JONES v. PALONI et al
Filing
3
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 12/27/2017. (mps)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
RUBEN JONES,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 17-1949 (FLW) (LHG)
:
v.
:
:
OPINION
STEVEN PALONI et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
FREDA L. WOLFSON, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Ruben Jones, is a state prisoner who is incarcerated at Northern State
Prison, in Newark, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint asserting
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because this Court previously granted Mr. Jones leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, the complaint must now be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous
or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit. For the following reasons, the
complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
II.
BACKGROUND
The factual allegations of the complaint will be taken as true for the purposes of this
opinion. The complaint names as defendants St. Francis Medical Center (“St. Francis”), a
hospital in Trenton, New Jersey, and three individual doctors, Steven Paloni, M.D., Helmi Saud
Do, M.D., and Scott D. Miller, M.D. (Compl., ECF No. 1.)
In November 2006, Mr. Jones underwent knee surgery at St. Francis, with the
involvement of Dr. Miller and Dr. Paloni. (Id. ¶¶ 12–17.) Mr. Jones asserts that Dr. Paloni,
apparently an anesthesiologist, told Mr. Jones “that he would be injecting a needle into the right
foot between the fourth & fifth metatarsals to numb his leg before undergoing surgery.” (Id. ¶
16.) Following the surgery, Mr. Jones alleges that he continued to suffer “excruciating pain and
swelling in his knee and ankle.” (Id. ¶ 20.)
Mr. Jones returned to St. Francis in December 2006 due to continued swelling of his
ankle. (Id. ¶ 21.) He asserts that he “made a vehement effort to explain to the defendant Helmi
Saud Do, that the swelling and excruciating pain in his right foot was independent of the
surgically repaired knee” and explained “that the pain he was experiencing was in the exact same
location where the anesthesiologist had injected the plaintiff with a needle to numb his leg prior
to surgery.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Mr. Jones alleges that while Dr. Saud Do ordered an ultrasound scan of
Mr. Jones’s right leg and foot, the doctor otherwise disregarded his complaints. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22.)
Mr. Jones states that he continued to suffer excruciating pain for the following eight
years. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) Mr. Jones went to a podiatry clinic in February 2014, where an x-ray
revealed a metallic object between the fourth and fifth metatarsals of his right foot. (Id. ¶ 25.)
He was again admitted to St. Francis on June 6, 2014, and the metallic object was surgically
removed. (Id. ¶ 26.) Mr. Jones reports that his “postoperative course was uneventful.” (Id.)
Mr. Jones notes that he filed a late notice of tort claim in December 2014, “which was
granted by the court on/or about February of 2015.” (Id. ¶ 27.)
The complaint alleges that each of the defendant doctors “was deliberately indifferent to
plaintiff’s serious medical condition and deprived plaintiff of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, in violation of the Eight [sic] and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Id. ¶¶ 30, 34, 37.)
2
Mr. Jones alleges that Dr. Miller and Dr. Paloni were responsible for leaving a metallic object in
his foot during the November 2006 surgery. (Id. ¶¶ 33–39.) He asserts that Dr. Saud Do failed
to provide proper medical treatment that would have revealed the metallic object in his foot in
December 2006. (Id. ¶¶ 29–32.) The complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.
¶¶ 32, 36, 39.)
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321-66
to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review prisoner complaints when the
prisoner (1) is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), (2) seeks redress
against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, or (3) asserts a claim
concerning prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The PLRA directs district courts to sua
sponte dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (per
curiam); see also Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir.
2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To survive the
Court’s screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter
to show that the claim is facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d
3
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v.
Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’
or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Glunk v. Noone, 689 F. App’x 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2017) (per
curiam). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
IV.
DISCUSSION
The Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 A
plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his
constitutional rights. That section provides,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
Indeed, Mr. Jones makes clear in his complaint that “[a]ll courses of action herein, are brought
under the provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2.)
1
4
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v.
Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988).
An incarcerated plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment
where institutional staff have provided inadequate medical care. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 32–33 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1976); Pearson v. Prison Health
Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017). Claims under § 1983 are subject to New Jersey’s twoyear statute of limitations for personal-injury claims. See Patyrak v. Apgar, 511 F. App’x 193,
195 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010)); Evans v. Gloucester Twp., 124 F. Supp. 3d 340, 349 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing Pittman v.
Metuchen Police Dep’t, 441 F. App’x 826, 828 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)). The accrual of a
cause of action is a matter of federal law and generally coincides with the time that the plaintiff
suffers injury. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634–35 (3d Cir. 2009). Pursuant to the
“discovery rule,” however, accrual and the running of the limitations period may be delayed until
“the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered with ‘due diligence’ that his rights had been
violated.” Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 70 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Dique, 603 F.3d at
185; William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 568 F.3d 425, 438 (3d Cir. 2009) (examining whether
plaintiff “had sufficient information of possible wrongdoing to place it on inquiry notice or to
excite storm warnings of culpable activity.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).
Mr. Jones alleges that Dr. Miller and Dr. Paloni erroneously left a metallic object in his
foot during surgery in November 2006. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 16–19.) He contends that Dr. Saud Do
5
erroneously failed to detect this metallic object during an examination in December 2006. (Id. ¶¶
20–22.) Mr. Jones indicates that he did not learn of the metallic object in his foot until a
podiatric examination in February 2014, and he then had it removed in June 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 25–
26.) His subsequent recovery was, apparently, “uneventful,” (id. ¶ 26), and the complaint does
not allege any further injury or treatment, (see id.).
The occurrences that would typically signal accrual of a claim—the acts by the individual
defendants and the resulting injury—had all occurred by late 2006. The Court may apply the
discovery rule, however, to toll the accrual until Mr. Jones had notice of his injury and who was
responsible for it. But, an applying this doctrine could only delay the accrual of Mr. Jones’s
claims until February 2014, when an x-ray revealed the metallic object in his foot.2 Accordingly,
the two-year limitations period for Mr. Jones’s § 1983 claims ended in February 2016. Because
Mr. Jones’s complaint is dated March 2, 2017 and was not received by the Court until March 21,
2017, the statute of limitations as elapsed. 3
The Court also considers whether the limitations period was suspended or tolled. ‘“State
law, unless inconsistent with federal law, also governs the concomitant issue of whether a
limitations period should be tolled.’” McPherson v. United States, 392 F. App’x 938, 944 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Dique, 603 F.3d at 185). Statutory tolling under New Jersey must be based
The Court notes Mr. Jones’s allegation that he explained to Dr. Saud Do in December 2006
that his foot pain was independent from his knee surgery and “that the pain he was experiencing
was in the exact same location where the anesthesiologist had injected the plaintiff with a needle
to numb his leg prior to surgery.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 22.) It thus appears that there could be an
argument that Mr. Jones should have had inquiry notice of the metallic object in his foot at that
time. Nonetheless, interpreting the facts alleged most favorably to Mr. Jones, as the Court must
on a preliminary screening, the Court will assume for the purposes of this opinion that Mr. Jones
lacked notice of his alleged injury until February 2014.
2
3
While Mr. Jones indicates that he received judicial approval for late filing of a notice of tort
claim with the state, (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 27–28), this has no bearing on the timeliness of his complaint
under the statute of limitations of his federal claims brought here.
6
on a specifically identified basis. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–21 (minority or insanity);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–22 (non-residency of persons liable). Nothing in the complaint,
however, supports any of the statutory bases for tolling.
Equitable tolling under New Jersey law may arise “where ‘the complainant has been
induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the deadline to pass,’ or where a
plaintiff has ‘in some extraordinary way’ been prevented from asserting his rights, or where a
plaintiff has timely asserted his rights mistakenly by either defective pleading or in the wrong
forum.” Cason v. Arie St. Police Dep't, Civ. No. 10–497 (KSH), 2010 WL 2674399, at *5 n.4
(D.N.J. June 29, 2010) (quoting Freeman v. State, 347 N.J. Super. 11, 31 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002)). Again, the complaint does not articulate any basis for equitable tolling.
Finally, the Court notes that Mr. Jones states in his complaint that he “filed a notice of
tort claim on March 11, 2015 and exhausted his administrative remedies on March 17, 2016.”
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 7.) The Court construes this reference to “exhaust[ing] his administrative
remedies” as referring to a notice of tort claim under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“TCA”)
and, specifically, a letter dated March 17, 2016 that Mr. Jones received from the state Division of
Risk Management. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 27–28 & Ex.) This letter simply indicated that the
Division had received his notice of tort claim and forwarded it to Rutgers Biomedical Health
Sciences. (ECF No. 1, Ex.) The Court is cognizant that, under proper circumstances, efforts to
exhaust prison administrative remedies, as required by the PLRA, may also serve to toll the
limitations period. See Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 602–03 (3d Cir. 2015);
Paluch v. Sec’y Penn. Dep’t of Corr., 442 F. App’x 690, 694 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam);
Baskerville v. Jackson, Civ. A. No. 15-6463 (CCC), 2016 WL 4487851, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 24,
2015). Nonetheless, the complaint’s reference to exhausting administrative remedies seems to
7
refer to filing a notice of tort claim under the TCA, not pursuit of prison administrative remedies
under the PLRA. See Ali-X v. Hayman, Civ. No. 10-4666 (JBS/JS), 2013 WL 1628953, at *2–5
(D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2013) (explaining that PLRA bars claims regarding prison conditions if
available administrative remedies not exhausted, whereas TCA confers immunity to tort claims
on public employees if timely notice of claim not filed). Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Jones has
not pleaded any facts that would support tolling the limitations period on this basis.
It is therefore apparent from the face of the complaint that the § 1983 claims asserted are
barred by the statute of limitations and must be dismissed.4 See Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F.
App'x 110, 111–12 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Although the running of the statute of
limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious from the face of
the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred
complaint sua sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.”);
Hunterson v. Disabato, 244 F. App'x 455, 457 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[A] district court
may sua sponte dismiss a claim as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l) where it is
apparent from the complaint that the applicable statute of limitations has run.”).
Even if Mr. Jones’s complaint were timely, however, it still fails to adequately state a
claim under § 1983. A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim for inadequate medical care must show
the existence of a serious medical need and that facility staff demonstrated deliberate
indifference to that medical need. Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d at 534; Mattern v.
4
While he does not explicitly identify such a claim, it appears that the facts alleged by Mr.
Jones could also be consistent with a state-law claim for medical malpractice. (See ECF No. 1.)
A medical-malpractice claim is subject, however, to the same two-year statute of limitations as §
1983 claims, and thus would be untimely for the same reasons explained herein. See N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:14-2; Caravaggio v. D’Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 244–45 (2001). Furthermore, without
some accompanying federal claim and an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction or an
establishment of diversity jurisdiction, this Court would lack subject-matter jurisdiction to hear
such claims. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552–65 (2005).
8
City of Sea Isle, 657 F. App’x 134, 138 (3d Cir. 2016); Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d
Cir. 2009); Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). The Third
Circuit has stated that “a medical need is ‘serious’ for purposes of a denial of medical care claim
if it is either ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so
obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’”
Mattern, 657 F. App’x at 139 (quoting Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)).
A finding of deliberate indifference requires demonstrating that the defendant medical
provider had the requisite state of mind, i.e., knowledge of a serious medical risk and disregard
for that risk. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 335, 337 (3d Cir. 2016); Natale, 318 F.3d at
582; see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (finding that an Eighth Amendment
violation requires a showing of “obduracy and wantonness”); Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209,
227 (3d Cir. 2017) (equating deliberate indifference with at least “reckless[] disregard [for] a
substantial risk of serious harm.”). “[T]he deliberate indifference standard ‘affords considerable
latitude to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of
inmate patients . . . .” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d at 538; see also Palakovic, 854
F.3d at 227; Parkell, 833 F.3d at 337. The Third Circuit has identified a variety of circumstances
that amount to deliberate indifference, such as: “‘where the prison official (1) knows of a
prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary
medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving
needed or recommended medical treatment.’” Parkell, 833 F.3d at 337 (quoting Rouse v.
Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Natale, 318 F.3d at 582. A mere
“inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care”—i.e., negligent diagnosis or treatment—
9
will not create an Eighth Amendment claim. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06; Parkell, 833 F.3d at
337.
Here, Mr. Jones does not allege any acts by the defendants that could be found to rise to
the level of deliberate indifference. Nothing suggests that either Dr. Miller or Dr. Paloni left a
metallic object in Mr. Jones’s foot deliberately. While Mr. Jones alleges that Dr. Saud Do
“totally disregarded” his explanation that the pain was in the location that Dr. Paloni injected
anesthetic, he also alleges that Dr. Saud Do “ordered an ‘Ultrasound’ of plaintiff’s right leg and
lower extremities.” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 20–22.) There is no indication that Dr. Saud Do in fact knew
of the metallic object in Mr. Jones’s foot and deliberately ignored it.5 See Pearson v. Prison
Health Serv., 850 F.3d at 535–36 (noting that the state-of-mind inquiry on a deliberative
indifference claim is a subjective standard). Indeed, Mr. Jones merely alleges that Dr. Saud Do
“failed to take appropriate measures and assessment which would have revealed the foreign
object that was left in his foot.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 30.) At most, these factual allegations may
suggest medical negligence.6
It is possible, however, that Mr. Jones may be able to plead facts that would support
tolling the statute of limitations or that would suffice to state a § 1983 claim. Thus, the
complaint is dismissed without prejudice to Mr. Jones filing an amended complaint that would
5
While the description of the interaction is somewhat ambiguous, if Mr. Jones had told Dr. Saud
Do specifically that he suspected an object had been left in his foot, or there were some other
indication that Dr. Saud Do knew this was the likely cause of pain, some level of deliberate
indifference might be inferred. If Mr. Jones had such knowledge or suspicions at that time,
however, the discovery rule would clearly permit the claim to accrue at that time, and the
complaint would be untimely by several additional years. See supra p. 6 & note 2.
6
As discussed above, see supra note 4, a claim for medical malpractice would also seem to be
untimely, and, in any case, this Court would lack any basis to exercise jurisdiction over such a
claim alone.
10
adequately state a timely claim. Any such amended complaint should be filed within thirty days
after the date of this opinion and accompanying order.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint in this matter is dismissed without prejudice.
DATED: December 27, 2017
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
The Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
United States District Judge
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?