SHAIKH v. JACKSON TOWNSHIP et al

Filing 161

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying Plaintiff's 151 Motion to Reinstate the Case Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 8/26/2020. (jmh)

Case 3:15-cv-04106-PGS-DEA Document 161 Filed 08/26/20 Page 1 of 8 PageID: 3177

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ZIA SHAIKH,
Civil Action No.:
3:1 5-cv-041 06-PGS-DEA

Plaintiff
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
v.

JACKSON TOWNSHIP, ET AL.,

Defendants.

SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
Presently before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Zia Shaikh’ s (“Plaintiff’) Motion to Reinstate
the Case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). (ECF No. 151). Plaintiff, who is under the erroneous
impression that his case was previously dismissed based on the Rooker-Feidman doctrine, argues
that pursuant to a recently decided Third Circuit case, this Court incorrectly applied the Rooker
Feldman doctrine, and therefore his case should be reinstated. Oral argument was held on July 15,
2020. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs motion is denied in its entirety.
I.
By way of background, this action arises out of a marital dispute between Plaintiff and his
ex-wife, co-defendant Laura Germadnig-Shaikh [hereinafter “Germadnig-Shaikh”], which was
adjudicated in New Jersey Superior Court [hereinafter the “family court matter”].
On or about September 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Divorce against
Germadnig-Shaikh in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Ocean County, Family Part.
Zabarsky Summ. J. Statement of Material Facts (SOMF)
1

¶

(See

1, ECF No. 98-2). Over the next two

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years, Plaintiff failed to pay court-ordered family support payments and otherwise failed to comply
with state court orders related to the divorce proceedings. (Id.

¶ 2).

On or about June 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Federal Complaint against Germadnig-Shaikh,
her parents, and two of her friends (collectively, the “Germadnig Defendants”); the law firm of
Citta, Holzapfel & Zabarsky, as well as Kimberly Zabarsky’ (the “Zabarsky Defendants”); Jackson
Township, the Jackson Township Police Department, and various township police officers (the
“Jackson Township Defendants”); Cathleen Christie-Coneeny, Esq., who represented Germadnig
Shaikh at one point in the family court matter; and a number of actors and entities who were
involved or mentioned in the underlying family court matter in some fashion (collectively, “the
Defendants”). (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged twelve separate claims, including false imprisonment, abuse
of process, R.I.C.O. claims, and various constitutional violations. (See Compl.

¶ 79-2 10).

The

thrust of Plaintiff’s allegations was that the Defendants acted in concert to have him falsely arrested
for domestic violence, to deprive him of his children, to extort monies from him for child and
spousal support, and to otherwise prejudice him in the family court matter. (See generally Id.).
Around the same time of the filing of his Federal Complaint, Plaintiff filed a nearly
identical civil action in Ocean County Superior Court, Law Division, against virtually the same
defendants and alleged similar claims2. (Zabarsky Summ. J. SOMF ¶ 4).
Between 2014 and 2016, the Ocean County Court issued numerous Orders and Opinions
in the family court matter, most of which were adverse to Plaintiff. (See Exs. A, C, E, F, G, J, M,
N to Zabarsky Summ J. Br.).

1
2

Kimberly Zabarsky is the wife of Defendant Steven A. Zabarsky, Esq. (Compl.
Ocean County divorce case and related civil case were consolidated.
2

¶ 9).

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II.
After Plaintiff filed his Federal Complaint, Defendants filed various dispositive motions.
In sum, Defendants argued that the allegations in the Complaint were meritless and simply a
retaliatory action against Plaintiff’s wife, his wife’s attorney, and other actors involved in the
original family court matter.
On November 9, 2016, this Court ruled on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims and issued an
oral opinion from the bench. (See generally Hr’g Tr. Nov. 9, 2016, ECF No. 160). Generally, this
Court found that Plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts to plead his numerous causes of
action3. (See generally id.). The Court did not rely on or even mention the Rooker-Feidman
doctrine in its ruling. (Id.).
As such, this Court issued an Order on November 15, 2016 which, inter alia, granted the
Zabarsky Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; granted the Germadnig Defendants’
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granted the Jackson Township Defendants’ Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings; dismissed all causes of action against Defendant Christie; denied
Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Strike Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; and dismissed Plaintiffs
Complaint. (Order, ECF No. 141). Then, on December 21, 2016, this Court denied Plaintiffs
motion to amend his Complaint and directed the Clerk to close the case. (Order, ECF No. 148).
Plaintiff did not appeal either Order. Instead, approximately three years later, Plaintiff filed
the instant motion to reinstate the case.

On the discrete issue of the revocation of Plaintiffs passport pertaining to the family court matter,
this Court abstained from deciding that issue based on the Colorado River abstention doctrine.
(Hr.’g Tr. 20:6-25; 21-1-3).
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III.
The crux of Plaintiff’s arguments in his present motion is that this Court incorrectly applied
the Rooker-Feidman doctrine during the dispositive motions stage because (1) Plaintiff was a
“winner” in the state court domestic violence matter, and (2) he is not seeking to overturn or appeal
a state court decision. (Pl.’s Moving Br.

¶J 9, 10, ECF No. 151). Plaintiff relies principally on a

recently decided Third Circuit case, Maihan v. Sec ‘y United States Dep ‘t of State, 938 F.3d 453
(3d Cir. 2019), which he alleges “opens the door for [him] to reopen his case” under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b). (Pl.’s Reply Br.

¶ 7, ECF No. 154).

Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that he is not seeking alimony, child support, child custody, or
divorce; nor is he requesting that this Court act as a “super-appeal” court. (Pl.’s Moving Br.

¶ 6).

Rather, Plaintiff states that he filed the instant motion “strictly for monetary damages for harm and
damage done to him by state court actors acting in concert with private actors.” (Id.). Plaintiff
also requests that this Court enter a stay of execution for the duration of these proceedings4.
Iv.

Because Plaintiff is pro se, the Court construes Plaintiff’s motion liberally. See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Higgs v. AG of the United States, 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir.
2011). Accordingly, based on the briefing papers, Plaintiff’s motion appears to seek relief under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) and (6).
Rule 60(b) states that “on motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for several reasons, including “newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to

‘

Only the Zabarsky Defendants have responded to Plaintiff’s motion. Counsel for the other
defendants no longer represent their clients; or the defendants have elected not to respond to
Plaintiffs motion. (See ECF Nos. 153, 156, 158).
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move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);” and for “any other reason that justifies relief,” the catchall
provision. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) and (6).
A motion filed under Rule 60(b) “is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court
guided by accepted legal principles applied in light of all the relevant circumstances.” Tischio v.
Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 511, 533 (D.N.J. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The remedy provided by Rule 60(b) is “extraordinary, and special circumstances must justify
granting relief under it.” Tischio, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 533 (quoting Moolenaar v. Government of
Virgin Islands, 822 F.2d 1342, 1346 (3d Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005).

Generally, “a motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(c)(1). If, however, a party claims that new evidence has been discovered, as is the case
here, a motion must be made “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the
date of the proceeding.” Id.
V.
In this case, the Maihan decision is immaterial to the present case, and Plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances that would justify reopening the case. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s motion must be denied.
A. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Motion
At the outset, Plaintiff’s motion, which was filed on December 9, 2019, was untimely filed.
As indicated, a motion under Rule 60(b) must be made “within a reasonable time;”
however, when a party claims that new evidence has been discovered, the motion must be made
no more than one year after the entry ofjudgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

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In this case, the Order adjudicating the dispositive motions and dismissing Plaintiffs
Complaint was entered on November 15, 2016, while the Order denying Plaintiffs motion to
amend his complaint was entered shortly after, on December 21, 2016. Thus, Plaintiffs instant
motion was filed well after the one-year time frame based on his “newly discovered” evidence
theory, as required by Rule 60(c). Similarly, his motion was not filed within a “reasonable time”
because, as further explained below, the Third Circuit’s deciding of the Maihan case is not a
satisfactory reason to justify Plaintiff waiting three years to file his motion to reinstate the case.
Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to appeal the above-mentioned Orders within the time frame
allotted by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (requiring that
when one appeals a civil case, “the notice of appeal.

.

.

must be filed with the district clerk within

30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.”).
Nevertheless, due to Plaintiffs pro se status, he may have been unfamiliar with the court
rules and filing deadlines. As such, the Court will address the merits of Plaintiffs arguments.
B. Maihan and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
As indicated, Plaintiffs motion and the arguments therein are based primarily on Maihan,
a recent Third Circuit decision. 938 F.3d 453. Plaintiff claims that Maihan constitutes “newly
discovered evidence” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2), which, he claims, supports his assertion that
his Federal Complaint was unjustly dismissed. (Pl.’s Reply Br.

¶

1). Yet, the advent of new case

law long after a decision has been rendered does not fall within the parameters of Rule 60(b)(2).
See Bohus v. Beloff 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 1991)) (setting forth the requirements of Rule
60(b)(2)).
In Maihan, which was a case that arose out of a family law dispute in New Jersey state
court, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs federal complaint after ruling that it lacked

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jurisdiction to hear the case under the Rooker-Feidman doctrine; and, to the extent that it had
jurisdiction, declined to exercise it under the Younger abstention doctrine. Maihan, 938 F.3d at
455-56. The Third Circuit, however, reversed in part the district court’s ruling and held that the
district court did, in fact, possess federal question jurisdiction despite the district court’s invocation
of the Rooker-Feidman doctrine and Younger abstention doctrine. Id. at 45 8-65. Therefore, the
Maihan court’s decision relied primarily on the correct interpretation and application of both
doctrines. Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s reliance on Maihan is seriously misguided because it rests on the
erroneous premise that this Court previously held that the Rooker-Feidman doctrine applied in this
case. However, when deciding the parties’ dispositive motions in November 2016, this Court
adjudicated Plaintiffs causes of actions on the merits; notably, neither the Court nor the parties
even mentioned the Rooker-Feidman doctrine during oral argument, and the doctrine was not
mentioned in the subsequent Orders that were entered. (See generally Hr’g Tr.). Unlike the district
court in Maihan, this Court exercised its federal question jurisdiction, addressed directly
Plaintiff’s causes of actions, and dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint on the merits.
As such, Maihan is wholly irrelevant to and factually distinguishable from this case and
cannot possibly be deemed new evidence or a legitimate reason to justify reopening the case. Even
if the Malhan decision had some bearing on this case, there is no evidence to suggest that Malhan
was meant to be applied retroactively to future cases such as the present one. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs motion to reinstate the case is denied in its entirety.
ORDER

This matter, having come before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Reinstate Case (ECF
No. 151), and the Court having carefully reviewed and taken into consideration the submissions

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of the parties, as well as the arguments and exhibits therein presented, and for good cause shown,
and for all of the foregoing reasons,
IT IS on this

‘24

day of August, 2020,

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate Case (ECF No. 151) is DENIED.

PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.

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