BOYKINS v. LANIGAN et al

Filing 5

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 12/16/2015. (eaj)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JAMES A. BOYKINS,
Civil Action No. 15-7769 (PGS)
Plaintiff,
OPINION

v.
GARY M. LANIGAN,
Defendant.

SHERIDAN, DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff James A. Boykins (“Plaintiff’), a convicted and sentenced state prisoner currently
confined at New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, New Jersey, seeks to bring this action in forma
pauperis.

Based on his affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant Plaintiffs application to

proceed informapauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to file

the Complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §sS l915(e)(2)
and 1915A, to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes
that the Complaint must be dismissed without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from the Complaint, and are accepted for
purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiffs
allegations.
On June 24, 2015, Plaintiffs mother purchased six two-ounce plastic bottles of Muslim
religious prayer oil from third party vendor. (Compl.

¶

12.) On June 28, 2015, the prayer oil

arrived at the prison mailroom, where it was confiscated as contraband by Defendant G. Kelly.
(Id.

¶

13.) On July 9, 2015, Defendant Officer McFady informed Plaintiff that said oils are

considered contraband and Plaintiff would have to make arrangements to mail the oils to someone,
have someone pick them up, donated to charity or destroyed. (Id.

¶

14.) Plaintiff informed the

officer that he would have the oil picked up by a visitor. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that the confiscation of the oil violates his rights under the Free Exercise
clause of the First Amendment and his rights under N.J.A.C. 1OA:17-5.8. (Id.

¶J 24-26.)

He is

seeking injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief. (Id. at 16.)
II.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,

§

801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66

to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions
in which a prisoner is proceeding informa pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.
respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.

§

§

§

191 5(e)(2)(B), seeks redress

1915A(b), or brings a claim with

1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua

ponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may

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be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This
action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§ l915(e)(2)(B), l9l5A

because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in jorma pauperis.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Coip. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim the complaint must allege “sufficient
,
1
factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Ma/a v, Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
2.

Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§

1983 for certain violations of his

constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
...

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 191 5(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir.
2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d
Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
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be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress....

Thus, to state a claim for relief under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d
Cir. 2011).
B. Analysis

The law applicable to prisoners’ Free Exercise claims is well-settled. Although prisoners
“clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment,

...

including its directive that no law

shall prohibit the free exercise of religion,” O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citations
omitted), at the same time, “the fact of incarceration and the valid penological objectives of
deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security justify limitations on the
exercise of constitutional rights by inmates.” DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50-5 1 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citing Fell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974)). Thus, a prison inmate “retains [only]
those rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological
objectives of the corrections system.” See Fell, 417 U.S. at 822.
Two threshold requirements must be met before particular beliefs, alleged to be religious
in nature, are accorded First Amendment protection. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025,
1029-30 (3d Cir. 1981). The beliefs avowed must be (1) sincerely held, and (2) religious in nature.
Id.

If both of these requirements are met, the Court must then apply the standard set out by the

Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), for assessing prison regulations that restrict
inmates’ constitutional rights. Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 2002).
4

Under

Turner, a regulation passes muster if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
482 U.S. at 89.

Turner instructs courts to weigh four factors when applying this standard: first,

whether the regulation bears a “valid, rational connection” to a legitimate and neutral
governmental objective; second, whether prisoners have alternative ways of exercising the
circumscribed right; third, whether accommodating the right would have a deleterious impact on
other inmates, guards, and the allocation of prison resources generally; and fourth, whether
alternatives exist that “fully accommodate[

]

the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid

penological interests.” Fraise, 283 F.3d at 513 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 91).
Under the first step of the free exercise inquiry, the Court must determine whether
Plaintiffs need to obtain his prayer oils from a third party vendor is sincerely held and religious
in nature. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1029-30. While the Court has no reason to doubt the sincerity of
Plaintiffs religious beliefs and his need for prayer oil, Plaintiff has not alleged, and the Court
cannot conceive of any sincerely held religious belief which would require that his prayer oils be
mailed to him directly rather than obtaining said oil from the prison chaplain, as required by the
Department of Corrections’s regulation. DeHart, 227 F.3d at 5 1-52; see also N.J.A.C.

§

IOA:17-

5.8 (“fragrance oil in approved containers, which are necessary as part of the religious service,

may be brought into the correctional facility only by the chaplain or a volunteer religious group
leader from the community”). Notably, Plaintiff has not alleged that he cannot obtain the requisite
oils from a prison chaplain or other religious official, but only that his attempt to order said oils
from a third party vendor was denied. There are no allegations contained in the Complaint to
indicate that Plaintiffs desire to receive his religious oils directly from a third party vendor, rather
than through the chaplain’s office, is due to a sincerely held religious belief; rather, it appears to

5

be a personal preference. Id. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to meet the threshold requirement to
state a free exercise claim and it will be dismissed without prejudice.
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III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint will be dismissed in its entirety for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
3
1915A(b)(1).

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

However, because it is conceivable that Plaintiff may be able to supplement his

pleading with facts sufficient to overcome the deficiencies noted herein, the Court will grant
Plaintiff leave to move to re-open this case and to file an amended complaint. An appropriate
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Even if the Court were to conclude that Plaintiffs preference for directly ordering the prayer oils
is the result of a sincerely held religious belief, the prison policy of outlawing such a practice
appears to pass the Turner test. First, the requirement manifestly “bears a valid, rational
connection to a legitimate and neutral governmental objective.” Fraise, 283 F.3d at 513-14
(citation omitted). Creating a rule that “fragrance oil in approved containers, which are necessary
as part of the religious service, may be brought into the correctional facility only by the chaplain
or a volunteer religious group leader from the community,” N.J.A.C. § IOA:17-5.8, clearly bears
a “valid and rational” connection to the Department of Correction’s interest in regulating and
controlling the items sent to inmates in its custody. Second, Plaintiff has a viable alternative to
exercising the circumscribed right; as stated above, Plaintiff has not alleged that he is being denied
prayer oil from the prison chaplain but only that he is not permitted to directly order his own. He
can exercise the “circumscribed right” by simply obtaining the oil from the appropriate prison
official. Third, permitting Plaintiff to receive prayer oil through the mail directly “would have a
deleterious impact on other inmates, guards, and the allocation of prison resources generally.”
Fraise, 283 F.3d at 520. If Plaintiff were permitted to receive such items in the mail directly, the
previously discussed security interest would be compromised. Moreover it is clearly most
efficient for prison resources to have all religious items regulated and brought into the prison by a
limited number of individuals. Finally, there are no “alternatives that fully accommodate[] the
prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests,” Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted), because the existing policy does fully accommodate Plaintiffs rights; Plaintiff
is permitted to obtain religious oils from the chaplain and there are no allegations in the Complaint
indicating that he has been prevented from doing so.
2

...

Since Plaintiffs claim over which this Court has original jurisdiction has been dismissed, to the
extent that Plaintiff sought to bring state law claims, this Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over those claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
‘

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer
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order follows.

/

Dated:

11

C
0
NL
Peter 0. Sheridan, U.S.D.J.

performs any function in the case and “carmot be utilized to cure defects in the amended
[complaint], unless the relevant portion is specifically incorporated in the new [complaint].” 6
Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted).
An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the allegations in the original complaint, but the
identification of the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and explicit. Id. To avoid
confusion, the safer course is to file an amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.
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