ALLEN v. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE et al

Filing 35

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Brian R. Martinotti on 11/28/2017. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
:
RA-KING ALLEN,
:
:
Civil Action No. 16-1660-BRM-DEA
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, et al.,
:
:
OPINION
Defendants.
:
____________________________________:
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendants New Jersey State Police (“NJSP”), Superintendent Joseph
R. Fuentes, and State Trooper Richard Nugnes’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Partial Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff Ra-King Allen’s Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 28.) 1 Allen opposes this

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In their moving papers, Defendants sought to dismiss Allen’s Complaint in its entirety.
(See ECF No. 28.) They sought to dismiss defendants NJSP and Fuentes arguing NJSP was
completely immune from liability and Fuentes was immune in his official capacity. (Id. at 2, 7-8.)
They further contended Allen’s claims against Fuentes in his individual capacity should be
dismissed because they were based solely on an impermissible theory of respondeat superior. (Id.
at 8-10.) However, in their reply brief, they dropped their Motion to Dismiss against Defendants
NJSP and Fuentes, conceding they were barred from raising the issue of immunity against both
Defendants because the defense was available to them when they filed their original motion to
dismiss the initial Complaint on June 3, 3016. (ECF No. 12; see ECF No. 34 at 2 (acknowledging
Allen’s argument as to why Defendants are procedurally barred from asserting the defense of
immunity and conceding “the Third Circuit has strictly construed Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2) to
impose restrictions on the filing of successive motions to dismiss”).) Therefore, Defendants reply
brief only asks the Court to “grant Defendants’ Motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for malicious
prosecution based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” (ECF No. 34 at 6.) Accordingly, the
Court will only address this issue and construes Defendants’ Motion as a Partial Motion to
Dismiss.
Indeed, Defendants are barred from raising defenses or objections which were available at
the time of the original complaint. See Oliver v. Roquet, No. 13-1881, 2014 WL 4271628, at *3
(D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2014) (“[T]his district has stated that with respect to amended complaints and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2), even if a plaintiff files an amended complaint . . . [it] does not revive the
right to interpose defenses or objections which might have been made to the original complaint.”)
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Motion. (ECF No. 29.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), the Court did not hear
oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND
For the purpose of this Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the

Complaint as true, considers any document “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint,”
and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. In re Burlington Coat Factory
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997); see Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
228 (3d Cir. 2008).
This action arises out of a motor vehicle stop that occurred on April 28, 2008, in Warren
County, New Jersey. (ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 14-15.) Allen was the passenger in a vehicle that was stopped
for a motor vehicle violation by the NJSP. (Id.) Nugnes was among the troopers involved in the
stop. (Id. ¶ 16.) After determining both the driver and Allen had valid outstanding warrants, both
individuals were placed under arrest. See State of New Jersey v. Allen, No. A-1290-10T2, 2011
WL4407521, *1 (N.J. App. Div. Sept. 23, 2011). 2 During a search incident to those arrests,
marijuana was found on Allen’s person. Id. Nugnes then directed the car to be towed and a tow
truck driver arrived at the scene. (ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 16-17.) At some point after the tow truck driver

(citations omitted). Here, the defense of immunity and qualified immunity could have been raised
in Defendants’ first motion to dismiss. (See ECF No. 1.) To the extent Defendants still seek to
raise an immunity defense, they may do so in a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Rule 12(c) or a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(a). This will alleviate the Rule
12(g)(2) issue.
2

While courts typically cannot consider matters outside of the pleadings when deciding a motion
to dismiss, there is an exception to this general rule when a document is integral to, or explicitly
relied upon in, the complaint. In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d at
1426. Allen expressly refers to the Appellate Division’s September 23, 2011 decision in his
Complaint (ECF No. 24 ¶ 32) and, therefore, the Court may rely upon that decision when deciding
this Motion.
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arrived, the vehicle’s trunk was inadvertently opened and Nugnes discovered a quantity of drugs
and drug paraphernalia inside a container in the trunk. (ECF No. 24 ¶ 18.) Neither Allen nor the
driver of the vehicle consented to the opening of the trunk. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff was arrested
for and charged with possession of a controlled dangerous substance. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 28.) Allen alleges
“[t]his contraband was not in plain view.” (Id. ¶ 22.)
Allen made a motion to suppress the evidence as being illegally seized without a warrant
before the trial court. (Id. ¶ 24.) Allen alleges Nugnes “engaged in deceit during his testimony” by
offering “false representations” to the trial judge. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26, 30.) As a result of the deceit, the
trial judge denied the motion and Allen pled guilty. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28, 30.) As a result of his guilty plea
and the “untruthful testimony” of Nugnes, Allen received a sentence of fourteen (14) years
imprisonment with a fifty-seven (57) month period of parole ineligibility. (Id. ¶ 31.) On September
23, 2011, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s denial of Allen’s motion to suppress.
(Id. ¶ 32.) Allen appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court and, on December 6, 2013, the matter
was remanded back to the trial court for additional findings of fact regarding the search of the
vehicle. (Id. ¶ 33.)
On remand, the trial court concluded Nugnes’ testimony
appeared at times offhand and at one point flippant. At other times
his speech was jerky and impatient. The overall impression he gave
was of someone whose time was being wasted or whose word was
above questioning. His manner did not inspire confidence in his
concern for truthfulness and accuracy. In contrast to his answers to
other questions, he qualified his answers to the crucial questions
about the appearance and location of the contraband in the trunk of
the car with phrases like “as far as I remember”, “probably” and “I
believe.” The court found his testimony on these points to be
evasive. His answers to questions about lifting the trunk lid were, in
the aggregate, equivocal.

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(ECF No. 28-3 at 1; 3 see ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 34-36.) Based on Nugnes’ and the tow truck driver’s
testimony, the trial judge found the trunk was opened inadvertently by the tow truck driver, without
direction from Nugnes and that Nugnes saw something suspicious in the trunk and asked the tow
truck driver not to close the trunk. (ECF No. 28-3 at 4.) “He then leaned over and handled whatever
was in the trunk.” (Id.) However, “[b]ased on [Nugnes’] imprecision and equivocations about the
location and appearance of the items in the trunk, the court [was] not persuaded, by even the
preponderance of the evidence, that the [contraband] was visible prior to [Nugnes] incursion into
the trunk.” (Id.) As a result of those factual findings on remand, on June 23, 2015, after Allen had
been incarcerated for fifty-seven (57) months, the New Jersey Supreme Court vacated Allen’s
conviction, finding there was no probable cause for his arrest. (ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 37-39.)
Plaintiff commenced this action on March 24, 2016, asserting claims against Defendants
for: (1) violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Art. 1 s. 7 of the New Jersey State Constitution; (2) failure to
implement appropriate policies, customs and practices, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) negligent
hiring and retention; and (4) malicious prosecution. (ECF No. 1 at 4-7.) Defendants moved to
dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF
No. 12.) On March 7, 2017, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint
without prejudice. (ECF Nos. 21-22.) On March 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint,
nunc pro tunc, asserting: (1) malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, New Jersey
common law, and Article 1, Paragraph 7 of the Constitution of the State of New Jersey against
Defendants (Count I); and (2) violations of civil rights pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

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Allen expressly refers to the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact in his Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 34-36) and, therefore, the Court may rely upon that decision when deciding this
Motion. In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d at 1426.
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Defendants (Count II). (ECF No. 24.) On April 19, 2017, Defendants filed a Partial Motion to
Dismiss Allen’s malicious prosecution claims against Defendants (Count I). (ECF Nos. 28, 34.)
See n. 1, supra.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a

district court is “required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff].” Phillips, 515 F.3d at
228. “[A] complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations.”
Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the Plaintiff’s “obligation to provide
the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the
complaint are true, those “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for misconduct alleged.” Id. This “plausibility standard” requires the complaint allege “more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it “is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Detailed factual allegations” are not
required, but “more than ‘an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation” must be pled; it

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must include “factual enhancements” and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the
elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
While as a general rule, a court many not consider anything beyond the four corners of the
complaint on a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), the Third Circuit has held “a court may
consider certain narrowly defined types of material without converting the motion to dismiss [to
one for summary judgment pursuant under Rule 56].” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec. Litig., 184
F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). Specifically, courts may consider any “document integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at
1426.
III.

DECISION
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims for malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, New Jersey common law, and Article 1, Paragraph 7 of the Constitution of the State of New
Jersey against Defendants should be dismissed “because the doctrine of collateral estoppel should
apply to preclude a finding that Nugnes’ testimony before any State court was either perjurous or
fraudulent.” (ECF No. 28-1 at 11.) Specifically, they argue none of the state courts made any
findings that Nugnes perjured himself, was purposefully deceptive, or coercive such that he
committed fraud upon the courts, and therefore, any allegation by Plaintiff to the contrary is barred
by collateral estoppel. (Id. at 13.)

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Allen argues Defendants are procedurally barred from dismissing his malicious
prosecution claims on a theory of collateral estoppel because that defense was available in their
initial motion to dismiss in June 2016. (ECF No. 29 at 2-3.) Specifically, he contends “the New
Jersey Courts ruling on [his] underlying case were in existence at the time of [D]efendants’ initial
motion,” and therefore they should have raised their collateral estoppel defense in their initial
motion. (Id. at 3.) In the alternative, Allen argues Defendants’ Motion should be denied “because
no court in the underlying case ever specifically ruled that Nugnes committed perjury or fraud
does not mean it did not occur. Nor does this cause of action require that any court actually rule
that perjury or fraud were perpetrated upon the court.” (Id. at 11.) Allen further contends, “because
the courts did rule that there was insufficient credible evidence, and that evidence was supplied by
[] Nugnes, it is clear that [] Nugnes was not worthy of belief, and did engage in misdirection.” (Id.)
He further argues that, because the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court decision, it
did in fact find Nugnes testimony was not credible. (Id.)
As a preliminary matter, Defendants are not procedurally barred from bringing this instant
Partial Motion to Dismiss Allen’s malicious prosecution claims on a theory of collateral estoppel.
While the Third Circuit has strictly construed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2) to impose
restrictions on the filing of successive motions to dismiss, it applies only to bar defenses and
objections that were “available” to the moving party at the time of the motion. Leyse v. Bank of
Am. Nat’l Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316, 320 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Except as provided in rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a
party that makes a motion under [Rule 12] must not make another motion under [Rule 12] raising
a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.”)(quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2)). The Court finds Defendants did not waive their defense of collateral
estoppel defense because there were insufficient facts in the initial Complaint to indicate that the

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defense was necessary or possible. In the initial Complaint, Allen did not allege any facts
demonstrating Nugnes made false representations or provided deceitful testimony to any of the
New Jersey State courts involved in his criminal case as he alleges in his Amended Complaint.
(Compare ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 63-70 with ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 43-57.) Instead, his claims for malicious
prosecution in his initial Complaint were entirely predicated upon an alleged unconstitutional
search and seizure. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 63-70.)
Similarly, Allen’s malicious prosecution claims are not collaterally estopped. “Collateral
estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents a party who litigated an issue previously from rearguing
that particular issue even if the other litigants were not party to the earlier proceeding.” James v.
Heritage Valley Fed. Credit Union, 197 F. App’x 102, 105 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Szehinskyj v.
Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 432 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2005)). Thus, “[a] finding in a prior criminal
proceeding may estop an individual from litigating the same issue in a subsequent civil
proceeding.” Id. (citing Emich Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 340 U.S. at 568-69 (1951)).
Federal courts must give the judgment of a state court “the same preclusive effect as would be
given the judgment by a court of that state.” Id. (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)). Under New Jersey law, collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of
an issue where:
(1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the
prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior
proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final
judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was
essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the
doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the
earlier proceeding.
First Union Nat’l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 921 A.2d 417, 424 (N.J. 2007).

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For collateral estoppel to apply, the issue sought to be precluded must be the same issue
decided in the prior proceeding. Defendants’ collateral estoppel defense fails because the issue
determined by the New Jersey State courts in the underlying actions was whether an exception to
the warrant requirement existed to excuse the State’s warrantless search of Allen’s trunk, not
whether Nugnes was “perjurous or fraudulent.” Indeed, the New Jersey Appellate Division
articulated the issue before it as:
THE MOTION COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE WHEN
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD TO SUPPORT A WARRANTLYESS SEIZURE
PURSUANT TO THE PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT.
Allen, 2011 WL 4407521, at *1. Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court described the issue
before it as, “This case involves a warrantless search. The State, therefore, must establish by a
prepondereance of the evidence that the search was justified under a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement.” State v. Allen, 114 A.3d 737 (N.J. 2015). The only issued ever decided by
the New Jersey courts was whether there was sufficient credible evidence in the record to support
a warrantless search of Plaintiff’s trunk, and the New Jersey Supreme Court held there was not.
Moreover, the fact that on remand the trial court concluded Nugnes’s testimony “did not
inspire confidence in his concern for truthfulness and accuracy,” was evasive, equivocal, and
imprecise, is without merit. (ECF No. 28-3 at 1, 4; 4 see ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 34-36.) The issue before
the trial court on remand was whether there was sufficient credible evidence in the record to
support a warrantless search of Allen’s trunk, and the trial court did not make, neither was it asked

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Allen expressly refers to the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact in his Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 34-36) and, therefore, the Court may rely upon that decision when deciding this
Motion. In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d at 1426.
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to make, an official determination as to whether Nugnes’s testimony was perjurious, fraudulent or
deceitful. (See id.) Accordingly, the Court finds the New Jersey courts did not decide whether
Nugnes was deceitful or fraudulent and Allen is not barred from asserting his claims for malicious
prosecution.
Because the Court finds Allen’s malicious prosecution claims against Defendants are
properly before it, it must determine whether Allen has set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim for [malicious prosecution under § 1983] that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the conduct
deprived him of his rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States and (2) the conduct challenged was committed by a person acting under color of
state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor
Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005).
To state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 and determine whether the alleged
conduct deprived plaintiff of his Fourth Amendment rights, a plaintiff must plead:
(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal
proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the
proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to
justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent
with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

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Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d
497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)). The first four elements listed above also comprise the New Jersey
common law tort of malicious prosecution. Wilson v. N.J. State Police, No. 04-1523, 2006 WL
2358349, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2006); See Wiltz v. Middlesex Cty. Office of the Prosecutor, No.
05-3915, 2006 WL 1966654, at *9 (D.N.J. July 12, 2006) (stating elements of New Jersey common
law malicious prosecution claim). “Failure to prove any one of these . . . elements denies the
plaintiff a cause of action for malicious prosecution.” Wiltz, 2006 WL 1966654, at 9. Furthermore,
the analysis for Allen’s New Jersey Constitutional malicious prosecution claim is the same as the
§ 1983 analysis. See Estate of Martin v. U.S. Marshals Serv. Agents, 649 F. App’x 239, 245 n.4
(3d Cir. 2016) (holding that “it appears undisputed that [p]laintiffs’ claims under the New Jersey
Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act trigger the same legal elements and principles
as . . . [the] federal causes of action [under Section 1983]”); Lucia v. Carroll, No. 12-3787, 2014
WL 1767527, at *5 (D.N.J. May 2, 2014) (finding that the analysis for plaintiff’s Article 1,
Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution malicious prosecution claim was the same as its §
1983 claims). Accordingly, the Court applies the same standard to all of Plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution claims.
Moreover, the Third Circuit
adhere[s] to the well-settled principle that, in situations in which a
judicial officer or other independent intermediary applies the correct
governing law and procedures but reaches an erroneous conclusion
because he or she is misled in some manner as to the relevant facts,
the causal chain is not broken and liability may be imposed upon
those involved in making the misrepresentations or omissions.
Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 250 (3d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citing Hector v. Watt, 235
F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000); Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427-28 (5th Cir. 1988)); see Johnson

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v. Provenzano, 646 F. App’x 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Where the judicial officer has not been
deceived but fails to properly apply the governing law and procedures, such error must be held to
be superseding cause, breaking the chain of causation for purposes of § 1983.”) (citation omitted).
There is, however, “a distinction between that situation and . . . [one] where the actions of the
defendants, while clearly a cause of the plaintiff’s harm, do not create liability because of the
intervention of independent judicial review, a superseding cause.” Egervary, 366 F.3d at 250.
Where “the judicial officer is provided with the appropriate facts to adjudicate the proceeding but
fails to properly apply the governing law and procedures, such error must be held to be a
superseding cause, breaking the chain of causation for purposes of § 1983 . . . liability.” Id. at 25051 (citations omitted).
In his Amended Complaint, Allen alleges a criminal prosecution was instituted against him
and later terminated in his favor by dismissal. (ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 44, 47.) He contends “[t]here was
an absence of probable cause to commence the proceeding” and, further, “[t]here was actual malice
as evidenced by the lack of probable cause for the charge.” (Id. ¶¶ 48-49.) He further asserts
Nugnes “engaged in deceptive behavior, by testifying falsely at Plaintiff’s initial suppression
hearing, as well as the remand hearing” and that the “initial trial court’s refusal to suppress the
evidence was induced by the deception of [] Nugnes.” (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.) Allen further contends, “[d]ue
to [] Nugnes deception to the suppression courts, Plaintiff’s claim has not been nullified by
intervening independent judicial review” and “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision to suppress the
evidence was based upon the failure of evidence caused by [] Nugnes’s deceptive testimony.” (Id.
¶¶ 53-54.) Moreover, the trial court indicated Nugnes’s testimony “did not inspire confidence in
his concern for truthfulness and accuracy,” was evasive, equivocal, and imprecise. (ECF No. 28-3
at 1, 4; see ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 34-36.) Indeed, at this motion to dismiss stage, Allen has pled sufficient

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facts to state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, New Jersey common law, and the
New Jersey Constitution. Not only has he pled the requirements for a malicious prosecution claim,
Johnson, 477 F.3d at 81-82, but he has pled the initial trial court’s refusal to suppress evidence
was induced by deception or coercion on the part of Defendants. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss is DENIED.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 28) is DENIED.

Date: November 28, 2017

/s/ Brian R. Martinotti___________
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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