Gupta v. Wipro Limited et al

Filing 81

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 12/15/2017. (mmh)

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
:
ARVIND GUPTA,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civil Action No. 17-1954 (FLW) (DEA)
:
v.
:
:
OPINION
WIPRO LIMITED; AZIM
:
HASHIM PREMJI; and the
:
SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES :
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR;
:
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________ :
WOLFSON, United States District Judge:
Pro se1 Plaintiff Arvind Gupta (“Plaintiff” or “Gupta”) brings this action for alleged
wage and hour violations under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101,
et seq., against Defendants, Wipro Limited (“Wipro”), Azim Hashim Premji, and the Secretary
of the United States Department of Labor (the “Secretary”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The
action is nearly identical to a prior suit that Plaintiff brought before this Court in 2014, Gupta v.

1

Since Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the Court is obligated to construe his pleadings liberally.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir.
2003) (“[The Court will] apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has
mentioned it by name.”). However, the Court notes that Plaintiff appears to be an experienced
pro se litigant, having represented himself in federal cases, both within this circuit and in sister
circuits, involving substantially the same issues as those reviewed infra. See, e.g.,
Gupta v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Labor, 649 F. App'x 119 (3d Cir. 2016); Gupta v. Perez, 101 F.
Supp. 3d 437 (D.N.J. 2015), reconsideration denied, No. 14-4054, 2015 WL 5098173 (D.N.J.
Aug. 31, 2015), aff'd sub nom. 649 F. App'x 119; Gupta v. Headstrong, Inc., No. 12-6652, 2013
WL 4710388 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2013); Compunnel Software Grp., Inc. v. Gupta, No. 14-4790,
2015 WL 1224298 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2015) reconsideration denied, No. 14-4790, 2015 WL
1808628 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2015).
1

Perez, et al., No. 14-4054 (“Gupta I”), in which Plaintiff also asserted wage and hour claims
against Wipro and the Secretary. As discussed further in the procedural history section of this
Opinion, this Court issued a decision granting summary judgment against all of Plaintiff’s claims
in Gupta I, which decision was affirmed by the Third Circuit. Gupta v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of
Labor, 649 F. App'x 119 (3d Cir. 2016).
Presently before the Court is Wipro and Mr. Premji’s (collectively, the “Wipro
Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 For the reasons that follow, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND3
Because the parties are intimately familiar with the facts of this case, which mirror those

asserted in Plaintiff’s prior actions, the Court will only briefly revisit them here. Plaintiff, a
citizen of India, works in the fields of financial services, business analysis, information
technology, and program management. Compl. ¶ 2. Defendant Wipro is a global information
technology, consulting and outsourcing company, with over 150,000 employees serving clients
in over 175 cities worldwide. Id. at ¶ 4. Within the United States, Wipro employs both citizens
and nonimmigrant workers through the federal H-1B visa program. Id. at ¶ 3. Defendant Azim
Hashim Premji is the President of Wipro. Id. at ¶ 5.
On May 11, 2003, Plaintiff entered the United States to work for Wipro as an H1-B
worker, pursuant to a labor condition application (“LCA”) that had been approved by the

The Wipro Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is joined in by the Secretary.
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint, and are accepted as true on this
Motion to Dismiss.
2
3

2

Department of Labor (“DOL”). Id. at ¶ 20. The H1-B program “is designed to allow
professionals from other countries who are employed in ‘specialty occupations’ to work in the
United States on a temporary basis.” Gupta, 649 F. App'x at 120. Gupta alleges that, from May
2003 until March 2006, Wipro engaged him to perform a variety of client-facing assignments,
which required him to work at least forty hours per week. Compl. ¶ 28. Plaintiff further alleges
that, since March of 2006, he has remained employed by Wipro, albeit in “nonproductive status
while waiting for an assignment and being ready, willing, and able to perform any official duties
. . . .” Id. at ¶ 114.4
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case has a long and protracted procedural history, involving various courts and

administrative tribunals. It all began on May 20, 2009, when Gupta filed a complaint with the
DOL’s Wage and Hour Division (“WHD”), alleging that Wipro took unauthorized deductions
from Gupta’s wages, and seeking relief under the H-1B nonimmigrant worker provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. On May 29, 2009, the WHD rejected Gupta’s complaint as
untimely, because it was filed more than twelve months after the last alleged unlawful deduction.
In June of 2009, Gupta filed a second complaint in the WHD, alleging that Wipro had
taken unauthorized deductions from the wages of other Wipro employees. In the second
complaint, Gupta represented himself as a business competitor of Wipro, and submitted a single
pay stub from a then-current Wipro employee, dated June 1, 2009, which Gupta claimed to have
obtained through his work as a business recruiter. By letter dated January 7, 2010, the WHD

4

As explained, infra, because Defendants assert a res judicata defense, the Court will take
judicial notice of the fact, established through Plaintiff’s prior litigation, that Plaintiff’s
employment relationship with Wipro ended in 2006, and thus, will disregard Plaintiff’s
allegation that he has remained employed with Wipro in nonproductive status since 2006. See
Gupta, 649 F. App'x at 121.
3

informed Gupta that, based on Gupta’s representations as a business competitor, reasonable
cause existed to investigate Wipro. Specifically, the WHD considered Gupta’s second complaint
to be potentially viable due to the allegation that Gupta was a business competitor of Wipro’s,
because, under federal regulations, status as a competitor of an H-1B employer may confer
standing upon a claimant to pursue claims regarding other employees. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.715.
After opening the investigation, the WHD contacted Gupta seeking more information
about his recruiting business. On April 22, 2010, Gupta sent an email to the WHD investigator
overseeing his case, in which he admitted that he had never started a recruiting business. The
WHD issued a decision on May 7, 2010, finding that, as a result of Gupta’s email, there was no
reasonable cause to investigate Gupta’s second complaint, and that the case should be closed.
On July 12, 2010, Gupta sent an email to the WHD, requesting that the principles of “equitable
tolling” be applied to his May 2009 complaint as an aggrieved worker, on the ground that Wipro
allegedly misled Gupta about his rights.
On August 26, 2010, Gupta filed a motion with the Office of Administrative Law
(“OAL”), in which he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
regarding his complaints. On November 3, 2010, the ALJ issued an order directing the WHD
Administrator to show cause why, given the Administrator’s initial decision to conduct an
investigation of Gupta’s second complaint, the Administrator was not required to issue a post
investigation determination letter under 20 C.F.R. § 655.806(b). In response, the Administrator
attached Gupta’s April 22, 2010 email, in which Gupta stated that he had never started a
recruiting business, and argued that, as a result of Gupta’s admission, Gupta lacked standing to
file a complaint as an aggrieved “competitor” of Wipro under 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.715 and
655.806(a).

4

On December 23, 2010, the ALJ issued an order, in which the ALJ construed the
Administrator’s response to the order to show cause as a motion for summary decision. The ALJ
invited the parties to submit briefs on the issue of whether, following Gupta’s email, the WHD
had subject matter jurisdiction to investigate Gupta’s second complaint. Both Gupta and the
Administrator filed supplemental briefs. In a decision dated March 28, 2011, the ALJ found that
the Administrator was entitled to summary decision on both of Gupta’s complaints, finding that
the first complaint was time-barred, and that Gupta lacked standing to pursue the second
complaint. Specifically, with respect to Gupta’s aggrieved worker complaint, the ALJ found
that, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 655.805(a)(2), Gupta’s first complaint was untimely, because Gupta
failed to file it within twelve months of Wipro’s most recent allegedly unlawful deduction, and
because Gupta was not entitled to equitable tolling. Next, with respect to Gupta’s second
complaint, the ALJ found that Gupta was not an aggrieved competitor under 20 C.F.R. §
655.715, and thus, lacked standing to pursue an aggrieved competitor claim. Finally, the ALJ
decided that she did not have the authority to review Gupta’s assertion that his complaint should
be considered under 20 C.F.R. § 807 as a non-aggrieved “credible information source”
complaint, because “the regulation specifically states that no hearing is available from a decision
by an Administrator declining to refer [such] allegations to the Secretary [of Labor]. The
Administrator’s discretion in this area is plenary and nonreviewable.”
On April 23, 2011, Gupta appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Administrative Review
Board (“ARB”).5 On May 9, 2011, Gupta moved before the ARB to amend the dates of his
employment with Wipro. Specifically, although Gupta had previously represented that his
employment with Wipro ended on March 31, 2006, Gupta sought to amend the end-date of his

5

The ARB is the highest appellate body within the DOL.
5

employment until June 10, 2008, the day his H1-B visa expired. On August 11, 2011, the ARB
remanded the case to the ALJ, holding that due process required the ALJ to give Wipro an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings, notwithstanding Gupta’s request that the matter
remain confidential to the extent possible.
On January 25, 2012, after eliciting briefing on remand from the Administrator, Wipro,
and Gupta, the ALJ entered a post-remand decision affirming summary decision against Gupta.
In the decision, the ALJ denied Gupta’s request to amend the dates of his employment.
Additionally, the ALJ concluded that, despite Gupta’s supplemental evidence,6 the record still
reflected that Gupta’s aggrieved worker complaint was untimely, given that March 2008, the
date of Gupta’s most recent paycheck from Wipro, preceded Gupta’s May 2009 complaint by
more than twelve months.
Undeterred, on January 30, 2012, Gupta filed a petition for review of the ALJ’s decision
with the ARB. On February 27, 2014, the ARB issued a final decision affirming the ALJ’s
dismissal of Gupta’s case. At the outset, the ARB found that the undisputed facts established
that Gupta’s May and June 2009 complaints advanced the same, single type of violation: illegal
deductions connected to the base salary earned in Gupta’s home country. With respect to
Gupta’s first complaint, regarding Gupta’s claim of H-1B violations pertaining to his own wages,
the ARB affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Gupta’s claims as an aggrieved worker were timebarred. In particular, the ARB found that the last allegedly illegal deductions made from his
wages occurred on or before March 2006, which made his 2009 complaints over three years

6

Specifically, the ALJ allowed Gupta to introduce post-remand exhibits, including: (1) a pay
stub and W-2 form showing Gupta’s earnings in March 2008; (2) a copy of Gupta’s labor
application from June 14, 2005 through June 10, 2008; and (3) a declaration from Gupta.
6

late.7 The ARB also affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal of Gupta’s aggrieved competitor complaint as
to the allegedly illegal deductions made from the wages of other H-1B workers at Wipro, finding
that the undisputed evidence – particularly Gupta’s own admissions – demonstrated that Gupta
was not Wipro’s competitor and, thus, that Gupta lacked standing to pursue the complaint.
Finally, the ARB held that the discretion to investigate credible source complaints lies with the
WHD Administrator and other DOL officials, and that the regulations prohibit parties from
appealing the DOL’s refusal to exercise such discretion.
On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed suit against Wipro and the Secretary (“Gupta I”) in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking judicial review of the
ARB’s final decision. On March 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed a “Complaint for Judicial Review of
Final Agency Decision, and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, INA Violations By Wipro.” On
June 24, 2014, Gupta I was transferred to this Court. Thereafter, I construed Plaintiff’s March
25, 2014 filing as an amended complaint seeking not only judicial review of the ARB’s final
decision, but also asserting: (1) a claim of unauthorized deductions against Wipro; and (2) claims
for declaratory relief and a preliminary injunction.
Following the transfer of Gupta I, the parties, by way of agreement, proceeded directly to
summary judgment briefing, with Wipro, the Secretary, and Gupta each filing motions for
summary judgment. On October 28, 2014, while the motions for summary judgment were
pending, Gupta filed a “Motion for Injunctive Relief,” seeking a final monetary award on his
claims. Additionally, on April 14, 2015, Gupta filed a “Motion for Leave to File Supplement
Claims,” in which Wipro sought to bring additional claims and to add Mr. Premji as a defendant.

7

The ARB also found that Gupta failed to present persuasive reasons to invoke equitable tolling.
7

On April 27, 2015, this Court issued a forty-page decision, granting Wipro and the
Secretary’s motions for summary judgment in their entirety, and denying Gupta’s motion for
summary judgment, motion for injunctive relief, and motion seeking leave to file supplemental
claims. Gupta v. Perez, 101 F. Supp. 3d 437, 462 (D.N.J. 2015), reconsideration denied, No. 144054, 2015 WL 5098173 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2015), aff'd sub nom. Gupta v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of
Labor, 649 F. App'x 119 (3d Cir. 2016). With respect to Count One, titled, “Due Process
Violations and Other Issues,” the Court found that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim for
deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and that Plaintiff’s
allegations that the DOL committed minor procedural violations in adjudicating his complaint
did not amount to a deprivation of the opportunity to be heard. Gupta, 101 F. Supp. 3d at 448-50.
Regarding Count Two, “Nature of Gupta’s Complaint—Unauthorized Deductions and Failure to
Pay Wages,” the Court found that that “the ARB's failure to consider Plaintiff's informal
allegations [that Wipro did not pay required wages to Plaintiff during some months when
Plaintiff was on Wipro’s H-1B visa] in its Final Decision and Order was not arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion,” because Plaintiff never properly amended his DOL
complaint to add such a claim. Id. at 450-52. Regarding Count Three, “Did the Agency Properly
Deny Gupta’s Motion for Leave to Amend,” the Court found that “the ALJ [did not] act[] in an
arbitrary or capricious manner in denying Plaintiff's request to amend” the dates of Plaintiff’s
employment with Wipro in his administrative complaint, “especially because the ALJ did admit
and consider Plaintiff's post-remand exhibits.” Id. at 452-53.
Regarding Count Four, “Timeliness of DOL Complaints,” the Court stated that “the
ARB's finding that Plaintiff's complaint was untimely was not arbitrary or capricious. Given that
Wipro was only invited to respond to Plaintiff's ALJ complaint after the ARB remanded the

8

decision, and Wipro agreed with the Administrator's position that Plaintiff's complaint was
untimely as an aggrieved worker, the Court does not find that the record reflects that Wipro
waived its statute of limitations defense. And[,] the Court does not find any evidence in the
record to contradict the ARB and ALJ's findings that Plaintiff's 2009 complaint was [in fact]
untimely.”8 Id. at 453-55. Regarding Count Five, “Equitable Tolling and Estoppel,” the Court
found that the ARB’s decision declining to equitably toll the one-year statute of limitations
applicable to Plaintiff’s complaint, on the basis that Wipro actively misled Plaintiff about his
cause of action, was not arbitrary and capricious. Plaintiff relied upon evidence that could, at
best, demonstrate that Wipro actively misled a plaintiff as to the terms of an employer-employee
relationship, which is separate from actively misleading a plaintiff as to his cause of action. Id.
at 455-57. As to equitable estoppel, this Court found that “Plaintiff appears to conflate the
principles of equitable estoppel with the very nature of his claim. Arguing that Wipro's 2005
letter [to Plaintiff regarding the terms of his employment] is misleading insofar as the INA's
applicable statutes and regulations governing authorized and unauthorized deductions supersede
any contrary terms of Plaintiff's employment is tantamount to arguing that Wipro unlawfully
deducted amounts from Plaintiff's wages . . . . Thus, the ARB's decision to affirm the ALJ's
declination to exercise equitable estoppel is also not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.” Id. at 457.
Regarding Count Six, “Aggrieved Party and Interested Party Status,” the Court stated that
“[a]s to Plaintiff's complaint as an aggrieved competitor, the Court finds reasonable the ALJ and

Under the applicable DOL regulation, “[a] complaint must be filed not later than 12 months
after the latest date on which the alleged violation(s) were committed, which would be the date
on which the employer allegedly failed to perform an action or fulfill a condition specified in the
LCA, or the date on which the employer, through its action or inaction, allegedly demonstrated a
misrepresentation of a material fact in the LCA.” 20 C.F.R. § 655.806.
8

9

ARB's interpretation of an aggrieved ‘competitor’ as reflected in § 655.715 to preclude potential
or future competitors.” Id. 458. Further, the Court found that “the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff's
alleged status as a ‘worker in a specialty occupation’ in non-productive status within 12 months
of filing a complaint did not create a separate ‘aggrieved party’ basis on which to file a DOL
complaint was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 459. Finally, the Court
found that “to the extent Plaintiff is seeking review of the ARB's decision to affirm the ALJ's
decision on Plaintiff's argument that his complaint should be accepted and reviewed as a
‘credible source’ complaint under § 655.807, that argument must fail,” because that regulation
“states that ‘[n]o hearing shall be available from a decision by the Administrator declining to
refer allegations addressed by this section to the Secretary, and none shall be available from a
decision by the Secretary certifying or declining to certify that an investigation is warranted.’
Further, there is a ‘presumption that agency decisions not to institute proceedings are
unreviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2),’ and Plaintiff did not provide, nor does this Court find,
evidence that would overcome this presumption as it applies to § 655.807.” Id. at 459-60
(internal citations omitted).
In Counts Eight and Nine,9 the Court found that “Plaintiff's attempt in Count Eight to relitigate his DOL complaint of unauthorized deductions, and his attempt in Count Nine to raise a
claim in the first instance that Wipro failed to pay wages to Plaintiff between 2006 and 2008 in
Count Nine, must fail,” because “the INA does not authorize a private right of action to enforce
the laws regarding payment of wages to H–1B workers; rather, claimants must go through
administrative channels and may only seek judicial review once administrative remedies have

9

The Court noted that in Count Seven, Plaintiff only sought declaratory relief with respect to
Counts One through Six. Gupta, 101 F. Supp. 3d at 460, n 31.
10

been exhausted.” Id. at 460. Next, I found that “[b]ecause the Court has affirmed the ARB's
final decision and order, Plaintiff's remaining claims for declaratory relief, a preliminary
injunction, compensatory damages, punitive damages, pre-and post-judgment interest, and
litigation expenses must also fail.” Id. at 461. Further, the Court explained that “[b]ecause the
Court has affirmed the ARB's decision on the bases challenged by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's motion for
preliminary injunctive relief is moot.” Id. Finally, the Court denied Plaintiff’s April 14, 2015
motion seeking leave to file supplemental claims and to add a new party, finding that, to the
extent Plaintiff believed that he had new claims, he should assert them in a separate lawsuit. Id.
at 462. On May 5, 2015, Gupta filed a motion for reconsideration, which this Court denied on
August 31, 2015.
On September 2, 2015, Gupta filed a third complaint against Wipro with the WHD.
Remarkably, contrary to Gupta’s prior representations, – in which Gupta had initially alleged
that his employment with Wipro ended on March 31, 2006, and then later sought to amend his
employment end-date to June 10, 2008 – the third complaint alleged that Gupta was employed by
Wipro from 2003 until present time. The DOL found no reasonable cause to investigate Gupta’s
third complaint.
On September 14, 2015, Gupta appealed this Court’s April 27, 2015 and August 31, 2015
Orders to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. On November 3, 2015,
Wipro filed a motion for summary action, which was joined by the Secretary, arguing that
Gupta’s appeal should be dismissed, because Gupta failed to present any substantial issue for
review. Gupta responded by: (1) filing a motion to strike, arguing that Wipro should be
precluded from filing a motion for summary action; and (2) filing his own motion for summary

11

action, arguing that this Court’s prior rulings were so defective that they should be reversed prior
to appellate briefing.
On December 9, 2015, while these motions were pending before the Third Circuit, Gupta
filed a motion for an award of costs and expenses with this Court, seeking reimbursement for all
of his costs and expenses in connection with the litigation of Gupta I. Wipro opposed Gupta’s
motion on the ground that Gupta was not a prevailing party. On January 11, 2016, Gupta filed
another motion with this Court, seeking leave to file a motion for “immediate monetary relief.”
On February 2, 2016, this Court entered an Order denying both of Gupta’s motions. On
February 10, 2016, Gupta appealed this Court’s February 2, 2016 Order to the Third Circuit.
The Third Circuit issued a per curiam Opinion on May 5, 2016, in which it: (1) granted
the summary action filed by Wipro and the Secretary; (2) denied Gupta’s motion for summary
action; and (3) affirmed this Court’s April 27, 2015 and August 31, 2015 Orders dismissing
Gupta I. Gupta, 649 F. App'x at 121-23. Specifically, the Third Circuit found that, because
“Gupta left his employment at Wipro in March 200610 . . . the ARB properly concluded that
Gupta’s complaints, filed in May and June 2009, were untimely to the extent he sought relief on
behalf of himself as an aggrieved worker.” Id. at 121. The Third Circuit also found that Gupta’s
other claims lacked merit, finding that, despite Gupta’s “to bypass the administrative review
process completely by raising claims directly in the District Court,” – which the court
characterized as an “apparent effort to avoid application of the 12-month limitations period” –
“no private right of action exists for violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n).” Id. at 122. Additionally,
the court affirmed the ARB’s finding that the ALJ’s denial of Gupta’s request to hear his

The court did note, however, that Gupta “briefly worked for [Wipro] again in March 2008.”
Gupta, 649 F. App'x at 120.
10

12

complaint as a “credible source” complaint under 20 C.F.R. § 655.807(h)(2) was unreviewable.
Id. at 123. Finally, the court affirmed my denial of Gupta’s motions for reconsideration and for
an award of costs and expenses, finding that there was no basis for consideration, and that,
because Gupta was not a prevailing party, he was not entitled to fees or costs. Id.
Despite having been defeated at every level of review, Gupta’s indomitable crusade
pressed on. To wit, Gupta next filed a motion with the Third Circuit, seeking to appeal the
Northern District of California’s June 2014 transfer order, and requesting that the appeal be
transferred to the Ninth Circuit. On July 11, 2016, the Third Circuit denied the motion to
transfer, and “admonished” Gupta that the Court would “consider sanctions, including an award
of attorneys’ fees if requested, should [Gupta] persist in the filing of frivolous motions.”
Undaunted, on July 22, 2016, Gupta filed a motion to transfer Gupta I to the Northern District of
California, which this Court denied as moot on July 25, 2016. On July 26, 2016, Gupta then
moved to reopen and transfer this case to the Northern District of California. On July 27, 2016,
this Court entered an Order finding that Gupta failed to raise a viable basis for reopening this
case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and advising Gupta that, insofar as he believed
“he has further claims to assert that were not dismissed on the merits in the present case, he may
file a new case in the appropriate venue.” ECF No. 98. Gupta then moved before the Northern
District of California to reopen his case, which motion was denied on August 31, 2016.
On September 15, 2016, Gupta filed the instant Complaint in the Northern District of
California. The Gupta II Complaint fourteen causes of action, which are summarized as follows:


Counts One (“Breach of Contract”) and Two (“Breach of Implied-In-Fact Contract”):
Gupta alleges that Wipro breached its obligations, under a LCA filed by Wipro with the
United States government, to pay certain wages to Gupta.

13



Count Three (“Unjust Enrichment, Quantum Meruit”): Gupta seeks wages from Wipro
under the doctrines of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, on the ground that he has
been “available” and “waiting for an assignment” from Wipro since 2003.



Count Four (“Promissory Estoppel”): Gupta alleges damages as a result of Wipro’s
alleged failure to uphold promises allegedly made to Gupta regarding the payment of
wages and benefits.



Counts Five and Six: Gupta asserts causes of action pursuant to the wage and hour
provisions of the California Labor Code.



Count Seven (“Failure to Pay Required Wages under ‘INA’”): Gupta alleges that Wipro
failed to pay him wages, in violation of its obligations to nonimmigrant workers under
the INA.



Count Eight (“Unauthorized Deductions from Required Wages”): Gupta claims that
Wipro took unauthorized deductions from his wages, in violation of the INA.



Count Nine (“Retaliation for Protected Activity”): Gupta alleges that Wipro retaliated
against him for initiating prior proceedings regarding Wipro’s alleged underpayment of
wages, in violation of the INA.



Count Ten (“Unpaid and Underpaid Wages (FLSA)”): Gupta alleges that Wipro failed
to pay him, or underpaid him, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29
U.S.C. § 201, et seq.



Count Eleven (“Liquidated Damages”), Twelve (“Compensatory Damages”) and
Thirteen (“Punitive Damages”): Gupta asserts stand-alone claims for liquidated,
compensatory, and punitive damages.



Count Fourteen (“‘APA’ Claim to Compel Investigation and/or Adjudication of
Plaintiff’s ‘INA’ Claims against Wipro and Premji”): Gupta seeks an order compelling
the WHD to investigate his allegations against Wipro for violations of the INA,
including for taking unauthorized deductions from Gupta’s wages.
The Wipro Defendants moved to transfer Gupta II to this Court, which motion was

granted by the Honorable Edward J. Davila, U.S.D.J, on March 24, 2017. On May 4, 2017, the
Wipro Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On May 12, 2017, the Secretary joined
in the Wipro Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Having been fully briefed, that Motion is now
properly before this Court.
14

III.

LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “a court must grant a motion to dismiss

if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a claim.” In re Schering Plough Corp.
Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). In evaluating
whether a complaint adequately pleads the elements of standing, courts apply the standard of
reviewing a complaint pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 F.3d at 243.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must first separate the
factual and legal elements of the claims, accepting the well-pleaded facts as true. See Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). All reasonable inferences are drawn in
the plaintiff's favor. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The Third Circuit requires a three-step analysis to meet the plausibility standard
mandated by Twombly and Iqbal. First, the court should “outline the elements a plaintiff must
plead to a state a claim for relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). Next, the
court should “peel away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled
to the assumption of truth.” Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (“While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). It is
well-established that a proper complaint “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

15

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Finally, the court should assume the veracity of all
well-pled factual allegations, and then “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 365 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A claim is
facially plausible when there is sufficient factual content to draw a “reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This last step of the
plausibility analysis is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
Generally, “[t]o the extent that [a] court considers evidence beyond the complaint in
deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it is converted to a motion for summary judgement.” Anjelino
v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 88 (3d Cir. 1999). However, where a defense of claim
preclusion is raised on a motion to dismiss, “the court can take notice of all facts necessary for
the decision.” Toscano v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 288 Fed. Appx. 36 (3d Cir. 2008);
Conceicao v. Nat'l Water Main Cleaning Co., 650 F. App'x 134, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The
defense of claim preclusion, however, may be raised and adjudicated on a motion to dismiss and
the court can take notice of all facts necessary for the decision.”). Specifically, “a court may take
judicial notice of the record from a previous court proceeding between the parties.” Id. “The
party seeking to take advantage of claim preclusion has the burden of establishing it.” Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 158 (3d Cir. 2001).
IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Claim Preclusion

“Claim preclusion prevents claims between the same parties from being litigated anew
after a final judgment has been entered in a previous suit.” Toscano, 288 F. App'x at 38. The

16

doctrine bars not only claims that were actually brought in a previous lawsuit, but also claims
that could have been brought in the prior suit. Duhaney v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 621 F.3d 340,
347 (3d Cir. 2010). Requiring plaintiffs to present all claims arising out of the same occurrence
in a single suit is designed to “avoid piecemeal litigation and conserve judicial resources.”
Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 260 (3d Cir. 2010). To that end, claim preclusion
exists to “protect litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or
his privy and . . . promot[es] judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Post v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 154, 169 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see Gage v. Warren Tp.
Committee & Planning Bd. Members, 463 Fed. Appx. 68, 72 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The doctrine of
claim preclusion is central to the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the
conclusive resolution of disputes, and seeks to avoid the expense and vexation of multiple
lawsuits, while conserving judicial resources and fostering reliance on judicial action by
minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.”).
A party seeking to invoke claim preclusion must establish the following three elements:
“‘(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies
and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.’” Strunk v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
614 F. App'x 586, 588 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963
(3d Cir. 1991)). The Third Circuit has advised that this test should not be applied
“mechanically”; instead, courts should “‘focus on the central purpose of the doctrine, to require a
plaintiff to present all claims arising out [of] the same occurrence in a single suit.’” Sheridan,
609 F.3d at 260 (quoting Churchill v. Star Enterprises, 183 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 1999)).
The Court finds that claim preclusion bars Plaintiff’s claims in this case. First, this
Court’s August 27, 2015 Order, granting summary judgment on all claims asserted in the Gupta I

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Complaint, constituted a final judgment on the merits.11 See Hubicki v. ACF Indus., Inc., 484
F.2d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1973) (“[T]he law is clear that summary judgment is a final judgment on

In his Opposition to the Wipro Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that this Court
previously dismissed Plaintiff’s INA claims in Gupta I for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
and thus, that the prior decision was not a final judgment on the merits as it pertains to those
claims. Plaintiff is correct that “a dismissal for jurisdictional purposes does not serve as a final
judgment on the merits.” Simoni v. Luciani, 872 F. Supp. 2d 382, 390 (D.N.J. 2012); see
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 286 (1961) (“If the first suit was dismissed for . . . want
of jurisdiction, or was disposed of on any ground which did not go to the merits of the action, the
judgment rendered will prove no bar to another suit.”). Without belaboring its decision in Gupta
I, the Court notes, and Plaintiff does not dispute that, with the exception of the INA claims in
Gupta I, the Court’s dismissal of all other claims asserted therein was on the merits. And, even
assuming that the Court’s dismissal of the INA claims could be deemed jurisdictional, the
doctrine of issue preclusion bars Plaintiff’s INA claims in Gupta II. To that end, in Counts
Seven, Eight, and Nine of the instant Complaint, Plaintiff asserts direct claims under the INA, in
the first instance, against Defendants, by arguing that Wipro violated the INA’s wage regulations
by: (1) failing to pay required wages to Plaintiff during the period from May 2003 to the present;
(2) taking unauthorized deductions from Plaintiff’s wages; and (3) retaliating against Plaintiff for
engaging in protected activity. As Plaintiff is well-aware, however, federal courts, including
both this Court and the Third Circuit in Gupta I, have repeatedly held that Section 1182(n) of the
INA, under which Gupta seeks to assert his wage claims against Wipro, does not authorize a
private right of action to enforce the laws regarding payment of wages to H–1B workers; rather,
claimants must go through administrative channels and may only seek judicial review once
administrative remedies have been exhausted. Gupta, 649 F. App'x at 122 (“[N]o private right of
action exists for violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n).”); see Watson v. Bank of Am., 196 Fed. Appx.
306, 307 (5th Cir. 2006) (Plaintiff “had no private right of action in the first instance under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(n), the subsection governing the H–1B program and providing procedures for
enforcing its requirements.”); Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 422–24 (4th Cir.
2005) (concluding that there is no implied cause of action under § 1182(n)); see also Gupta v.
Headstrong, Inc., No. 12-6652, 2013 WL 4710388, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2013)
(“Accordingly, ‘Section 1182(n) does not provide for a private right action in federal court in the
first instance for complaints concerning an employer's violation of the Section.’”) (quoting Shah
v. Wilco Sys., Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 641, 647-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); Biran v. JP Morgan Chase,
No. 02-5506, 2002 WL 31040345, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002) (“Not only do comprehensive
administrative mechanisms exist, but also the legislative history of the Immigration and
Nationality Act yields no support for the proposition that Congress intended to create a private
right of action” in Section 1182(n), the INA section governing LCAs). Here, Plaintiff attempts
to bypass the exhaustion requirement by asserting his INA claims directly in District Court.
However, because no private right of action exists for violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n),
Plaintiff’s INA claims are dismissed.
11

18

the merits sufficient to raise the defense of res judicata in a subsequent action between the
parties.”); see, e.g., McLaughlin v. Bd. of Trustees of Nat'l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan,
686 F. App'x 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2017) (“District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Plan in McLaughlin I constitutes a final judgment on the merits for the purposes of res
judicata.”).
Second, the Court finds that “same parties or their privies” requirement of claim
preclusion is satisfied, because Plaintiff, Wipro, and the Secretary were parties to both suits.
Additionally, while Plaintiff did not name Mr. Premji as a defendant in Gupta I, the Third Circuit
has explained that claim preclusion “may be invoked against a plaintiff who has previously
asserted essentially the same claim against different defendants where there is a close or
significant relationship between successive defendants.” Lubrizol, 929 F.2d at 966 (quoting
Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 841 (3d Cir. 1972)); see, e.g., Hickox v. Cty. of Blair, 591
F. App'x 107, 110 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s second
complaint on the ground of claim preclusion, despite the fact that the second complaint included
an additional defendant not named in the first); Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 261 (finding that the
defendant-company “met the ‘same parties’ requirement of the claim preclusion defense because
[the plaintiff] and the [defendant-company] were parties in both actions. The fact that there are
additional parties in [the second action] does not affect our conclusion.”); Heine v. Dir. of Codes
& Standards, No. 15-8210, 2017 WL 3981135, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 11, 2017) (applying claim
preclusion, where the parties in the first and second actions were identical, with the exception of
several additional parties in the second case). And, significantly for the purposes of the present
case, “a lesser degree of privity is required for a new defendant to benefit from claim preclusion
than for a plaintiff to bind a new defendant in a later action.” Lubrizol, 929 F.2d at 966. Here,

19

Mr. Premji, the additional named party, is the President of Wipro, and the allegations levied
against him are identical to those asserted against Wipro, stemming from the same employment
relationship. Accordingly, given the close and significant relationship between Wipro and Mr.
Premji, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of establishing the same parties or
privies requirement of claim preclusion.
Finally, the claims asserted in this case are based on the same cause of action asserted in
Gupta I. Courts within the Third Circuit “take a ‘broad view’ of what constitutes the same cause
of action.” Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 261. To that end, the Third Circuit has disavowed attempts to
create a “simple test . . . for . . . determining what constitutes a cause of action for res judicata
purposes.” United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting
Donegal Steel Foundry Co. v. Accurate Prod. Co., 516 F.2d 583, 588 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1975)).
Rather, courts “look toward the ‘essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the
various legal claims.’” Lubrizol, 929 F.2d at 963 (quoting Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply, Div. of
U.S. Steel Corp., 688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1982)); see Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767
F.3d 247, 277 (3d Cir. 2014) (“‘Res judicata generally is thought to turn on the essential
similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.’”) (quoting Sheridan,
609 F.3d at 261). The “essential similarity” approach “reflects the ‘present trend . . . of requiring
that a plaintiff present in one suit all the claims for relief that he may have arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence.’”12 Duhaney, 621 F.3d at 348 (quoting Lubrizol, 929 F.2d at 963).
In conducting the essential similarity inquiry, courts look to the following Athlone
factors: “‘(1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same . . . ; (2)

For this reason, the “essential similarity” approach to defining a cause of action is alternatively
referred to as the “transactional” approach. See Duhaney, 621 F.3d at 350.
12

20

whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) whether the witnesses and documents necessary
at trial are the same . . . ; and (4) whether the material facts alleged are the same.’” Sheridan,
609 F.3d at 261 (quoting Athlone, 746 F.2d at 984). “It is not dispositive that a plaintiff asserts a
different theory of recovery or seeks different relief in the two actions.” Blunt, 767 F.3d at 277
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d
169, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (advising that the same cause of action analysis “does not depend on the
specific legal theory invoked, but rather ‘the essential similarity of the underlying events giving
rise to the various legal claims.’”) (citation omitted); Lubrizol, 929 F.2d at 963 (“A mere
difference in the theory of recovery is not dispositive.”). And, as referenced above, claim
preclusion “bars not only claims that were brought in the previous action, but also claims that
could have been brought.” Post, 501 F.3d at 169 (emphasis added). Thus, “‘[t]he fact that
several new and discrete discriminatory events are alleged does not compel a different result. A
claim extinguished by res judicata includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions,
out of which the action arose.’” Blunt, 767 F.3d at 277 (citation omitted).
At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff failed to present any substantive argument in
opposition to Defendants’ contention that Gupta II is based on the same cause of action as Gupta
I, and thus, Plaintiff has conceded the point.13 Hollister v. U.S. Postal Serv., 142 F. App'x 576,

13

As the Court has already indicated, Courts typically afford pro se litigations, such as Plaintiff,
considerable leeway. Pratt v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 563 F. App'x 132, 134 (3d
Cir. 2014). “The rationale underlying this rule is that a pro se litigant generally lacks both legal
training and experience and, accordingly, is likely to forfeit important rights through
inadvertence if he is not afforded some degree of protection.” Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90,
101 (2d Cir. 2010). However, “the degree of solicitude may be lessened where the particular pro
se litigant is experienced in litigation and familiar with the procedural setting presented.” Id. at
102; see Coulter v. Paul Laurence Dunbar Cmty. Ctr., 685 F. App'x 161, 166 (3d Cir. 2017)
(finding that the district court properly imposed a deadline against pro se litigant, despite
21

577 (3d Cir. 2005) (observing that a party’s failure to oppose an argument raised in a motion to
dismiss constitutes waiver of the same); Ankele v. Hambrick, 286 F. Supp. 2d 485, 496 (E.D. Pa.
2003), aff'd, 136 F. App'x 551 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Plaintiff makes no response to this argument, and
thus has waived his opportunity to contest it.”); Pers. v. Teamsters Local Union 863, No. 122293, 2013 WL 5676802, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2013) (“Failure to raise legal arguments in
opposition to a motion to dismiss results in waiver.”).
Moreover, after reviewing the Athlone factors in light of the “essential similarity of the
underlying events giving rise” to Plaintiff’s legal claims, the Court finds that the claims in this
action are essentially duplicative of the claims asserted in Gupta I. Significantly, the acts
complained of and theories of recovery asserted in both actions are nearly identical. To that end,
in Gupta I, Plaintiff alleged that Wipro had made unauthorized deductions from his wages, or
otherwise failed to pay Plaintiff wages, between 2003 and 2006. In that action, Plaintiff
maintained that Wipro owed him those sums pursuant to the INA, as well as under a breach of
contract theory. In Gupta II, Plaintiff once again alleges that Wipro took unauthorized

deference afforded pro se litigants, where the plaintiff was “an experienced and sophisticated
litigant by pro se standards.”); United States v. Stuler, 396 F. App'x 798, 799 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“Although we are mindful of our obligation to construe a pro se litigant's pleadings liberally,
because [the plaintiff] is an experienced litigant, we limit our consideration to those decisions of
the District Court that he expressly challenges.”); Banks v. Pennsylvania, No. 09-1437, 2010 WL
569545, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2010) (“While the general rule is that where a plaintiff is pro se,
courts are to accord an even more liberal reading of the complaint, employing less stringent
standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney,
in cases where there is an experienced pro se litigator, the Court need not accord such a liberal
reading to the complaint.”); see also see Allen v. Aytch, 535 F.2d 817, 821 (3d Cir. 1976)
(observing that the rationale underlying the requirement to construe pro se pleadings liberally
may not apply to “someone with substantial legal training, even if he was not yet a member of
the bar of the district court when the complaint was filed.”). Accordingly, while the Court
recognizes that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, because he an experienced litigant, Plaintiff will be
afforded less deference than the typical pro se litigant.
22

deductions from his wages, or otherwise failed to pay him wages.14 And, as in Gupta I, Plaintiff
asserts claims under for violations of the INA and for breach of contract in this case.
While Gupta II also includes claims for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, promissory
estoppel, and violations of the FSLA and California Labor Code, as the Court has already noted,
claim preclusion bars not only claims that were actually asserted in a previous action, but also
“claims that could have been brought.” Post, 501 F.3d at 169 (emphasis added). Thus, the
relevant question is not whether Plaintiff did, in fact, assert the these claims in Gupta I, but
whether Plaintiff could have asserted these claims in Gupta I. In that regard, Plaintiff failed to
proffer any argument as to why these claims could not have been asserted in Gupta I. And, in
conducting its own review, because these claims all arise out of the same employment
relationship, and concern the same underlying facts, the Court cannot discern any reason why
these claims could not have been asserted in Gupta I.
Moreover, the final two Athlone factors also weigh in favor of finding that Gupta I and
the present case arise from the same cause of action. In particular, the witnesses and documents
necessary to resolve both cases at trial would be nearly identical. Additionally, the material facts
and events underlying the claims in both actions are indistinguishable, arising entirely out of
Gupta’s employment relationship with Wipro, and concerning Defendants’ alleged failure to pay,
or underpayment of, wages and benefits. Indeed, the only discernable difference between Gupta

In a transparent attempt to circumvent the Third Circuit’s decision in Gupta I, affirming the
ARB’s finding that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred, Plaintiff now alleges that his employment
relationship with Wipro extended beyond 2006, until the present day. Nonetheless, the Third
Circuit previously determined that Plaintiff’s employment relationship with Wipro ended in
March 2006, except for a brief period of work in 2008. Gupta, 649 F. App'x at 121.
Accordingly, as it is permitted to do on a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, the
Court will take judicial notice of that fact. See Toscano, 288 Fed. Appx. at 36; Conceicao, 650
F. App'x at 135.
14

23

I and Gupta II is Gupta’s additional allegation in Gupta II that Wipro failed to provide earnings
statements for “June 2008 and later,” Compl., Ex. PX-12, at 5, a fact that arises out of Plaintiff’s
employment relationship with Wipro, and thus, could have been asserted in the initial action.
See Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at 173–74 (“Even crediting [the plaintiff’s] attempt to distinguish his
second set of facts as ‘new,’ it is beyond dispute that these allegations ‘could have been brought’
as part of his first complaint.”); see also Haefner v. N. Cornwall Twp., 40 F. App'x 656, 658 (3d
Cir. 2002) (“Claim preclusion . . . applies even where new claims are based on newly discovered
evidence, unless the evidence was either fraudulently concealed or it could not have been
discovered with due diligence.”).
Plaintiff presents three arguments in opposition to the application of collateral estoppel.
First, Plaintiff argues that, because he filed the instant case in the Northern District of California,
this Court lacks jurisdiction over the case. Second, Plaintiff argues that the Wipro Defendants
waived any res judicata argument by failing to appeal the October 19, 2016 Order of the
Honorable Howard R. Lloyd, U.S.M.J., of the Northern District of California, which denied
Wipro’s motion to consider this case as related to Gupta’s prior lawsuit. Third, Gupta argues
that Wipro waived any res judicata defense by failing to appeal the portion of this Court’s April
27, 2015 Order denying Plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to file supplemental claims, in which
the Court stated that, to the extent Plaintiff believed he had additional claims, Plaintiff could seek
to assert such claims in a separate action. Each of these arguments lack merit.
First, as Judge Davila aptly observed in his March 24, 2017 Order transferring this case
to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) & (c), jurisdiction is proper in the District of New
Jersey, because Wipro is a resident corporation thereof. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s jurisdictional
argument is without merit.

24

Second, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that Wipro waived any res judicata
argument by failing to appeal Judge Lloyd’s October 19, 2016 Order. In the October 19, 2016
Order, Judge Lloyd merely indicated that Gupta refused to consent to allowing the case to
proceed before a magistrate judge, and thus, found that “relating the cases would be an idle act,
and the motion to relate these cases is denied.” ECF No. 33. Judge Lloyd thus issued no
substantive ruling pertaining to the relatedness of the two cases. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to
cite any support for the proposition that a failure to appeal a motion to relate cases precludes a
future res judicata defense.
Finally, the Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that Wipro waived any res judicata
defense by failing to raise the same before the Third Circuit while Gupta I was on appeal. On
April 14, 2015, while motions for summary judgment were pending in Gupta I, Gupta filed a
“Motion for Leave to File Supplemental claims and add a party,” seeking leave to add the
following supplemental claims: (1) breach of implied-in-fact contract; (2) unjust enrichment and
quantum meruit; (3) promissory estoppel; and (4) unpaid wages under the FLSA. Plaintiff also
requested leave to add Mr. Premji as a defendant. In its April 27, 2015 Order, the Court denied
Gupta’s motion, finding that the supplemental claims were “separate and distinct from the
judicial review of the ARB’s Final Decision and Order that Plaintiff had originally sought.”
Gupta, 101 F. Supp. at 462. As a result, the Court explained that “Plaintiff’s newly-raised claims
should be brought in a separate lawsuit.” Id. In so finding, the Court clarified that it made “no
finding regarding the viability or timeliness of the newly-proposed claims and the proposed
addition of a party.” Id. at 462, n 34.
Plaintiff overstates the implications of this Court’s April 27, 2015 Order denying
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file supplemental claims. In denying Plaintiff’s motion, the Court

25

simply found that, at the summary judgment stage of Gupta I, permitting Plaintiff to amend his
complaint would unduly prejudice the defendants. While the Court stated that Plaintiff’s
supplemental claims should be asserted in a separate lawsuit, if at all, it rendered no findings as
to the “viability . . . of the newly-proposed claims,” including whether such claims would be
barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion. Indeed, on July 27, 2016, the Court entered an
Order denying Plaintiff’s motion to reopen his case and transfer it to the Northern District of
California, stating that, “[i]nsofar as Plaintiff believes he has further claims to assert that were
not dismissed on the merits in the present case, he may file a new case in the appropriate venue.”
ECF. No. 98. It is readily apparent from this ruling this Court’s April 27, 2015 Order went no
further than denying Plaintiff’s attempt to make an eleventh-hour amendment adding new claims
to his case. By stating that Plaintiff should seek to file the supplemental claims in a new action,
if at all, the Court made no finding as to the viability of those claims, including whether such
claims would be barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Nor were Defendants under any
obligation to raise any defense with regard to the supplemental claims at that time.
In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff either raised, or could have raised, all of the claims
asserted in this case in Gupta I. Allowing Plaintiff to assert these claims in the instant case,
when they are based on the exact same factual conduct underlying the claims asserted in Gupta I,
would undermine the judicial efficiency that the doctrine of claim preclusion seeks to promote.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of establishing that the
doctrine of claim preclusion is applicable in this case, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety is granted.15

The Court notes that, in the “Conclusion” section of the Wipro Defendants’ moving brief, the
Wipro Defendants “seek that Plaintiff be precluded from filing any further litigation, motions, or
other documents in federal or state court relating to his employment with Wipro . . . .” Wipro
15

26

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

Dated: December 15, 2017

/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Hon. Freda L. Wolfson
United States District Judge

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 36. Nonetheless, the Wipro Defendants have not set forth any legal
basis under which the Court could impose such relief, and the Court declines to order the same at
this juncture without a properly filed brief. However, Plaintiff is advised that this Court will not
hesitate to impose sanctions or injunctive relief in the event that Plaintiff files further frivolous
pleadings.
27