BENHUR v. MADAVARAM et al

Filing 10

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 10/30/2015. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MAEBIL BENHUR,
Civ. No. 15-6826
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. MADAVARAM,
SUNOCO A+ FOOD MART, MAIN AND
HAWS, INC., R.J. VENTURES, INC.,
JOHN DOES 1-5, JANE DOES 1-5, and/or
DOE CORPORATION 1-5,
Defendants.
THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion of Defendants Christopher J.
Madavaram, Main and Haws, Inc., and R.J. Ventures, Inc. (“Defendants”) to Dismiss the
Complaint of Plaintiff Maebil Benhur (“Plaintiff”). (ECF No. 6). Plaintiff opposes this Motion.
(ECF No. 8). The Court has issued the Opinion below based upon the written submissions and
without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons stated
herein, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
This case involves thirteen years of alleged abuse of Plaintiff Maebil Benhur by
Defendant Christopher J. Madavaram. The alleged abuse includes physical and sexual abuse,
stalking, defamation, and purposeful interference with Plaintiff’s employment and job prospects.
Plaintiff’s allegations are summarized briefly as follows: after Plaintiff came to the United States
in 2002, Plaintiff worked for Madavaram for approximately six years. Madavaram owns and
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operates a Sunoco A+ Food Mart in Pennsylvania, where Plaintiff was directed to operate the
cash register, price items, and clean. While Plaintiff worked for Madavaram, he began to abuse
her physically and sexually and to stalk her. Consequently, in 2008, Plaintiff fled from
Pennsylvania to New Jersey. However, Madavaram learned where Plaintiff was living, and in
2009, he recommenced his physical and sexual abuse. Since then, Madavaram has continued to
stalk and harass Plaintiff, as well as her family members.
Starting in 2009, Madavaram also began calling Plaintiff’s place of employment and
telling employees that they should not work with Plaintiff because she was a prostitute and had
poor character. Madavaram has continued calling Plaintiff’s employers and coworkers to the
present day, even as Plaintiff has moved to different jobs. Madavaram has also repeatedly called
prospective employers to prevent them from hiring Plaintiff, stating that she could work only for
him. This conduct has led Plaintiff to quit several jobs and to accept another job for lower pay,
and has made it difficult for Plaintiff to gain future employment opportunities as potential
employers are concerned about being harassed by Madavaram. As a result of Madavaram’s
ongoing conduct, Plaintiff has suffered loss of income, loss of standing in the community and
business world, emotional distress, and depression.
Plaintiff received restraining orders against Madavaram starting in 2009. But due to
Madavaram’s ongoing harassment, Plaintiff filed suit on August 3, 2015 in the Ocean County
Superior Court against Madavaram and two companies that he owns and operates, Main &
Haws, Inc. and R.J. Ventures, Inc.1 Plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress,

Plaintiff also filed suit against Sunoco A+ Food Mart, but Defendants note that Sunoco A+
Food Mart and Main & Haws, Inc. were improperly pled as separate entities as they are actually
the same entity. Considering this, the Court will only discuss the corporate defendants Main &
Haws, Inc. and R.J. Ventures, Inc. All claims against Sunoco A+ Food Mart will be dismissed.
1

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defamation per se, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and tortious
interference with an existing contract. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 11, 2015,
and Defendants removed the case to federal court on September 14, 2015 on the basis of
diversity of citizenship. On September 25, 2015, Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss that is
presently before the Court. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted for several reasons, including violation of the relevant statutes of limitations
as well as inadequate pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). In the alternative,
Defendants request that Plaintiff be required to file a more definite statement under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(e).
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
i.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

The adequacy of pleadings is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which
requires that a complaint allege “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” This Rule “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing’ rather than a blanket
assertion of an entitlement to relief”). Even though a plaintiff is not required to plead her claims
with intricate detail, Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to provide “some specificity.” Hunter Roberts
Const. Grp., LLC v. J. Rihl, Inc., No. 12-7751, 2013 WL 3445331, at *3 (D.N.J. July 9, 2013)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).

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ii.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), a defendant may move for a more definite
statement if the pleading “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a
response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The moving party “must point out the defects complained of
and the details desired.” Id. Rule 12(e) motions can, accordingly, provide a useful mechanism
to resolve ambiguity and to obtain the “factual basis underlying a plaintiff's claim for relief.”
U.S. v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 301 (3d Cir. 2006).
Motions for a more definite statement, however, are “generally disfavored,” particularly
in light of the liberal pleading standards under the Federal Rules. Premier Payments Online, Inc.
v. Payment Sys. Worldwide, 848 F. Supp. 2d 513, 522 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citation omitted); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Rule 12(e) therefore endeavors to address a pleading that “is so vague or
ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith,
without prejudice to [itself].” Clark v. McDonald's Corp., 213 F.R.D. 198, 232–33 (D.N.J.
2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 12(e), accordingly, provides a
remedy for an “unintelligible” pleading, but does not serve as a mechanism to correct a pleading
merely lacking in detail. Premier Payments Online, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d at 522 (citation
omitted). Nor does a Rule 12(e) motion serve as a means to elucidate information obtainable
through the discovery procedures of the Federal Rules. MK Strategies, LLC v. Ann Taylor Stores
Corp., 567 F. Supp. 2d 729, 737 (D.N.J. 2008) (noting that Rule 12(e) motions are not
appropriate where the more definite statement sought “presents a proper subject for discovery”).

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iii.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a
complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). The defendant bears the burden
of showing that no claim has been presented. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d
Cir. 2005). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court should conduct a threepart analysis. See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). “First, the court must
‘take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
56 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court must accept as true all of a plaintiff’s well-pleaded
factual allegations and construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fowler
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). The court may disregard any
conclusory legal allegations. Id. Finally, the court must determine whether the “facts are
sufficient to show that plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679). Such a claim requires more than mere allegation of an entitlement to relief or
demonstration of the “mere possibility of misconduct;” instead, the facts must allow a court
reasonably to infer “that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 210, 211
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79).
B. Analysis
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss each of the Plaintiff’s five counts of the Complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. In the alternative, Defendants ask the Court to order Plaintiff to file a more definite
statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Defendants also ask the Court to dismiss
all of the claims against the corporate defendants. Each request will be addressed in turn, in the
order discussed by Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss.

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i.

Count II – Defamation Per Se

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s claim for Defamation Per Se should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A defamation claim has three
elements: “(1) the assertion of a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) the
unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party; and (3) fault amounting at least to
negligence by the publisher.” Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 969 A.2d 1097, 1113 (N.J.
2009).
Defendants do not initially argue that Plaintiff fails to meet the elements of a defamation
claim, but rather that Plaintiff’s claims fall outside the statute of limitations. (Defs.’ Br. Supp.
Mot. Dismiss 4-6, ECF No. 6-1). In New Jersey, defamation claims must be commenced within
one year of the publication of the alleged defamatory statements. N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-3
(West). Defendants state that “[n]early all of the alleged defamatory statements set-forth in
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are plainly barred” by the statute of limitations. (Defs.’ Reply
Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 1, ECF No. 9). But as Plaintiff notes, accepting all of the Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, Madavaram made at least some of the alleged defamatory statements in 2015,
within one year of the filing of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on August 11, 2015. (See, e.g.,
Compl. ¶¶ 60, 63, 75, Case No. OCN-L-2126-15, ECF No. 3; Pl.’s Mem. Opp. Defs.’ Mot.
Dismiss 3-5, ECF No. 8). As at least some of Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by the statute of
limitations, the count will not be dismissed on this basis.
In reply, Defendants argue that the incidents not barred by the statute of limitations do
not support a claim because the Plaintiff does not allege specific defamatory statements made to
specific persons. (Defs.’ Reply Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 1-3, ECF No. 9). But “a defamation
pleading does not need to cite precise defamatory statements, it must only provide sufficient

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notice to the other party of the allegations made against him.” Ciemniecki v. Parker McCay
P.A., No. 09-6450, 2010 WL 2326209, at *5 (D.N.J. June 7, 2010) (internal quotation omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that Madavaram made statements that she was of bad character and a prostitute
to Mr. Jaswinder Bindra, as well as to Plaintiff’s coworkers and employees, within the relevant
time period. (Compl. ¶¶ 60, 63, 75, Case No. OCN-L-2126-15, ECF No. 3). This satisfies the
pleading requirements of Rule 8 by providing factual allegations with some specificity.
Accepting all of the Plaintiff’s allegations as true, this also shows that the Plaintiff has a
plausible claim for relief. Therefore, the count will not be dismissed.
ii.

Counts III and IV – Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
and Tortious Interference with an Existing Contract

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s claims for Tortious Interference with Prospective
Economic Advantage and Tortious Interference with an Existing Contract should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under New Jersey law, both claims
use the same standard: a claim for tortious interference must allege (1) the existence of a contract
or a prospective economic relationship; (2) interference that was intentional and with malice; (3)
the loss of the contract or prospective gain as a result of the interference; and (4) damages.
Rainbow Apparel, Inc. v. KCC Trading, Inc., No. 09-5319, 2010 WL 2179146, at *8 (D.N.J.
May 26, 2010); see also Ciecka v. Rosen, 908 F. Supp. 2d 545, 556 (D.N.J. 2012).
Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff fails to meet the elements of a tortious interference
claim, but rather that these claims should be dismissed because they are “subsumed by the failed
defamation claim.” (Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6-7, ECF No. 6-1). In the alternative,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s tortious interference claims “are nothing more than rote
recitations of the elements of the respective causes of action,” and request either dismissal of
these counts, or an order requiring Plaintiff to file a more definite statement under Federal Rule
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of Civil Procedure 12(e). (Id. at 8-9). Given that the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation claim, the claims for tortious interference cannot be dismissed by
being “subsumed by the failed defamation claim.” Even if the Court had not denied Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation claim, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the tortious
interference claims rest on more than just Madavaram’s defamatory statements. (See, e.g.,
Compl. ¶¶ 19, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 50, Case No. OCN-L-2126-15, ECF No. 3). The
Court will therefore deny to dismiss the counts for tortious interference on this basis.
The Court also finds that Plaintiff pleaded the tortious interference claims with adequate
specificity to satisfy the pleading standard of Rule 8 and to enable Defendants to respond to
Plaintiff’s Complaint. Among other allegations, Plaintiff states that Madavaram repeatedly
called her at her place of employment (Nobles Smoke Shop) and told other employees that they
should not work with the Plaintiff because she was a prostitute; Madavaram demanded that
Plaintiff fire one of her coworkers and threatened to kill both of them; and he confronted and
harassed several other employers or potential employers. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 19, 22, 25, 30, 32, 33,
40). Plaintiff states that these incidents led her to quit several jobs, accept another job at
Nordstrom for lower pay, and have made it difficult for Plaintiff to earn future employment
opportunities, as potential employers are concerned about being harassed by Madavaram. (See,
e.g., id. ¶¶ 34, 37, 38, 39).
While Plaintiff might have included more details about the names of certain employers or
employees, or more specific dates, Rule 8 does not require such specificity. See, e.g., Estabrook
v. Safety & Ecology Corp., 556 F. App’x 152, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that plaintiff need
not identify specific dates or times at which alleged harassment occurred); Church & Dwight Co.
v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmBH, No. 10-453, 2010 WL 5239238, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec.

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16, 2010) (noting that plaintiff need not identify specific prospective customers or contracts to
show a reasonable expectation of prospective economic benefit). Nor is the Complaint “so
vague or ambiguous” that Defendants “cannot reasonably prepare a response,” such that
Defendants would be entitled to a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). As this Court has
stated, Rule 12(e) “provides a remedy for an ‘unintelligible’ pleading, but does not serve as a
mechanism to correct a pleading merely lack[ing] in detail.” Marley v. Donahue, No. 14-1597,
2014 WL 5152618, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 2014). To the extent Defendants would like Plaintiff
to provide more detail, they should seek to obtain this information through discovery, not
through a more definite statement. See id.; MK Strategies, LLC v. Ann Taylor Stores Corp., 567
F. Supp. 2d 729, 737 (D.N.J. 2008). Considering this, the Court will not dismiss the tortious
interference claims, nor will the Court require Plaintiff to file a more definite statement.
iii.

Count I – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. An
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim has four elements: (1) the defendant acted either
intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant’s conduct is so extreme and outrageous as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community; (3) the defendant’s intentional or reckless conduct must have been the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s emotional distress; and (4) the distress is so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Juzwiak v. Doe, 2 A.3d 428, 433 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2010).
Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff fails to meet the elements of a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, but rather that this claim should be dismissed because it is

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“subsumed by the failed defamation claim.” (Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 10, ECF No. 6-1).
In the alternative, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims fall outside the statute of limitations.
(Id. at 10-12). Finally, in the event that the Court does not grant their Motion to Dismiss these
claims, Defendants request that Plaintiff be ordered to file a more definite statement under Rule
12(e).
Given that the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation
claim, the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress could not be dismissed by being
“subsumed by the failed defamation claim.” Even if the Court had not denied Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation claim, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims rest on more than just Madavaram’s
defamatory statements. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 34, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48, Case No. OCN-L2126-15, ECF No. 3). On this basis, the Court will not dismiss the count for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
As for the statute of limitations, claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
generally must be commenced within two years. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2 (West) (“Every
action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any
person within this State shall be commenced within 2 years next after the cause of any such
action shall have accrued.”); see also Hollingsworth v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey,
No. 06-571, 2009 WL 1702293, at *5 (D.N.J. June 16, 2009). But New Jersey courts recognize
that “[w]hen an individual is subject to a continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct,” as
with claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, “the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the wrongful action ceases.” Wilson v. Wal–Mart Stores, 729 A.2d 1006, 1010

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(N.J. 1999); Hollingsworth, 2009 WL 1702293, at *5.2 Accepting all of the Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, Plaintiff has a plausible argument that Madavaram committed a continual,
cumulative pattern of tortious conduct from 2002 to the present. Moreover, some of
Madavaram’s alleged tortious conduct occurred within the past two years, and thus within the
statute of limitations even under Defendants’ arguments. Given these facts, at least some, if not
all, of Madavaram’s tortious conduct falls within the two-year statute of limitations, and so the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim will not be dismissed on this basis.
The Court also finds that Plaintiff pled the intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim with adequate specificity to satisfy the pleading standard of Rule 8 and to enable
Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Among other allegations, Plaintiff states that
Madavaram sexually abused her, physically abused her, stalked her, followed her and her family
members, defamed her, and purposefully interfered with her job prospects. (See, e.g., Compl.
¶ 47, Case No. OCN-L-2126-15, ECF No. 3). While Plaintiff might have included more detail in
these allegations, Rule 8 does not require such specificity. See, e.g., Estabrook, 556 F. App’x
155-56; Church & Dwight Co., 2010 WL 5239238 at *4. Nor is the Complaint “so vague or
ambiguous” that Defendants “cannot reasonably prepare a response,” such that Defendants
would be entitled to a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). To the extent Defendants would
like Plaintiff to provide more detail, they should seek to obtain this information through
discovery, not through a more definite statement. See Marley, WL 5152618, at *1; MK
Strategies, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 737. Considering this, the Court will not dismiss the count for

2
Defendants argue that Madavaram’s actions do not constitute continuing violations because
even if a pattern of battery occurs, each individual battery constitutes a separate tort. (Defs.’ Br.
Supp. Mot. Dismiss 11, ECF No. 6-1). However, this argument is not relevant as Plaintiff does
not plead battery in the Complaint.
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intentional infliction of emotional distress, nor will the Court require Plaintiff to file a more
definite statement.
iv.

Count V – Injunctive Relief

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim because injunctive relief is not a separate cause of action, and Plaintiff is
not entitled to this form of relief. (Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 15-16, ECF No. 6-1). The
Court agrees that injunctive relief is not a separate type of claim, but rather a form of relief, and
as such, should not be designated as a separate count in the Complaint. See, e.g., Kauffman v.
Pennsylvania Soc. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 766 F. Supp. 2d 555, 560 (E.D. Pa.
2011) (“The relief a plaintiff seeks, and the claims he asserts, are thus conceptually distinct
components of a complaint, and there is no need for a plaintiff to devote a separate count of a
complaint to a request for a certain type of relief.”). Rather, the request for injunctive relief
should appear in Plaintiff’s prayer for relief. Considering this, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
count for injunctive relief.
However, this form of remedy will still be available to Plaintiff, and the Court will grant
leave to amend the Complaint within 30 days if Plaintiff wishes to request injunctive relief as
part of the prayer for relief under other counts of the Complaint. While Defendants have asked
the Court to dismiss this form of relief with prejudice, the dismissal of particular forms of relief
would be premature at this stage of the litigation. “[T]he test of the complaint upon a motion to
dismiss lies in the claim not in the demand. The only issue is whether the claim stated would
give the plaintiff a right to any relief, not to the particular relief he demands.” Falk v. Levine, 60
F. Supp. 660, 663 (D. Mass. 1945); see also Zodda v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
Pa., No. 13-7738, 2014 WL 1577694, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2014) (noting that the plaintiff need

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not prove a claim for a particular remedy at the motion to dismiss stage); Asphaltic Enterprises,
Inc. v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 39 F.R.D. 574, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (“[I] t is well
established that the prayer for relief does not determine whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of
action.”). Considering this, Defendants’ request to dismiss injunctive relief as a possible remedy
will be denied.
v.

Corporate Defendants

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims against Main & Haws, Inc. and R.J.
Ventures, Inc. must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In
the Complaint, Plaintiff does not identify the legal theory under which the corporate defendants
could be held liable, but in later briefs, the parties focus on the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the torts of employees
committed within the scope of their employment. Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 513 (N.J.
1982).
Before determining that an employee’s acts were within the scope of employment, the
court must first consider whether a master-servant relationship existed between the employer and
the employee. See Carter v. Reynolds, 815 A.2d 460, 463 (N.J. 2003). “A servant is a person
employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical
conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or right to control.”
Id. at 464 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (Am. Law Inst. 1958)). Then, to
determine whether an employee’s acts were within the scope of employment, the court considers
(1) whether the act is of a kind the employee is employed to perform; (2) whether the act occurs
substantially within the authorized time and space limits of the employment; (3) whether the act
is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and (4) if force is intentionally used

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by the servant against another, whether the use of force is not unexpectable by the master. Davis
v. Devereux Found., 37 A.3d 469, 490 (N.J. 2012) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228
(Am. Law Inst. 1958)).
Plaintiff only mentions corporate defendants Main & Haws, Inc. and R.J. Ventures, Inc.
in the Complaint briefly and in conclusory legal allegations. Plaintiff states that she was initially
directed to work for Madavaram in 2002 at Main and Haws, Inc. and at R.J. Ventures, Inc. (See
Compl. ¶ 10, Case No. OCN-L-2126-15, ECF No. 3). Madavaram’s abuse allegedly began
while Plaintiff was working there, but Plaintiff does not provide any additional factual
allegations linking Madavaram’s abuse to the companies. The only other mention of the
corporate defendants in the Complaint occurs when Plaintiff states that Madavaram contacted her
employers and coworkers in his business or professional capacity. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 22, 25, 32,
40). This conclusory legal allegation will be disregarded by the Court.
Although neither party briefed this issue, the Court questions whether Plaintiff could
establish the requisite master-servant relationship between Madavaram and the corporate
defendants. At no point does Plaintiff allege that Madavaram is an employee of either
corporation. Rather, Plaintiff states that Madavaram is an “owner, operator, and/or partner” of
the corporations. (See id. ¶ 3). As Madavaram is seemingly the sole owner of both corporations,
there would seemingly be no “master” for whom Madavaram would work as a “servant.” In any
case, Plaintiff did not present enough facts to make a plausible claim that such a master-servant
or employer-employee relationship did exist.
Even if Plaintiff had shown that such a master-servant or employer-employee relationship
existed, none of Plaintiff’s facts address whether Madavaram’s actions fell within his scope of
employment. Plaintiff does not address whether Madavaram’s allegedly tortious conduct was of

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a kind Madavaram was employed to perform, whether the conduct occurred within the
authorized time and space limits of his employment, whether the conduct was actuated by a
purpose to serve the corporate defendants, or whether the use of force was expectable by them.
Given Plaintiff’s sparse factual allegations against Main and Haws, Inc. and R.J.
Ventures, Inc., Plaintiff did not provide sufficient facts to make a plausible claim against the
corporate defendants under respondeat superior. Based on the Complaint, the connection
between Madavaram’s alleged abuse and the corporate defendants does not rise above a
speculative level. Therefore, the claims against Defendants Main and Haws, Inc. and R.J.
Ventures, Inc. will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. However, Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend the Complaint within 30
days to add sufficient factual allegations against the corporate defendants to satisfy Rule 8.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted with respect to
Count V for injunctive relief and all claims against Defendants Main & Haws, Inc., R.J.
Ventures, Inc., and Sunoco A+ Food Mart. The Motion to Dismiss will be denied with respect to
all of Plaintiff’s other claims. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend the Complaint within 30
days if Plaintiff wishes to request injunctive relief as part of the prayer for relief under Counts IIV of the Complaint, or to add additional factual allegations against the corporate defendants.
An appropriate Order follows.

/s/ Anne E. Thompson
ANNE E. THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.

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