HARRIS v. ANDERSON et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 8/5/2016. (km)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

GOLDA D. HARRIS,
Civil Action No. 16-1914 (MAS)
Petitioner,
v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM ANDERSON, et al.,
Respondents.

SHIPP, District Judge
Prose Petitioner Golda D. Harris ("Petitioner") brings this Petition for a Writ of Mandamus
in forma pauperis, requesting the Court to issue an order directing the New Jersey state trial court
to proceed on numerous private criminal complaints filed by Petitioner in state court. The Court
holds, infra, that the Petition is simply a civil complaint improperly masked as a mandamus
petition. See Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1996). As such, the Court must review
the Petition to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions).
For the reasons stated below, the Court dismisses the Petition for failure to state a claim for which
relief may be granted.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For the purposes of this Memorandum Opinion, the Court accepts all facts alleged in the

Petition as true and in the light most favorable to Petitioner. The three-page Petition contains
mostly conclusory statements and very few factual allegations; instead, Petitioner appears to rely

on the exhibits attached to the Petition to support her claims. Substantively, Petitioner asserts that
her federal and state constitutional rights were violated when the state trial court dismissed twentyfive criminal complaints she filed with the state court as lacking probable cause. (Pet. 2-3, ECF
No. 1.) Petitioner alleges that the dismissals were against the weight of the evidence and that the
trial judge dismissed the complaints due to bias and favoritism. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner further alleges
that she was initially told by the state court that there was probable cause to file the complaints,
but the state court later contradicted itself by dismissing them as lacking probable cause. (Id. at
3.) Thus, Petitioner seeks an order from this Court to compel the state trial court to reinstate her
criminal complaints and to proceed with the criminal matters. (Id. at 1.)

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "Specific facts are not
necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests."' Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiffs obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment]
to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do .... Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.

Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to accept
its factual allegations as true, see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012),
and to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
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III.

DISCUSSION

A.

Mandamus Petition vs. Complaint

Before the Court addresses the merits of the Petition, the Court first explains its statement
above that the Petition is really a civil complaint masked as a mandamus petition. Although
Petitioner does not provide the statutory basis of her mandamus petition, the Court construes it as
being brought under the All Writs Act, which states that "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(b) states that "[t]he writs of scire facias and
mandamus are abolished.

Relief previously available through them may be obtained by

appropriate action or motion under these rules." Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(b). As such, courts in this
circuit have held that a district court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a mandamus petition
unless no other avenue exists to provide the relief sought. See Bey v. Ct. Com. Pl., No. 13-0506,
2013 WL 5780777, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2013); Gregris v. Edberg, 645 F. Supp. 1153, 1157
(W.D. Pa. 1986); see also Kerr v. US. Dist. Ct. for N Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)
(" [T]he party seeking issuance of[ a] writ [of mandamus must] have no other adequate means to
attain the relief he desires, and that he satisfy the burden of showing that (his) right to issuance of
the writ is 'clear and indisputable.'") (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The Third Circuit has held that in deciding whether a mandamus petition is considered a
"civil action," and therefore subject to the requirements of the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, "[a] litigant should not be able to evade [§ 1915] by masking as a mandamus petition a
paper otherwise subject to the [statute]." Madden, 102 F.3d at 78; see In re Steele, 251 F. App'x
772, 772-73 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[I]f a prisoner files a 'mandamus petition' that actually would initiate

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an appeal or a civil action, [§ 1915] applies."). "It is the nature of the document, rather than the
label attached by the litigant, that controls." Madden, 102 F.3d at 78. In essence, when a
mandamus petition seeks relief that should have been properly brought through a civil complaint,
courts should treat it as a civil complaint subject to all of the requirements under§ 1915.
Here, Petitioner alleges, as the basis of her Petition, that her rights under the federal and
state constitutions were violated when the state trial court dismissed her private criminal
complaints. (Pet. 3.) In effect, Petitioner is simply raising civil rights claims that should have
been properly brought through the federal civil rights statute under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Indeed,
Petitioner could obtain the same remedy she is pursuing in the Petition by seeking injunctive relief
in a § 1983 action. Given the general abolishment of the writ of mandamus by Rule 81, and the
Supreme Court's directive that no mandamus shall issue unless no other remedy is available, the
Court construes the Petition as a civil rights complaint rather than a mandamus petition, and treats
it accordingly.

B.

Merits

A plaintiff can pursue a cause of action under § 1983 for certain violations of her
constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish, first,
the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that
the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. Am.

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Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1999); Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 16667 (3d Cir. 2013).
As stated above, Petitioner alleges that her constitutional rights were violated when the
state trial court dismissed her private criminal complaints for lack of probable cause. The Court
disagrees. In federal court, only the government may initiate criminal proceedings. United States

v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case."). However, in New Jersey, any person may file
a criminal complaint with the state court. N.J. Ct. R. 3:2-l(a) ("The clerk or deputy clerk,
municipal court administrator or deputy court administrator shall accept for filing any [criminal]
complaint made by any person.") (emphasis added). The judicial officer then must make a finding
of whether there is probable cause to believe that an offense was committed. N.J. Ct. R. 3:3-1. If
the officer determines that there is probable cause for the complaint, a warrant or a summons
should be issued. Id. If the officer determines that there is no probable cause, the complaint should
be dismissed. N.J. Ct. R. 3:3-l(d).
While a private citizen may file a criminal complaint in New Jersey, the matter ends ifthe
government decides not to initiate prosecution. Additionally, "a citizen lacks standing to contest
the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with
prosecution." Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). "[G]enerally, there is no
statutory or common law right, much less a constitutional right, to an ... investigation [of a private
criminal complaint.]" Fuchs v. Mercer Cty., 260 F. App'x 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations and
quotations omitted). In fact, under New Jersey law, Petitioner does not even have a right to appeal
the decision of the trial court not to prosecute. State v. Preto, No. 09-05, 2006 WL 66475, at *2
(N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2006) (holding that a private citizen "lack[s] standing to appeal

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the dismissal of his complaint by the municipal court judge after a determination of 'no probable
cause"'). Here, Petitioner cites no authority to support her claims. After careful consideration, the
Court finds that the Petition fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted, and is thereby
dismissed. 1

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition is DISMISSED.

s/ Michael A. Shipp
Michael A. Shipp
United States District Judge
Dated: August 5, 2016

1

As explained above, because the Court finds that the Petition is subject to the requirements of
§ 1915, this dismissal is to be construed as a strike for the purposes of the three-strike rule under
§ 1915(g).
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