GRAHAM v. MONMOUTH COUNTY BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS et al

Filing 84

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that Defendant Monmouth County Building and Grounds' 71 Second Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Defendant Compton's 72 Second Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Defendant Krzyanowski's 73 Second Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 9/19/2018. (mps)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LUTHER GRAHAM,
Plaintiff
v.
MONMOUTH COUNTY BUILDINGS
AND GROUNDS,
DAVID KRZYANOWSKI,
ROBERT W. COMPTON,
and CRAIG BELL,

)
)
Civil Action No:
16-cv-1578 (PUS)

)
)

MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER

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)
)
)

Defendants.
SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 71, 72, 73).
I.
In brief, Defendants originally brought motions for summary judgment on April 21 and 22,
2017, which this Court granted in part and denied in part on March 20, 2018. After the Court’s
ruling, the only claims remaining were Count I and Count III for retaliation and hostile work
environment against the County and individual Defendants, specific to the circumstances
surrounding Plaintiff’s application, interview, and rejection for the Crew Supervisor Position. On
April 3, 2018, Defendants brought motions for reconsideration. Upon review, the Court granted
Defendant Bell’s motion for reconsideration, but instructed the other Defendants that if they wish
to renew a motion for summary judgment on the crew supervisor position they should file a new

motion for summary judgment with a statement of undisputed facts, because their motion for
reconsideration was confusing. Thereafter, Defendants filed the motions for summary judgment
currently pending before this Court.
Since the facts of this case were explained in detail in the previous motion for summary
judgment (ECF 56), this memorandum will be limited to facts relevant to the crew supervisor
position.
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) when the moving party
demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the evidence establishes the moving
party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 32223 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non
movant, and it is material if, under the substantive law, it would affect the outcome of the suit.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In considering a motion for summary
judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of
the evidence; instead, the non-moving party’s evidence “is to be believed and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”

Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d

Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the party opposing the motion must
establish that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey
Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir. 1985). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment
cannot rest on mere allegations and instead must present actual evidence that creates a genuine
issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier
Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (3d Cir. 1995). “[U]nsupported allegations.

2

.

.

and pleadings

are insufficient to repel summary judgment.” Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorp., 912 F.2d 654,
657 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (requiring nonmoving party to set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”). Moreover, only disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law will preclude the entry of summary
judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. If a court determines, after drawing all inferences in
favor of [the non-moving party] and making all credibility determinations in his favor “that no
reasonable jury could find for him, summary judgment is appropriate.” Alevras v. Tacopina, 226
Fed. App’x. 222, 227 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
There are three motions pending before this Court, one from each of the following: (1)
Defendant Monmouth County Buildings and Grounds (hereinafter, “Monmouth County”); (2)
Defendant David Krzyanowski; and (3) Defendant Robert Compton’. (ECF No.71,73,72). The
Court will address Krzyzanowski’s motion first.
Defendant Krzyanowski argues that he was not involved in the decision with regard to
Graham’s application for the the Crew Supervisor position2. Krzyanowski became a supervisor of
General Services Operations in 2012 and currently holds that position. (SOF ¶3). According to
Krzyanowski, due to the Civil Service requirements, the hiring process requires authorization of
the County Administrator. (SOF ¶6). Krzyanowski furthers that he did not interview Plaintiff for
the Crew Supervisor Building Maintenance Workers position, rather Plaintiff was interviewed by
Superintendent Robert Compton. (SOF ¶8-9).

Initially, the Court notes that Krzyanowski’s

involvement in the hiring is unclear, and the facts are in dispute. While Krzyanowski argues that

I

Defendant Compton’s motion was submitted in the form of a letter-brief and relies on Monmouth County’s
arguments.
2

Defendant Krzyanowski did not submit a brief along with this motion.

3

he was not involved in the hiring process, he stated in his deposition

that he provided a

recommendation. (T. 35, 5-36, 2) Specifically,

Q
6

7

A.

Robert Hsu?
i Jn riot ui uf
tvc
ever ‘thh ih trude

Robort Bri

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crew.

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Do you knuw hn w ane oto the
tIni he Iwlds nv?
A. No sure.
Q y mcntioncd I3& pirt of th radc5
crew. Es he one your iridIrct ordniitcs?
c-rt.
W he one af your direct
uburdinates when you firsi cariw into t3e
pozifluo yii hold a %tIprVtOr?
A. Mo, he wsnL.
Q Whn did he bcarnt one of your
indirctt subardlns?
T dont TCn whrn h gu that
piarL
Q. Dirt you have any hisilvement in him
b*rnth one of your ladiruct ubordLnztc, ii

Q.

positi(m

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6
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(ECF No. 45-5, Ex. 0 pg. 35:5-36:2).
Based on this factual dispute, a jury may determine Mr. Krzyanowski was involved. As such,
summary judgment is denied.
Defendant Monmouth County argues that the Crew Supervisor position was a Civil Service
position, requiring a Building Services Promotional Title. (SOF ¶5). Since Plaintiff did not hold
the required promotional title, and since he admitted that he had not acquired it (SOF ¶6), he lacked
the requisite qualifications to become a Crew Supervisor.

Further, according to Defendants’

account, Plaintiff interviewed poorly for the position, whereas another applicant, Mr. Briscoe,
interviewed exceptionally. (Id. ¶7-9).

4

Monmouth County submitted a supplemental affidavit of Compton to support its motion.
This supplemental affidavit sets forth alleged facts that appear to be inconsistent with the facts
outlined in the prior motion. For instance, in the prior motion, Defendant’s main argument was
that Briscoe was a better interviewer, and during Compton’s deposition, he stated he did not know
where Plaintiff “fell” with regard to the preferred candidates. In the supplemental affidavit,
Compton specifically recalls that Plaintiff fell toward the bottom of the list. Compton explained
in his supplemental declaration that he conducted twelve interviews for that specific position,
including Plaintiff. The interview consisted of twenty-one questions weighted by importance. Each
interviewee’s response to the questions are scored on a 0-3 basis. Mr. Briscoe scored 2.47 in the
interview, placing him at the top. Plaintiff scored 1.0 and ranked 10 out the 12 people that were
interviewed. Plaintiff argues that this information contradicts Compton’s deposition testimony,
and argues that this information was not previously provided in discovery.
Lastly, all three Defendants argue that there is no evidence of any connection between the
retaliation complaints filed by Plaintiff and the Crew Supervisor position, since those complaints
were filed prior to the position’s posting. More specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff filed
complaints of some discriminatory actions on February 2, 2015, March 12, 2015, April 30, 2015,
June 18, 2015, and October 1, 2015. Since the crew supervisor position was posted on March 8,
2016, Defendants argue that these events lacked any causal proximity to the denial of the Crew
Supervisor position. To the contrary, the five months between the last event (October 1, 2015)
and March 8, 2016 is sufficient to show temporal proximity.
Overall, this matter still involves genuine issues of material facts that cannot be resolved
by the Court via this motion, thus the motions for summary judgment are denied.

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ORDER

This matter has been opened to the Court for summary judgment on the crew supervisor
position (ECF No.71,72,73) and the Court having considered the moving papers, and for good
cause having been shown;
IT IS on this 1 9th day of September, 2018,
ORDERED that Defendant Monmouth County Building and Grounds’ second motion for
summary judgment (ECF 71) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant Compton’s second motion for summary judgment (ECF 72) is
DENIED; and it is further.
ORDERED that Defendant Krzyanowski’s second motion for summary judgment (ECF
73) is DENIED.

PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.

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