HUZINEC v. SIX FLAGS GREAT ADVENTURE, LLC et al
Filing
50
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 4/24/2018. (mmh)
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
:
EVAN HUZINEC,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civil Action No. 16-2754 (FLW) (DEA)
:
v.
:
:
OPINION
SIX FLAGS GREAT ADVENTURE,
:
LLC; SIX FLAGS ENTERTAINMENT
:
CORPORATION; et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________ :
:
SIX FLAGS GREAT ADVENTURE,
:
LLC,
:
:
Third Party Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
FOR FUN TOURS; CELEBRATION
:
TOURS AND TRAVEL, INC.; WILKER :
GOMES; JULIANO MIRANDA; and
:
MARIANA VOLGADO,
:
:
Third Party Defendants.
:
:
___________________________________ :
WOLFSON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Evan Huzinec (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Six Flags Great Adventure,
LLC and Six Flags Entertainment Corporation (collectively, “Six Flags”), alleging negligence in
connection with personal injuries that Plaintiff allegedly sustained while riding a roller coaster at
the Six Flags theme park in Jackson, New Jersey (the “Park”). Thereafter, Third Party Plaintiff
Six Flags Great Adventure, LLC (“Third Party Plaintiff” or “SFGA”) brought a third party action
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for contribution and indemnification against Third Party Defendants For Fun Tours (“FFT”),
Celebration Tours and Travel, Inc. (“Celebration”), Wilker Gomes, Juliano Miranda, and
Mariana Volgado (collectively, the “Third Party Defendants”). Presently before the Court is
Celebration’s Motion to Dismiss SFGA’s Amended Third Party Complaint, pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, respectively. Celebration also requests fees and
costs in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. For the reasons that follow,
Celebration’s Motion to Dismiss SFGA’s claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction is
granted, and Celebration’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim is denied as moot.
Celebration’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a Pennsylvania resident. Amended Third Party Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), ¶
1. SFGA is a New Jersey limited liability corporation, with its principal place of business in
Jackson, New Jersey. Id. at ¶ 2. Celebration is a Florida corporation, with its principal place of
business in Orlando, Florida. Id. at ¶ 4; Affidavit of Amylto Rios Silva (“Silva Aff.”), ¶ 4.1 FFT
is a Brazilian corporation that organizes and operates travel programs to destinations in the
United States. Am. Compl. ¶ 3. Although Celebration and FFT have engaged in arm’s-length
transactions, the two corporations have no other relationship, such as shared employees or
“In examining personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), the Court must look beyond the
pleadings.” Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 331 (D.N.J. 1997); see Time Share
Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1984); Witasick v. Estes, No.
11-3895, 2012 WL 3075988, at *5 (D.N.J. July 30, 2012) (“A Court must look beyond the
pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(2) motion.”).
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common ownership interests. Silva Aff. ¶ 7. Gomes and Miranda are employees of FFT and
residents of Brazil. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6. Volgado is a resident of Brazil, who was a participant
in a FFT tour to the Park on July 5, 2014. Id. at ¶ 7.
The underlying actions giving rise to this action are as follows. According to his
Complaint, on July 5, 2014, Plaintiff sustained personal injuries while riding the “El Toro” roller
coaster at the Park. Id. at ¶ 15. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he “‘was struck in the head,
face and right eye by a flying cellphone dropped by another patron.’” Id. (quoting Compl. at 3, ¶
4). On May 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed suit against Six Flags, asserting claims for negligence,
breach of implied and express warranty, and fraudulent concealment. ECF No. 1.
According to the Amended Third Party Complaint, the cellphone that struck Plaintiff
belonged to Volgado. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18. In that regard, SFGA alleges that Volgado snuck
the cellphone onto the ride, in violation of the Park’s rules, and subsequently lost control of the
cellphone during the course of the ride, causing it to strike Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 18. SFGA avers that
Volgado had a duty to comply with the Park’s written and verbal safety regulations, including a
regulation requiring passengers of El Toro to secure all loose articles, and that Volgado’s failure
to do so amounted to a breach of that duty, and proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at ¶¶
22-24.
SFGA alleges that, on the date of the incident, Volgado visited the park as part of a travel
tour (the “Tour”) organized and operated by FFT and Celebration. Id. at ¶ 16. Gomes and
Miranda were the FFT employees charged with supervising the Tour. Id. at ¶ 16. With respect
to Celebration’s involvement in the Tour, in June of 2014, FFT contacted Celebration to request
assistance in procuring admission tickets and transportation for the Tour. See Silva Aff. ¶ 8;
Certification of Heather M. Eichenbaum (“Eichenbaum Cert.”), ¶¶ 14, 48-51. Upon receiving
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FFT’s request, Celebration contacted SFGA’s sales office by telephone and email to obtain a
quote for admission tickets on behalf of FFT. See Silva Aff. ¶ 10; Eichenbaum Cert. ¶¶ 48-49.
Subsequently, FFT advanced funds to Celebration, which Celebration used to purchase tickets to
the Park from SFGA.2 See Silva Aff. ¶ 10. SFGA agreed to have FFT pick up the tickets at the
Park on July 5, 2014. See id. Celebration also contacted UniWorld, a New York corporation, to
purchase bus services to and from the Park on behalf of the Tour. See id. at ¶ 9; Eichenbaum
Cert. ¶¶ 50-51. Once again, FFT provided payment to Celebration in advance for its
procurement of the bus services from UniWorld, and Celebration thereafter made payment to
UniWorld. See Silva Aff. ¶ 9.
SFGA filed the Amended Third Party Complaint on April 25, 2017, asserting claims for
contribution and indemnification against Celebration, FFT, Gomes, Miranda, and Volgado. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 25-29. Celebration filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on September 26, 2017. ECF
No. 30. That Motion has been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 37-38, 40.
DISCUSSION
Celebration argues that SFGA’s Amended Third Party Complaint must be dismissed,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), because this Court lacks personal
jurisdiction to adjudicate SFGA’s claims against Celebration. In the alternative, Celebration
argues that the Amended Third Party Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Finally, Celebration requests that this
Court award Celebration the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing the instant Motion,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
In support of its Opposition to Celebration’s Motion, SFGA has also attached invoices
demonstrating that, between 2011 and 2016, Celebration purchased over $37,000.00 worth of
admission tickets to the Park from SFGA. See SFGA’s Opposition, Ex. C, ECF No. 37-4.
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I.
Personal Jurisdiction
In its Motion to Dismiss, Celebration argues that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction
over Celebration in this case. In opposition, SFGA contends that personal jurisdiction exists
over Celebration under theories of both general and specific jurisdiction.
A.
Legal Standard
To withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s personal
jurisdiction over the moving defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. D'Jamoos ex rel.
Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 2009); see Cerciello v.
Canale, 563 F. App'x 924, 925 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that the plaintiff “‘bears the burden to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,’ that personal jurisdiction is proper.”) (citation
omitted). “However, when the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion to
dismiss, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction and the
plaintiff is entitled to have its allegations taken as true and all factual disputes drawn in its
favor.” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004). Still, to meet its
burden, the plaintiff must establish “jurisdictional facts through sworn affidavits or other
competent evidence. . . . [A]t no point may a plaintiff rely on the bare pleadings alone in order to
withstand a defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction.”
Id. at 101 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the plaintiff meets this burden, “the
burden shifts to the defendant to establish the presence of other considerations that would render
the exercise of personal jurisdiction unreasonable.” Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, 182 F. Supp.
3d 166, 172 (D.N.J. 2016); Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS, Nat. Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1226
(3d Cir. 1992).
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“A district court sitting in diversity may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant to the extent allowed under the law of the forum state.” Metcalfe v. Renaissance
Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2009); see FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e). In assessing whether
personal jurisdiction exists, the Court’s analysis is twofold: “[t]he court must first determine
whether the relevant state long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction; if so, the court
must then satisfy itself that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.” Display
Works, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 172. “Since New Jersey’s long-arm statute allows ‘the exercise of
personal jurisdiction to the fullest limits of due process,’ [the Court must] ‘look to federal law for
the interpretation of the limits on in personam jurisdiction.’” Malik v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp.,
710 F. App'x 561, 563 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259
(3d Cir. 1998)).
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment sets the outer boundaries of a
state tribunal's authority to proceed against a defendant.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011). In Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of
Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Supreme Court held that a state
may authorize its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if that
defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. at 316 (citation
omitted). “Following International Shoe, ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation . . . became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.’” Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
B.
General and Specific Jurisdiction
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Courts recognize two types of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and specific
jurisdiction. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137
S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). General jurisdiction refers to a court's power to “hear any and all
claims” against a defendant. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. General jurisdiction exists over a
corporation where its “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render
[it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Id.; Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138. In Daimler, the
Supreme Court explained that a corporation is “at home” in its place of “incorporation and
principal place of business,” and thus, those locations serve as the paradigm bases for general
jurisdiction. 571 U.S. at 137. As a result, “it is ‘incredibly difficult to establish general
jurisdiction [over a corporation] in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal
place of business.’”3 Malik, 710 F. App'x at 564 (citation omitted).
Here, in arguing that general jurisdiction exists, SFGA points to various transactions
between Celebration and SFGA, memorialized in invoices, which show that Celebration
purchased over $37,000.00 worth of admission tickets from SFGA between 2011 and 2016. See
SFGA’s Opposition, Ex. C. As a result of those transactions, SFGA contends that “Celebration’s
contacts with SFGA alone are both continuous and systematic,” SFGA’s Opposition Br. at 5,
rendering SFGA “at home” in New Jersey, and thus, subjecting SFGA to general jurisdiction in
New Jersey. I disagree.
Contrary to SFGA’s argument, Celebration is not subject to general jurisdiction in New
Jersey. Significantly, as SFGA’s Amended Complaint acknowledges, Celebration is a Florida
Nonetheless, the Daimler Court noted that it was not foreclosing “the possibility that in an
exceptional case, corporation's operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation
or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the
corporation at home in that State.” 571 U.S. at 139 n. 19 (emphasis added).
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corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. Am. Compl. ¶ 4. Therefore, SFGA
has failed to establish either of the paradigmatic bases for general jurisdiction under Daimler.
Nor has SFGA alleged facts sufficient to find that is “an ‘exceptional’ case such that the place of
incorporation/principal place of business rule should be disregarded.” Barth v. Walt Disney
Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc., 697 F. App'x 119, 120 (3d Cir. 2017). To that end, while SFGA
alleges that Celebration purchased tickets in New Jersey, “mere purchases, even if occurring at
regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a State's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a
nonresident corporation in a cause of action not related to those purchase transactions.”
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984). Indeed, as the
Daimler Court explained:
General jurisdiction . . . calls for an appraisal of a corporation's activities in their entirety,
nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be
deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise, ‘at home’ would be synonymous with ‘doing
business’ tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United States.
571 U.S. at 139.
Here, the transactions between SFGA and Celebration are insufficient to meet Daimler’s
standard of an exceptional case.4 SFGA has not alleged that Celebration maintains any offices in
New Jersey, has employees in New Jersey, incurs or pays taxes in New Jersey, or has any
business activities in New Jersey outside of its dealings with SFGA. Silva Aff. ¶¶ 4-6. Rather,
SFGA has only proffered evidence that, at most, shows that Celebration conducted some
business in New Jersey, without any analysis of Celebration’s nationwide dealings. That limited
transactional history, standing alone, falls far short of the “continuous and systematic”
affiliations with New Jersey required to find that Celebration is subject to general jurisdiction in
4
Tellingly, SFGA’s Opposition fails to reference Daimler altogether.
8
New Jersey. See JWQ Cabinetry, Inc. v. Granada Wood & Cabinets, Inc., No. 13-4110, 2014
WL 2050267, at *3 (D.N.J. May 19, 2014) (finding that general jurisdiction was lacking, where
the plaintiff “only offered evidence that shows that [the defendant] conducted some business in
New Jersey . . . .”). Indeed, if evidence of sporadic business dealings in a forum, without more,
constituted exceptional circumstances, the exception would swallow the rule. Accordingly, the
Court finds that SFGA has not met its burden of establishing that Celebration is subject to
general jurisdiction in New Jersey.
Next, in the absence of general jurisdiction, “a state court can exercise only specific, or
case-linked, jurisdiction over a dispute.” Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1785. Specific jurisdiction
exists over a non-resident defendant where the plaintiff’s claim “‘arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the
defendant's contacts with the forum.’” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S.
at 414 n. 8); see Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (“In order for a court to exercise specific
jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying
controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.’”)
(quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). Courts apply a three part test to determine whether
specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant exists: “First, the defendant must have
purposefully directed [its] activities at the forum. Second, the litigation must arise out of or
relate to at least one of those activities. And third, if the prior two requirements are met, a court
may consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise comport[s] with fair play and
substantial justice.” Petrucelli v. Rusin, 642 F. App'x 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations
and quotations marks omitted); see Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780.
In arguing that specific jurisdiction exists in this case, SFGA contends that Celebration
purposely directed its activities to New Jersey by purchasing admission tickets to the Park and
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arranging bus services for the Tour on behalf of FFT. Next, relying on the Third Circuit’s
opinion in O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007), SFGA maintains
that there is a sufficient nexus between Celebration’s forum contacts with New Jersey –
Celebration’s purchase of admission tickets from SFGA and its arrangement of transportation for
the Tour on behalf of FFT – and Plaintiff’s injury to find that specific jurisdiction exists. Finally,
SFGA contends that the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Celebration would not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Contrary to SFGA’s arguments, the Court does not find that specific jurisdiction over
Celebration exists in this case. As the Court has already explained, the first factor of the specific
jurisdiction test requires a showing that the defendant “‘purposefully directed [its] activities’ at
the forum.” O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
472 (1985)). While “[p]hysical entrance [into the forum] is not required,” the defendant must
have deliberately targeted the forum State. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 317; see Grand Entm't Grp.,
Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Mail and telephone
communications sent by the defendant into the forum may count toward the minimum contacts
that support jurisdiction.”). Here, Celebration concedes that it purposely directed its activities at
the New Jersey by: (1) contacting SFGA’s New Jersey sales office by telephone or email to
obtain pricing quotes for admission tickets to the Park on behalf of FFT; and (2) making
payment, with funds provided in advance by FFT, to SFGA for admission tickets for the FFT
Tour.5 Celebration’s Reply Br. at 10-11. Accordingly, the Court will assume, as the parties do,
that Celebration purposely directed those activities at the forum.
In its Motion, Celebration disputes SFGA’s contention that the procurement of bus services
was a New Jersey related contact, arguing that its communications were directed at UniWorld’s
offices in New York, rather than New Jersey. See Mot. to Dismiss at 17 n. 2. Nonetheless,
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Nonetheless, the Court cannot find that the present litigation arises out of or relates to
Celebration’s forum contacts. While the Third Circuit has not adopted a bright-line test for
determining whether a tort case arises out of or relates to a defendant’s forum contacts,
O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 320, it has provided useful guidance for courts conducting the relatedness
inquiry. The starting point for any court’s analysis is but-for causation, Colvin v. Van Wormer
Resorts, Inc., 417 F. App'x 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2011), which requires a showing that “the plaintiff's
claim would not have arisen in the absence of the defendant's contacts.” O'Connor, 496 F.3d at
319. Nonetheless, the “the animating principle behind the relatedness requirement is the notion
of a tacit quid pro quo that makes litigation in the forum reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at 322.
But-for causation falls short of that principle, because it “literally embraces every event that
hindsight can logically identify in the causative chain.” Id. (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Thus, “[b]ut-for causation cannot be the sole measure of relatedness because it is
vastly overinclusive in its calculation of a defendant's reciprocal obligations.” Id.
Rather, “specific jurisdiction requires a closer and more direct causal connection than that
provided by the but-for test.” Id. at 323. While “there is no ‘specific rule’ susceptible to
mechanical application in every case, . . . in the course of this necessarily fact-sensitive inquiry,
the analysis should hew closely to the reciprocity principle upon which specific jurisdiction
rests.” Id. (quoting Miller Yacht Sales, 384 F.3d at 100). As the O’Connor court explained:
With each purposeful contact by an out-of-state resident, the forum state's laws will
extend certain benefits and impose certain obligations. Specific jurisdiction is the cost of
enjoying the benefits. The relatedness requirement's function is to maintain balance in
this reciprocal exchange. In order to do so, it must keep the jurisdictional exposure that
results from a contact closely tailored to that contact's accompanying substantive
obligations. The causal connection can be somewhat looser than the tort concept of
because Celebration’s procurement of bus services from UniWorld does not alter this Court’s
ultimate conclusion, the Court will assume, for the purposes of this Motion, that those
transactions constitute a New Jersey contact.
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proximate causation, but it must nonetheless be intimate enough to keep the quid pro quo
proportional and personal jurisdiction reasonably foreseeable.
496 F.3d at 323 (internal citations omitted).
Here, SFGA has failed to demonstrate that its claims against Celebration arise out of or
relate to Celebration’s forum contacts. As the Court has already explained, Celebration’s only
contacts with New Jersey were procuring admission tickets to the Park from SFGA on behalf of
FFT, and procuring transportation services for the Tour on behalf of FFT.6 However, SFGA’s
contribution and indemnification claims against Celebration relate to the negligence committed
by a member of the Tour while at the Park, as opposed to those ticket purchases or bus services.
To that end, while this case may have presented a closer call if the underlying claims centered on
allegations related to those tickets (e.g., in a breach of contract action based on fraudulent ticket
sales), the Court cannot conclude that Celebration’s jurisdictional exposure includes negligence
claims arising out of an alleged tort committed by a Tour member at the Park.7 As a mere
conduit for the ticket sales, it was not reasonably foreseeable that Celebration would be hailed
into a New Jersey court for the actions of one of the end-consumers of those tickets. Indeed,
SFGA’s argument, taken to its logical extreme, would subject Celebration to specific jurisdiction
in New Jersey, regardless of how many times an admission ticket for the Park changed hands,
Outside of Celebration’s status as an intermediary in organizing the Tour, SFGA has not
established jurisdictional facts demonstrating that Celebration had any other responsibilities with
regard to the Tour, including any supervisory role over the Tour’s participants. Indeed, although
SFGA alleges generally in its Amended Complaint that Volgado was at the Park under the
“guardianship of [Celebration, FFT,] and/or Juliano Miranda and/or Wilker Gomes,” Am.
Compl. ¶ 16, in its response to the instant Motion, SFGA conceded that Volgado “was a member
of a tour group . . . operated by [FFT],” and that the Tour’s chaperones, Miranda and Gomes,
were employees of FFT, not Celebration. See SFGA’s Opposition Br. at 1; Eichenbaum Cert. ¶
9.
7
Indeed, in a prior Opinion in this case, this Court already held that “[i]t is beyond dispute that
the ticket itself did not cause any harm to Plaintiff.” ECF No. 10 at 8.
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where the ultimate consumer of the ticket engaged in some sort of tortious action while visiting
the Park. In short, the claims at issue in this case are simply too attenuated from Celebration’s
forum contacts to hold that specific jurisdiction exists.
Additionally, SFGA’s reliance on O’Connor is misplaced. In that case, the plaintiff filed
negligence claims against a Barbados hotel in Pennsylvania court, after the plaintiff slipped and
fell in the hotel’s massage parlor. See O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 315-16. Prior to the accident, the
hotel actively sent brochures highlighting its amenities to the plaintiff’s Pennsylvania home. See
id. at 316. As a result of those brochures, the plaintiff decided to book a trip to the hotel, and,
through various phone calls between the plaintiff and the hotel, prearranged the massage. See id.
The hotel moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which motion was granted by the
District Court. Id.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, finding that the Pennsylvania court had specific
jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff’s claims against the hotel. Id. at 325. As a threshold
matter, the court found that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the hotel’s forum contacts
were the but-for cause of his injury. Id. at 323 (“[B]ut for the mailing of the brochure, [the
plaintiff] never would have purchased a massage, and he would not have suffered a massagerelated injury.”). Next, in finding that the nexus between the plaintiff’s claims and the hotel’s
forum contacts exceeded but-for causation, the court emphasized the fact that the hotel
contracted with the plaintiff to provide massage services while the plaintiff was in Pennsylvania.
See id. Specifically, the court explained that the “hotel acquired certain rights under that
contract, and with those rights came accompanying obligations,” including “an implied promise
that [the hotel] would ‘exercise due care in performing the services required.’” Id. (citation
omitted). And, because the plaintiff alleged that the hotel breached its duty of care, the court
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found that those claims were “directly and closely relate[d]” to the hotel’s forum contacts,
thereby satisfying the requirements for specific jurisdiction. Id.
Conversely, here, Celebration’s forum contacts are completely divorced of the underlying
personal injury claims asserted by Plaintiff.8 To that end, unlike in O’Connor, neither Plaintiff
nor SFGA has alleged that Celebration contracted with Plaintiff directly, or otherwise had any
duty of care with respect to the conduct of the Tour’s participants. Rather, Celebration’s forum
contacts are limited to its intermediary role in procuring tickets and bus services on behalf of
FFT. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that there is any “meaningful link”
between the legal obligations that arose from those business transactions and the underlying
claims at issue in this case. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 324. Stated differently, Celebration’s
enjoyment of the right to serve as an intermediary broker for tickets and transportation services
in New Jersey did not give rise to any reciprocal duty of care to protect visitors of the Park from
the conduct of the end-users of those tickets. Accordingly, because the claims at issue in this
case do not arise out of or relate to Celebration’s New Jersey contacts, the Court finds that it
lacks personal jurisdiction to adjudicate SFGA’s claims against Celebration.9
C.
Jurisdictional Discovery
Finally, SFGA argues that the Court should permit jurisdictional discovery in this case.
The Supreme Court has advised that “where issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue, discovery is
available to ascertain the facts bearing on such issues.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437
U.S. 340, 351 n. 13 (1978). In general, courts within the Third Circuit permit jurisdictional
Because SFGA’s claims against Celebration – for contribution and indemnification – are
entirely derivative of Plaintiff’s negligence claims in the underlying lawsuit, the Court examines
whether Celebration’s forum contacts arise out of or relate to Plaintiff’s negligence claims.
9
In light of the Court’s finding that the claims at issue in this case do not arise out of or relate to
Celebration’s forum contacts, I need not reach the third step of the specific jurisdiction analysis.
8
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discovery “unless the plaintiff's claim is ‘clearly frivolous.’” Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A.,
318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Massachusetts Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am.
Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1042 (3d Cir. 1997)). Additionally, the Third Circuit has instructed
that “jurisdictional discovery [is] particularly appropriate where a defendant is a corporation.”
Rocke v. Pebble Beach Co., 541 F. App'x 208, 212 (3d Cir. 2013). Nonetheless, jurisdictional
discovery is not warranted unless the plaintiff “presents factual allegations that suggest ‘with
reasonable particularity’ the possible existence of the requisite ‘contacts between [the party] and
the forum state . . . .’” Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 456 (quoting Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1223).
Thus, a plaintiff may not “undertake a fishing expedition based only upon bare allegations, under
the guise of jurisdictional discovery.” Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA,
623 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2010); see Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 108
n. 38 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[J]urisdictional discovery is not available merely because the plaintiff
requests it.”).
In the case at bar, SFGA has not presented factual allegations sufficient to find that
jurisdictional discovery is warranted. To that end, the Court has already found that the only
forum contacts identified by SFGA (Celebration’s ticket purchases from SFGA and transactions
with UniWorld) fall woefully short of the sort of continuous and systematic contacts needed to
deem Celebration “at home” in New Jersey, and are unrelated to the claims at issue in this suit.
And, while SFGA argues generally that “the full extent of Celebration’s contacts with New
Jersey [are] unknown,” SFGA’s Opposition Br. at 5 n. 2, SFGA concedes that Celebration is a
Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Florida, and has not alleged any other
specific facts demonstrating that SFGA may have additional contacts in New Jersey.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to allege with particularity any facts suggesting that
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personal jurisdiction may exist over Celebration with respect to the negligence claims at issue in
this case, the Court finds that jurisdictional discovery would be futile, and SFGA’s request is
denied.10 See Malik, 710 F. App'x at 565 (affirming the District Court’s denial of jurisdictional
discovery, where the plaintiff “did not present factual allegations that suggested with reasonable
particularity the possible existence of the requisite contacts between appellees and the forum
state to warrant jurisdictional discovery.”); Barth, 697 F. App'x at 120 (affirming denial of
request for jurisdictional discovery, where “jurisdictional discovery would have been futile.”).
II.
Celebration’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Celebration also seeks to recover the
attorneys’ fees and costs that it incurred in filing instant Motion. Specifically, Celebration
argues that Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate, because: (1) SFGA’s claims against Celebration
were made with knowledge that FFT, and not Celebration, operated the Tour; (2) SFGA was
aware that Volgado was a participant in the Tour, and that the Tour was under the supervision of
two FFT employees; and (3) SFGA failed to voluntarily withdraw its claims against Celebration,
despite Celebration’s September 14, 2017 letter identifying the jurisdictional issues in this case.
In opposition, SFGA contends that Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate, because its claims
against Celebration are well-grounded in both law and fact.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c), if “the court determines that [Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure] Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction
on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 11. Rule 11(b) provides:
In light of the Court’s finding that it lacks personal jurisdiction to adjudicate SFGA’s claims
against Celebration, the Court will not reach the merits of Celebration’s Rule 12(b)(6)
contentions.
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(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or
other paper--whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it--an attorney or
unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law
or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
Rule 11 sanctions are “intended to discourage the filing of frivolous, unsupported, or
unreasonable claims.” Leuallen v. Borough of Paulsboro, 180 F. Supp. 2d 615, 618 (D.N.J.
2002); see In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The purpose of
Rule 11 is to deter litigation abuse that is the result of a particular ‘pleading, written motion, or
other paper’ and, thus, streamline litigation.”). “Rule 11 sanctions are warranted ‘only in the
‘exceptional circumstances' where a claim or motion is patently unmeritorious or frivolous.”
Goldenberg v. Indel, Inc., No. 09-5202, 2011 WL 1134454, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2011)
(quoting Watson v. City of Salem, 934 F. Supp. 643, 662 (D.N.J. 1995)); see Bensalem Twp. v.
Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303, 1314 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Rule 11 sanctions may be
awarded in exceptional circumstances in order to ‘discourage plaintiffs from bringing baseless
actions or making frivolous motions.’”) (quoting Doering v. Union Cty. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988)). Stated differently, Rule 11 sanctions are only
appropriate “in those rare instances where the evident frivolousness of a claim or motion
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amounts to an ‘abuse[ ] of the legal system.’” Didonato v. Imagine One Tech. & Mgmt., Ltd, No.
15-8377, 2016 WL 6584911, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2016) (quoting Doering, 857 F.2d at 194).
“The legal standard to be applied when evaluating conduct allegedly violative of Rule 11
is reasonableness under the circumstances, with reasonableness defined as an ‘objective
knowledge or belief at the time of the filing of a challenged paper’ that the claim was wellgrounded in law and fact.” Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 289 (3d
Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); Leuallen, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 618. In that regard, “[t]he Rule
imposes an affirmative duty on the parties to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the applicable law
and facts prior to filing.” Bensalem, 38 F.3d at 1314. Ultimately, “[t]he award of costs and
attorneys' fees under Rule 11 . . . is a matter committed to the district court's discretion.” Sun
Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1986); see Jefferson Beach House
Condo. Ass'n v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New Jersey, No. 13-6480, 2014 WL 4681074, at *8
(D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2014) (“Rule 11 sanctions are imposed at the discretion of the Court . . . .”).
Here, the Court finds that an award of attorneys’ fees and costs under Rule 11 is not
warranted. Simply put, this is far from the exceptional case. Although I have ruled that SFGA
failed to meet its burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over Celebration, SFGA’s
arguments were grounded in actual forum contacts between Celebration and New Jersey – those
contacts were simply too attenuated from the underlying negligence claims in this case to find
that specific jurisdiction exists. As indicated by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in BristolMyers, personal jurisdiction is an issue that continues to perplex both parties and the courts.
Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that SFGA’s assertion of personal jurisdiction
over Celebration in this District amounts to abuse of the litigation process, and thus, the Court
declines to impose Rule 11 sanctions in this case.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, SFGA’s claims against Celebration are dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Celebration’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs is denied.
Dated: April 24, 2018
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Hon. Freda L. Wolfson
United States District Judge
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