failed to Properly Evaluate Plaintiff’s Credibility
It is the ALJ’s responsibility “to determine the extent to which a claimant is accurately
stating the degree of pain or the extent to which he or she is disabled by it.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181
F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). A claimant’s “allegations of subjective symptoms must be supported
by objective medical evidence.” Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 354 F. App’x 613, 618 (3d Cir.
2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b)). Here, the ALJ evaluated the record, analyzed the
credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective allegations of pain and weakness in light of the entire record,
and proffered reasonable justifications for his findings on credibility.
However, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred because he “failed to give appropriate
consideration to the record as a whole before finding [Plaintiff]’s allegations were ‘not entirely
credible.’” (ECF No. 12 at 33.) Plaintiff argues “the ALJ cannot substitute his own interpretation
of the medical findings for the medical experts” and improperly made a credibility determination
based solely on the basis of objective medical evidence. (Id.) Plaintiff contends the “ALJ cited no
authority that her level of care conflicts with her statements about her conditions.” (Id. at 33-34
(citing Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008).) According to Plaintiff, “the Third
Circuit has downplayed the significance of minimal daily activities as evidence that can refute
credible medical evidence of disability” and, thus, the ALJ should not have found Plaintiff’s
allegations inconsistent with evidence that she can perform some, unspecified activities of daily
living. (Id. at 34 (citing Frankenfield v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 405, 408 (3d Cir. 1988).) Plaintiff
contends “[t]here is no evidence in the present record that [Plaintiff] ever engaged in significant
daily activities that contradict any of her statements regarding her limitations.” (Id.) Finally,
Plaintiff argues her “honorable work history with sustained earnings every year for over 20 years

27

prior to her disability” compels a finding that she is entitled to “substantial credibility.” (Id. at 3435 (citing Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1979).)
In response, the Commissioner argues the ALJ’s credibility assessment is supported by
substantial evidence and he followed the appropriate two-step process to arrive at his decision. The
Commissioner argues the ALJ correctly found the objective medical evidence failed to support
Plaintiff’s allegations of complete disability prior to December 31, 2006 and the ALJ’s credibility
determination should be entitled to great deference. Once again, the Court agrees.
It is the ALJ’s responsibility “to determine the extent to which a claimant is accurately
stating the degree of pain or the extent to which he or she is disabled by it.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181
F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, “[i]n addition to objective medical facts and expert medical
opinions, the [ALJ] must consider the claimant’s subjective evidence of pain and disability, as
corroborated by family and neighbors; and all of these factors must be viewed against the
applicant’s age, educational background and work experience.” Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376,
381 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974)). A claimant’s
“allegations of subjective symptoms must be supported by objective medical evidence.” Bailey v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 354 F. App’x 613, 618 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b)). As
such, “the ALJ may reject [subjective complaints of pain] when they are inconsistent with
objective medical evidence in the record.” Morel v. Colvin, Civ. No. 14-2934 (ES), 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 44347, at *11 (D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2016) (citing Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d
Cir. 1985)).
Courts will “ordinarily defer to an ALJ’s credibility determination because he or she has
the opportunity at a hearing to assess a witness’s demeanor.” Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376,
380 (3d Cir. 2003). “The substantial evidence standard entitles an ALJ to considerable deference,

28

especially in credibility findings.” Volage v. Astrue, No. 11-cv-4413, 2012 WL 4742373, at *7
(D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2012). “An ALJ is required to consider the claimant’s subjective complaints, but
may reject these complaints when they are inconsistent with the objective medical evidence,
claimant’s own testimony, or other evidence in the record.” Id.; see also Thomas v. Astrue, No.
10-cv-6205, 2012 WL 1067690, at *4-*5 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012).
Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility determination. In arriving at his
determination, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible. (Tr. 17.) Specifically, the ALJ found
the objective medical evidence failed to support Plaintiff’s allegations of complete disability prior
to December 31, 2006, explaining the record contains minimal evidence prior to her date last
insured and noting the treatment Plaintiff received was routine, consisting of NSAID medication,
physical therapy and home exercise programs, and injections. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)(vi) (treatment history is an important indicator about the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s
symptoms). The ALJ was within his discretion to find Plaintiff’s treatment record prior to her date
last insured belies Plaintiff’s allegations that her symptoms prevented her from working.
The ALJ was also within his discretion to find Plaintiff’s subjective complaints not credible
because she continued to carry out a wide range of daily activities, albeit with some difficulty. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (stating that the Commissioner will consider a claimant’s daily
activities when assessing credibility). As the ALJ noted in his decision, Plaintiff testified that, prior
to her date last insured, she remained able to perform a wide range of routine tasks, and had
previously reported, in an April 18, 2012 Function Report-Adult, spending her days actually
performing routine tasks such as: laundry and housework; driving an automobile; running errands;

29

preparing meals; grocery shopping; performing laundry and household chores; working on the
computer; caring for her pets; and doing physical therapy. (Tr. 17-18, 38-50, 169-73.)
Finally, while an ALJ may afford a claimant “substantial credibility” due to a lengthy work
history, Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1979), contrary to Plaintiff’s
contention, “work history alone is not dispositive” of credibility. Sanborn v. Colvin, No. 13-cv224, 2014 WL 3900878, at *1 n.1 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 11, 2014), aff’d, 2015 WL 3452872 (3d Cir. June
1, 2015) (citation omitted). Indeed, the Third Circuit has held “an ALJ is not required to equate a
long work history with enhanced credibility.” Sanborn, 2015 WL 3452872, at *3 (citing Fargnoli
v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001)). Here, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s work
history as one of many factors in determining Plaintiff’s credibility and, ultimately found that it
did not outweigh the other factors he reviewed. Newcomer v. Comm’s of Social Sec., 2015 WL
1780205 (W.D.Pa. Apr. 20, 2015) (affirming ALJ’s credibility determination where the ALJ
acknowledged claimant’s work history). The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s statements were not
entirely credible is supported by the medical and non-medical evidence in the record, and the ALJ
properly restricted Plaintiff to a full range of light work. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1
(“The [RFC] assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result from an
individual’s medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, including the
impact of any related symptoms.”); Welch, 808 F.2d at 270 (stating that an individual is not
required to be without pain or discomfort to be found not disabled).
In sum, the ALJ properly weighed and evaluated the medical and opinion evidence in the
record and his decision is supported by substantial evidence. This Court declines to re-weigh that
evidence. See Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding, on

30

appeal, a district court cannot re-weight the evidence but must affirm if the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence). Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. An appropriate Order

will follow.

Date: January 25, 2017

/s/ Brian R. Martinotti___________
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

31