HOPEWELL VALLEY REGIONAL BOARD OF EDUCATION v. J.R. et al
Filing
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LETTER OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 3/7/2016. (eaj)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(609) 989-2182
CHAMBERS OF
Clarkson S. Fisher Federal Building &
U.S. Courthouse
402 East State Street
Trenton, New Jersey 08608
FREDA L. WOLFSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
LETTER OPINION
March 7, 2016
Michael I. Inzelbuch, Esq.
Sovereign Bank Building
555 Madison Avenue
Lakewood, NJ 08701
RE:
Robin S. Ballard, Esq.
Schenck, Price, Smith & King, LLP
220 Park Avenue
P.O. Box 991
Florham Park, NJ 07932
Hopewell Valley Reg’l. Bd. of Ed. v. J.R. and C.H. o/b/o S.R
Civil Action No.: 3:15-cv-8477-FLW-LHG
Dear Litigants:
This matter comes before the Court on a motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), filed by Defendants J.R. and C.H. o/b/o S.R. (collectively “Defendants”) to
dismiss Plaintiff Hopewell Valley Regional Board of Education’s (“District” or “Plaintiff”)
Verified Complaint Seeking Interlocutory Appeal based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted and this matter is dismissed without
prejudice.
The following are facts drawn from the Complaint and attached exhibits, except where
noted. S.R. was born on December 11, 2000. Compl. ¶ 1. On March 1, 2006, S.R. was
registered to start kindergarten in the District, but was withdrawn by her parents as of June 2006.
Id. at ¶ 4. Instead, in the fall of 2006, S.R. began attending the Lewis School of Princeton (“Lewis
School”). Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.
In the summer of 2013, S.R.’s parents completed paperwork to enroll her in the District
again, and S.R. attended a back-to-school night at the Timberlane Middle School. Id. at ¶ 6. On
September 4, 2013, the District’s Child Study Team (“CST”) received a request from S.R.’s
parents to be evaluate S.R.. Id. at ¶ 8.
When the 2013-14 school year began, S.R. did not attend classes at Timberlane Middle
School, but continued to attend the Lewis School instead. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. On September 8, 2013,
S.R.’s parents emailed the District to inform that S.R. would continue to attend the Lewis School
and to request funding and transportation. Id. at ¶ 11. The District’s CST scheduled a meeting
with S.R.’s parents for September 16, 2013 to determine whether S.R. would be evaluated. Id. at
¶ 9. On September 23, 2013, S.R. was removed from the District’s rolls. Id. at ¶12.
On or about January 7, 2014, Defendants filed a due process petition. Id. at ¶ 19, Ex. A.
On January 7, 2014, the District filed a notice challenging the sufficiency of the due process
petition. Id. at ¶ 21, Ex. B. On January 27, 2014, ALJ Lisa James-Beavers concluded that
Defendants’ due process petition contained all of the information required by law and, accordingly,
denied the District’s sufficiency challenge and ordered that the matter be returned to the Office of
Special Education so that the parties could proceed with a resolution session or mediation. Id. at
¶ 22, Ex. C.
On January 28, 2014, the District filed an Answer to the due process petition, Id. at ¶ 23,
Ex. D, and the parties attended a settlement conference on May 23, 2014, before ALJ JamesBeavers. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25. On July 10, 2014, the District filed its first motion for summary
decision, arguing that because S.R. attended the Lewis School, it was that District’s responsibility
to conduct S.R.’s initial evaluation. Id. at ¶ 26, Ex. E. Defendants cross-moved for partial
summary decision, seeking an order that the District evaluate and make an eligibility determination
of S.R., reimburse Defendants for various costs, and sought an independent evaluation of S.R..
Id. at ¶ 27, Ex. F. On September 24, 2014, ALJ Ronald W. Reba denied the District’s motion for
summary decision, based on his conclusion that S.R. was registered in the District and had
requested an evaluation, ordered the District to evaluate S.R. and make an eligibility determination,
and reserved on Defendants’ cross-motion for reimbursement and an independent evaluation
following the conclusion of the District’s evaluation. Id. at ¶ 33, Ex. H.
Following ALJ Reba’s decision, the District’s CST conducted an evaluation of S.R. Id.
at ¶ 34. On March 20, 2015, the CST found S.R. eligible for special education and related
services, and the District offered S.R. an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for the
remainder of the 2014-15 school year. Id. at ¶ 35.
On June 26, 2015, the District filed a second motion for summary decision, alleging the
presence of new facts not known when the first motion for summary decision was filed. Id. at ¶¶
39-40, Ex I. On September 24, 2015, ALJ John S. Kennedy denied the second motion for
summary decision based on the existence of several factual disputes. Id. at ¶ 43, Ex. L.
On December 4, 2015, the District filed suit in this Court, seeking interlocutory review of
the three ALJ decisions outlined above. On December 17, 2015, Defendants filed the instant
motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The parties have represented to
the Court that the due process hearing before ALJ Kennedy is scheduled to proceed in this matter
in April 2016.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) mandates the dismissal of a case for “lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Once a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge is raised, the plaintiff bears the
burden of demonstrating the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See McCann v. Newman
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Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is treated
as either a “facial or factual challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” 1 Gould
Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). Under a facial attack, the
movant challenges the legal sufficiency of the claim, and the court considers only “the allegations
of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Id. However, “[i]n reviewing a factual attack, the court may consider evidence
outside the pleadings.” Id. (citing Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Defendants’ motion relies on the reasons outlined in this Court’s opinion issued in H.T. v.
Hopewell Valley Regional Board of Education, No. 14-1308, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108641
(D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2015), to assert a facial challenge to the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.2 The
District counters that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction because the District is “a party
aggrieved by the findings and decisions made in connection with a due process hearing,” under
the IDEA. Pl. Opp. Br. at 2 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction: “they have only the power that is
authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.”
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). As this Court discussed in
more detail in H.T., while the IDEA provides the right to file a civil action challenging an
administrative decision, the IDEA limits such appeals to specific circumstances. See 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 108641 at *14-18. Specifically, the IDEA provides for the filing of civil actions in
federal courts in the following circumstances:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection (f) or (k)
who does not have the right to an appeal under subsection (g), and any party
aggrieved by the findings and decision made under this subsection, shall have the
right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this
section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction
or in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in
controversy.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). “The plain language of the statute, therefore, permits an appeal to the
federal courts only where a party is ‘aggrieved by the findings and decision’ made under
1
Here, Defendants make both a facial attack, arguing that this Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction because the IDEA does not provide jurisdiction to file a complaint in federal court
challenging the underlying decisions, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), and two factual challenges,
based on mootness and the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, see J.Q. v. Wash. Twp. Sch.
Dist., 92 F. Supp. 3d 241, 245 (D.N.J. 2015); A.D. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Ed., 90 F. Supp. 3d
326, 334 (D.N.J. 2015). Because this Court finds in favor of Defendants based on their facial
challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction, it will not address Defendants’ factual challenges.
2
The Court notes that Defendants raise this argument in a single paragraph, which does
nothing more than cite to this Court’s previous decision in H.T., and further only asserts this
argument as a basis for dismissal of Count I of the Complaint, concerning only ALJ JamesBeavers’ decision, rather than the entire Complaint.
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subsections (f), (k), or (g).” H.T., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108641, at *16.
No impartial hearing has occurred in this matter yet, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), and, obviously,
no appeal from such an impartial hearing has occurred yet either, id. at § 1415(g). Nor does this
matter concern the placement of S.R. in an alternate educational setting. Id. at § 1415(k).
Instead, all of the underlying decisions at issue in this matter concern the sufficiency of S.R.’s due
process petition, which are decided under Section 1415(c). Accordingly, this Court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over the Complaint. See id. at § 1415(i)(2)(A).
Nevertheless, the District argues that even though this Court has previously found in H.T.
that the IDEA does not provide subject-matter jurisdiction to federal courts over sufficiency
determinations, the Court should nevertheless reach the merits of its appeal, as the Court did in
H.T., rather than dismiss solely on jurisdictional grounds. See H.T., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108641 at *18. While it is true that, “out of an abundance of caution, and to prevent any undue
delay to the parties,” id., this Court did address the plaintiff’s sufficiency arguments in H.T., this
matter is procedurally different for two reasons.
First, the decision at issue in H.T. was an ALJ’s dismissal of a due process petition based
on insufficiency. Id. at *13; see also M.S.-G v. Lenape Reg’l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 306 Fed.
Appx. 772, 774 (3d Cir. 2009); D.F. v. Collingswood Pub. Schs, No. 10-594, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2624, *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2013). Here, all of the ALJ decisions at issue have merely denied
the District’s challenges to the due process petition – not the dismissal of the due process petition
itself – finding each time that the petition should proceed to an impartial hearing. Second, the
parties in H.T. did not raise the issue of the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction; instead, the parties
briefed their substantive arguments concerning the merits of the decision at issue in that case and
the Court raised the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Here, Defendants’ motion to
dismiss only raises challenges to this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and the District’s
opposition brief, understandably, only responds to those arguments. More importantly, without
jurisdiction, this Court cannot address the merits of this case. See In re Orthopedic “Bone Screw”
Products Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1997).
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction is granted, and the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order will
follow.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON
United States District Judge
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