HOF v. JANCI et al

Filing 50

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 11/30/2018. (mmh)

RECEIVED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DEC o3 2018
AT &.so

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

/I '. t.j "-

A; M

WILLl~~ETR~ALSH

RAYMOND HOF,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 17-295
V.

OPINION
JAMES JANCI, Esq.,
Defendant.

THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.

INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by
- Defendant James Janci ("Defendant"). (ECF No. 37.) Plaintiff Raymond Hof ("Plaintiff')
opposes. (ECF No. 43.) The Court has decided the Motion after considering the parties' written
submissions without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1 (b ). For the following
reasons, Defendant's Motion is denied.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against Defendant, former First Assistant
Prosecutor of the Hunterdon County Prosecutor's Office, in his individual capacity. (Am.
Compl. TJ[ 1, 5, ECF No. 24.) The facts pertinent and necessary for the disposition of this
Motion are as follows.
On June 12, 2014, Plaintiff was charged with domestic violence. (Def.'s Stmt. of
Material Facts ("Def.'s SMF'') <J[ 11, ECF No. 37-3; Domestic Violence Offense Rpt. at 1-2, Ex.

1

E, ECF Nos. ·31-5, 44-5 (filed under seal).) The parties dispute the specific underlying factual
allegations of the charge, but allegedly Plaintiff physically assaulted his girlfriend by, at one
point, wrapping surgical tape "around her lips and neck." (Pl. 's Resp. Stmt. of Material Facts
("Pl.'s Resp. SMF') ')[ 11, ECF No. 43; Domestic Violence Offense Rpt. at 2.) Police arrested
Plaintiff that same day. (Def. 's SMF ')[ 11.) Although a New Jersey Superior Court entered a
temporary restraining order ("TRO") prohibiting Plaintiff from contact with the girlfriend (id. <J[

12; Domestic Violence Offense Rpt. at 2-5), that TRO was dismissed four days later on June 16,
2014 (Pl.'s SMF<J[ 12). On June 30, 2014, bail was set at $20,000 without a 10% option. (Def.'s
SMF 113; Order of Procedure After Arrest, Ex. F, ECF No. 44-6.) A grand jury indicted Plaintiff·
on August 7, 2014 for (1) terroristic threats, (2) unlawful possession of a weapon, (3) possession
of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and (4-5) two counts of criminal restraint. (Def. 's SMF ')[')[

1-2; Indictment, Ex. H, ECF No. 44-8.) Plaintiff entered a guilty plea to one count of criminal
restraint on August 15, 2014. (J. of Conviction at 1, Ex. I, ECF No. 44-9.) On May 15, 2015, his
plea was accepted and he was sentenced to time served, which had been 254 days. (Id.)
However, Plaintiff was incarcerated from the date of his arrest on June 12, 2014 until his
sentencing on May 15, 2015. Consequently, sometime in late 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion to
reduce bail and dismiss a no-contact order that had been previously imposed and that prohibited
Plaintiff from contacting the victim, his girlfriend. A hearing was scheduled for January 8, 2015.
(Def.'s SMF ')[ 16.) In anticipation of the bail h~aring, Defendant submitted a letter to the
presiding court, opposing any bail reduction "[g]iven the seriousness of the charges [and] the
prior history of decompensation." (Ex. G, ECF No. 43-4.) The girlfriend testified during the
bail hearing that the no-contact order was not necessary and, in fact, that she wanted Plaintiff to
move back in with her once he was released. (Pl.'s Suppl. SMFTJ[ 7-10, ECF No. 43.) As a

2

result, the court reduced Plaintiff's bail and lifted the no-contact order. (Def. 's SMF 1 18; Pl. 's
Resp. SMF <J[ 18.)
Despite the fact that the court lifted the no-contact order, on the day that Plaintiff planned
to post bail and seek his release, January 16, 2015, the parole office implemented a no-contact
provision as a special condition of release that prohibited Plaintiff from contacting the girlfriend,
with whom Plaintiff planned to reside upon release. (Def.'s SMF<J[<J[ 19-20; Notice of Imposition
of Special Condition ("Condition Notice") at 1, Ex. M, ECF No. 44-13; Pl.'s Suppl. SMF 1113-

15, 18-20.) Although the Condition Notice noted that a similar TRO was previously imposed
and subsequently dismissed, the Condition Notice stated that it sought "to reinforce these
restraining orders, prevent contact with [the girlfriend] and keep [Plaintiff] in compliance with
[his supervision requirements]." (Condition Notice at 1.)
However, the parties dispute the events that occurred between the bail hearing on January

8, 2015 and implementation of the Condition Notice on January 16, 2015. Defendant admits that
Defendant discussed the bail hearing with Plaintiff's parole officer, which prompted Plaintiff's
parole officer to implement a no-contact provision as a special condition of Plaintiff's release,
but Defendant also makes clear that "Plaintiff's parole officer implemented [the] no-contact
order regardless of any representations made by [Defendant]." (Def. 's SMF ff 17, 19, 30.)
Plaintiff, on the other hand, avers that Defendant discussed the bailing hearing with certain
parole officers who were not even assigned to Plaintiff. (Pl. 's SMF <J[ 17.) During the course of
this conversation, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant lied to the parole officers by conveying that a
no-contact order was still in place and that Plaintiff was still prohibited from contacting the
girlfriend. (Pl. 's Suppl. SMF <J[<J[ 24-29.) Plaintiff's criminal counsel testified that he had a threeway telephone conversation with Defendant and Defendant's superior, Mr. Anthony Kearns, in

3

which Defendant admitted to lying to the parole officers because Defendant characterized
Plaintiff as "an animal" and thus sought "to protect the community" from Plaintiff. 1 (Id. <J[<J[ 24-

26; Hasketh Dep. 21:21-24:13, Ex. F, ECF No. 43-4.) Plaintiff further avers that these parole
officers-and not Plaintiff's assigned parole officer-are the ones who implemented the
Condition Notice. (Pl.'s Suppl. SMF<J[ 19.) The parole board affirmed the Condition Notice on
January 22, 2015.
As a result of the Condition Notice, Plaintiff's inability to reside with the girlfriend upon
release caused several different problems for Plaintiff. Plaintiff was subject to Community
Supervision for Life ("CSL") as a result of a Megan's Law conviction in 2001. (Def.'s SMF <J[
4.) One of those terms required that Plaintiff, inter alia, "reside at a residence approved by the
assigned parole officer." (CSL Conditions <J[ 5, Ex. K, ECF No. 44-11.) Because, at this point,
Plaintiff was not permitted to reside with the girlfriend, Plaintiff had no other place to reside, and
thus Plaintiff's parole officer required (per CSL Conditions <J[ 12) that Plaintiff attend a
residential counseling program at the Bo Robinson House. 2 (Def.'s SMF<JrJ[ 24-25; Ex. N, ECF
No. 44-14; Hof Cert. 17, Ex. J, ECF No. 43-5.) The parties dispute Plaintiff's response to this
condition: Defendant contends that Plaintiff refused to agree to this condition and that his refusal
alone violated his CSL, "triggering his parole violation and the extension of his stay in jail"
(Def. 's SMF <J[<J[ 27-28, 31 ); Plaintiff contends that refusing to "sign off' on this condition is not

1 This

slight is not the only example of impropriety alleged by Plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges
that after the January 8, 2015 bail hearing, Defendant allegedly called Plaintiffs mother and
instructed her not to post bail for Plaintiff. (Pl.' s Suppl. SMF <J[ 16.)
2
Separately, Plaintiff contends that the parole office lied to him about this program: although
"Plaintiff was told that the Bo Robinson House was an unlocked transitional residence with
mental health treatment. ... [t]his is not the case" as the "Bo Robinson [House] is a lock down
transitional jail with no mental health treatment" (i.e., "[e]essentially a half-way house"). (Pl.'s
Suppl. SMF <J[ 21.)
4

itself a violation of his CSL but, regardless, the parole officers would "not offer him another
chance to sign the paper" despite Plaintiff later on agreeing to sign off on this condition (Pl. 's
SMF <J[ 27; Pl.'s Suppl. SMF ,r,r 21-22). Because the parole officers did not provide Plaintiff a
second opportunity to agree to this condition, Plaintiff alleges the following:
Officer Cunningham told Plaintiff that he was released on bail. He followed this
up by saying a no-contact order was still place and that he could not live with [his
girlfriend]. Officer Cunningham then told Plaintiff he would be homeless and that
it was against the law for him to be homeless. As a result, Officer Cunningham
arrested Plaintiff on a CSL Violation.
(Pl.'s Suppl. SMF<J[ 23.) Plaintiff was charged with a third-degree CSL violation and was placed
in jail for about another month. (Hof. Cert. TJ( 10-11.) Plaintiff was released from jail on
February 20, 2015, and upon release Plaintiff completed the required counseling over the course
of the next year. (Def.'s Br. at 28, ECF No. 37-3; Hof Cert. ,r,r 11-12.) Plaintiff eventually
pleaded guilty to a previous "CSL violation regarding possessing a computer," and "[t]he CSL
violation for [allegedly] refusing to commit to residential housing was dismissed." (Def.'s
Suppl. Resp. at 4, ECF No. 48; see also CSL J. of Conviction, ECF No. 48.)3
On January 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, in his individual and
official capacities, and the Hunterdon County Prosecutor's Office. (ECF No. 1.) On September
7, 2017, the Court dismissed with prejudice all claims against the Hunterdon County
Prosecutor's Office. (Order at 1, ECF No. 23.) The Court also dismissed all claims in
Defendant's official capacity, but denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in regard to the claims
in his individual capacity. (Id.) The Court also granted Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint
within twenty days of the Order. (Id.)

3

On May 15, 2015, Plaintiff was sentenced for the CSL violation concurrently with the criminal
restraint charge for time served: 254 days. (J. of Conviction at 1; CSL J. of Conviction at 1.)

5

On September 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint alleging six counts
against Defendant: ( 1) § 1983 claim that derived from an alleged violation of Plaintiff's right not
to be unreasonably seized pursuant to the Fourth Amendment (Am. Compl. <J[<J[ 21-26, ECF No.
24); (2) violation of Plaintiff's rights under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. § 10:6-1
(id. TI[ 27-33); (3) malicious prosecution (id. TI[ 34-42); (4) malicious representation causing
damage (id.

<J[<J[

43-46); (5) fraud (id.

<J[<J[

47-50); and (6) false imprisonment (id. TI[ 51-56).

Defendant answered on October 16, 2017. (ECF No. 27.)
The parties conducted discovery over the course of the following year (see ECF No. 34),
and, pursuant to a scheduling order (ECF No. 36), Defendant filed the instant Motion for
Summary Judgment on October 12, 2018 (ECF No. 37). Plaintiff opposed the Motion on
October 30, 2018 (ECF No. 43), and Defendant submitted a reply on November 20, 2018 (ECF
No. 49). On November 9, 2018, the Court requested additional briefing from the parties. (ECF
No. 46.) In response, Defendant submitted a supplemental response on November 20, 2018
(ECF No. 48); Plaintiff did not submit any additional briefing.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" if it could lead
a "reasonable jury [to] return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if it will "affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law." Id. When deciding the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact,
a court's role is not to weigh the evidence; all reasonable "inferences, doubts, and issues of
credibility should be resolved against the moving party." Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720

6

F.2d 303, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983). In resolving a motion for summary judgment, a district court
considers the facts drawn from "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials, and any
affidavits." Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).
The court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. More precisely, summary judgment should be granted if the
evidence available would not support a jury verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 24849. The Court must grant summary judgment against any party "who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

DISCUSSION
Defendant urges the Court to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant, primarily
offering six arguments: (1) Defendant is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity (Def. 's Br. at
13-20); (2) Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity for the§ 1983 claim (id. at 20-24); (3)
Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity for all state claims (id. at 24-25); (4) Plaintiff failed
to establish that Defendant's alleged misconduct was the proximate cause for Plaintiff's alleged
harm (id. at 9-13); (5) Plaintiff has failed to plead a prima facie claim of malicious prosecution

(id. at 25-26); and (6) Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations (id. at 27-28).
The Court addresses and, ultimately, rejects each of these arguments.

I.

Immunity
A.

Absolute Prosecutorial lmmuntiy

Defendant first claims that he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. "Most
public officials are entitled only to qualified immunity" from § 1983 actions, Yarris v. Cnty. of

7

Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006), but "state prosecutors are absolutely immune from
liability under§ 1983 for actions performed in a quasi-judicial role," Light v. Haws, 412 F.3d 74,
77 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,427,431 (1976)). A prosecutor's
quasi-judicial role includes both "activity taken while in court, such as the presentation of
evidence or legal argument, as well as selected out-of-court behavior 'intimately associated withthe judicial phases' of litigation." Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 (3d Cir. 1992)
(internal citation omitted); see also Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339,356 (3d Cir.
1999). But a prosecutor performing duties better characterized as "administrative" or
"investigatory'' that seemingly "do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a
prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity." Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). In those instances, the prosecutor's conduct may be
entitled to qualified immunity or even no immunity at all. See Kulwicki, F.2d at 1463.
Essentially, the prosecutor bears the burden to establish that "she was functioning as the state's
'advocate' while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation."

. Yarris, 465 F.3d at 136.
Here, Plaintiff alleges in the Amended Complaint that Defendant misrepresented certain
facts to parole officers which led to Plaintiffs incarceration for a time period longer than the law
provides. Certainly, Defendant's alleged conduct at issue did not occur during a court
proceeding or presentation of evidence or legal argument. Defendant essentially concedes this
point but argues instead that he was acting "as part of his role as an advocate for the State."
(Def.'s Br. at 19.)
Despite Defendant's stated justification, the circumstances do not equate to an
entitlement of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Defendant first contends that his "exchanges

8

with the parole board were instituted as part of his role as an advocate for the State and in
preparation for ... the January 8, 2015 bail hearing" (id. (emphasis added)), but the record is
unclear as to whether these exchanges occurred before or after the January 8, 2015 bail hearing.
(Compare Def.' s SMF <J[ 17 (Defendant spoke with parole "[a]t some point"), with PI.' s Resp.
SMF <J[ 17 (Defendant spoke with parole "immediately prior to expected release").) In fact,
Defendant contends that he was motivated to "keep the community and [the girlfriend] safe"
(Def.'s Br. at 20), which, one may infer, may have been a response to the New Jersey Superior
Court's grant of bail after the January 8, 2015 hearing.
Defendant further contends that his conduct-contacting parole to "keep the community
and [the girlfriend] safe" (id.)-occurred "while deciding whether or not to dispose of the case
on a plea or oppose the motion for bail" (id. at 18). But a reading of the facts most favorable to
the non-movant demonstrates that Defendant was not deciding whether to initiate prosecution as
Plaintiff had already been charged and indicted. Defendant was also not deciding whether to
oppose bail as it was clear that Defendant already opposed bail and generally felt strongly about
Plaintiffs propensity for violence. (See, e.g., Pl.' s Suppl. SMF 'fl[ 26-28 (citing testimony that
Defendant called Plaintiff "an animal" and that Defendant "thought it was the right thing to have
[Plaintiff] removed from their county").)

The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist to prevent a grant of summary
judgment in favor of Defendant. The Court is unable to determine whether Defendant's conduct
was in preparation for a "judicial proceeding" and, if it was, whether Defendant's conduct
exceeded his advocative role as prosecutor. Indeed, as the Court stated in its Opinion regarding
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, it still seems plausible that Defendant's conduct more closely
mirrors cases in which prosecutors acted in a purely investigative role. (See Op. at 12, ECF No.

9

22.) If Plaintiffs proffered allegations were true, Defendant would not be entitled to absolute
immunity. Cf Buckley, 509 U.S. at 276-78 (concluding that prosecutor was not acting as state's
"advocate" and thus not entitled to absolute immunity). Therefore, the Court finds that
Defendant is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.
B.

Qualified Immunity

Defendant also claims that, in the alternative, he is entitled to qualified immunity. "The
doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability as long 'as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."' McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359,364 (3d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 451 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The court determines (1) "whether
the facts, and inferences drawn therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
establish that the official's conduct violated a constitutional right," id. (citing Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)); and (2) "whether, as a legal matter, the right that the defendant's
conduct allegedly violates was a clearly established one, about which a reasonable person would
have known," Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2000). Defendant carries "the burden
of persuasion at a summary judgment proceeding [as he is] the party asserting the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity." Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 150 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014). Defendant
therefore must either "show that there was no genuine dispute of material fact to refute the[]
contention that [Defendant] did not violate [Plaintiff's] constitutional rights as he asserted them,
or show that reasonable officers could not have known that [Defendant's] conduct constituted
such a violation when [Defendant] engaged in it." Id.

10

1.

Clearly Established Right

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant lied to parole officers to manufacture Plaintiffs unlawful
arrest, thereby violating Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right not to be unreasonably seized. (Pl.' s
Br. at 24, ECF No. 43.) At the outset, the Court recognizes, as it recognized in its previous
Opinion (see Op. at 13-14), that arresting an individual without probable cause or "engineer[ing]
a false arrest" constitutes a "violation of clearly established law that would have been apparent to
a reasonable officer." Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480,483 (3d Cir. 1995); Evans v. City
of Newark, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62070, at *39 (D.N.J. May 10, 2016). Because the Court is
free to address the two prongs in the order of its choosing, Walker v. Coffey, 2018 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26864, at *6 (3d Cir. Sep. 20, 2018) (noting that "[a] court may address either of these
questions first" (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009))), at this point the Court
finds that this step is satisfied.
2.

Fourth Amendment Violation

Moving on to the other step, the Court must determine whether Defendant adequately
refutes the contention that Defendant violated Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right not to be
unreasonably seized. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 150 F.3d at 288. Plaintiff alleges in the Amended
Complaint that Defendant violated the Fourth Amendment "by inflicting false imprisonment
upon [P]laintiff' (Am. Campi. <J[ 24) and in its brief currently before the Court that Defendant
violated the Fourth Amendment by "arrest[ing Plaintiff] without probable cause" (Pl.' s Br. at
24). The Court construes Plaintifrs allegations as stating a false arrest or false imprisonment
claim under the Fourth Amendment, and must determine whether Defendant sufficiently refutes
this claim.

11

"To state a false arrest or false imprisonment claim under the Fourth Amendment and
pursuant to Section 1983 requires that the plaintiff show that 'the arresting officer lacked
probable cause to make the arrest."' Hickson v. Marina Assocs., 743 F. Supp. 2d 362,370
(D.N.J. 2010) (internal citation omitted); see also Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628,
636 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that "lack of probable cause" is a common element in both false arrest
and false imprisonment claims under the Fourth Amendment). "Probable cause is 'defined in
terms of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
[suspect] had committed or was committing an offense,"' Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 81718 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975)), and courts must
examine "the totality of the facts and circumstances," Hickson, 743 F. Supp. 2d at 370.
The Court previously found that Plaintiffs allegation-fabricating grounds for Plaintiffs
re-arrest-sufficed to survive the motion-to-dismiss stage. Here, too, the Court finds that this
allegation suffices to survive this stage of the litigation. First, Plaintiff presents evidence that
buttresses his claim. Plaintiffs criminal counsel testified during his deposition that he heard
Defendant admit to lying to the parole officers in an effort to protect the girlfriend and the
community. (Hasketh Dep. 21:21-24:13; Pl.'s Suppl. SMFTJ[ 26-27.) Knowingly and
deliberate! y making false statements to instigate an arrest, even with good intentions, would
probably constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87
(3d Cir. 2000) (outlining a successful§ 1983 claim for false arrest). 4

4

Defendant submits that "Plaintiff fails to set forth plausible constitutional violations against
him." (Def.'s Br. at 23.) However, Defendant seemingly concedes that Plaintiff alleges that
"[Defendant] wrongly contacted [P]laintiff s parole officer and lied about a no contact order."
(Id.) Defendant essentially argues that even if he had lied to a parole officer-triggering
Plaintiffs unjustified re-arrest and thereby subjecting him to unlawful detention-that conduct
did not violate Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right not to be unreasonably seized.
12

Second, although Defendant refutes Plaintiffs allegations, genuine issues of material fact
exist that preclude Defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity: ( 1) Defendant submits that
Defendant spoke with "Plaintiffs parole officer'' and that Plaintiffs parole officer made the
decision to implement the no-contact provision (Def.' s SMF TJ[ 17, 19), but Plaintiff submits that
Defendant spoke with parole officers not assigned to Plaintiff and that the decision to implement
the no-contact provision was not made by Plaintiffs assigned parole officer (Pl.' s Resp. SMF TJ[
17, 19); (2) Defendant contends that the parole board imposed the Condition Notice "to keep
Plaintiff in compliance with his CSL" (Def.' s SMF <J[ 21 ), but Plaintiff contends that prior to the
Condition Notice, "there was no parole or CSL restriction preventing Plaintiff from contacting
[his girlfriend]" (Pl.'s Resp. SMF<J[ 21); (3) Defendant argues that Plaintiff had no place to reside
upon release (Def.' s SMF TJ[ 25, 27), but Plaintiff argues that he was not permitted to "stay at a
hotel temporarily'' as in previous times when he was bailed out and that the parole officers
rescinded their offer to permit Plaintiff to stay at the Bo Robinson House (Pl.'s Resp. SMF <J[ 25;
Pl.'s Suppl. SMF <J[ 22); and (4) Defendant claims that the parole officers knew that the New
Jersey Superior Court lifted the no-contact order but reinstated the no-contact condition
notwithstanding their conversation with Defendant. (Def.' s SMF <J[ 30.) Plaintiff, however,
claims that the two parole officers, who were not assigned to Plaintiff, believed that a no-contact
was still in place as a result of their conversation with Defendant. (Pl.'s Suppl. SMF <J[<J[ 20, 23.)
Finally, numerous factual conflicts restrain the Court's ultimate conclusion. Because it is
Defendant's burden to resolve these discrepancies and unanswered questions, the Court finds
that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.

C.

State Law Immunity

Defendant also contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity for all state or common

13

law claims "for the same reasons [he] would be entitled to qualified immunity for any alleged
federal constitutional violations." (Def. 's Br. at 24--25.) The New Jersey Tort Claims Act
("NJTCA"), N.J.S.A. § 59:3-3, provides that "[a] public employee is not liable if he acts in good
faith in the execution of enforcement of any law." Defendant here concedes that "New Jersey
has adopted the same standard of objective reasonableness which applies in § 1983 cases" as the
"[NJTCA] is coterminous with the analysis of objective reasonable under § 1983 qualified
immunity." (Def.'s Br. at 24-25 (collecting cases).) Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
clarified that "[t]he same standard of objective reasonableness that applies in Section 1983
actions also governs questions of good faith arising under the [NJTCA]." lanuale v. Borough of
Keyport, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177515, at *31 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2018) (quoting Wildoner v.
Borough of Ramsey, 744 A.2d 1146, 1153 (N.J. 2000)); French v. Squire-Tibbs, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 90170, at *18 (D.N.J. June 26, 2013) ("[B]ecause the Court has already found that
Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity under the standard for section 1983 claims, it
must also find that his actions were not 'objectively reasonable' under the [NJTCA] standard.").
Therefore, because the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity for the §
1983 claim, the Court likewise finds Defendant is not entitled to immunity under the NJTCA.
II.

Statute of Limitations

Defendant also contends that the Amended Complaint is barred by the statute of
limitations and should thus be dismissed with prejudice. (Def.'s Br. at 27-28.) Defendant
explains that the state law of New Jersey provides a two-year statute of limitations for Plaintiffs
§ 1983 claim. Because "Plaintiff posted bail on February 20, 2015 .... his complaint needed to

be filed February 20, 2017." (Id. at 28.) Therefore, Defendant contends, the Amended
Complaint is barred "[a]s the present action was not commenced until October 1, 2017." (Id.)

14

However, Plaintiff did not commence this litigation on October 1, 2017; Plaintiff filed the
original complaint on January 16, 2017. (ECF No. 1.) If Defendant were referring to the date
Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint, that date is September 1 l, 2017. (ECF No. 24.)
Regardless, though Defendant is correct that New Jersey's two-year statute of limitations
is appropriate here, see Ong v. Hudson County Superior Court, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 27918, at
*4 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2018) (explaining that "[a] complaint pursuant to § 1983 is characterized as a
personal-injury claim and thus is governed by .... New Jersey's two-year statute of limitations
[for] personal injury actions" (internal citation omitted)), the Amended Complaint relates back to
the date of the original complaint because the Court granted Plaintiff twenty days to amend his
complaint and Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint within that period of time, Atkinson v.

Middlesex County, 610 F. App'x 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that a plaintiff may not cure a
deficiency and refile a complaint "if the statute of limitations has run by the time the court orders
dismissal without prejudice, unless the District Court grants leave to amend within a time
certain" (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)); Brennan v. Kulick, 407 F.3d 603, 606 (3d
Cir. 2005) (concluding that "orders which dismiss a complaint without prejudice with leave to
amend are not deemed final until either the time for amendment has expired or the plaintiff has
announced its intention to stand on its complaint"). Accordingly, Defendant's argument fails.

III.

Proximate Causation
"A § 1983 claim requires that the state actor was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs

harm." Johnson v. Provenzano, 646 F. App'x 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2016). To prove his claim, a
plaintiff "must establish an affirmative link or plausible nexus between the afore-described
[misconduct] and [his] incarceration." Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 854 (3d Cir. 1990).
At this stage of the litigation, however, a plaintiff need only "put forth evidence from which a

15

jury might infer ... a plausible nexus between the [alleged misconduct] and plaintiff['s] injuries.

Id. (emphasis added).
Defendant contends that he is entitled to summary judgment because Defendant's alleged
misconduct was not the proximate cause of Plaintiffs alleged harm. (Def.'s Br. at 9-13.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs parole officer was aware that the no-contact order had been
lifted, so that any misinformation that may have been relayed to him had nothing to do with the
ultimate decision to implement the Condition Notice. 5 (Id. at 9.) But Defendant provides no
_direct evidence, such as deposition testimony from the parole officers, that the parole board was
aware that the superior court had lifted the no-contact order. Rather, Defendant identifies three
pieces of circumstantial evidence and urges the Court to infer that the parole board was aware
that the no-contact order had been lifted and thus Defendant's alleged misrepresentation could
not have influenced the parole board's decision to implement a no-contact condition on
Plaintiffs release.
Defendant first maintains that the Condition Notice itself provides a justification for the
no-contact provision. (Def.'s Br. at 10-11.) The Condition Notice states in relevant part:
A recent check ... revealed a Temporary Restraining Order prohibiting you from
having contact with [your girlfriend] which was imposed on 6/12/2014 and
dismissed on 6/16/[20] 14.... This special condition is being imposed in an effort
to reinforce these restraining orders ... and keep you in compliance with your
[CSL].
(Condition Notice at 1.) However, this explanation appears to refute Defendant's argument.
This explanation suggests that its author, whose name is illegible to the Court, believed a nocontact order was still in place and that this Condition Notice simply reinforced that order.

5

It is worth noting as well that the parties dispute the identity of the parole officer with whom
Defendant communicated. (Compare Def.' s SMF ')[ 17 (parole officer assigned to Plaintiff), with
Pl.'s SMF CJ[ 17 (two parole officers unassigned to Plaintiff).)
16

Defendant next asserts that Plaintiff remained incarcerated after the January 8, 2015 bail
hearing merely because Plaintiff refused to sign the condition that he enter a community
treatment facility prior to his release. (Def. 's Br. at 12.) In response, Plaintiff insists that he
eventually acquiesced and agreed to comply, but the parole officers by then rescinded that offer.
(Pl.'s Br. at 19.) However, the Court is unable to decipher the cause of Plaintiffs re-arrest and
continued incarceration because the facts underlying the second charge remain cloudy. Indeed,
the charge related to Plaintiffs re-arrest-allegedly violating his CSL for refusing to commit to
residential housing-was ultimately dismissed. (Def. 's Suppl. Resp. at 4; see also CSL J. of
Conviction.)
Defendant lastly submits that "the parole board did its due diligence, and independent of
[Defendant's] representations, found that there was no such [court] order in place" (Def.'s Br. at
12), essentially rendering Defendant's alleged misconduct meaningless. But Plaintiff contends
that this contention "is patently false and incredibly misleading" as Defendant has provided no
evidence that such an independent investigation occurred. (Pl.'s Br. at 18.) These disputes of
material fact and ostensible ambiguity, therefore, compels the Court to deny Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
IV.

Malicious Prosecution
Under New Jersey common law, to establish a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff

must show that (1) a criminal action was instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the
criminal action was actuated by malice, (3) there was an absence of probable cause for the
proceedings, and (4) the criminal proceeding was terminated favorably to the plaintiff. Pitman v.

Ottehberg, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140564, at *25 n.13 (D.N.J. Sep. 30, 2013) (citing Hyatt v.
Cnty. of Passaic, 340 F. App'x 833, 838 (3d Cir. 2009); LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 970 A.2d 1007,

17

1022 (N.J. 2009)).
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs claim for malicious prosecution should be dismissed
because Plaintiff "failed to allege any of the requirements for establishing a claim for malicious
prosecution." (Def.'s Br. at 25-26.) More specifically, Defendant argues that (1) "[t]he
proceeding was not instituted by malice but because the police respond[ed] to a domestic
violence call"; (2) "there was probable cause for the domestic violence charge"; (3) Plaintiff
failed to adduce evidence that his "charge for violating his [CSL] allegedly caused by
[Defendant's] misconduct was later terminated in his favor." (Id. at 26.)
Notwithstanding, because the facts as to which charge resulted in a favorable outcome for
Plaintiff are muddied, the Court cannot conclude whether the required elements are present.
Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the malicious prosecution claim is
denied.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. An
appropriate order will follow.

ANNE E. THOMPSO , U.S.D.J.

18