KEELEN V BOROUGH OF KEANSBURG
Filing
14
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 3/27/2018. (mmh)
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
:
THOMAS KEELEN,
:
Civil Action No.: 17-4521(FLW)
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
OPINION
BOROUGH OF KEANSBURG, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
____________________________________:
WOLFSON, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff Thomas Keelen (“Plaintiff” or “Keelen”), a former bar owner,
brought this § 1983 suit against the Borough of Keansburg (the “Borough”) and
Borough employees, including James K. Pigott, George Hoff, Arthur Boden,
James Cocuzza, Thomas Foley and Sean Tonne (collectively, “Defendants”),
accusing them of taking unconstitutional retaliatory actions by, inter alia,
refusing to renew Plaintiff’s liquor license. In the instant matter, Defendants
move to dismiss the Complaint on the basis that Plaintiff is contractually barred
from suit by a previous settlement agreement with the Borough.
In the
alternative, Defendants invoke Younger abstention, and request that this Court
abstain from exercising jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, Defendants
motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
For the purposes of this motion, the Court will only recount relevant facts
from the Complaint, and take them as true. For over 47 years, Keelen was the
owner of TJK Stadium Bar (the “Bar”) in Keansburg, New Jersey. See Compl.,
¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiff is the sole shareholder of Slover Productions, LLC (“Slover”),
which held the Bar’s liquor license. Id. at ¶ 4. Based on the pleadings, Plaintiff
and the Borough have had a tumultuous history. In 2001, Plaintiff filed his first
§ 1983 suit against the Borough for taking certain retaliatory actions against
him and his store because, allegedly, Plaintiff served as a witness in a criminal
case on behalf of a defendant. See id. at ¶¶ 13-16. Among other actions taken
against Plaintiff, Plaintiff alleges that the Borough previously suspended the
Bar’s liquor license in 2001. Following the 2001 lawsuit, however, the liquor
license was restored. Id. at ¶ 22.
In May 2016, Slover applied for its annual liquor license renewal, which
Id. at ¶ 28.
was set to expire on June 30, 2016.
In connection with the
application, the Borough requested Plaintiff to attend a town council 1 meeting to
discuss the renewal. According to Plaintiff, at the meeting, defendant Pigott, the
Chief of Police, recommended the City Council to not renew the license, because
of a high level of narcotics activity occurring at the Bar, which required the police
to respond to numerous service calls. Id. at ¶ 32. Pigott also recommended to
the New Jersey Division of Alcohol Beverage Control (the “NJABC”) that Solver’s
Named defendants Boden, Cocuzza, Foley and Tonne are the Borough’s
council members.
1
2
liquor license be permanently suspended for similar reasons.
Id. at ¶ 43.
Ultimately, the liquor license was not renewed by the Borough, and according to
Plaintiff, he was “forced” to close the Bar. Id. at ¶ 51.
On October 3, 2016, Plaintiff, on behalf of Slover, appealed the Borough’s
decision to the NJABC. Id. at ¶ 52. Following settlement negotiations between
Slover and the Borough, “Slover was granted a Plenary Retail Consumption
Liquor License with the specific condition that Plaintiff sell the [Bar].” Id. at ¶
53. 2 According to Plaintiff, he subsequently sold the Bar, with a liquor license,
at a diminished value. Id. at ¶ 54.
Based on the actions of Defendants, Plaintiff brought this § 1983 lawsuit.
Plaintiff accuse Defendants of conspiring to deprive Plaintiff of his “constitutional
and/or property rights by abusing their authority to harass and retaliate against
Plaintiff for testifying in the [criminal] case and having African American clientele
and entertainment at the [Bar].” Id. at Count One, ¶ 3. In that regard, Plaintiff
asserts that Defendants committed, under color of state law, “a physical and
regulatory taking of Plaintiff’s personal and/or real property in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at Count Three, ¶ 2. Plaintiff also claims
that he was subjected to abuse of process in violation of § 1983, and that
Defendants retaliated against him in violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment
While not pled in the Complaint, in addition to the settlement with the
Borough, Slover petitioned the NJABC to accept an offer of $4,500 in lieu of
prosecution; in response, the NJABS issued a “Petition to Make Offer in
Compromise in Lieu of Prosecution of License,” signed by Keelen, that concluded
the investigation. See Petition dated February 21, 2017.
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rights. Id. at Count Two, Count Four. Finally, under § 1983, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants committed “selective enforcement” in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at Count Five. In addition, Plaintiff brings parallel state
law claims under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”). Id. at Count Six.
In the instant matter, Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on the
basis that the settlement agreement entered into between the Borough and
Plaintiff bars the claims raised here, since Plaintiff had agreed to waive all claims
against the Borough arising from the suspension of the liquor license.
Alternatively, Defendants seek to invoke the Younger Abstention doctrine, and
request the Court to abstain from hearing this case.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When
reviewing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, courts “accept all factual
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint,
the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Under such a
standard, the factual allegations set forth in a complaint “must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all
of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "[A] complaint must do more than
allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an
entitlement with its facts." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d
Cir. 2009).
However, Rule 12(b)(6) only requires a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must include “enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest the required element. This does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for
enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
of the necessary element.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (internal quotations and
citations omitted); Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710
F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) ("[A] claimant does not have to set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim. The pleading standard is not akin to a
probability requirement; to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint merely has
to state a plausible claim for relief." (citation and internal quotations omitted)).
In sum, under the current pleading regime, when a court considers a
dismissal motion, three sequential steps must be taken: first, “it must take note
of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Connelly v. Lane Constr.
Corp., 809 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted). Next, the
court “should identify allegations that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. (citations and
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quotations omitted). Lastly, “when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. (citations, quotations and brackets
omitted).
II.
Settlement Agreement
Defendants argue that Plaintiff entered into two separate settlement
agreements with the Borough, both of which foreclose his right to obtain the
relief sough in the Complaint, because each of Plaintiff’s causes of action are
predicated on the Borough’s investigation, the subsequent loss of his liquor
license, and its impact on his decision to sell the Bar. According to Defendants,
the first settlement agreement was memorialized in emails between Plaintiff’s
attorney and the Borough’s counsel.
Defendants submitted these emails as
exhibits to their motion. The second agreement was a statutorily authorized
“offer in compromise” of a $4,500 fine that Plaintiff, on behalf of Slover, accepted
from the NJABC in exchange for the agency ending its disciplinary proceedings
against the licensee, Slover.
As a preliminary matter, with respect to the email exchanges between
counsel, Plaintiff has not attached, or pled, in the Complaint the content of the
emails; Plaintiff has, however, alleged that settlement negotiations between the
Borough and Slover took place, and that the parties reached an agreement.
Indeed, Plaintiff, in his opposition brief, does not dispute the authenticity of the
email exchanges submitted by Defendants. In fact, Plaintiff also relies on these
emails in his motion papers.
In that regard, because Plaintiff explicitly
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references the settlement negotiations between Borough counsel and his
counsel, the Court will consider the emails on this motion. 3 See In re Rockefeller
Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir.1999)(finding that a court
may consider documents that are “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the
complaint”); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1426 (3d Cir. 1997)(even if a “[c]omplaint does not explicitly refer to or cite [a
document] … the critical [issue] is whether the claims in the complaint are
‘based’ on an extrinsic document and not merely whether the extrinsic document
was explicitly cited.”).
Under New Jersey law, “an agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract
which, like all other contracts, may be freely entered into, and which a court,
absent a demonstration of fraud or other compelling circumstance, shall honor
For two reasons, I will also consider the Borough’s formal Resolution,
which ratified the parties’ settlement agreement. First, “[w]hen a complaint relies
on a document . . . the plaintiff obviously is on notice of the contents of the
document, and the need for a chance to refute evidence is greatly diminished.”
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 119697 (3d Cir. 1993). Even if a “[c]omplaint does not explicitly refer to or cite [a
document] … the critical [issue] is whether the claims in the complaint are
‘based’ on an extrinsic document and not merely whether the extrinsic document
was explicitly cited.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426
(3d Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Here, because the
Complaint references the settlement agreement and the Borough’s adoption of
that agreement, it is appropriate to consider the Resolution. Additionally, public
documents may be considered in deciding a motion to dismiss. See Southern
Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group, Ltd., 181 F.3d 410,
426 (3d Cir. 1999); Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch. Dist., 377 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir.
2004); see also Herring v. United States, No. 03-5500, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18545, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sep.10, 2004), aff'd, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005). Because
the Borough’s Resolution is indisputably a public document, for also this reason,
I will consider the Resolution and its content. Furthermore, I note that both
parties rely on the language of the Resolution in their respective motion papers.
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and enforce as it does other contracts.” Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super.
118, 124-25 (App. Div. 1983) (internal citation and quotation omitted); see
Mortellite v. Novartis Crop Prot., Inc., 460 F.3d 483, 492 (3d Cir.2006) (citing
Borough of Haledon v. Borough of N. Haledon, 358 N.J. Super. 289, 305 (App.
Div. 2003)). In that regard, state contract law applies in determining whether an
enforceable settlement agreement has been reached. See Dep't of Pub. Advocate
v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util., 206 N.J. Super. 523, 527-28 (App. Div.1985); Excelsior
Ins. Co. v. Pennsbury Pain Ctr., 975 F. Supp. 342, 348- 49 (D.N.J.1996) (holding
that “state law governs the construction and enforcement of settlement
agreements in federal court”).
In New Jersey, a contract arises from offer and acceptance of terms that
are sufficiently definite “that the performance to be rendered by each party can
be ascertained with reasonable certainty.” West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9,
24-25 (1958); Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 531 (1956). “Thus, if
parties agree on essential terms and manifest an intention to be bound by those
terms, the parties have created an enforceable contract.” Weichert Co. Realtors
v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427 (1992). An offeree may manifest assent to the terms of an
offer through words, creating an express contract, or by conduct, creating a
contract implied-in-fact. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19(1) (1981).
The relationships between the parties or other circumstances may justify the
offeror expecting a reply, such that the offeror may correctly assume that the
offeree’s silence indicates assent to the proposal.
Johnson & Johnson v.
Charmley Drug Co., 11 N.J. 526, 539 (1953). Thus, when an offeree accepts the
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offeror’s services without expressing any objection to the essential terms of the
offer, the offeree has manifested assent to those terms. Weichert, 128 N.J. at 436.
Significantly, a formal writing is not necessary to create a contract.
Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124 (App. Div. 1983). The form of the
contract is not the focus; the parties may bind themselves through an informal
memorandum. See Berg Agency v. Sleepworld—Willingboro, Inc., 136 N.J. Super.
369, 374 (App. Div. 1975). Indeed, courts will enforce settlement agreements
notwithstanding the absence of a formal writing as long as the parties agreed
upon the essential terms of a settlement, even if they left the details to be fleshed
out in subsequent writings. Lahue v. Pio Costa, 263 N.J. Super. 575, 596 (App.
Div. 1993); Hagrish v. Olson, 254 N.J. Super. 133, 138 (App. Div. 1992).
Determining whether a term is essential “depends on the agreement and its
context and also on the subsequent conduct of the parties . . . .” JM Agency, Inc.
v. NAS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. L-1541-05, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1548, at
*3 (App. Div. Aug. 3, 2007) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 131, cmt.
g (1981)).
I note that there is a strong public policy in New Jersey favoring the
enforcement of settlements. See Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990).
Consistent with that policy, courts should “strain to give effect to the terms of a
settlement whenever possible.” Dep't of Pub. Advocate v. N.J. Bd. Of Pub. Util.,
206 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div. 1985). In that regard, the party seeking to
set aside the settlement has the burden of proving “extraordinary circumstances
to vitiate the agreement” by “clear and convincing evidence.” Casagrande v.
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Casagrande, No. C-268-08, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2631, at *5 (App.
Div. Dec. 3, 2012); Moran v. Davita, Inc., No. 06-5620, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
102146, at *13 (D.N.J. Jun. 28, 2013).
In this case, Plaintiff does not contest that a settlement agreement exists,
or that certain terms of the agreement were set forth in a series of email
exchanges between counsel; rather, Plaintiff maintains that the principal parties
to the agreement are the Borough and Slover — the holder of the liquor license
— not Plaintiff. In that regard, for support, Plaintiff points to the language of the
Resolution and argues that the Resolution explicitly makes a distinction between
Slover, as the licensee, and Plaintiff. Plaintiff further argues that it was Slover
— not Plaintiff — that agreed to waive all claims against the Borough and its
employees. I do not agree with Plaintiff’s position.
The relevant language of the Resolution states:
WHEREAS, Slover Production LLC (“Licensee”) is the holder of
Plenary Retail Consumption Liquor License . . . and the owner of
TJK Tiki Stadium [the Bar]; and
WHEREAS, Licensee is owned, operated and controlled by Thomas
Keelen; and
*
*
*
WHEREAS Counsel for Licensee engaged in settlement negotiations
with the Borough Attorney for a resolution of a conditional renewal
of License . . . subject to various special conditions which are set
forth below, and the approval and completion of a person-to-person
transfer . . .; and
1. Licensee agrees that neither it nor Thomas Keelen shall
re-open [the Bar] in any capacity . . . .
. . .
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3. Licensee agrees that if a person-to-person transfer is
approved by the Borough Council of the Borough of
Keansburg, neither Licensee nor Thomas Keelen shall have
any financial interest in or connection wot the transferee
in any way whatsoever, nor shall Thomas Keelen or
Licensee have any financial interest whatsoever in the
transferee’s establishment.
4. Licensee agrees and consents to waiving any and all
potential litigation related to the non-renewal of License . .
. against the Borough of Keansburg including, but not
limited to, the Borough Council of the Borough of
Keansburg, the Keansburg Borough Manage, and the
Keansburg Police Department (the “Waiver Clause”).
Keansburg City Council Resolution dated January 18, 2017 (the “Resolution”),
pp. 10-11.
Plaintiff argues that the term “Licensee,” as used in the Resolution, refers
to Slover, not Plaintiff, and that Keelen is explicitly referred to separately in the
document.
In that regard, Plaintiff maintains that because Keelen was not
mentioned in the Waiver Clause, he did not waive any of his personal rights to
sue the Borough. While Plaintiff’s reading of the Resolution may be technically
correct, Plaintiff’s argument is based on a faulty premise — that the Resolution
is the settlement agreement between the parties; that is not case. The Resolution
is merely enacted by the city council in this particular instance to memorialize
and approve the parties’ agreement. See, e.g., Mawhinney v. Bennett, No. 083317, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1715, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2010); Petit-Clair v.
Hoffman, No. 14-7082, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101311, at * 7 (D.N.J. Jun. 29,
2017)(finding that while plaintiffs are correct that the City Council Agenda dose
not reference construction of the boatlift, “however, the Agenda does not
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supersede the [settlement agreement].”). While Plaintiff insists that the terms of
the settlement agreement are reflected in the Resolution, the Resolution does not
represent the actual settlement agreement itself.
Instead, the fact that the
parties, i.e., Keelen and the Borough, did not reduce their agreement to a formal
writing is of no moment under New Jersey law; the email exchanges between
counsel evince the parties’ understanding of their rights and obligations under
the settlement.
The Borough’s counsel, Matthew Donohue, sent Plaintiff’s counsel,
Michael Kasanoff, an email, with the subject line Slover Productions v.
Keansburg, stating that the Borough is “placing the Keelen License renewal on
for January 10th or 18th [2017],” and that the proposed resolution included the
understanding that the Bar “doesn’t ever open again; waive all litigation against
the Borough; and Mr. Keelen can have no financial connection or return to the
new bar.”
See Donohue Email dated December 16, 2016.
Mr. Kasanoff
responded by stating the following:
Thanks for this outstanding update, which I have shared with my
client . . . . You eloquently sum up our understanding below. A big
thank you on behalf of all us [sic] to you . . . and the Keansburg
governing officials, for being reasonable and pragmatic in amicably
resolving this matter.
Kasanoff Emailed dated December 16, 2016.
On January 11, 2017, Mr. Donohue sent another email to Mr. Kasanoff
memorializing the parties’ understanding regarding the specific terms of the
negotiated settlement agreement. Those terms were set forth in the email as
follows:
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•
•
•
•
Keelen agrees to never open the [Bar] ever again;
Keelen agrees the license is inactive and essentially a
pocket license, and will only activate upon the completion
of an approved person-to-person transfer by the Borough
Council;
Keelen agrees to have no financial interest with the
transferee or the transferee’s proposed establishment;
and
Keenlen agrees to waive any and all litigation related
to the non-renewal of the license against the Borough
including, but not limited to, the Borough Council,
the Borough Manager, and the Keansburg Police
Department.
See Donohue Email dated January 11, 2017 (emphasis added). Mr. Donohue
indicated that if Plaintiff did not agree to those terms, “the settlement is off.” See
id.
The chain of emails between Plaintiff’s counsel and the Borough’s attorney
provide sufficient evidence that the parties reached an enforceable settlement,
with precise terms that were agreed upon by the parties — particularly by
Plaintiff. See, e.g., Triffin v. Sunrise Banks, No. A-3445-14T1, 2017 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 902, at *11-12 (App. Div. Apr. 12, 2017)(finding that the chain of
emails between the parties provided compelling evidence that the parties reached
an enforceable settlement); Trian Group, Ltd. P'ship v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co.,
No. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42931, at *15-16 (D.N.J. Jun. 6, 2006)(“[t]he e-mail
exchange between counsel on December 2, 2005[,] clearly reflects that, on that
date, the parties had an agreement-in-principle . . . .”). Indeed, Mr. Donohue
stated that the settlement would not be effectuated if Plaintiff did not agree to
certain terms, including waiving any and all litigation related to the non-renewal
of the license.
Importantly, the email unambiguously states that Keenlen,
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himself, must agree to the terms as written — not Keelen as a representative of
Slover. And, there is no mention that Slover or any other corporate entities must
also agree to the terms set forth in the email. Plaintiff does not allege that he
raised any issue with the provisions in the email, nor that those provisions were
changed prior to the enactment of the Resolution. In fact, the email was sent
just days before the Resolution was considered by the city council. And, based
on the language of the last email sent to Plaintiff’s counsel, 4 the Court may infer
that no further amendments were made to the terms of the settlement
agreement. Despite the terms of the settlement agreement delineated in that last
email between the parties, Plaintiff, nonetheless, attempts to carve himself out
of the agreement by relying on the language of the Resolution, a document that
does not represent the parties’ settlement. Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, the
terms set forth in the email, not the Resolution, constitute the parties’
understanding of the agreement, and hence, the Court is bound to enforce those
terms. See Trian Group, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42931, at *16 (“[w]here a party
to an agreement-in-principle suddenly changes its mind and refuses to execute
the written contract without explanation, the court must enforce the
agreement.”); U.S. v. Lightman, 988 F. Supp. 448, 463 (D.N.J. 1997); Pascarella,
190 N.J. Super. at 125.
Otherwise, it would violate the basic principles of
contract law to permit Plaintiff to rely on technicalities contained in a post-
Other than the wording of the Resolution, Plaintiff did not discuss, or
submit, any other emails between counsel that impacted the terms of the
settlement.
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contractual document to alter the terms of the settlement that he freely
negotiated.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has waived his rights to bring any claims
that relate to the non-renewal of the liquor license, he is contractually barred
from bringing those claims asserted in this action. 5
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants are dismissed.
Dated: March 27, 2018
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Hon. Freda L. Wolfson
United States District Judge
Defendants also ask this Court to abstain from hearing this matter under
the Younger doctrine, however, as dismissal is appropriate on other bases, the
Court declines to consider this argument. See Udoh v. Moreira, No. 14-2929,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14654, at *6 n.1 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2018). But, in any event,
without delving into the legal arguments, for a number of reasons, I do not find
Younger abstention applicable. The most important of which is the fact that
Plaintiff would not have an adequate opportunity to raise his federal
constitutional claims in the state administrative proceedings in the Division of
Alcoholic Beverage Control. Plaintiff avers in this case that he has been
personally harmed by the alleged wrongful conduct of Defendants, and as a
consequence, he is seeking money damages. While Plaintiff may be able to raise
those constitutional issues as defenses in his administrative proceedings, those
proceedings are not a proper forum to raise Plaintiff’s constitutional claims,
particularly since Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff is entitled to a de
novo judicial review of the Division’s decision. See Middlesex Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (Younger abstention not
available where there is no “adequate opportunity [in the state proceedings] to
raise the constitutional claims.”); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian
Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986)(finding that state administrative proceedings
that do not provide an opportunity for the resolution of the claimant's
constitutional contention, are adequate for Younger abstention if the state's
judicial review of the administrative proceeding provides opportunity for de novo
hearing of the constitutional claim).
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