COLEMAN v. SNOWDEN et al
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 4/25/2016. (eaj)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
WILLIAM COLEMAN,
Civil Action No. 15-4270 (FLW)
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GEORGE H. SNOWDEN, et al.,
Defendants.
In the instant civil action, Plaintiff alleges that his federal constitutional rights were
violated when he was not brought before a magistrate judge within 72 hours of his arrest by
members of the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office on October 20, 2014. (ECF No. 1-2,
Complaint appended to Notice of Removal.) Plaintiff initially filed this action in state court
against the City Long Branch Police Department, George H. Snowden, and the Monmouth
County Prosecutor’s Office. 1 (Id. at 8.) After removing the action to federal court and filing its
Answer, Defendant City of Long Branch Police Department (Hereafter “City of Long Branch
Police Department” or “Defendant”) filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Plaintiff has not submitted a response to the motion. 2 For the
1
After removal, the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office and George H. Snowden (the
“Prosecutor Defendants”) sought and received several extensions of time within which to file
their answer or move for dismissal. The Prosecutor Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss
the Complaint on October 13, 2015 (ECF No. 11), and Plaintiff has not submitted a response to
that motion. The Court will address the Prosecutor Defendants’ motion separately.
2
The Court has conducted a search of the Monmouth County Correctional Institution (“MCCI”)
Inmate Search database, available at http://inmates.mcsonj.org/inmatesearch.php, and the
database indicates that Plaintiff is currently housed at MCCI.
1
reasons explained in this Memorandum Opinion, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings is granted.
The Court begins by noting that the photocopy of Plaintiff’s state court Complaint in this
removal action is barely legible, but the one paragraph Complaint appears to state in pertinent
part as follows:
On October 20, 2014, I was rearrested by Monmouth County
Prosecutor’s Officers on charges [illegible]. I was not brought to
my first appearance (29 charges) after these complaints was [sic]
filed after 72 hours for the 29 charges of indictable offense, which
is a violation of the Constitution of the United States Right (Civil
Rights) Due Process Rights[,] 14th Amendments, 5th Amendments,
6th Amendment Rights. On this date of October 28, 2014, I would
like to see fairness and justice to be served in the court [illegible]. 3
(ECF No. 1-2, Complaint at 7.)
As noted above, Defendant removed the action from state court on June 24, 2015, and
filed its Answer on the same day. (ECF Nos. 1-2.) Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss
the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), arguing that it had no involvement in the alleged
violation(s), i.e., the failure to bring Plaintiff before a magistrate judge within 72 hours of his
arrest. (ECF No. 10-1, Moving Br. at 1.) In order to establish its non-involvement, Defendant
has attached the certification of City of Long Branch Police Director Jason Roebuck, along with
a number of exhibits, and has invited the Court to convert the motion to a motion for summary
judgment, if necessary. (See id., certification of Jason Roebuck at 10-4 and accompanying
exhibits.)
3
Although Plaintiff mentions his arrest, the gravamen of his Complaint appears to be that he was
not brought before a judge within seventy-two hours after arrest, as required by New Jersey
Court Rule 3:4-2.
2
“A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is treated like a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6).” Millar v. Pitman Bd. of Educ., No. CIV. 10-4104 RBK/JS, 2011 WL
2417141, at *2 (D.N.J. June 13, 2011) (citing Bor. of Sayreville v. Union Carbide Corp., 923 F.
Supp. 671, 676 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Turbe v. V.I., 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir.1991)). Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss an action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. With a motion to dismiss, “‘courts accept all factual
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled
to relief.’” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). In other words, a complaint survives a
motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In
addition to the allegations of the complaint, a court may consider matters of public record,
documents specifically referenced in or attached to the complaint, and documents integral to the
allegations raised in the complaint. Mele v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251, 255 n. 5
(3d Cir. 2004).
Here, the Complaint itself is devoid of any facts showing that the City of Long Branch
Police Department was involved in the purported constitutional violation(s) alleged in the
Complaint. 4 Plaintiff states only that he was “rearrested by Monmouth County Prosecutor’s
Officers,” and the Complaint contains no allegations that the City of Long Branch Police
Department or any of its individual officers failed to bring him before a judge within 72 hours of
his arrest. As such, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
4
As such, the Court need not rely on the affidavit and exhibits attached to the instant motion.
3
Although this type of dismissal would ordinarily be without prejudice, the Court finds
that granting leave to amend the Complaint would be futile with respect to this particular
Defendant. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (District
court may deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a) when amendment is futile.). It is well-settled
that a police department is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. PBA Local No. 38 v.
Woodbridge Police Dept., 832 F. Supp. 808, 826 (D.N.J. 1993); Ayala v. Randolph Township,
No. 12–7809, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154213, at *18–19, 2014 WL 5503107 (D.N.J. Oct. 30,
2014). The Third Circuit has recognized that a municipal police department is “merely an
administrative arm of the local municipality, and is not a separate judicial entity.” Padilla v.
Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 F. App'x 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting DeBellis v. Kulp, 166
F.Supp.2d 255, 264 (E.D. Pa. 2001)); see also N.J.S.A. 40A:14–118 (providing that New Jersey
police departments are “an executive and enforcement function of municipal government.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the City of Long Branch Police Department is
dismissed with prejudice. 5 An appropriate Order follows.
5
Even if Plaintiff had named the City of Long Branch as a defendant, the Complaint fails to
provide any facts that could support a claim against the City of Long Branch pursuant to Monell
v. Dep't of Social Servs. New York City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). “When a suit against a
municipality is based on § 1983, the municipality can only be liable when the alleged
constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation, or decision officially
adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.” Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89
F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658); see also McTernan v. City of York,
PA, 564 F.3d 636, 657 (3d Cir. 2009). Thus, for municipal liability to attach under Monell, any
injury must be inflicted by “execution of a government’s policy or custom.” Santiago v.
Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 135 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). To satisfy
the pleading standard for a Monell claim, a claimant “must identify a custom or policy, and
specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658 (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has not identified any custom or policy of the City of Long Branch that led to the
alleged violation(s) of his constitutional rights. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to allege a
Monell claim against the City of Long Branch, he must submit an Amended Complaint within 30
days of the date of the Order accompanying this Memorandum Opinion.
4
s/Freda L. Wolfson
Freda L. Wolfson,
United States District Judge
Date: April 25, 2016
5
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