STEVENS v. JONES et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM ORDERED that Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to all Defendants; Plaintiff's claim that defendants Vitale and Greggus conspired with defendant Jones to falsely arrest and imprison him is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; Plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims shall continue to PROCEED against defendant Jones only. Signed by Judge Brian R. Martinotti on 10/2/2017. (km, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CALVIN TAYLOR STEVENS,

Civil Action No. 16-8694-BRM-DEA

Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

ANTHONY JONES, BRANDT GREGGUS,
and VINCENT J. VITALE,
Defendants.

THIS MATTER is opened by the Court, sua sponte, upon screening the Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 15) of pro se Plaintiff Calvin Taylor Stevens (“Plaitniff”) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, for the
reasons expressed below, and for good cause shown, finds Plaintiff’s false arrest and false
imprisonment claims shall continue to PROCEED against defendant Anthony Jones (“Jones”)
only; Plaintiff’s claim that defendants Detective Brandt Greggus (“Greggus”) and Assistant
Prosecutor Vincent J. Vitale (“Vitale”) conspired to falsely arrest and imprison him shall be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims shall be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE against all Defendants.
As this Court previously explained to Plaintiff, because he is proceeding in forma pauperis
in this matter, his Amended Complaint is subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, the Court is required to dismiss any claims which are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek damages from a defendant who is
immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a

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complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x
120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
district court is “required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [Plaintiff].” Phillips v. Cty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). “[A] complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations.” Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
However, the Plaintiff’s “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is “not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286.
Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the complaint are true, those “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for misconduct alleged.” Id. This “plausibility standard” required the complaint allege “more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it “is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Detailed factual allegations” are not
required, but “more than ‘an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation” must be pled; it
must include “factual enhancements” and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the
elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). “Determining whether a

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complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff reasserts his false arrest and false imprisonment
claims against defendant Jones which this Court has already permitted to proceed. 1 (ECF Nos. 10,
11.) While the Court need not readdress those two claims, Plaintiff also asserts claims against two
additional defendants named for the first time in the Amended Complaint – Defendants Greggus
and Vitale. Plaintiff’s claims against Greggus arise out of Plaintiff’s contention that Greggus lied
under oath in order to secure Plaintiff’s indictment, and that Vitale used this false testimony to
secure that indictment. Plaintiff thus essentially alleges that Greggus and Vitale maliciously
prosecuted him based on the false testimony used to initiate criminal proceedings against Plaintiff

Although Plaintiff does not re-allege everything in his original complaint in the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff clearly states the Amended Complaint is an “add on” to his original complaint,
and it is thus clear he intends his Amended Complaint to be comprised of both his original
proceeded claims and his new claims against the newly added defendants. Therefore, the Court
construes Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to incorporate by reference the claims this Court
previously allowed to proceed. See, e.g., Phillip v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 861 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462
n.9 (D.N.J. 2012) (holding courts should construe amended complaints as incorporating an original
complaint where it appears that a pro se plaintiff did not intend for his amended complaint to
replace his original filing). Because this Court has already screened Plaintiff’s original complaint
and permitted it to proceed in part, the Court will not rescreen those claims contained in the original
complaint in this Order, and will instead only address the new claims contained in the Amended
Complaint.
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in violation of Plaintiff’s rights, and are thus liable to him pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
also contends these two defendants conspired with Jones to have Plaintiff falsely arrested and
imprisoned in contravention of his constitutional rights.
Turning first to malicious prosecution, as this Court already explained to Plaintiff, a
plaintiff attempting to raise a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution must plead:
(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal
proceeding ended in [the plaintiff’s] favor; (3) the defendant
initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant
acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff
to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered [a] deprivation of liberty
consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal
proceeding.
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2014). A plaintiff cannot make out a claim for
malicious prosecution unless he specifically alleges the criminal prosecution was terminated in his
favor. Id. While Plaintiff has pled Greggus and Vitale initiated a proceeding against him by
working together to secure a grand jury indictment and that they secured the indictment through
the use of perjury, Plaintiff has once again failed to plead that his criminal prosecution terminated
in his favor. Therefore, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims against all Defendants are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim for which relief may be
granted.
Plaintiff also pleads a new claim—that defendants Greggus and Vitale conspired with
Jones to have Plaintiff falsely arrested and imprisoned in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 2 (See ECF No. 15 at 44-45, 49.) In order to plead a claim for false arrest, a § 1983 plaintiff

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Plaintiff alleges both Greggus and Vitale conspired with Jones to deprive him of his rights by
falsely imprisoning him and by initiating the grand jury proceedings against him. Thus, Plaintiff
alleges a conspiracy both as to malicious prosecution and false arrest/false imprisonment. Because
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim fails either individually against Greggus and Vitale or as a
conspiracy involving Greggus, Vitale, and Jones for the reasons stated above (Plaintiff’s failure to
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must plead facts which indicate “there was an arrest” or seizure of the plaintiff and the arrest or
seizure “was made without probable cause.” James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d
Cir. 2012). A § 1983 false imprisonment claim is derivative of a false arrest claim, and will stand
where the alleged facts indicate that the allegedly improper arrest resulted in pre-arraignment
detention of the plaintiff. See Adams v. Officer Eric Selhorst, 449 F. App’x 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citing Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also Stevens v. Way,
Civ. No. 15-7261, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67863, at *9 (D.N.J. 2016).
In order to plead a conspiracy claim under § 1983, however, a plaintiff must make
additional factual allegations. The basic element of a § 1983 conspiracy is a “meeting of the minds”
of the alleged members of the conspiracy. Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir.
2008) (citation omitted). A plaintiff seeking to raise a claim that the defendants conspired to
deprive him of his rights must therefore “provide some factual basis to support the existence of the
elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action.” Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of
N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1481 (10th
Cir. 1990)). Because a plaintiff must plead facts showing his claim to be plausible rather than
merely possible, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, “the bare allegation of an agreement is insufficient
to sustain a conspiracy claim.” Brown v. Deparlos, 492 F. App’x 211, 215 (3d Cir. 2012).
Likewise, “[i]t is insufficient to allege that ‘the end result of the parties’ independent conduct
caused plaintiff harm or even that alleged perpetrators of the harm acted in conscious parallelism.’”
Desposito v. New Jersey, No. 14-1641, 2015 WL 2131073, at *14 (D.N.J. May 5, 2015) (quoting

plead favorable termination), the Court now refers solely to the portion of the alleged conspiracy
concerning Plaintiff’s false arrest/imprisonment claim.
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Novellino v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr. Mountanview Youth, No. 10-4542, 2011 WL 3418201, at *15
(D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2011).
In this matter, Plaintiff merely asserts defendants Greggus and Vitale conspired to falsely
arrest or imprison him. He does not plead any facts which, if true, would establish agreement and
concerted action, instead providing only conclusory allegations of a conspiracy. Indeed, Plaintiff
does not allege any facts which would suggest Greggus or Vitale were involved in his initial arrest
and imprisonment by defendant Jones, and instead provides allegations indicative only of their
involvement in the grand jury phase of his prosecution. 3 At best, Plaintiff has pled facts showing
Greggus and Vitale’s actions resulted in his continued imprisonment, which is insufficient to state
a claim for conspiracy under § 1983. Desposito, 2015 WL 2131073 at *14. Accordingly, Plaintiff
has failed to plead a claim for conspiracy, and his false arrest and false imprisonment conspiracy
claims against defendants Greggus and Vitale are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS THEREFORE on this 2nd day of October 2017,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE as to all Defendants; and it is further

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To the extent Plaintiff’s asserted conspiracy concerns an alleged agreement by Greggus and
Vitale to attempt to indict him and have him detained pre-trial following that proceeding, such
claims are malicious prosecution claims, rather than false imprisonment claims. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007) (false imprisonment and false arrest claims only cover
the period between arrest and the issuance of process or arraignment, claims related to
imprisonment following the onset of legal process arise instead as malicious prosecution claims).
Thus, to the extent the asserted conspiracy concerns the actions of Greggus and Vitale in
preparation for grand jury proceedings or in those proceedings themselves, any such conspiracy
claim would fail for the reasons that Plaintiff’s direct malicious prosecution claim fails – Plaintiff
has not pled that his criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor. Id.
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ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claim that defendants Vitale and Greggus conspired with
defendant Jones to falsely arrest and imprison him is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims shall continue to
PROCEED against defendant Jones only; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall send a copy of this Order to Plaintiff by
regular U.S. mail; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall send a copy of the Docker Report to Plaintiff
by regular U.S. mail.

/s/ Brian R. Martinotti___________
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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