BHATT v. COMMISSIONER OF NJ DOL et al

Filing 62

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Brian R. Martinotti on 1/30/2018. (mmh)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
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:
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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COMMISSIONER OF NJDOL, et al.,
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Defendants.
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____________________________________:
CHAULA S. BHATT,

Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-5654-BRM-DEA

OPINION

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court are: (1) Defendants Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of
Labor (the “Commissioner of NJDOL”) and Division Director of the NJDOL’s Motion to Dismiss
(the “Director of NJDOL,” collectively the “NJDOL Defendants”) (ECF No. 31); and (2)
Defendants Collabera Inc. (“Collabera”) and Judy Kramer’s (“Kramer”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 44). Pro se Plaintiff Chaula S. Bhatt (“Bhatt”) opposes the Motions. (ECF Nos. 51 and 52.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), the Court did not hear oral argument. For the
reasons set forth below, the NJDOL Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part and Kramer and Collabera’s Motion is GRANTED.

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I.

BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
For the purposes of the motions to dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the

Complaint as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Phillips v.
Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Further, the Court also considers any
“document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
Though difficult to glean from the Amended Complaint the necessary facts giving rise to
this claim, Bhatt’s claims generally relate to an allegation that she is owed unemployment benefits
and does not owe a refund to NJDOL. (Am. Compl. (See ECF No. 15).) She seems to also allege
Defendants engaged in a scheme to keep her unemployed and from receiving unemployment
benefits. (Id.)
Bhatt has been unemployed since 2009 due to alleged “state aided, encouragement,
retaliation of AT&T through its business affiliates which resulted in needs of filing for an [sic]
unemployment benefit claims on multiple occasions, all of which resulted into denials, delays,
problems and/or artificial debts . . . fabricated by NJ-UI department.” (Id. ¶ 62.) On May 8, 2016,
Bhatt submitted her a weekly unemployment compensation benefits. (Id. ¶ 37.) In the process of
submitting her claim, Bhatt alleges the unemployment compensation benefits system “showed the
summary stating that [Bhatt] was over paid $6,709 in compensation benefits, years ago, in ‘Error’
by workers of NJ-DOL and/or purposely unintegrated computerized systems of NJ-DOL,
implemented in practice by NJ-DOL commissioner to aid involved defendants and similar
corporations always preferred by NJ.” (Id. ¶¶ 37, 43.) Bhatt “further alleges . . . she was given the
reasons that [she] was overpaid during 2010 and 2011 after her unlawful terminations from AT&T

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due to ‘Errors’ of State’s Unemployment Department in making overpayments to [Bhatt] long ago
during 2009 and 2010.” (Id. ¶ 43.) As such, Bhatt’s claim for unemployment benefits was denied
or temporarily stayed because she owed the State of New Jersey $6,709, because they overpaid
her in the past. (Id. ¶¶ 91-92.) Bhatt appealed her denial and request to refund $6,709 in overpaid
unemployment benefits, was granted a hearing as to her appeal, but was ultimately denied benefits
and asked to refund the amount overpaid by the New Jersey Division of Unemployment. (Id. ¶¶
86, 95.)
Bhatt alleges the NJDOL Defendants with the help of AT&T fabricated an “artificial debt”
in thousands of dollars for unemployment benefits. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 26.) As to Kramer, AT&T’s counsel,
Bhatt alleges Kramer contacted Chris Healy, a Planet Associates employee, and had a conversation
with them about Bhatt’s performance issues while at AT&T, “due to which she was let go due to
multiple unlawful termination.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Bhatt further claims Kramer “lied on her submissions”
to the NJDOL and law enforcement regarding her reasons for termination. (Id. ¶ 7.)
As to Collabera, Bhatt alleges Collabera participated with AT&T in unlawfully terminating
her. (Id. ¶ 5.) She further alleges “Collabera did not pay extended unemployment benefits amounts
and basic unemployment benefits although it had deducted part of [her] wages towards NJUI 1
funds.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Due to Collabera’s alleged non-payment, an “artificial debt” was created in her
name for the payments “without requesting payments from Planet Associates Inc. and Collabera
Inc.” (Id. ¶ 12.) However, throughout the Amended Complaint she states she did at one point
receive unemployment benefits. (Id. ¶ 37, 43.) Therefore, this Court draws the inference that
Collabera did pay into the system at one point. Like Kramer, Collabera is alleged to have made

1

Though the Amended Complaint does not define NJUI, but the Court concludes it signifies New
Jersey Unemployment Insurance Benefits.
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“false reports” to law enforcement and the NJDOL “for framing [Bhatt] and for continuously
employing her to keep her unemployed as long as possible in spite of being highly skilled and
experienced.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Bhatt also alleges she was forced to participate in professional skills
advancement trainings “because she has been unemployed due to adverse inferences of involved
defendants of AT&T in participation with Collabera and Planet Associates Inc.” (Id. ¶ 34.)
B. Procedural History
On September 16, 2016, Bhatt filed her Initial Complaint against the NJDOL Defendants
and Middlesex County Social Welfare. (Compl. (ECF No. 1).) On March 21, 2017, Bhatt filed an
Amended Complaint adding Defendants Planet Associates, Collabera, and Kramer and alleging
eight counts: (1) conspiracy to interfere with Bhatt’s civil rights; (2) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; (3) conversion; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) unpaid and delayed unemployment
and welfare benefits claim; (6) overpayment statement/record keeping claim; (7) common law
fraud; and (8) gross negligence. (Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15).) On June 7, 2017, the NJDOL
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 31.) On July 10, 2017,
Middlesex County Social Welfare Board filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint. (ECF No.
41.) On July 19, 2017, Collabera and Judy Kramer filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 44.) On September 12, 2017, Bhatt filed Answers to the Motions to Dismiss.
(ECF Nos. 51 and 52.) In addition, she filed a Response to Middlesex County Social Welfare
Board’s Answer to her Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 53.) 2 On October 20, 2017, Collabera and
Kramer filed a Reply Brief to their Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 57.) The NJDOL Defendants

2

Bhatt labeled her Response as “Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants of Middlesex County Social
Welfare Board’s Motion to Dismiss.” (ECF No. 53 at 1.) However, Middlesex County Social
Welfare Board did not file a Motion to Dismiss, but instead filed an Answer to the Amended
Complaint. Therefore, the Court will not address Bhatt’s Response.
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did not file a reply brief. On November 6, 2017, Bhatt filed a sur-reply to Collabera and Kramer’s
Reply Brief. (ECF No. 58.) 3
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a

district court is “required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff].” Phillips, 515 F.3d at
228. “[A] complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations.”
Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the Plaintiff’s “obligation to provide
the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the
complaint are true, those “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for misconduct alleged.” Id. This “plausibility standard” requires the complaint allege “more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it “is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Detailed factual allegations” are not

3

Bhatt did not seek leave from the Court before filing her sur-reply, as she was required to do
pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(6). Nonetheless, the Court considered it and it did not impact
the substance of this decision.
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required, but “more than ‘an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation” must be pled; it
must include “factual enhancements” and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the
elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
While as a general rule, a court many not consider anything beyond the four corners of the
complaint on a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), the Third Circuit has held “a court may
consider certain narrowly defined types of material without converting the motion to dismiss [to
one for summary judgment pursuant under Rule 56].” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec. Litig., 184
F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). Specifically, courts may consider any “‘document integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at
1426.
III.

DECISION
A. Claims Against the NJDOL Defendants
The NJDOL Defendants argue Bhatt’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed as to them

because: (1) the Amended Complaint is insufficient to plead claims against them; (2) the NJDOL
Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity; (3) Bhatt has failed to establish Article
III standing; (4) the Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to Rooker-Feldman; and (5) the Court should
abstain from hearing it under the Buford Abstention Principle. (See ECF No. 31-1.)

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1. Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rooker-Feldman
The Court will initially address the NJDOL Defendants’ argument that this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over the action because Bhatt’s claims are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine. Pursuant to Rooker-Feldman, federal district courts may not adjudicate federal
claims that were previously adjudicated in state court or are inextricably intertwined with a state
court decision. See District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983);
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). A federal claim is inextricably intertwined
with a prior state court decision if “granting the relief requested in the federal action requires
determining that the state court’s decision is wrong or would void the state court’s ruling.” FOCUS
v. Allegheny Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas., 75 F.3d 834, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1996). The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine precludes the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction “where a federal action would be the
equivalent of an appellate review of a state court judgment.” Hogg’s v. New Jersey, 352 F. App’x
625, 629 (3d Cir. 2009). This doctrine is applied where “the losing party in state court filed suit in
federal court after the state proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-court
judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). However, “when the source of the injury is the defendant’s
actions (and not the state court judgments), the federal suit is independent, even if it asks the federal
court to deny a legal conclusion reached by the state court.” Great Western Mining & Mineral Co.
v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2010).
Bhatt alleges the NJDOL Defendants erred in denying her unemployment benefits and
requesting she repay benefits that were over paid. She further alleges they violated various federal
and state statutes by denying her unemployment benefits and requesting she pay a refund.
Therefore, Bhatt’s individual claims (Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Six, Seven, and Eight)

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against the NJDOL Defendants are not barred by Rooker-Feldman because the source of the injury
is the NJDOL Defendants’ actions, not the NJDOL decision. Custin v. Wirths, No. 12-910, 2016
WL 1157644, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2016). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine cannot be applied “too
broadly,” the “doctrine is confined to ‘limited circumstances’ where ‘state-court losers complain[]
of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and invit[e] district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” In re Phila.
Entm’t & Dev. Partners, No. 17-1954, 2018 WL 358216, at *5 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2018) (quoting
Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 281). Accordingly, the NJDOL Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
those claims based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is DENIED in part. To the extent Bhatt seeks
review and rejection of the NJDOL’s decision denying her unemployment benefits and requesting
she pay a refund, such arguments are DISMISSED pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Accordingly, Bhatt’s Count Five against the NJDOL Defendants is DISMISSED because it seeks
“unpaid and delayed unemployment” benefits. (ECF No. 15 at 34-35.)
2. Article III Standing
Next, the NJDOL Defendants allege Bhatt’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed for
failure to establish Article III standing. (ECF No. 31-1 at 14-15.) Specifically, they argue Bhatt
fails to address standing before this Court because she
fails to make a logical claim that her denial of unemployment
benefits and the refund owed is an injury traceable to the
Commissioner or the Director personally because [Bhatt] fails to
allege any misconduct on the part of the Commissioner or the Direct
in the [NJDOL] allegedly having denied [Bhatt’s] benefits.
(Id. at 15.)
“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and
‘Controversies.’” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007). “Standing to sue is a doctrine

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rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct.
1540, 1547 (2016). “The standing inquiry focuses on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had
the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.” Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele,
757 F.3d 347, 360 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008)).
A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is properly brought pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), because standing is a matter of jurisdiction. Ballentine v. United States,
486 F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n v. Gov’t of
the U.S. Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The issue of standing is
jurisdictional.”); Kaufman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 733 (3d Cir. 1970) (“[W]e must
not confuse requirements necessary to state a cause of action . . . with the prerequisites of
standing.”)). “Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must accept as true all material allegations set
forth in the complaint, and must construe those facts in favor of the nonmoving party.” Ballentine,
486 F.3d at 810 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant
Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2003)). Nevertheless, on a motion to dismiss for lack of
standing, the plaintiff “‘bears the burden of establishing’ the elements of standing, and ‘each
element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of
the litigation.’” FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 838 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992)). However, “general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct
may suffice.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
Article III “standing consists of three elements.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (quoting Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560). To establish standing, “[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2)
that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be

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redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. “The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal
jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id. (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas,
493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)).
Contrary to the NJDOL Defendants’ argument, Bhatt has established she has standing to
pursue claims against them. Bhatt’s Amended Complaint asserts she suffered an injury in fact that
is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the NJDOL Defendants. Specifically, the Amended
Complaint alleges, in part, that: (1) “under directives of [NJDOL] [C]ommissioner, NJ’s
Unemployment Compensation Department created additional debt on Plaintiff’s name to avoid
payment of any unemployment compensation benefits to [Bhatt] during her training;” (2) the
Director of NJDOL used business relations it has with AT&T “to create artificial debt on [Bhatt’s
name for all contracts interfered by AT&T;” and (3) NJDOL “[D]irector made arrangements for
[Bhatt’s] [unemployment benefits] during 2011 without requiring payments of funds from her
former employer Planet Associates at the time and also did the same for Collabera by not
requesting [Bhatt’s] former employers to contribute to extended employment benefit funds”
resulting in their being insufficient funds for her to receive unemployment benefits. (ECF No. 15
¶¶ 26, 47, and 57.)
Furthermore, Bhatt’s injuries are likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision of
this Court. Bhatt’s Amended Complaint alleges several constitutional due process violations due
to the NJDOL Defendants’ actions in denying her unemployment benefits and requesting her to
pay a refund. Because Bhatt alleges a personal injury—that the NJDOL Defendants did not provide
her with proper hearings, notice, or comply with state statutes in denying her benefits and finding
that she was overpaid—she may be entitled to nominal or compensatory damages. See Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264-66 (1978) (stating “the denial of procedural due process should be

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actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury” and that a plaintiff could recover
compensatory damages if it proves actual injury caused by the denial of his constitutional rights).
Therefore, Bhatt has established Article III standing, that she suffered an injury in fact, fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the NJDOL Defendants, and that is likely to be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
Accordingly, the NJDOL Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss based on lack of standing is DENIED. 4
3. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The NJDOL Defendants also argue they should be dismissed as Defendants to this suit
because they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. (ECF No. 31-1 at 10-13.) Pursuant
to the Eleventh Amendment, “nonconsenting states may not be sued by private individuals in
federal court unless Congress abrogates the state’s immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of its
power.” Hogg’s, 352 F. App’x at 628 (citing Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 363-64 (2001)). “[E]ven in actions where the state is not a named party, where the state
is deemed to be the real party in interest, a suit will be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Custin,
2016 WL 1157644, at *3 (citing Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir.
2005)).
“To determine whether a suit against a state entity is a suit against
the state, courts are to consider the following factors: (1) whether
the source of the money to pay a judgment would be the state
treasury, (2) the status of the entity under state law, and (3) the
entity's degree of autonomy.”
Id. (citing Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Ops., Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989)).

4

To the extent Bhatt seeks to be awarded unemployment benefits, such remedy cannot be redressed
by a favorable decision in this Court as it is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
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The NJDOL is clearly a department of State government, therefore any claim against it is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. However, Bhatt has not filed suit against the NJDOL, but
instead the NJDOL Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. (See ECF No. 15.)
Personnel of the NJDOL, sued in their official capacities, are likewise shielded from claims for
damages by the Eleventh Amendment. See Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588
F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009). Accordingly, any claims against the NJDOL Defendants in their
official capacity are DISMISSED.
Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to state officials sued in their individual
capacities. Custin, 2016 WL 1157644, at *3. Instead, courts have provided for a qualified
immunity, which shields public officials from suit for their good-faith and objectively reasonable
conduct. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). However, the burden of proving
entitlement to qualified immunity rests with the defendant. See Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d
120, 142 n.15 (3d Cir. 2001). Bhatt’s Amended Complaint asserts causes of action against the
NJDOL Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Because the burden of proving
entitled to qualified immunity rests with the NJDOL Defendants and they have not addressed it,
the Court cannot and will not address qualified immunity. Accordingly, claims against the NJDOL
Defendants in their individual capacity shall proceed.
4. Failure to State a Claim
The NJDOL Defendants argue the Amended Complaint “should be dismissed based on the
insufficiency of the pleadings.” (ECF No. 31-1 at 8.) Specifically, they argue Bhatt’s
claims are exceptionally vague and conclusory and certainly do not
involve allegations against the Commissioner or Director with any
degree of specificity whatsoever. It is evident that [Bhatt’s] claim is
essentially not direct against the Commissioners or Director
personally since no facts involving the Commissioner or Direct

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themselves are alleged, but rather against the [NJDOL], the agency
which administers unemployment benefits in New Jersey.
(Id. at 9.)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded
factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
misconduct alleged.” Id. This “plausibility standard” requires the complaint allege “more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it “is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Detailed factual allegations” are not
required, but “more than ‘an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation” must be pled; it
must include “factual enhancements” and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the
elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In a 12(b)(6) motion, the
defendant bears the burden of showing no claim has been presented. Hedges v. United States, 404
F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir.
1991).
In their Motion to Dismiss, the NJDOL Defendants only contend the Amended Complaint
should be dismissed because it does not plead specific allegations against them. (ECF No. 31-1 at
8-10.) Such argument lacks merit. As set forth above, in the Article III Section, Bhatt has plead
specific allegations against the NJDOL Defendants. (See ECF No. 15 ¶¶ 26, 47, and 57.)
Accordingly, the NJDOL Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to this argument is DENIED. Because
the NJDOL Defendants bear the burden of showing that no claim has been presented, and they
choose solely to argue the Amended Complaint failed to assert specific claims against them, the

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Court will not analyze Bhatt’s specific claims against these Defendants. See Hedges, 404 F.3d at
750.
5. Burford Abstention Principle
Lastly, the NJDOL Defendants argue Bhatt’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed
because the Court “should abstain from hearing it under the Buford Abstention Principle.” (ECF
No. 31-1 at 20-22.) Specifically, they argue “the [NJDOL] has put into place a complex, but fair,
system for dealing with claims for unemployment benefits,” and therefore the Court should abstain
from trying this matter and defer to the NJDOL. (Id. at 21-22.)
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) discusses federal court deference to “difficult
questions of state law or . . . complex state policies.” Matusow v. Trans–County Title Agency,
L.L.C., 545 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2008). “The purpose of Burford is to ‘avoid federal intrusion
into matters of local concern and which are within the special competence of local courts.’” Hi
Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295, 303–04 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Chiropractic Am.
v. Lavecchia, 180 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 1999). Courts employ a “two-step analysis” when
determining the propriety of abstention under Burford. Id. at 304 (quoting Riley v. Simmons, 45
F.3d 764, 771 (3d Cir. 1995)). First, courts ask “‘whether timely and adequate state law review is
available.’” Id. (quoting Riley, 45 F.3d at 771). If such review is available, we “determine if the
case . . . involves difficult questions of state law impacting on the state’s public policy or whether
the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction would have a disruptive effect on the state’s efforts to
establish a coherent public policy on a matter of important state concern.” Id. (quoting Riley, 45
F.3d at 771).
Burford does not permit abstention in this case because Bhatt’s claims do not involve any
difficult questions of state law or implicate any complex state policies, nor do they have any impact

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on the public policy concerns of the NJDOL. Cf. Chiropractic Am., 180 F.3d at 105–06 (affirming
dismissal under Burford abstention principles where plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
New Jersey’s automobile insurance regulations). Instead, Bhatt’s claims revolve around
constitutional violations, which the Court is well equipped to address. Accordingly, the NJDOL
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on this ground is DENIED.
B. Claims Against Kramer and Collabera
Kramer and Collabera argue Bhatt’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed because:
(1) Bhatt lacks standing; (2) it is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Buford abstention
principle; (3) they are not state actors pursuant to § 1983; (4) Bhatt does not allege they conspired
or that they took an over act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy in violation of §§ 1985(3)
and 1986; (5) 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 has no applicability to them; (6) Title VI also has no
applicability to them; (7) Bhatt has not pled they caused her intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (8) Bhatt does not allege any discriminatory conduct against them in violation of § 1981;
(9) Bhatt cannot allege she is entitled to unemployment benefits to make out a claim of conversion;
(10) Bhatt cannot demonstrate they were unjustly enriched by her denial of unemployment benefits
and request to pay back funds; and (11) Count Five should be dismissed because it seeks unpaid
and delayed unemployment benefits and Kramer and Collabera had no obligation to provide Bhatt
with such benefits. (See ECF No. 44-1.)
Because Bhatt’s standing to bring a claim against Kramer and Collabera is a threshold
jurisdictional requirement, see Pub. Interest Research Grp. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium
Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 1997), the Court considers this argument at the outset.
As set forth supra, there are three elements a plaintiff must establish in order to have Constitutional
standing under Article III. To establish standing, “[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury

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in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547.
Here, Kramer and Collabera challenge all three elements. Even assuming Bhatt was able
to satisfy the first element of standing regarding her alleged injury, the Court finds she lacks
standing to bring claims against Kramer and Collabera because the facts alleged in the Amended
Complaint fail to demonstrate any causal connection between the alleged injury and any conduct
on the part of Kramer and Collabera.
As the Third Circuit has explained, “[t]he second requirement of Article III standing,
causation, requires that ‘the alleged injury-in-fact is causally connected and traceable to an action
of the defendant [ ].’” Edmonson, 725 F.3d at 418 (citing The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354,
360 (3d Cir. 2000); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). The causation requirement of standing is “akin to ‘but
for’ causation and . . . the traceability requirement [can be] met even where the conduct in question
might not have been a proximate cause of the harm, due to intervening events.” Edmonson, 725
F.3d at 418. A thorough review of the Amended Complaint makes clear that Bhatt has failed to
allege any specific conduct by Kramer or Collabera that is “fairly traceable” to her alleged injury.
The conduct of which Bhatt primarily complains is that she was denied unemployment
benefits, required to pay back a refund, and that her constitutional rights were violated in the
process. (See generally ECF No. 15.) Determinations to deny unemployment benefits and request
she pay a refund were made by the NJDOL, not Kramer or Collabera. While Bhatt’s Amended
Complaint alleges Kramer and Collabera provided false statements to the NJDOL and that
Collabera failed to pay unemployment benefit amounts it deducted as part of her wages towards
“NJUI” funds, it fails to state if and how those false reports led to her denial of unemployment
benefits and request to pay back funds. It also fails to demonstrate how Collabera’s alleged failure

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to pay unemployment benefits amounts deducted was the reason for her denial or request to pay a
refund. In fact, Bhatt admits in her Amended Complaint that she was receiving benefits at some
point, but such benefits were ceased because the NJDOL committed an “error” and determined
they had overpaid her unemployment benefits. (ECF No. 15 ¶ 37.) Bhatt “alleges . . . she was given
the reasons that [she] was overpaid during 2010 and 2011 after her unlawful terminations from
AT&T due to ‘Errors’ of State’s Unemployment Department in making overpayments to [Bhatt]
long ago during 2009 and 2010.” (Id. ¶ 43.)
While Bhatt asserts Collabera did not pay the NJDOL funds it extracted from her wages,
that was not the reason provided by NJDOL for her denial of benefits, as stated in Bhatt’s Amended
Complaint. Moreover, Bhatt’s conclusory assertions that Collabera did not pay the NJDOL funds
it extracted from her wages are speculative. Indeed, Bhatt admits her allegations are merely
speculative by stating in her opposition, “some entity has either failed to contribute or has diverted
and therefore stolen those funds by artificially induced ‘errors’ of ‘over payments’ to [Bhatt] This
matter requires investigations by discovery and exposing multi-end fraud caused by false reporting
and deceit of defendants.” (ECF No. 51 at 9.) “[D]iscovery is not intended as a fishing expedition
permitting the speculative pleading of a case first and then pursuing discovery to support it; the
plaintiff must have some basis in fact for the action.” Zuk v. Eastern Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of Med.
Coll. of Pa., 103 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 1996). Therefore, it is clear she has not alleged an injury
traceable to Collabera. Instead, she alleges NJDOL’s “errors,” not Kramer or Collabera’s, are
responsible for her alleged injuries.
Notably, Kramer’s name only appears in the Amended Complaint twice, stating: (1) she
“contacted Planet Associates’ former employer Mr. Chris Healy and the two had telephone
conversations about Plaintiff’s ‘Performance Issues’ at AT&T due to which she was let go by due

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to multiple unlawful terminations” and (2) that she “lied on her submissions to NJ’s enforcement
by false reporting.” Such allegations are not sufficient to demonstrate Kramer’s conduct is fairly
traceable to her injury. As such, Bhatt has not pled Kramer and Collabera’s conduct lead to her
injury. Accordingly, Kramer and Collabera’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED due to Bhatt’s lack
of standing to proceed against them. Because Bhatt lacks standing, the Court need not address the
rest of Kramer and Collabera’s arguments.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Kramer and Collabera’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED
in its entirety. The NJDOL Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to any claims against
them in their official capacity and as to Count Five. The NJDOL Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
is DENIED as to all other respects. To the extent Bhatt seeks review of the NJDOL’s decision
denying her unemployment benefits and requesting she pay a refund, such remedy is not available
and such arguments are DISMISSED pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Date: January 30, 2018

/s/ Brian R. Martinotti___________
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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