BOLDMAN et al v. WAL-MART STORES, INC. et al
Filing
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OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 2/10/2016. (mmh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOSEPH J. BOLDMAN, et al.,
Civ. No. 16-0004
Plaintiffs,
OPINION
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Wal-Mart
Stores, East, LP, and Wal-Mart Stores, East, Inc.’s (collectively “Wal-Mart” or “Defendants”)
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiffs Joseph and Laura Boldman (“Plaintiffs”). (ECF
No. 5). Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on the basis of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6). (Id.). Plaintiffs oppose. (ECF No. 9). The Court has issued the
Opinion below based upon the written submissions of the parties and without oral argument
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss will be granted, and the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Joseph and Laura Boldman’s allegations are as follows: on January 1, 2014, the
Boldmans were visiting Mr. Boldman’s grandparents in Aberdeen Township, New Jersey. The
family planned to enjoy a New Year’s Day campfire, and so Mr. Boldman attempted to start a
fire using a five-gallon portable gasoline can. Suddenly, the gasoline can exploded, injuring Mr.
Boldman. As a result of the accident, Mr. Boldman suffered third-degree burns to approximately
forty percent of his body, resulting in extensive skin graft operations, prolonged hospitalization,
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rehabilitation, disfigurement, physical pain, loss of sensation, emotional suffering, and
substantial medical expenses and economic losses. Mrs. Boldman observed the accident and has
suffered emotional distress, loss of consortium, and loss of enjoyment of life.
The gasoline can was manufactured by Blitz, U.S.A. Inc., a now-defunct company that
has no attachable assets and has been adjudicated bankrupt. However, the gasoline canister was
sold to Mr. Boldman’s grandfather by Wal-Mart at an unspecified prior date. Plaintiffs have
therefore brought product liability claims against Wal-Mart as the seller of the can, on the
theories of strict liability and negligence. Plaintiffs allege failure to warn and design defects
under the New Jersey Products Liability Act and the common law. Plaintiffs assert that the
device was not safe because it did not have a safety device known as a flame arrestor. Plaintiffs
also assert that Wal-Mart knew that these gasoline cans had the propensity to explode, but
rejected proposed design changes and neglected to add safety warnings in order to maximize
profits.
On November 17, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their product liability action against Wal-Mart in
the Superior Court of New Jersey. The Complaint and Summons were served on December 8,
2015. On January 4, 2016, Defendants removed the case to federal court. Then, on January 11,
2016, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. This Motion is presently before
the Court.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
i. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
The adequacy of pleadings is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which
requires that a complaint allege “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
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pleader is entitled to relief.” This Rule “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing’ rather than a blanket
assertion of an entitlement to relief”). Even though a plaintiff is not required to plead his claims
with intricate detail, Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to provide “some specificity.” Hunter Roberts
Const. Grp., LLC v. J. Rihl, Inc., No. 12-7751, 2013 WL 3445331, at *3 (D.N.J. July 9, 2013)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).
ii. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a
complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). The defendant bears the burden
of showing that no claim has been presented. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d
Cir. 2005). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court should conduct a threepart analysis. See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). “First, the court must
‘take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
56 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court must accept as true all of a plaintiff’s well-pleaded
factual allegations and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fowler
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). The court may disregard any
conclusory legal allegations. Id. Finally, the court must determine whether the “facts are
sufficient to show that plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679). Such a claim requires more than mere allegation of an entitlement to relief or
demonstration of the “mere possibility of misconduct;” instead, the facts must allow a court to
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reasonably infer “that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 210, 211
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79).
B. Analysis
Defendants provide two justifications for their Motion to Dismiss. First, Defendants
argue that Plaintiffs’ common-law negligence claims are subsumed by the New Jersey Products
Liability Act (“PLA”). Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the
PLA, either for a design defect or failure to warn.
As to Defendants’ first argument, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are
subsumed by the PLA. In New Jersey, “any claim or action brought by a claimant for harm
caused by a product, irrespective of the theory underlying the claim, except actions for harm
caused by breach of an express warranty” is subsumed by the PLA. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C1(b)(3); In re Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d 484, 503 (N.J. 2007) (noting that “the PLA is both
expansive and inclusive, encompassing virtually all possible causes of action relating to harms
caused by consumer and other products”). The PLA provides:
A manufacturer or seller of a product shall be liable in a product liability action
only if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the product
causing the harm was not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purpose
because it: a. deviated from the design specifications, formulae, or performance
standards of the manufacturer or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the
same manufacturing specifications or formulae, or b. failed to contain adequate
warnings or instructions, or c. was designed in a defective manner.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-2. The New Jersey Legislature enacted the PLA to establish clear rules
with respect to actions for damages for harm caused by products. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-1(a).
Therefore, if a claim falls within the scope of the PLA, that claim may only be pursued under the
Act. See Green v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 205, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)
(“Under the [PLA] . . . the causes of action for negligence, strict liability and implied warranty
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have been consolidated into a single product liability cause of action, the essence of which is
strict liability.”).
To determine whether the PLA subsumes a particular claim, “courts examine the
essential nature of the claim presented and decide whether the claim would traditionally be
considered a products claim.” Rodnite v. Hovnanian Enters., Inc., No. 08-3787, 2010 WL
3079576, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2010). Since the passage of the PLA, New Jersey courts have
repeatedly held that a claim of negligent manufacture is no longer viable as a separate cause of
action for harm caused by a product. See, e.g., Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Arcadian Corp., 189
F.3d 305, 313 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Under New Jersey law negligence is no longer viable as a
separate claim for harm caused by a product.”); Brown ex rel. Estate of Brown v. Philip Morris
Inc., 228 F.Supp.2d 506, 516 (D.N.J. 2002) (“Because the [PLA] generally subsumes commonlaw product liability claims, the Third Circuit, the New Jersey District Court, and New Jersey
State courts consistently have dismissed product liability claims based on common-law theories
when those theories allege harm caused by a product.”) (internal citations removed).
In this case, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant negligently and recklessly controlled the
design and manufacture of the Blitz gasoline cans, and failed to provide adequate warnings.
These claims fall squarely within the definition of a products action provided by the PLA
because they involve “harm caused by a product” and do not involve a claim of breach of an
express warranty. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-1(b)(3) (definition of “products liability
action”). Nor do Plaintiffs allege any other theories of harm outside the domain of a products
liability action, such as the breach of a duty arising independently of the manufacturer’s duty to
provide a non-defective product. Worrell v. Elliott & Frantz, 799 F. Supp. 2d 343, 351 (D.N.J.
2011). Because Plaintiffs’ claims fall squarely within the definition of a traditional products
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claim, and traditional products claims are subsumed by the PLA, Plaintiffs’ common-law
negligence claims are subsumed by the PLA. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’
common-law negligence claims.
As to Defendants’ second argument, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim under the PLA for either a design defect or failure to warn. The elements for proving a
product defect are essentially the same for both a design defect and a failure to warn claim. See
Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620, 627-28 (N.J. 1996); Mathews v. Univ. Loft Co.,
903 A.2d 1120, 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). A plaintiff must prove: (1) the product
was defective; (2) the defect existed when the product left the hands of the defendant; (3) the
defect proximately caused injuries to the plaintiff; and (4) the injured plaintiff was a reasonably
foreseeable user. Myrlak v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 723 A.2d 45, 52 (N.J. 1999).
In cases involving design defect claims, the plaintiff must show specifically that the product “is
not reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes.” Jurado
v. W. Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1317 (1993) (citation omitted). In a failure to warn case, the
duty to warn is premised on the notion that a product is defective absent an adequate warning for
foreseeable users that “the product can potentially cause injury.” Clark v. Safety–Kleen Corp.,
845 A.2d 587, 598 (N.J. 2004) (quoting Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 716 (N.J.
1993)).
Viewing Plaintiffs’ allegations in the light most favorable to them, Plaintiffs nonetheless
fail to plead essential elements of their product liability claims. Plaintiffs state that “the subject
Blitz five-gallon gas container used by plaintiff, Joseph Boldman, on January 1, 2014, was not
reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purposes at the time Wal-Mart sold the Blitz
canister.” (Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 1). However, at no point do Plaintiffs identify the gasoline
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can’s intended purpose, or any reasonably foreseeable purpose, which is one of the required
elements of a products liability claim. The closest Plaintiffs come to identifying an intended
purpose is when they assert that Wal-Mart assured shoppers that “the Blitz cans were fit,
suitable, and safe to hold and use with gasoline.” (Compl. ¶ 5). However, Plaintiffs fail to fully
connect the dots of Wal-Mart’s alleged assurance with an intended purpose, making it difficult
for Defendants to make a counterargument. Moreover, this purported intended use does not
parallel the use Plaintiffs made of the gasoline can, in that they allegedly used the gasoline can
not merely to hold gasoline, but also to start a campfire. In the absence of factual allegations
about the can’s intended purpose, the Court must disregard this paragraph of the Complaint as a
conclusory legal allegation. The Complaint also fails to allege that Mr. Boldman was a
reasonably foreseeable user of the gasoline can, another required element. As to Plaintiffs’ claim
of inadequate warning, Plaintiffs do not allege what warnings were provided with the gasoline
can, if any, and why they were inadequate. In the absence of these factual allegations, the Court
cannot construe the Complaint as stating a claim for failure to warn. Finally, the Complaint is
lacking in specificity as to the date of the gasoline can purchase.
Given these defects, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under the PLA for failure
to state a claim. Because the Court will dismiss both the common-law claims and the claims
under the PLA, no claims remain, and the entire Complaint must be dismissed. However, the
Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice, and Plaintiffs will be granted leave to
amend.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted, and the Complaint
will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend the Complaint
within thirty days. A corresponding Order follows.
/s/ Anne E. Thompson
Anne E. Thompson, U.S.D.J.
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