C.F. v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE et al

Filing 77

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that Defendant's informal application for reconsideration of this Court's decision denying Defendant's request to conduct an additional inspection on the Jeep [ECF No. 75 ] is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Douglas E. Arpert on 11/19/2018. (mmh)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
C.F.,
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:

Civil Action No. 17-4036 PGS DEA
(Consolidated with
Civil Action Nos. 17-4206 (PGS)
17-4050 (PGS))

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

ARPERT, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the Court on an informal application by Defendant United
States of America for reconsideration of this “Court’s decision denying Defendant’s request to
conduct an additional inspection of one of the vehicles (i.e., the Jeep) involved in the motorvehicle accident that is the subject of these consolidated actions. See Defendant’s Letter to the
Court dated September 27, 2018. ECF No. 75. Defendant argues that the Court should reconsider
its decision to prevent “manifest injustice”, that is, Defendant “will be prejudiced if its seatbelt
expert is deprived of an inspection of the Jeep to rebut Plaintiff’s inertial and inadvertent seatbelt
release theory.” Id. at p.5. Further, Defendant argues, it “could not predict the seatbelt release
theory raised in Dr. Pugh’s report, and a second inspection of the Jeep would not prejudice any
party to these actions.” Id. at p.7.
Plaintiffs C.F. and D.F. oppose Defendant’s application. See Plaintiffs’ Letter to the
Court dated October 1, 2018. ECF No. 76. In short, Plaintiffs argue, Defendant “has failed to
present any new evidence or legal authority to support its request for reconsideration.” Id. at p.1.
Further, Plaintiffs maintain:
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It is apparent…that Defendant USA was cogently award of
the seatbelt “issue” in this matter throughout the fact-discovery
period and that Defendant USA and its experts had every
opportunity to conduct inspections of the subject Jeep, including its
seat belt, during the fact-discovery period.
Id. at p.3.
The underlying facts and procedural history of these consolidated actions are well known
to the parties and the Court and need not be recited here at length. Pursuant to the operative
scheduling order, fact discovery was to be concluded by July 2, 2018. Plaintiff served Dr. James
Pugh’s (biomechanical) expert report on July 27, 2018, On August 18, 2018, Defendant served a
Subpoena seeking to conduct an additional inspection of the Jeep. An initial inspection of the
Jeep was conducted by Defendant and its experts—including a 3-D scan of the vehicle—on
March 13, 2018. After Plaintiffs objected to Defendant’s Subpoena, the issue was presented to
the Court by Defendant.
In an Opinion and Order dated September 13, 2018, the Court denied Defendant’s request
for the inspection and quashed Defendant’s Subpoena. ECF No. 69. The factual and legal bases
for that decision speak for themselves.
I.

LEGAL STANDARD
A party seeking reconsideration of a Court’s Order must show “(1) an intervening change

in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court
[issued its order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law for fact or to prevent manifest
injustice.” Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). “Manifest
injustice pertains to situations where a court overlooks some dispositive factual or legal matter
that was presented to it.” Inventory Recovery Corp. v. Gabriel, No. 11-1604, 2017 WL 319177,
at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2017).
III. DISCUSSION
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Here, Defendant has not identified any change in the controlling law or new evidence that
would support its application. Rather, Defendant contends reconsideration is necessary to
prevent “manifest injustice.” Specifically, Defendant claims an addition inspection of the Jeep by
a seatbelt expert is required to rebut the “novel theory of seatbelt malfunction” that was revealed
for the first time in Dr. Pugh’s report in July 2018.
Further review of the factual history of this case, as developed through the discovery
process, only serves to reinforce the Court’s original decision to deny Defendant’s application to
permit an additional inspection. Defendant acknowledges that “from the onset of discovery [it]
pursued evidence of whether or not Plaintiff C.F. was not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the
accident.” ECF No. 75 at p.1. Moreover, “[e]arly in discovery, in support of its cross-claim, the
Defendant developed evidence that Plaintiff C.F. was not wearing his seatbelt.” Id. In the course
of discovery, conflicting deposition testimony was obtained on this issue. Accordingly,
Defendant can not reasonably claim to have been surprised by the seatbelt reference in Dr.
Pugh’s report. As previously noted by the Court, “Dr. Pugh’s report does not contain any
conclusions that relate or refer to any alleged seatbelt malfunction.” ECF No. 69 at p.3. Rather,
Dr. Pugh concludes, in part, that C.F. “would have sustained the [same] injuries irrespective of
whether or not the seatbelt had been in place at the moment of impact with the tree.” ECF No. 76
at p.4.
Defendant has asserted a cross claim against Plaintiff/Defendant Robert Fuggi III, the
driver of the Jeep in which C.F. was a passenger. ECF No. 12. There, Defendant alleges that the
“injuries sustained by the plaintiffs were in whole or in part, caused by plaintiffs’ failure to
properly wear the appropriate seat belt restraint device.” Id. at ¶ 22. Defendant argues that the
driver “may be comparatively negligent if he failed to ensure that his minor brother, Plaintiff

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C.F., fastened his seat belt and the seatbelt would have prevented C.F.’s serious injuries.” ECF
No. 75 at p.5.
To successfully evidence “manifest injustice,” a movant must demonstrate that the Court
“overlooked some dispositive factual or legal matter that was presented to it.” Inventory
Recovery Corp., 2017 WL319177, at *3.
It is well established that New Jersey jurisprudence recognizes a co-called seat-belt
defense. “If a jury finds a plaintiff negligent for failure to wear a seat belt, plaintiff’s recovery for
injuries that could have been avoided by seat-belt use may be reduced by an amount reflecting
plaintiff’s comparative fault in not wearing a seat belt.” Malik v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 59
F.Supp.3d 686, 694 (D.N.J. 2014) (citing Waterson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 111 N.J. 238, 264
(1988). But, “in order for a jury to consider seat belt nonuse in reducing damages, the failure to
sear a seat belt must increase the extent or severity of injury.” Waterson, 111 N.J. at 264
(emphasis added). Dr. Pugh’s report concludes, among other things, that “had the seat belt been
in place at the moment of impact, [C.F.] would not have survived the collision because the
seatbelt would have held [C.F.’s] body in harm’s way and exposed his body to significantlyincreased forces from the intruding right side of the Jeep, thereby causing much more significant
head injuries and visceral damage, and likely death.” CF No. 75-1 at p.8. In other words, Dr.
Pugh concludes that C.F.’s injuries, though traumatic, were less severe because the seat belt was
not in place at the moment of collision. That conclusion does not depend on whether the reason
the seat belt was not in place was because C.F. was not wearing the seat belt or because of the
“inertial and inadvertent seatbelt release theory” identified by Dr. Pugh.
Of course, nothing in Dr. Pugh’s report precludes Defendants’ experts from rebutting his
conclusion about the nature and extend of C.F.’s injuries. Still, despite its assertions to the

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contrary, the foregoing demonstrates that Defendant has not met the standard for granting
reconsideration. Rather than identifying a clear error of law or any dispositive factual or legal
matters overlooked by the Court, Defendant essentially expresses disagreement with the Court’s
decision and raises arguments that were made, or could have been made, prior to the Court’s
decision. An application seeking reconsideration may not be used by a party “to raise arguments
or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of [the Order].” NL Indus., Inc.,
v. Comm. Union Ins. Co., 935 F.Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996). Where a party merely has a
difference of opinion with the Court’s decision, the issue should be raised through the normal
appellate process; reconsideration is not the appropriate method. Dubler v. Hangsterfer’s
Laboratories, Civ. No. 09-5144, 2012 WL1332569, *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2012) (citing Bowers v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 130 F.Supp.2d 610, 612 (D.N.J. 2001)). Consequently, having
considered the papers submitted and for the reasons set forth above,
IT IS on this of 19th day of November 2018,
ORDERED that Defendant’s informal application for reconsideration of this Court’s
decision denying Defendant’s request to conduct an additional inspection on the Jeep [ECF No.
75] is DENIED.

s/ Douglas E. Arpert
DOUGLAS E. ARPERT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Date: November 19, 2018

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