MANNARINO v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC.
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM and ORDER denying 6 MOTION to Dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiff Anna Mannarino filed by OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 3/28/2018. (mmh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ANNA MANNARINO,
Civil Action No:
I 7-cv-2564 (PGS)(DEA)
Plaint ff
v.
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC.,
MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER
)
Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC’s motion
to dismiss Plaintiff Anna Mannarino’s Complaint (ECF 6). For the reasons discussed herein,
Defendant’s motion is denied.
In this action, Plaintiff alleges that Ocwen failed to exercise reasonable diligence in
reviewing her loss mitigation application regarding Plaintiffs home mortgage loan, and failed to
timely respond to Plaintiffs three Notice of Errors in violation of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (RESPA), and Regulation X. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 1024, et seq.
I.
Plaintiff Anna Mannarino owns the property located at 131 Crawfords Corner Road,
Holmdel, New Jersey 07773 (hereinafter, the “Property”). (Compl. at
¶ 1; see ECF 1). Plaintiff
defaulted under the loan and mortgagee and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
(“Deutsche”) commenced a Foreclosure Action in the Superior Court of New Jersey on August
13, 2012. (ECF No. i-i Ex. A, Foreclosure Docket) (referred to as “Lawsuit 1”).
On October 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed a separate suit against Deutsche in the Superior Court
of New Jersey, alleging the same defenses and claims asserted in the Foreclosure Action. (ECF 6-
5). Thereafter, Deutsche removed the case to this Court (referred to as “Lawsuit 2”). See
Mannarino v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, et al., 3:1 4-cv-0777 1 (MAS-TJB)
In Lawsuit 1, the Final Judgment of Foreclosure was entered against Plaintiff on December
12, 2014. (Id. at ¶ 23).
On September 14, 2015, in Lawsuit 2, the Court granted Deutsche’s motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6) with prejudice; and without a right to amend the
Complaint. (ECF 6-6).
In Lawsuit 1, Deutsche proceeded to execute on the property and scheduled a sheriff’s sale
for December 5, 2016 on the Property. (Compi. at
¶
24; ECF 6-4). Plaintiff stayed the sheriffs
sale until January 9, 2017. (Compi. at ¶ 25, ECF 1-3.)
In Lawsuit 1, Ocwen serviced Plaintiff’s mortgage loan and was responsible for assessing
Mannarino’s loss mitigation applications, and other mortgage relief options that were undertaken
to avoid a judicial sale of the property. (Compi. at
¶ 3-4).
On April 14, 2017 Plaintiff instituted this suit against Ocwen (referred to as “Lawsuit 3”).
Plaintiff alleges that Ocwen is a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). (Compi. at
¶J
3-4, 13). Moreover, Plaintiff alleges her note
and mortgage is a “federally related mortgage loan” as that term is defined by 12 C.F.R.
§1024.2(b). (Compi. at
¶
17). This means that Ocwen must comply with Regulation X and other
RESPA provisions. As such, Ocwen did not fall within an exception for “small servicers” (12
C.F.R. §1026.41(e)(4)) or the exemption for a “qualified lender” (12 C.F.R. §617.700). (Compl.
atJ 18).
The Complaint alleges that the last date to apply for the Home Affordable Modification
Program (“HAMP”) was December 31, 2016. (Compl. at
2
¶
29; ECF 1-4); and a borrower was
required to submit an “Initial Package” on or before December 30, 2016. See, Making Home
Affordable Supplemental Directive 16-02. (Compl. at
¶
30; ECF 1-4). Plaintiff alleges she
submitted the documents required of an Initial Package (Loss Mitigation Application), including
some additional forms (RMA Form, Form 4506-T or 4506 T-EZ) as evidence of income, and
Dodd-Frank certification. (Compi. at
¶
31; ECF 1-5). Within the Loss Mitigation Application,
Plaintiff included a profit and loss statement for her business from the period of January 1, 2016,
to October 31, 2016. (Compl. at
¶
27). On November 28, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a Loss
Mitigation Application to Ocwen via email and facsimile. (Compl. at ¶ 26; ECF 1-3).
On November 29, 2016, Defendant sent Plaintiff correspondence informing Plaintiff that
Ocwen was “unable to offer a Home Affordable Modification because
.
.
.
the confirmed
foreclosure sale date was within seven business days,” which is an exception to the HAMP
program. Despite same, Defendant continued to review the Loss Mitigation Application because
it realized that the Loss Mitigation Application was submitted more than seven business days
before the foreclosure sale. (Compi. at ¶ 34).
Thereafter, on December 9, 2016, Defendant confirmed receipt of the Loss Mitigation
Application and requested that Plaintiff submit a profit and loss statement. (Compl. at
¶ 35; ECF
1 -7). Despite the fact that Plaintiff had already submitted a profit and loss statement with her initial
Application, on December 21, 2016, Plaintiff re-submitted the profit and loss statement to Ocwen
via mail. (Compl. at ¶ 36). Evidently, Defendant received this mailing on December 27, 2016 (Id.),
and Plaintiff again submitted the Profit and Loss statement to Defendant via facsimile the next
day. (Compl.
¶ 36; ECF Nos.
1-8, 1-9).
On January 4, 2017, Plaintiff’s attorney spoke with a representative (Niral) of Ocwen. Niral
advised Plaintiff’s attorney that Ocwen had not received the profit and loss statement; and
3
Defendant would not review Plaintiff’s Loss Mitigation Application because a complete package
was not received by December 30, 2016. (Compi. at
¶ 37; ECF Nos.
1-8, 1-9). On the same date,
Plaintiff submitted the profit and loss statement to Niral via email. (Compl. at ¶ 38; ECF 1-10).
On January 5, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a First Notice of Error to Defendant via mail,
which Defendant received on January 9, 2017. (Compl. ¶ 39-40; ECF Nos. 1-1 1, 1-12). This Notice
informed Defendant that the profit and loss statement was previously submitted to Defendant via
facsimile and email and that Defendant had committed a servicing violation by providing false
information to Plaintiff regarding the actual date on which the profit and loss statement was
received. 12 C.F.R.
§
1024.35. (Compl. atJ4l; ECFNos. 1-8, 1-9, 1-11).
On January 24, 2017, Ocwen, confirmed receipt of the First Notice of Error, and informed
Plaintiff: “We have determined additional time is required to review the details pertaining to your
specific request
.
.
.
[if] we are unable to respond within the 30-day anticipated timeline. Under
[RESPA], we are afforded an additional 15 days to complete our research and provide a response.”
(Compl. at42; ECF 1-13).
On February 1, 2017, Plaintiff’s attorney spoke with a representative (Sabarish) of Ocwen.
Sabarish informed Plaintiff’s attorney that Defendant had not received the profit and loss
statement. (Compi. at
¶
43; ECF Nos. 1-8, 1-9, 1-10). Plaintiff’s attorney refuted Sabarish’s
representation by advising that the profit and loss statement had been submitted three times
through facsimile, email, and mail. Id. Later, Sabarish confirmed that Ocwen had received the
profit and loss statement on or around December27 and December 28, 2016. (Compl. at ¶ 44).
Again, Plaintiff’s attorney who was concerned about Sabarish’s statement decided to
submit a Second Notice of Error to Defendant via mail. (Compl. at
¶ 45;
ECF 1-14). Within the
Second Notice of Error, Plaintiff’s counsel asserted that Ocwen had committed a servicing
4
violation when Sabarish falsely claimed Ocwen had not have received the profit and loss
statement, and Plaintiff’s counsel alleged a second violation for not reviewing Plaintiffs
Application within thirty days as the regulations require. (12 C.F.R.
§
1024.35.) Id.
Defendant then sent Plaintiff correspondence on February 9, 2017, informing Plaintiff that
Defendant could not offer her a loan modification under either Tier I or Tier 2 of HAMP because
“in accordance with [Making Home Affordable (MHA)] guidelines, we are unable to review you
for the HAMP as [Oscwen] was not in receipt of your Initial Package on or before December 30,
2016.” (Compl. at ¶ 48; ECF 1-16).
On February 10, 2017, Defendant sent Plaintiff correspondence, confirming receipt of the
Second Notice of Error and informing her “It is [Defendant’s] goal to complete all research and
provide a written response to you within (10) business days from the date of receipt of your letter
In the event we are unable to issue a complete response within 30 days, you will receive a letter
indicating additional time is required.” (Compi. at ¶ 47; ECF 1-15).
Thereafter, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Third Notice of Error via mail, concerning the
February 9, 2017 loan modification denial. (Compi.
¶ 49; ECF
1-17). In the Third Notice of Error,
Plaintiffs counsel referenced the two prior notices of error which informed Ocwen of its
misrepresentation regarding the date on which profit and loss statement was received. (12 C.F.R.
§
1024.35) (Compl. at
¶ 50-5 1).
Ocwen adjourned the foreclosure sale on Plaintiffs residence to May 8, 2017 in Lawsuit
1. (Compl. at
¶ 52; ECF
1-2).
II.
As a result of Defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining any
necessary documents and information submitted in support of Plaintiffs Loss Mitigation
5
Application, and its failure to timely review same, Plaintiff alleges she has suffered damages
including the opportunity to enter into a loss mitigation transaction and costs. (Compl. at ¶ 52-53).
On April 14, 2017, Plaintiff initiated this suit (Lawsuit 3) against Defendant alleging five causes
of action. They are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Violation of 12 C.F.R. §1024.41(b)(l) (Count I);
Violation of 12 C.F.R. §1024.35 (Count II);
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count III);
Violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692(d), etseq. (Count IV); and
Violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692(e), et seq. (Count V).
Defendant seeks dismissal of these claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because
Plaintiff has failed to state viable claims. (ECF 6-1).
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure
1 2(b)(6), the Court is required to accept as true all allegations in the Complaint and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and to view them in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 (3d Cir.
1994). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” AshcrojI v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). While a court will accept well-pleaded allegations as true for the purposes of
the motion, it will not accept bald assertions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or
sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see
also Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A complaint
should be dismissed only if the well-pleaded alleged facts, taken as true, fail to state a claim. See
In re Warfarin Sodium, 214 F.3d 395, 397-98 (3d Cir. 2000).
6
III.
Ocwen asserts a number of arguments why it is not obligated to service Mannarino’s
mortgage. Each argument is discussed below.
A.
One of the Ocwen’s principal arguments is that Ocwen was not a “servicer” as
defined by RESPA of Plaintiff’s loan and mortgage at the time of the filing of the Loss
Mitigation Application, and therefore it had no obligation to assess it under Regulation X.
Ocwen’s theory is since the note and mortgage merged into the foreclosure judgment entered in
Lawsuit 1 (December 12, 2014) long before Plaintiff’s Loss Mitigation Application was
received, and as such, the judgment terminates Defendant’s servicing obligations See, Genid v.
Fed Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n & Seterus, Inc., 2016 WL 4150455, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2016). (Def.’s
Br. at 6; ECF 6-1). This theory relies on New Jersey law, wherein a “mortgage is merged into
the final judgment of foreclosure and the mortgage contract is extinguished.
.
.
As a result, upon
entry of a foreclosure judgment, all contractual rights under the mortgage are merged into the
foreclosure judgment.”). Id. (Def.’s Br. at 11; ECF 6-1). The Genid decision discusses the
merger theory but the facts presented in this case are different. In Genid, the claims occurred
subsequent to judgment and subsequent to the foreclosure sale; here the events occurred after
judgment, but before the foreclosure sale.
In opposition, Plaintiff distinguishes Genid and argues that Defendant was a “servicer”
within the meaning of RESPA and Regulation X at the time of the Loss Mitigation Application
because no foreclosure sale had occurred. Further, Plaintiff’s counsel argues that Regulation X
regulates conduct of loan servicers during the loan modification program is pending even after
judgment has been entered. (Pl.’s Br. at 13; ECF 11).
7
In reviewing Regulation X, it has several provisions which broaden the scope of a
servicer’s obligations until after the judgment is entered. For example, one regulation (12 C.F.R.
§
1024.41 (g)( 1 )-(2)) prohibits a servicer from conducting a judicial sale after the “borrower has
submitted a complete loss mitigation application,” so long as certain conditions are met. In
addition, Regulation X broadly defines “servicer” as “a person responsible for servicing of a
federally related mortgage loan (including the person who makes or holds such loan if such
person also services the loan).” 12 C.F.R.
§
1024.2. Within that definition, there is no reference
to any “merger” theory as defendants counsel asserts.
Plaintiff also maintains that the merger doctrine should not apply due to the facts of the
case. Ocwen continued to service Plaintiff’s loan, after the judgment was entered. For example,
(1) Ocwen continued to communicate with Plaintiff and recognized that Plaintiff retained the right
to appeal the foreclosure judgment, (2) Defendant acknowledged that RESPA applied when it
extended time to research and respond to Plaintiff’s Notices of Error and to assess the Loss
Mitigation Information, and 3) Ocwen stated the “communication is from a debt collector
attempting to collect a debt.” (Pl.’s Br. at 14-15, ECF 11; ECF Nos. 1-13, 1-16).
Since the judicial sale had not occurred, and the cited regulations suggest a servicer has an
obligation to the Plaintiff at least until the judicial sale is completed, Ocwen’s “merger” theory
lacks merit under the circumstances.
B. Ocwen’s second argument is that it had no obligation to evaluate Plaintiff’s Loss
Mitigation Application filed in November, 2016 for two reasons. First, Ocwen argues that a
servicer is only required to evaluate a loss mitigation application once; and here, relying on an
assertion in Lawsuit 2, (“Plaintiff had earlier applied to Defendant for loss mitigation and had
received a response that she was not eligible for a loan modification because she had already been
8
provided a modification in 2006.”) (Def.’s Reply at 4; ECF 12). Accordingly, there is no need to
revisit loss mitigation.
Secondly, Ocwen argues Plaintiff failed to plead she had previously
received a loan modification in this case violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. According to Ocwen, it is a
violation of Rule 11 to withhold relevant factual evidence within the knowledge of the pleading
party in order to gain the advantage of being able to plead more causes of action than are
appropriate. See Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Austin Bank of Chicago, 837 F. Supp. 892,
894-95 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Defendant asserts that Regulation X requires a servicer to complete a
single loss mitigation application; and on its face, the November, 2016 application is a second
application.
More specifically, Regulation X provides in two sections that “[a] servicer is only
required to comply with the requirements of this section for a single complete loss mitigation
application for a borrowe?s mortgage loan account.” 12 C.F.R.
§ 1024.4 1(i) (emphasis added). “A
complete loss mitigation application means an application in connection with which a servicer has
received all the information that the servicer requires from a borrower in evaluating applications
for the loss mitigation options available to the borrower.” 12 C.F.R.
§ 1024.41(b)(1).
Plaintiff counters with several arguments. First Plaintiff contends that this Court should not
rely on extraneous facts set forth in Lawsuit 2 because the allegation in Lawsuit 2 is not directly
on point, and they are not integral to this litigation. See, In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997); Arcand v. Brother Int’l Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 282, 292
(D.N.J. 2009). Second, Plaintiff argues by merely relying on Plaintiff’s complaint in Lawsuit 2
that there are insufficient facts to determine whether the 2006 application was a “complete
application” as required under Regulation X. Third, Plaintiff argues that case law developed on
this point has determined that such services must comply with the regulations (12 C.F.R.
§
1024.41) at least once after effective date of the regulation (January 10, 2014). (Bennett v. Bank of
9
America, N.A., 126 F.Supp.3d 871, 884 (E.D.Ky. 2015); Schroeder v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC,
Civil Action No. 161561RAJ (W.D. Wash, June 8,2017); Billings v. Seterus, Inc., 170 F.Supp.3d
1011 (W.D.Mich.2016)’.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Obviously, the servicer’s obligation to review a complete
loss mitigation application emanates from the adoption of Regulation X in 2014. Secondly, to
refer back to an application from 2006 makes little sense; because the Plaintiffs financial
circumstances may be far different due to the passage of time
--
especially considering the ten year
period (2006-2016). As such, the Court denies the motion to dismiss on this basis.
C.
Ocwen’s third argument is that that Plaintiff’s application was untimely because
the application was filed within 37 days of the scheduled foreclosure sale. 12 CFR
§
1024.41 (c)( 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff claims that her loss mitigation application was filed
approximately 43 days prior to the scheduled foreclosure sale date (January 9, 2017). (See ECF
1-3).
Ocwen argues that the judicial sale was scheduled for December 5, 2016; but Plaintiff
contends that under a New Jersey statute she was entitled to an adjournment (which she
received) and the judicial sale was moved to January 7, 2017. Here, the judicial sale has not
occurred to date. As such, the motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.
D.
Ocwen’s fourth argument is that Count Two fails because a Notice of Error
cannot be used to challenge a denial of a loss mitigation application (citing Wiggins v. Hudson
City Say. Bank,No. AP 15-01938 (JKS), 2015 WL 4638452, at *8 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 4,
2015)). (Def.’s Br. at 9-10, ECF 6-1). Within Count 11, Plaintiff seeks more than the denial of
loss mitigation application, she seeks damages such as attorney’s fees and costs; and by
1
Some Courts have held otherwise. Trionfo v. Bank ofAm., NA., 2015 WL 5165415, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 2,
2015); Bobbittv. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 2015 WL 12777378, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 7,2015).
10
inference, seeks that the Loss Mitigation Application process be resumed (i.e. equitable relief).
As such, the Plaintiff may proceed on those grounds.
E.
Ocwen’s fifth argument is that the breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing does not apply for several reasons. Ocwen argues that the note and mortgage
merged into the judgment, and as such, no contract existed. This argument was decided above
(Section A), and I will rely on the same rationale. Genid v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assn & Seterus,
Inc., 2016 WL 4150455, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2016).
Finally, Ocwen avers that even if this Court finds a contract between the parties, there is
no contractual provision in the Note or Mortgage that confers an obligation upon Ocwen to modify
a Plaintiff’s loan. Simmons v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 2015 WL 4759441 at *4 (D.N.H. Aug. 11,
2015). Szczodrowski v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 15-10668, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
57327, at *5..6 (E.D.Mich. May 1,2015).
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Courts have held “If an original mortgagee can be sued
under state law for breach of contract, so may the partial assignee if he violates the terms of the
part of the mortgage loan contract that has been assigned to him.”) In re Ocwen Loan Servicing,
LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2007).
Here, this motion to dismiss Count III is denied. Further discovery is needed to determine
(1) whether a contract existed between the parties, (2) whether Defendant was contractually
obligated to service Plaintiffs loan through its evaluation of loss mitigation options upon
Plaintiff’s default; and (3) whether Defendant’s alleged misrepresentation of not receiving the
Initial Package by the deadline constituted a breach of the contract.
F.
Ocwen argues that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) violation should
be dismissed. The FDCPA creates a private right of action against debt collectors who fail to
11
comply with its provisions. 15 U.S.C.
§
1692(k). To prevail on a FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that “(1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s
challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the
defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” Douglass v.
Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014).
Ocwen argues that it did not harass (1692(d), and/or mislead (1692(c)) Plaintiff in its
communications. Defendant claims that Plaintiff and her counsel would not have been misled or
harassed by Defendant’s alleged misrepresentation that it had not received all the information
needed to review the Loss Mitigation Application (citing Simon v. FJA Card Servs. NA., 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56960, at *16 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2015)). (See Compl., ECF 1-13 at
¶ 42, 48
and
ECF 1-16). (Def.’s Br. at 15-16). The Third Circuit has analyzed FDCPA claims under the least
sophisticated debtor standard. Brown, 464 F.3d at 453-54; Rosenau, 539 F.3d at 221 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). The least sophisticated debtor standard “is lower than the
standard of a reasonable debtor” such that “a communication that would not deceive or mislead a
reasonable debtor might still deceive or mislead the least sophisticated debtor.” Rosenau v.
Unfund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221(3rd Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The
least sophisticated debtor standard is a difficult hurdle to overcome on a motion to dismiss. Here,
Plaintiff through its well plead complaint has shown sufficient facts that may misled or harassed
Plaintiff.
G.
Defendant argues that its communications initiated by the Plaintiff, and as such,
those communications do not fall within the scope of the FDCPA. Genid v. Fed. Nai’l Mortg.
Ass’n & Seterus, Inc., 2016 WL 4150455, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2016)). Here, there are claims of
misrepresentation of facts and delay in processing of Plaintiffs Loss Mitigation Application. The
12
Third Circuit has held that debt collection communications are not “limited to specific requests for
repayment” and include communications “conveying information regarding a debt” are subject to
the FDCPA. Allen v. LaSalle Bank, NA., 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has plausibly set forth a claim. That is, Plaintiff is a consumer, Defendant
(Ocwen) is a debt collector. Ocwen’s communications about the loss mitigation process constitute
debt collecting communications, and arguably, Ocwen misled Plaintiff. This adequately alleges a
cause of action.
H.
Ocwen’s final argument is that those communications between Plaintiffs attorney
and Ocwen are not subject to the FDCPA. (Def.’s Br. at 14; ECF 6-1).
Despite that contention, the Third Circuit has held “[a] communication to a consumer’s
attorney is undoubtedly an indirect communication to the consumer.” Allen v. LaSalle Bank, NA.,
629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The Third Circuit has construed the language
of the FDCPA broadly in order to give effect to the statute’s remedial purpose to protect consumers
from abusive debt collection practices. As such, Defendant’s motion is denied.
ORDER
This matter having been opened to the Court by Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs
complaint (ECF 6); and the Court having fully considered the submissions in support thereof, and
any opposition thereto; and having considered the arguments of counsel; and for good cause having
been shown;
IT IS on this 28th day of March, 2018,
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF 6) is DENIED.
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
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