MILLER v. WARREN HOSPITAL, IPA, P.A. et al

Filing 40

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 6/27/2016. (mmh)

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TREVOR MILLER,

:
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v.
:
:
WARREN HOSPITAL IPA, PA and :
CHRISTOPHER MANN M.D.,
:
:
Defendants. :

Civ. Action No.: 15-7496 (FLW)(DEA)
OPINION

Plaintiff Trevor Miller (“Plaintiff”) brings this medical malpractice suit against Defendants
Warren Hospital IPA PA (“Warren Hospital”) and Christopher Mann, M.D., (“Dr. Mann”)
(collectively, “Defendants”) for alleged negligence by Defendants in the care and treatment of
Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s mother, Susan Miller, at the time of Plaintiff’s birth on June 16, 1995.
Presently before the Court is Warren Hospital’s Motion to Partially Dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Plaintiff’s claim for vicarious liability against Warren Hospital (Count III of the
Amended Complaint) as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons set forth
below, Warren Hospital’s Motion to Partially Dismiss is denied.
I.

Procedural and Factual Background
The following allegations are taken from the Amended Complaint and are assumed as true

for the purposes of review under Rule 12(b)(6).
In October 1994, Susan Miller sought a consultation from Dr. Mann, who informed her
that she was pregnant with Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 11. For the next nine months, during the course
of Ms. Miller’s pregnancy, Dr. Mann “and/or other physicians in his medical group” saw Ms.
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Miller for routine prenatal checkups and administered general prenatal care. Am. Compl. ¶ 12. On
June 16, 1995, Ms. Miller went into labor and was hospitalized at Warren Hospital for the birth of
Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 13.
Plaintiff alleges that at the outset of Ms. Miller’s labor, employees 1 of Warren Hospital
performed a vaginal smear test and determined that she was “suffering from Group B
Streptococcus” (“Group B Strep”) and that she had “meconium in her waters.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1516. According to the Amended Complaint, “[i]t was well known at the time that the discovery of
meconium in a delivering mother’s waters is a sign of risk for vaginal delivery and that infants,
are highly susceptible to the transmission of Group B Strep infection as they traverse the vaginal
canal during delivery.” Am. Compl. ¶ 17. Plaintiff asserts that “[i]t was the standard of care [at the
time] for any mother diagnosed with Group B Strep to undergo a period of prophylactic
intravenous antibiotics and/or a caesarian section so as to prevent the transmission of Group B
Strep to the child.” Am. Compl. ¶ 18.
However, despite this standard of care, Ms. Miller was not treated with any antibiotics and
Plaintiff was delivered vaginally. 2 Am. Compl. ¶ 20. As a result, Plaintiff allegedly contracted
Group B Strep upon birth, which in turn caused him to develop hydrocephalus. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2324, 27. Due to his hydrocephalus, Plaintiff has developed ongoing cognitive and physical losses,
including frequent headaches, emotional distress, academic problems, difficulty concentrating in

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The Court notes that the Amended Complaint does not identify who performed the smear test on
Ms. Miller or who analyzed the results.
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The Court notes that it is somewhat unclear from the Amended Complaint which individual
health care provider decided to deliver Plaintiff vaginally, without administering antibiotics to Ms.
Miller. Nonetheless, the Amended Complaint asserts that “Dr. Mann and Warren Hospital were
negligent in their decisions to deliver [Plaintiff] vaginally and not to treat Susan Miller with
antibiotics.” Am. Compl. ¶ 22.
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school, loss of earning capacity, and placement of a shunt running from his brain to his abdominal
cavity, which prevents him from participating in certain physical activities. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-32.
Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Mann and Warren Hospital negligently caused these injuries through their
decision to deliver Plaintiff vaginally without treating Ms. Miller with antibiotics. Am. Compl.
¶ 22. Plaintiff brings the following three claims against Dr. Mann and Warren Hospital: (I)
negligence of Dr. Mann; (II) negligence of Warren Hospital; and (III) vicarious liability of Warren
Hospital.
On June 15, 2015, Plaintiff commenced the instant medical malpractice action against Dr.
Mann and Warren Hospital in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The
original Complaint contained only two counts against Defendants: (I) negligence of Warren
Hospital and (II) negligence of Dr. Mann. On August 20, 2015, Warren Hospital filed a Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on the basis of improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(3), or, in the alternative, Transfer Venue to the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1406(a) and 28 U.S.C. §1391(b). On August 26, 2015,
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, adding a vicarious liability claim (Count III) against Warren
Hospital for the negligence of Dr. Mann and “other health providers who assisted with Susan
Miller’s delivery of Trevor Miller,” but otherwise alleging no new facts. Am. Compl. ¶ 41. In
response, on September 8, 2015, Warren Hospital filed the instant Motion to Partially Dismiss
Count III as it pertains to “other health providers,” because this claim was barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. At the same time, Warren Hospital also renewed its Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint on the basis of improper venue or, in the alternative, Transfer Venue to the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Similarly, on September 25, 2015, Dr. Mann
filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or to Transfer Venue. On October 9, 2015, the
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Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, U.S.D.J., ordered that this case be transferred to the U.S. District
Court for the District New Jersey, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties to transfer venue.
Accordingly, this matter was transferred to this Court.
As a result of this transfer, Dr. Mann’s Motion to Dismiss or to Transfer Venue, as well as
those portions of Warren Hospital’s pending Motion related to improper venue, have been
rendered moot. Therefore, all that is presently pending before this Court is Warren Hospital’s
Motion to Partially Dismiss Count III. Both Plaintiff and Dr. Mann oppose this Motion.
II.

Standard of Review
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss on the
pleadings, courts “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint,
the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.
2008) (quotations omitted). Under such a standard, the factual allegations set forth in a complaint
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.
A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).
However, Rule 12(b)(6) only requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must include
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“enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest the required element. This does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Phillips, 515
F.3d at 234 (citation and quotations omitted); Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approved Basketball
Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A] claimant does not have to set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim. The pleading standard is not akin to a probability requirement;
to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint merely has to state a plausible claim for relief.”)
(citation and quotations omitted).
In sum, under the current pleading regime, when a court considers a dismissal motion, three
sequential steps must be taken: first, “it must take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to
state a claim.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotations and
brackets omitted). Next, the court “should identify allegations that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. (quotations omitted). Lastly, “when
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. (quotations and brackets
omitted).
III.

Analysis
Warren Hospital asserts that when Plaintiff amended his Complaint on August 26, 2015,

the amendment was made outside the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice
claims. Consequently, Warren Hospital contends that only those portions of the amendment that
relate back to the original Complaint are not barred by the statute of limitations. According to
Warren Hospital, in the original Complaint, there was no claim of negligence asserted against any
individual provider, other than Dr. Mann. Thus, Warren Hospital argues that Plaintiff’s claim in
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Count III against Warren Hospital for vicarious liability as to “other health providers who assisted
with Susan Miller’s delivery,” does not relate back to the original Complaint, and should be
dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Conversely, Plaintiff argues that the allegations
in the original Complaint gave Warren Hospital fair notice of the claim in Count III, and thus, this
claim properly relates back to the date of the original Complaint. As discussed infra, the Court
finds that Plaintiff’s claim in Count III of the Amended Complaint relates back to the date of the
original Complaint, and thus is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
To succeed on a motion to dismiss on the basis of statute of limitations, the defendant must
allege that “the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been
brought within the statute of limitations.” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2002)). Once a defendant has raised
a statute of limitations defense to a claim, it is the plaintiff’s burden to allege the facts necessary
to justify the application of equitable tolling. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S.
Ct. 1414, 1419 (2012). A federal court sitting in diversity must “apply the relevant state’s
substantive law, which includes its statute of limitations, as that law has been set forth by [that
state’s] legislature or highest court.” Jaworowski v. Ciasulli, 490 F.3d 331, 333 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted). When a federal court applies a state limitations period it also applies the
equitable tolling principals of that state. Knopick v. Connelly, 639 F.3d 600, 606 (3d Cir. 2011).
Under New Jersey law, medical malpractice actions must be commenced within two years
of the alleged negligence. Troum v. Newark Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 338 N.J. Super. 1, 15 (N.J. App.
Div. 2001) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-2); see also Guichardo v. Rubinfeld, 177 N.J. 45, 47 (N.J
2003). However, when a minor suffers personal injuries as a result of medical malpractice,
pursuant to New Jersey statute, the statute of limitations as to his claims is tolled until two years
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after he reaches eighteen years of age. Lafage v. Jani, 166 N.J. 412, 426 (N.J. 2001) (citing N.J.
Stat. Ann. 2A:14-21). In the instant case, Plaintiff turned eighteen on June 16, 2013. Thus, under
New Jersey law, Plaintiff was required to bring any claims against Defendants arising from their
alleged negligence at his birth by June 16, 2015. Plaintiff filed the original Complaint within one
day of this deadline, on June 15, 2015. However, when Plaintiff amended the Complaint on August
26, 2015 to add a vicarious liability claim against Warren Hospital (Count III), the statute of
limitations had expired. Indeed, Plaintiff does not dispute that his amendment was made after the
applicable statute of limitations had already run. However, he argues that under Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1)(b), Count III relates back to the date of the original complaint, which was within the
limitations period.
Under Rule 15(c)(1)(b), a party may make an amendment to a pleading that would
otherwise be time barred, if the amended pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading
by arising out of “the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(b). Relation back is structured “to balance the
interests of the defendant protected by the statute of limitations with the preference expressed in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in particular, for resolving disputes
on their merits.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 550 (2010). “Where an
amendment relates back, Rule 15(c) allows a plaintiff to sidestep an otherwise-applicable statute
of limitations, thereby permitting resolution of a claim on the merits, as opposed to a technicality.”
Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing id.). However, “[a]t the same time Rule
15(c) endeavors to preserve the important policies served by the statute of limitations — most
notably, protection against the prejudice of having to defend against a stale claim, as well as
society’s general interest in security and stability — by requiring ‘that the already commenced
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action sufficiently embraces the amended claims.’” Glover, 698 F.3d at 145 (quoting Nelson v.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1014-15 (3d Cir. 1995)). “In essence, application of Rule 15(c)
involves a search for a common core of operative facts in the two pleadings. As such, the court
looks to whether the opposing party has had fair notice of the general fact situation and legal theory
upon which the amending party proceeds.” USX Corp. v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 161, 166-67 (3d Cir.
2004)
Here, it is clear that there is a common core of operative facts between the original
Complaint and the new claim in the Amended Complaint -- Count III. In that regard, the Amended
Complaint alleges no new facts. Rather, it merely brings a new claim against Warren Hospital for
vicarious liability arising from the negligence of Dr. Mann and “other health providers who
assisted with Susan Miller’s delivery of Trevor Miller.” 3 Am. Compl. ¶ 41. As such, Count III is
rooted in the allegations in the original Complaint -- namely the “negligent decision” of Ms.
Miller’s health care providers to deliver Plaintiff vaginally, without administering antibiotics to
Ms. Miller.
Moreover, the Court questions whether Plaintiff’s “new” claim for vicarious liability
against Warren Hospital is not simply a duplicate of its original claim for negligence, because as
an institution, any liability on the part of Warren Hospital will necessarily arise from actions taken
by its agents. To that point, both the original Complaint and Amended Complaint assert that
“Warren Hospital acted by and through its agents, servants and employees, to include ostensible
agents and persons under the control of Warren Hospital.” Compl. ¶ 4; Am. Compl. ¶ 4. Given the
similarities between the original negligence claim against Warren Hospital and the new vicarious

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The amendment also changes the order in which negligence claims are asserted against Dr. Mann
and Warren Hospital.
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liability claim, the Court finds that the original Complaint gave Warren Hospital fair notice that
Plaintiff’s claims against it included negligence on the part of any individuals in its employ who
treated Ms. Miller during Plaintiff’s birth, not just Dr. Mann. In any event, Plaintiff’s original
Complaint sufficiently embraces his new claim for vicarious liability, such that pursuant to Rule
15(c)(1)(b), the new claim relates back to the date that the original Complaint was filed.
Accordingly, Count III is not barred by New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for claims of
medical malpractice.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Warren Hospital’s Motion to Partially Dismiss Count III is

denied.

Date: June 27, 2016

/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Freda L. Wolfson
U.S. District Judge

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