CRAFT v. BONDS et al

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that the Clerk shall ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATE this case and mail Petitioner certain forms; that if Petitioner wishes to reopen this case he shall notify the Court, in writing, within 30 days of the date of entry of this Memorandum and Order. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 2/27/2017. (mmh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

NATHAN CRAFT,

Civil Action No. 17-1221 (PGS)
Petitioner,
v.

:

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIE BONDS, et al.,
Respondents.

This matter comes before the Court on a self-titled Rule 60(b) motion filed by Nathan Craft,
seeking to vacate a prior criminal conviction by the State of New Jersey. However, this Court can
only vacate a judgment or order of its own or, under extraordinary circumstances, vacate the
judgment or order of another district court. Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 254 (3d
Cir. 2008). This Court has no authority, under the guise of Rule 60, to vacate a state court
judgment. Green v. Coleman, No. 14-0074, 2014 WL 1050542, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2014)
(citing Burnett v. Amrein, 243 F. App’x 393, 395 (10th Cir. 2007)). As such, Petitioner’s filing is
more properly construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§

2254.

However, Local Civil Rule 81.2 provides:
Unless prepared by counsel, petitions to this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.
shall be in writing (legibly handwritten in ink or typewritten), signed by the
petitioner or movant, on forms supplied by the Clerk.
.

L.Civ.R. 81.2(a). Petitioner did not use the habeas form supplied by the Clerk for § 2254 petitions,
i.e., A024l (modified): DNJ-Habeas-008 (Rev. 01-2014), which includes a declaration that the
Petition contains all the grounds for relief that Petitioner is raising, and that he understands the
failure to set forth all grounds may bar him from presenting additional grounds at a later date.

_______

IT IS therefore on this

day of

,

2017,

ORDERED that the Clerk shall ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATE this case;

Petitioner is informed that administrative termination is not a “dismissal” for purposes of the
statute of limitations, and that if the case is reopened, it is not subject to the statute of limitations
time bar if it was originally filed timely, see Papotto v. Hanford Lfe & Ace. ins. Co., 731 F.3d
265, 275 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing administrative terminations from dismissals); Jenkins v.
Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80, 84 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013) (describing prisoner
mailbox rule generally); Dasilva v. Sherffs Dep ‘t., 413 F. App’x 498, 502 (3rd Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (“[The] statute of limitations is met when a [motion] is submitted to the clerk before the
statute runs[.]”); it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall forward Petitioner a blank Petition Under 28
U.S.C.

§ 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

A0241 (modified): DNJ-Habeas-008 (Rev. 01-

—

20 14); it is further
ORDERED that if Petitioner wishes to reopen this case, he shall so notify the Court, in a
writing, within 30 days of the date of entry of this Memorandum and Order; Petitioner’s writing
shall include a complete, signed habeas petition on the appropriate form; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Order upon Petitioner by regular mail.

e—

-z--

Peter G. Sheridan, U.S.D.J.

2