PUE v. CHARTER INC. et al
Filing
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OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Brian R. Martinotti on 2/23/2018. (mmh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
BARRY PUE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 17-5094-BRM-DEA
v.
CHARTER INC. BKA INTERNATIONAL
HOUSEKEEPING and AMAZON,
OPINION
Defendants.
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court is Defendants IH Services, Inc. (“IH Services”) and Amazon.com, Inc.’s
(“Amazon,” collectively “Defendants”) 1 Motion Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Barry Pue’s (“Pue”)
Complaint or in the alternative for a More Definite Statement. (ECF No. 5.) Pue opposes the
Motion. (ECF No. 6.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), the Court did not hear
oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
For the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the
Complaint as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Phillips v.
Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Further, the Court also considers any
“document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
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Pue improperly pled IH Services, Inc. as “Charter Inc. BKA International Housekeeping” and
Amazon.com, Inc. as “Amazon.” The Court will refer to the parties by their proper names.
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Despite reading Pue’s Complaint liberally, the Court finds it to be vague and ambiguous.
Pue alleges he was employed by Defendants in “housekeeping” from July 16, 2015, to December
28, 2016. (Compl. (ECF No. 1, Ex. A) ¶ 1.) He alleges he was “overwork [sic], harass [sic], and
fired for no reason.” (Id.) He complained to Defendants, but “nothing was done.” (Id.) He contends
while working for Defendants he suffered physical harm that resulted in pain in his hands and feet,
as well as breathing problems. (Id. ¶ 3.) He makes no further allegations nor does he provide any
other facts in the Complaint.
Pue filed his Complaint on March 22, 2017, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Mercer
Vicinage. (See ECF No. 1, Ex. A.) On July 12, 2017, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal. (Not.
of Removal (ECF No. 1).) On August 2, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the
alternative for a More Definite Statement. (ECF No. 5.) Pue opposes the Motion (ECF No. 6) and
filed a sur-reply on September 1, 2017 (ECF No. 9).
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
district court is “required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff].” Phillips, 515 F.3d at
228. “[A] complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations.”
Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the plaintiff’s “obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 286 (1986)). A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the complaint
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are true, those “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for misconduct alleged.” Id. This “plausibility standard” requires the complaint allege “more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it “is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Detailed factual allegations” are not
required, but “more than an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation” must be pled; it
must include “factual enhancements” and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the
elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, Courts are required to liberally construe pleadings drafted
by pro se parties. See Tucker v. Hewlett Packard, Inc., No. 14-4699, 2015 WL 6560645, at *2
(D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Such pleadings are
“held to less strict standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. Nevertheless, pro se
litigants must still allege facts, which if taken as true, will suggest the required elements of any
claim that is asserted. Id. (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.
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2013)). “To do so, [a plaintiff] must plead enough facts, accepted as true, to plausibly suggest
entitlement to relief.” Gibney v. Fitzgibbon, 547 F. App’x 111, 113 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Bistrian
v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012)). Liberal construction also does not require the Court to
credit a pro se plaintiff’s “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch.
Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). That is, “[e]ven a pro se complaint may be dismissed for
failure to state a claim if the allegations set forth by the plaintiff cannot be construed as supplying
facts to support a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Id. (citing Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d
371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981)).
III.
DECISION
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint raises two arguments for dismissal. First,
Defendants argue Pue’s claims regarding physical injury suffered at his place of employment are
improperly before this Court because they are preempted by New Jersey Workers’ Compensation
law. (ECF No. 5-1 at 3.) Second, Defendants allege Pue’s remaining clams are conclusory and
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Id. at 4-5.)
A. Pue’s Claims Based on Physical Injury Suffered at his Place of Employment
Defendants move to dismiss any claims that relate to Pue’s alleged physical injuries that
occurred during employment. (Id. at 3.) Pue does not address Defendants’ argument. Instead, he
provides additional factual allegations of alleged harassment he suffered at work that were not
articulated in his Complaint. (ECF No. 6.) He argues he suffered “harassment” when he “put
[himself] on the line to tell [IH Services] one of their workers was bullying other workers into
doing their work.” (Id. at 1.)
In New Jersey, the Division of Workers’ Compensation is granted “exclusive original
jurisdiction of all claims for workers’ compensation benefits,” N.J.S.A. 34:15-19, and is “the
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proper forum in which an injured employee should initially pursue any remedies that may be
available to him or her.” Davis v. OneBeacon Ins. Grp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 329, 340 (D.N.J. 2010).
After the employee litigates before the Division he can pursue judicial relief in the courts. Id.; see
Flick v. PMA Ins. Co., 928 A.2d 54, 59 (2007) (“The doctrine of exhaustion is sensibly designed
to allow administrative bodies to perform their statutory functions in an orderly manner without
preliminary interference from the courts.” (citation omitted)).
“The Act’s exclusivity can be overcome if the case satisfies the statutory exception for an
intentional wrong.” Van Dunk v. Reckson Assocs. Realty Corp., 45 A.3d 965, 971 (2012). If an
employee can demonstrate an “intentional wrong” by its employer, an employee can bring a claim
directly against the employer, rather than rely on the remedies and compensation provided by the
Workers’ Compensation Act. Millison v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505, 509-10
(N.J. 1985). An employer can invoke the “intentional wrong” exception by demonstrating either:
(1) “a cause of action based upon subjective intent to cause injury”; or (2) “a cause of action based
upon intentional conduct with a substantial certainty that injury would occur.” N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.
v. Joseph Oat Corp., 670 A.2d 1071, 1073 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 665 A.2d
1108 (N.J. 1995). These two categories of conduct are not separate standards; rather, “subjective
intent and substantial certainty of harm are expressive of the same standard, i.e. deliberate intent
to harm.” Id. at 1074.
Pue’s Complaint states the harm that occurred as a result of Defendants’ conduct was hand
and foot pain and breathing problems. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 3, Ex. A.) His hand injuries allegedly occurred
from lifting, cutting, and pulling things at work. (Id.) His foot pain originated from pulling
equipment and walking over twenty miles. (Id.) Lastly, his breathing issues occurred from
exposure to dust and chemicals. (Id.) These allegations represent physical injuries, which must
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first be presented to the Division of Workers’ Compensation, because Pue has failed to plead any
facts, even when construed in his favor, alleging Defendants deliberately tried to harm him.
Namely, Pue fails to satisfy either of the two exceptions available to establish an intentional wrong
under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Moreover, Pue fails to plead whether or not he sought
leave at the administrative level prior to filing this suit. He also fails to relate any of these alleged
physical injuries to a proper cause of action that can be pursued in this Court. Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pue’s claims for physical injury suffered at work is GRANTED.
B. Pue’s Claims Fail to State a Claim
Defendants argue to the extent any other claims remain in the Complaint, they should also
be dismissed for failure to state a claim, because Pue “has failed to state any claim whatsoever
under any employment law” and “makes conclusory statements related to his termination.” (ECF
No. 5-1 at 4.) Defendants further contend“[h]e fails to make a single factual allegation that would
connect with his weakly implied claim of wrongful termination.” (Id.) Pue argues he suffered
harassment at work when he “put [himself] on the line to tell [IH Services] one of their workers
was bullying other workers into doing their work.” (ECF No. 6 at 1.) He further describes the
harassment as being told he would be fired if he did not come to work on his days off, being called
“all kinds of names” at work, having to go on light duty from being overworked, and that IH
Services “would bring people from other places to get [him] fired or make [him] quit.” (Id. at 12.)
Pue’s Complaint provides no factual allegations that can sustain a claim. He has failed to
plead any facts which run afoul of any employment law, demonstrate why he was allegedly
wrongfully terminated, or how or why he was harassed. “Even a pro se complaint may be
dismissed for failure to state a claim if the allegations set forth by the plaintiff cannot be construed
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as supplying facts to support a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Morse, 132 F.3d at 906 (citing
Milhouse, 652 F.2d at 373). While Pue’s opposition and sur-reply provide the Court with additional
facts and allegations, those facts are not articulated in the Complaint, and the Court cannot rely on
them. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is GRANTED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is
GRANTED. Defendants’ request for alternative relief is DENIED as MOOT. This dismissal is
without prejudice, and Pue may file an Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of his receipt
of the Order accompanying this Opinion. If Pue timely files an Amended Complaint, Defendants
shall file an Answer, or otherwise respond to the Amended Complaint, within the period prescribed
by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15. An appropriate Order follows.
Date: February 23, 2018
/s/ Brian R. Martinotti___________
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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