JIMENEZ v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 7/13/2016. (mmh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JASON JIMENEZ,
Civil Action No. 16-0826 (MAS)
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.
Respondents.
This matter having come before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of
Petitioner Jason Jimenez, for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. It appearing that:
1. On April 11, 2016, after having screened the Petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court issued a show-cause order directing Petitioner to show
why the Petition should not be dismissed as untimely. (Order, Apr. 11, 2016, ECF No. 4.)
2. In the show-cause order, the Court found that the Petition appeared to be statutorily timebarred by the one-year statute oflimitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). During the Court's review
of the case, the Court identified the state appellate court decision affirming the denial of
Petitioner's application for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), State v. Jiminez, Indictment No. 0609-1356, 2015 WL 1587951 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 10, 2015). 1 In that opinion, the
appellate court stated that Petitioner was sentenced on December 17, 2007, and did not file an
appeal. Id. at* 1. Subsequently, he filed his PCR application on December 1, 2009. Id. Because
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Although Petitioner spells his last name as "Jimenez" in the Petition, the State seemed to have
found that his last name is spelled "Jiminez." Indeed, in the New Jersey inmate database, Petitioner
See
is identified as "Jason Jiminez" with "Jason Jimenez" as a known alias.
https://www20.state.nj.us/DOC_Inmate/details?x=1392799&n=l (last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
Petitioner did not file his PCR application until December 1, 2009, more than a year after his
conviction and sentence became final, by the time statutory tolling would have applied, his oneyear limitations period had already expired. Therefore, it appeared that the Petition was statutorily
time-barred.
3. In his response, Petitioner appears to argue for equitable tolling. He first states that he
"immidiateily [sic] found [out] that [his] trail [sic] attorney Paul Bergrin never filed for [his] appeal
so on the date of [J]anuary 16, 2008, [he] filed for a[n] appeal before [his] 45 day time-bar to file
a[n] appeal." (Pet'r's Resp. 1, ECF No. 5.) He was told that he filed the appeal on the wrong
form, and had to refile. Id. He then asserts that he was placed in administrative segregation, so he
"did not have the acces[s] [he] needed to file a[n] appeal[.]" Id. Finally, he claims that he filed a
motion on September 25, 2009, and filed a PCR application on December 1, 2009. Id. Petitioner
also points to other incidents relating to his PCR counsel that occurred after December 1, 2009,
but those facts are irrelevant to the instant matter, as the Court's show-cause order only inquired
about the events that occurred before December 1, 2009.
4. Given the foregoing, even ifthe Court construes the September 25, 2009 filing as a properly
filed appeal, that filing itself was made more than a year after Petitioner's conviction and sentence
became final, so statutory tolling still would not have applied. As such, Petitioner's only "cause"
for equitable tolling appears to be his alleged administrative segregation from January 16, 2008 to
September 25, 2009. However, the Court fails to see why administrative segregation, by itself,
would have prevented Petitioner from making the necessary filings. The Court recognizes that
perhaps some extraordinary circumstance specific to Petitioner's administrative segregation may
have prevented him from making a filing.
Petitioner, however, provides no explanation or
evidence to that effect. Merely asserting that Petitioner was in administrative segregation is not
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enough to warrant equitable tolling. "To secure equitable tolling, it is not enough for a party to
show that he experienced extraordinary circumstances. He must further demonstrate that those
circumstances caused him to miss the original filing deadline." Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 803
n.29 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2011)). "The word
'prevent' requires the petitioner to demonstrate a causal relationship between the extraordinary
circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of his filing, a
demonstration that cannot be made if the petitioner, acting with reasonable diligence, could have
filed on time notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances." Id. (quoting Valverde v. Stinson,
224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000)).
5. Here, Petitioner states in a conclusory fashion that: (1) he diligently pursued his rights;
(2) he was actively misled by his PCR counsel; and (3) he timely asserted his rights in the wrong
forum. (Pet' r's Resp. 1.) However, there is no evidence to support any of the foregoing. Waiting
twenty months to file an appeal simply because he was in administrative segregation is not diligent.
In addition, allegedly being misled by his PCR counsel after the statute of limitations had already
expired does not constitute good cause to excuse the untimeliness. Furthermore, filing the wrong
form is not the same as filing in the wrongforum.
6. Having analyzed Petitioner's arguments and found them meritless, the Court now finds
that the Petition is untimely, and that Petitioner has not demonstrated good cause as to why his
Petition should not be dismissed. As such, the Court dismisses the Petition as time-barred.
7. Lastly, the Court denies a certificate of appealability ("COA''). Federal law provides that
an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a § 2254 proceeding unless
a judge issues a COA on the ground that "the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
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(2000), the United States Supreme Court held that "[w]hen the district court denies a habeas
petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a
COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling."
Here, the Court denies a COA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) because jurists ofreason would not
find it debatable that dismissal of the Petition is correct.
s/ Michael A. Shipp
MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: July 13, 2016
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