FIELDS v. WARDEN OF NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON
Filing
8
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 12/7/2015. (kas, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MARK FIELDS,
Petitioner,
Civil Action
No. 13-7693 (AET)
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,
OPINION
Respondent.
R.ECE\VED
APPEARANCES:
Mark Fields, Petitioner Pro Se
#544482986329B
New Jersey State Prison
PO Box 861
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
nsc =1 ims
THOMPSON, District Judge:
I .
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Petitioner Mark Fields'
("Petitioner")
submission of a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C.
§
2254.
(Docket Entry 1). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court concludes that the habeas petition shall be
divided into two actions, and a limited answer will be ordered
in this action.
I I . BACKGROUND
A. Procedural_Histo;x
Petitioner, a state-sentenced inmate incarcerated at New
Jersey State Prison, filed an application for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§
2254, on December 19, 2013.
(Docket
Entry 1). By Order dated December 27, 2013, the Honorable Joel
A. Pisano administratively terminated the petition for failure
to submit the filing fee or a complete application to proceed in
forma pauperis.
(Docket Entry 2). Petitioner submitted an
amended application to proceed in forma pauperis on March 5,
2014.
(Docket Entry 3).
On August 28, 2015, the Clerk's office received a letter
from Petitioner requesting this case be consolidated with
another one of his pending cases, Fields v. Plousis, No. 141139.
(Docket Entry 4). Both matters were reassigned to this
Court on September 1, 2015.
(Docket Entry 5). On September 18,
2015, the Court entered an Order advising Petitioner of his
rights under Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414
well as the consequences of filing a
§
(3d Cir. 2000), as
2254 petition under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA").
(Docket
Entry 6). The Court ordered Petitioner to advise the Court
within 45 days as to whether he wanted to have the pending
§
2254 petition ruled upon as filed, or whether he wanted to
withdraw the pending
§
§
2254 Petition and file one all-inclusive
2254 petition subject to the one-year statute of limitations.
(Docket Entry 6
~
5).
On October 26, 2015, the Court received a letter brief and
accompanying exhibits from Petitioner arguing the merits of his
2
petition.
(Docket Entry 7). As Petitioner has not submitted an
amended petition nor indicated that he wishes to withdraw his
pending petition, 1 the Court will rule upon the petition as filed
in accordance with its September 18, 2015 order.
B. Factual Background
1 . Ground One
On October 26, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced in the
Superioi Court of New Jersey on multiple indictments.
(Docket
Entry 7-1 at 4-13). The sentencing court imposed a nine-year
custodial term, subject to New Jersey's No Early Release Act
("NERA")' N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.2.
(Docket Entry 1 at 18). On
January 9, 2011, he was released for a mandatory period of
supervision.
(Docket Entry 1 at 20; Docket Entry 7-1 at 36).
On May 10, 2011, a urine test conducted by Petitioner's
parole officer returned a positive result for morphine.
(Docket
Entry 7-1 at 45). He admitted to having used heroin on May 5,
2011, and was referred to CDS counseling at the Jersey City
Community Resource Center ("CRC") on May 12, 2011.
(Docket Entry
7-1 at 45) . He continued attending CRC until August 3, 2011,
1
Petitioner's supplement cites 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as the statute
under which he seeks relief. (Docket Entry 7 at 2). Prisoners
challenging their state convictions or ~entences, including
parole issues, must bring their challenges under 28 U.S.C. §
2254. McKnight v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 3d 575, 579 (D.N.J.
2014). The petition shall proceed under § 2254 as originally
filed.
3
when he was arrested on a parole board warrant for violating the
terms of his supervised release, specifically for using a
controlled dangerous substance. 2 (Docket Entry 1 at 22; Docket
Entry 7-1 at 66) .
The Parole Board scheduled a probable cause hearing for
August 19, 2011.
(Docket Entry 7-1 at 77). The hearing proceeded
as scheduled, at which time Petitioner was represented by
counsel.
(Docket Entry 1 at 27). The Hearing Officer determined
there was no condition that prohibited taking prescription
medication; consequentially, there was no violation of
Petitioner's period of supervision.
(Docket Entry 7-1 at 80).
She recommended that his term be continued.
(Docket Entry 7-1 at
8 0) •
After the Adult Panel reviewed the Hearing Officer's report
and recommendations, it remanded Petitioner's case for further
revocation proceedings.
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 7). The panel
specifically requested testimony "relative to the facts and
circumstances surrounding [Petitioner's] arrest on August 3,
2011 . . . including, but not limited to [Petitioner's] alleged
2
Petitioner was taking prescribed pain killers as the result of
several injuries. It was the position of the Parole Board that
taking the prescribed narcotics, after Petitioner had been
informed on several occasions that he should obtain a nonnarcotic pain killer, was a violation of Supervision Condition
9: Refrain from the use and possession of controlled dangerous
substances. (Docket Entry 7-1 at 78).
4
admission to heroin use prior to reporting to the District
Parole Office that day." (Docket Entry 7-2 at 7). The rehearing
took place on September 30, 2011, at which time Petitioner was
again represented by counsel. The Hearing Officer determined the
testifying parole officer was credible regarding Petitioner's
alleged admission of use.
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 12). After
concluding that further drug counseling would not be
appropriate, she recommended that Petitioner's mandatory period
of supervision be revoked.
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 12).
Petitioner's attorney submitted written objections to the
recommendation.
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 14-15). On November 2,
2011, the Parole Board adopted the report of the Hearing Officer
and revoked Petitioner's mandatory period of supervision.
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 16).
Petitioner filed an administrative appeal of the revocation
order on January 30, 2012.
(Docket Entry 1 at 54). A final
agency decision was issued on April 18, 2012, denying the
appeal,
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 33); however, Petitioner states he
did not receive notice of the final decision until June 21,
2013.
(Docket Entry 1 at 54). He filed an appeal with the New
Jersey Appellate Division on July 22, 2013.
109).
(Docket Entry 7-3 at
The appeal was dismissed on October 16, 2013. Fields v.
5
N.J. State Parole Bd., No. A-006061-12 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
Oct. 16, 2013);
(Docket Entry 1 at 89) . 3
2. Grounds Two and Three
As,the November 2, 2011 revocation of his period of
supervision established a 12-month future eligibility term
("FET"), Petitioner was evaluated for release in February 2012.
(Docket Entry 1 at 59). Petitioner's case was reviewed by a
Hearing Officer on June 1, 2012, instead of having an in person
hearing.
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 40). The Hearing Officer referred
the case to a Board Panel.
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 40). Petitioner
objected to the lack of an in person hearing and filed an
administrative appeal on July 3, 2012, contending that he was
supposed to have had a hearing by July 2, 2012.
(Docket Entry 1
at 63). On July 5, 2012, the Board Panel denied parole and
established an 18-month FET.
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 45).
New Jersey State Parole Board Chairman James Plousis
responded to Petitioner's appeal on September 6, 2012.
(Docket
Entry 7-2 at 51). He indicated that "the conducting of a Board
Panel hearing 28 days prior to the parole eligibility date of
August 2, 2012 instead of 30 days prior to said date is so minor
of a delay that it does not rise to the level of a due process
violation." (Docket Entry 7-2 at 51). He also noted "the minimal
3
It is unknown whether Petitioner asked the New Jersey Supreme
Court for review.
6
delay in providing the Board Panel hearing did not prejudice you
in any way as your confinement was continued due to the Board
Panel Members determining that you did not meet the standard for
parole release." (Docket Entry 7-2 at 51). He indicated this was
solely a response to Petitioner's timeliness arguments and was
not a review of the merits of the Board Panel's decision.
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 51). A follow-up letter indicated that the
letter was "the final administrative agency decision on the
issue of the failure to provide a timely parole hearing."
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 52). Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in
the Appellate Division on October 19, 2012.
(Docket Entry 7-3 at
49). On May 17, 2013, the Appellate Division granted the Parole
Board's motion to dismiss the appeal. Fields v. Parole Bd., No.
A-000910-12 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. May 17, 2013);
(Docket
Entry 1 at 70). 4
Petitioner had been pursuing an administrative appeal of
the July 5, 2012 denial of parole and establishment of an 18month FET simultaneously with his appeal of the September 6,
2012 letter.
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 53). The Board issued a final
agency determination upholding the panel's decision on February
27, 2013.
(Docket Entry 7-2 at 55). Petitioner filed a notice of
appeal with the Appellate Division on April 18, 2013.
4
It is unknown whether
Court for review.
Petit~oner
7
(Docket
asked the New Jersey Supreme
Entry 7-3 at 65). By order dated February 11, 2014, the
Appellate Division dismissed the appeal for lack of prosecution.
Fields v. Parole Bd., No. A-003818-12 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
Feb. 11, 2014);
(Docket Entry 7-3 at 106). Petitioner filed the
instant § 2254 petition on October 29, 2013.
(Docket Entry 1).
Petitioner further states that during the appeals process,
he wrote to the Department of Corrections Commissioner that "he
refused to sign his max papers; he [does] not wish to serve his
maximum non-custodial term of mandatory parole supervision in
the custody of an institutional setting." (Docket Entry 1 at
81). He further stated that he "refused to participate in any
future attempts by the Parole Board to conduct any proceedings
for, or against [him] whatsoever [and] will remain on indefinite
postponement until a court informs me that the New Jersey State
Parole Board has been using unconstitutional procedures to [sic]
this Petitioner
." (Docket Entry 1 at 82). He contends
Douglas Chiesa, Executive Assistant to Chairman Plousis,
responded on June 25, 2013, stating:
Petitioner
will remain in confinement if he
interrupt[s]
the parole release process with his
"constitutional challenges and that the Board of Parole
will [retaliate] against him when he insist[s] on
exercising that right to postpone and refuse to
participate in any future attempts by the parole board
to conduct any proceedings for or against me whatsoever"
(Docket Entry 1 at 83). He asserts the letter "threatened"
him that he would remain in custody "until such time as he
8
may be granted parole release prior to the expiration of
the balance of the supervision term, or until the
expiration of the balance of the supervision term." (Docket
Entry 1 at 83); see also (Docket Entry 7-2 at 72). He
contends this action was retaliatory in nature, as was the
increase of the 18-month FET to a 20-month FET. 5 He states
he was informed by the Parole Board that "the matter will
remain on indefinite postponement until [Petitioner
advises] the state parole board in writing that.he wish[es]
to proceed with [his] hearing." (Docket Entry 1 at 85).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 2254(a) provides in relevant part: "[A] district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus
in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Habeas Rule 4 requires the
assigned judge to sua sponte dismiss a habeas petition or
application without ordering a responsive pleading "[i]£ it
plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that
s Chairman Plousis asserted in a letter dated August 16, 2013
that his reference to a 20-month FET in the February 27, 2013
final decision, (Docket Entry 7-2 at 57), was a typographical
error, and that the FET imposed by the Board_ on July 5, 2012 was
in fact 18-months. (Docket Entry 7~2 at 58).
9
the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court .
. " 28 U.S.C.
§
2254 Rule 4.
Petitioner brings this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
as a pro se litigant. A pro se pleading is held to less
stringent standards than more formal pleadings dra£ted by
lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A pro se habeas petition and
any supporting submissions must be construed liberally and with
a measure of tolerance. See Rainey v. Varner,
603 F.3d 189, 198
(3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom Rainey v. Walsh, 562 U.S.
1286 (2011).
IV.
ANALYSIS
Petitioner names the New Jersey State Parole Board as
Respondent in this action. As the proper respondent in a habeas
action is Petitioner's immediate custodian, Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426, 435-36 (2004), the Clerk shall be ordered to
substitute the Warden of New Jersey State Prison as the
Respondent in this matter.
Petitioner raises three grounds for relief predicated on
(1) the November 2, 2011 revocation of his mandatory parole
supervision period;
(2) the failure of the Parole Board to
conduct a timely hearing as of July 2, 2012; and (3) the July 5,
2012 denial of parole and imposition of an 18-month FET.
10
A. Severing of Judgments
Habeas Rule 2 states in relevant part: "A petitioner who
seeks relief from judgments of more than one state court must
file a separate petition covering the judgment or judgments of
each court." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(e). See also Magwood v.
Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 334 n.9 (2010); McKnight v. United
States, 27 F. Supp. 3d 575, 578 (D.N.J. 2014). Although a
petitioner "may join claims attacking multiple judgments in
'single court' situations," such a course of action is not
required under the habeas rules. 1 RANDY HERTZ
&
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 11. 4 (a)
JAMES
s.
LIEBMAN'
(6th ed. 2011) .
In this instance, the Court finds it prudent to sever
Ground One from Grounds Two and Three. The Clerk of the Court
shall therefore be ordered to open a separate proceeding under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 for consideration of Grounds Two and Three. The
new petition will be deemed as filed on October 26, 2013, the
date Petitioner handed the petition to prison officials for
mailing. The Clerk shall also be directed to copy the procedural
history of this matter into the new proceeding, concluding with
today's Order and Opinion. The "new" petition will be reviewed
according to Habeas Rules 2 and 4 under that docket number in a
separate opinion.
11
B. Ground One
Petitioner asserts that the November 2, 2011 revocation of
his period of mandatory supervision:
Violated his First Amendment right to remain silent
and legal access to the Court[;] his Fourth Amendment
Right to be free from illegal seizures[;] his
Fourteenth Amendment Right to due process of law[;]
his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be
free from official harassment and intimidation[;] his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from
malicious prosecution[;] his Fourteenth Amendment
right to be free from arbitrary actions of state
parole officials[;] his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment [right] to be free of parole official
correctional deliberate indifference[;] his Fourth and
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment.
(Docket Entry 1 at 17). He also claims Respondent violated NERA,
(Docket Entry 1 at 52), and that Chairman Plousis failed to
"properly train and supervise subordinates." (Docket Entry 1 at
4 5) •
With the exception of Petitioner's Due Process, Illegal
Seizure, and Eighth Amendment claims, the stated alleged
constitutional violations, including his failure to train and
supervise claims, are not cognizable in habeas proceedings.
Those claims are more appropriately brought in a civil rights
1983. 6 See Leamer v. Fauver, 288
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§
F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002)
("[W]hen the challenge is to a
6
The Court notes Petitioner presently has two such civil rights
actions pending in this Court, Civil Actions 13-7134 and 141139.
12
condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's
favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, an
action under § 1983 is appropriate."). Those claims shall be
summarily dismissed for failure to state a basis for habeas
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rules ·2 and 4.
Likewise, Petitioner's NERA claim is not cognizable on
habeas review. Section 2254 confers jurisdiction on
distr~ct
courts to grant relief to those in state custody "only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)
(emphasis added). Petitioner may not base a claim for federal
habeas relief on violations of state law. This claim is also
summarily dismissed.
Having screened the petition for summary dismissal, it does
not "plainly appear[ ] from the petition and any attached
exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief
II
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4. The State shall be ordered to answer
the Due Process, Illegal Seizure, and Eighth Amendment claims of
Ground One.
V.
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
severed from this
stated
above,
Grounds
Two
and
action and shall be opened in a
Three
new §
are
2254
proceeding. The State shall be ordered to answer the petition as
outlined above.
13
An appropriate order follows.
Date
I
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