WASHINGTON v. ELLIS et al

Filing 245

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 7/25/2023. (kht)

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Not for Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
RANDY WASHINGTON,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 17-7243 (PGS)(TJB)
:
v.
:
:
CHARLES ELLIS, et al.,
:
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________ :
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Randy Washington (“Plaintiff”), is a state prisoner currently
incarcerated at New Jersey State Prison (“NJSP”) in Trenton, New Jersey. He is
proceeding with a civil rights amended complaint against the following Defendants
Warden Charles Ellis (“Ellis”), Sergeant Timothy Friel (“Friel”), John Doe Mercer
County Correctional Center (“MCCC”) employees, John Doe Mercer County
Sheriff’s Officers, Mercer County Jail medical staff, Deputy Warden Oliver
(“Oliver”), Sergeant Tamaine Grier (“Grier”) (hereinafter “Defendants”). (ECF No.
38.) Presently pending before this Court is Defendants’ revised motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 221), Plaintiff’s response (ECF No. 241), and Defendants’ reply

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(ECF No. 242). For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment is
granted.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint. (ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff is currently housed at NJSP, but the events alleged took place at Mercer
County Courthouse and Mercer County Correctional Center. (See id.) Plaintiff
alleged violation of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights for alleged
excessive use of force, cruel and unusual punishment, deliberate indifference- denial
of medical care. (See id.) On May 3, 2018, the Court screened Plaintiff’s initial
complaint for dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (ECF No. 11.) Upon
screening, the Court proceeded Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force and
Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference denial of medical care claims. (Id.)
On December 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 38.)
Plaintiff’s claims arise out of an incident that occurred on June 29, 2017, in the
Mercer County Courthouse. (ECF No. 38.) On June 29, 2017, Plaintiff hit Jessica
Lyons, the deputy public defender for Mercer County who was representing him.
(ECF No. 241-2, Pl. Stat. Of. Mat. Facts (“PSOMF”) ¶ 1.) Defendants’ and
Plaintiff’s version of events that took place next differ.
Plaintiff submits that after striking his attorney, he did not advance towards
her. (ECF No. 38 at 6.) Rather, he waited to be handcuffed and allowed the officers
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to restrain and handcuff him without resistance. (PSOMF ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges that
approximately five seconds later, Officers “acted vindictively in their takedown by
‘slam[ing] [him] on the ground to inflict pain on [him] for hitting [his] public
defender’ even though he was under their control.” (Id. ¶ 3, quoting ECF No. 38 at
6.) He alleges as officers took Plaintiff to the floor, one of the sheriff’s officers came
down on Plaintiff’s hand, causing the bones in his hand to break. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff
was taken out of the courtroom in handcuffs and in the hallway leading to the holding
cell, the officers threw him “against a wall and one of the sheriffs kept trying to
tighten the handcuffs” and “twisting the cuffs around his broken hand.” (Id. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff submits that once he was in the holding cell, he notified the corrections
officers of his injuries and rather than provide medical care, officers took Plaintiff
to MCCC. (Id. ¶ 8.)
Defendants argue that “Plaintiff did not ‘wait for the sheriff to come handcuff’
him, as Mercer County Sheriff’s Officer Michael Restuccia leapt forward and
engaged Plaintiff one (1) second after he punched his Public Defender.” (ECF No.
221-1, Def. Stat. of Mat. Facts (“DSOMF”) ¶ 2.) Defendants submit that per video
that has been produced in this matter, Plaintiff punched Ms. Lyons in the face at
3:48:06 p.m. (Id. ¶ 4.) Officer Restuccia physically engaged Plaintiff one (1) second
after. (Id.) Mercer County Officer Joel Adams engaged with Plaintiff one (1) second
after Officer Restuccia. (Id.) Five (5) seconds after the punch, Plaintiff is taken to
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the floor by both officers. (Id.) Defendants submit that per the video, Plaintiff can
be seen led out of the courtroom and held in a hallway, where Sheriff’s Officers
placed Plaintiff against the wall without force. (Id. ¶ 9.) At not time do officers
appear to twist or tighten Plaintiff’s handcuffs. (Id.) Defendants argue that per the
video, once in the holding cell, Plaintiff did not “show” or display his hand as he
claims. (Id.)
Regarding Plaintiff’s medical care, Plaintiff alleges upon arriving back at the
Mercer County Correctional Center (“MCCC”), Plaintiff asked to go to the hospital
and was told to wait for Sergeant Friel. (ECF No. 38 at 7.) When Sergeant Friel
arrived, Plaintiff told Sergeant Friel that he needed to go to the hospital for his
injured hand. (Id.) Sergeant Friel took Plaintiff to the nurse but told Plaintiff that
they did “not send inmates to the hospital anymore, we can give you ice.” (Id.)
Plaintiff submits that his injured hand “looked like two hands put together with a
baseball on it.” (PSOMF ¶ 10.) Plaintiff was offered ice, but when tried to tell
Sergeant Friel that ice would not help because his hand was broken, Sergeant Friel
told Plaintiff that he was refusing medical care and took Plaintiff back to his cell.
(ECF No. 38 at 7.)
Plaintiff asked Sergeant Grier to take him to the hospital, but she said that
Sergeant Friel had said Plaintiff refused medical care. (PSOMF ¶ 12.) Plaintiff
clarified that he only refused the ice and wanted treatment for his broken hand. (Id.)
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Sergeant Grier took Plaintiff back to the nurse for ice. (Id.) Plaintiff did not receive
any pain medication for his hand. (Id.)
Medical records from June 29, 2017, indicate that Plaintiff was brought to the
nurse and Nurse Margarita Sheynberg noted that Plaintiff showed no signs of acute
distress, his right hand was swollen, and he refused ice and pain medications.
(DSOMF ¶ 25.) The medical note also indicates that a medical doctor call was placed
for the next day and an x-ray was ordered. (Id.) The following day, June 30, 2017,
Dr. Jennifer Petrillo of MCCC’s Medical Department ordered an x-ray for Plaintiff.
(Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff alleges Warden Charles Ellis and Deputy Warden Phyllis Oliver
examined Plaintiff’s hand and instructed him to take x-rays to determine if the hand
was broken. (PSOMF ¶ 13.)
On July 4, 2017, Patient Care Associates (“PCA”) came to MCCC and
performed Plaintiff’s x-ray. (DSOMF ¶¶ 29-30.) The radiology report concluded that
Plaintiff suffered an “acute right 4th metacarpal diaphyseal fracture” of his right
hand. (Id. ¶ 30.) The following day, on June 5, 2017, Dr. James Neal of MCCC’s
Medical Department acknowledged the radiology report and completed an “off site
authorized medical services request” for Skylands Orthopedics (“Skylands”),
requesting evaluation and treatment. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s initial appointment with Skylands was scheduled for Tuesday, July
25, 2017, but did not take place until the following day, Wednesday, July 26, 2017.
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(Id. ¶ 32.) Surgery was scheduled and performed on Plaintiff’s hand on August 2,
2017. (Id.)
On January 18, 2023, Defendants filed a motion in limine to introduce into
evidence the redacted surveillance video footage of the courtroom and hallways
surrounding the courtroom at and around the time of the June 29, 2017 incident.
(ECF No. 209.) On February 8, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 212.) On February 21, 2023, the Court held a teleconference on
Defendants’ motion in limine. On February 23, 2023, the Court granted Defendants’
motion in limine in part and ordered Defendants to submit a newly redacted
surveillance video and a revised motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 218.) On
March 8, 2023, Defendants submitted a revised motion for summary judgment
arguing that the record lacks sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find
in favor of Plaintiff on his excessive force and deliberate indifference claims. (ECF
No. 221.) Plaintiff filed a reply on June 2, 2023. (ECF No. 241.) The Court held oral
argument on June 5, 2023.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law” and a dispute about a material fact is genuine
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“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude the Court from
granting a motion for summary judgment. See id.
A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the
basis for its motion and must demonstrate that there is an absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “A party
asserting that a fact [is not] genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . .
citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents
. . ., affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(A). After the moving party adequately supports its motion, the burden shifts
to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or
by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324 (internal quotation marks omitted). To withstand a properly supported motion
for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and
affirmative evidence that contradict the moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at
250. “[I]f the non-movant’s evidence is merely ‘colorable’ or is ‘not significantly
probative,’ the court may grant summary judgment.” Messa v. Omaha Prop. & Cas.
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Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249-50)). “If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,”
however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.
“In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make
credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the
nonmoving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor.” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). The Court’s role in deciding a motion for
summary judgment is simply “to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Ultimately, there is “no genuine issue as to any
material fact” if a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s excessive force and deliberate indifference to
medical care claims should be dismissed.
1. Excessive Force
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s excessive force claim should be dismissed
because surveillance video of the take down of Plaintiff in the Mercer County
courtroom and his subsequent escort out of the courtroom clearly contradicts
Plaintiff’s version of events. (ECF No. 221-3 at 3-10.)
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When an inmate alleges that a prison official used excessive and unjustified
force, the Eighth Amendment controls. Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir.
2000) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). The subjective inquiry is
“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,
or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7
(1992); see also Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 328 (3d Cir. 2009). The objective
inquiry is whether the inmate’s injury was more than de minimis. Id. at 9–10.
The relevant factors the court must consider are:
(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the
relationship between the need and the amount of force that
was used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; (4) the extent
of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the
basis of the facts known to them; and (5) any efforts made
to temper the severity of a forceful response.
Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d at 328.
Generally, summary judgment is inappropriate on an excessive force claim
when parties offer conflicting testimony regarding the material events surrounding
the alleged force. Suarez v. City of Bayonne, 566 F. App’x, 181 (3d Cir. 2014). The
United States Supreme Court has reasoned that the existence of a videotape
recording, however, presents an “added wrinkle” to the general standard requiring
the court to construe facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). “Where there is a video recording of the relevant
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events, the Court views the facts as depicted in the recording, rather than in the nonmovant’s favor whenever the recording ‘blatantly contradict[s]’ the non-movant’s
version such that ‘no reasonable jury could believe it.’” Knight v. Walton, 660 F.
App’x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at
380–81). The decision only applies if the video blatantly contradicts a plaintiff’s
version of events. See El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 333 (3d Cir. 2020);
Patterson v. City of Wildwood, 354 F. App’x 695, 697-98 (3d Cir. 2009). If a review
of the videotape “refutes an inmate’s claims that excessive force was used against
him, and the video evidence does not permit an inference that prison officials acted
maliciously and sadistically, summary judgment is entirely appropriate.” Smalls v.
Sassaman, 2019 WL 4194211, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 4, 2019) (citing Tindell v. Beard,
351 Fed. App’x 591 (3d Cir. 2009)).
Defendants rely on Scott and argue the surveillance video of Plaintiff’s take
down and his subsequent escort out of the courtroom clearly contradicts Plaintiff’s
version of events. In his amended complaint and deposition, Plaintiff claims that
after he punched his attorney, he “waited for the sheriff to come handcuff [him],”
and that it was “about five seconds before the sheriffs tackle [] [him].” (ECF No. 38
at 6; ECF No. 212-5, Pl. Deposition (“Pl. Depo.”) at 16:14-22.) Plaintiff also alleged
in his amended complaint and testified at his deposition that sheriff’s officers “tackle
[him] on the table” and he “was under control when [they] had [him] on the table,”
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that he was “leaned [] over the table” with this “hands down . . . like holding the
table . . . [and he] was bent over the table frontwards.” (ECF No. 38 at 6; Pl. Depo.
at 17:3-4, 18:2-19.) Plaintiff testified at his deposition that the first officer who had
him under control did not intend to take Plaintiff to the floor, but another officer told
him to “take him down.” (Pl. Depo at 20:18-24.) Plaintiff testified that one of the
officers broke his hand when Plaintiff was slammed to the floor and the officer came
down on his hand. (Id. at 31:3-11.) Plaintiff also testified that the officer’s actions
were intentional, and they tried to “aggressively slam [him] down to inflict pain
because of what [he] did.” (Id. at 33:7-11.)
Plaintiff claims that after being taken out of the courtroom, he was “throw[n]
[] up against the wall and one of the sheriffs kept trying to tighten the handcuffs on
my hand.” (ECF No. 38 at 6.) During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he was
thrown against the wall after being brought out of the courtroom. (Pl. Depo. at 33:69.) Plaintiff described the place where this event occurred as “once you get out there
[out of the courtroom] you make the first right in the little other hallway, the hallway
by the cell door, the bullpens.” (Id. at 33:11-13.) Once in that “other hallway,”
Plaintiff claims that the sheriff’s officers “slammed [him] up against the wall,” not
headfirst, “more chest and chin” first. (Id. at 35:7-11.)
Defendants argue that the video contradicts Plaintiff’s version of events.
Plaintiff did not “wait for the sheriff to come handcuff” him, as Mercer County
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Sheriff’s Officer Michael Restuccia leapt forward and engaged Plaintiff one (1)
second after he punched his attorney. (ECF No. 221-4, Ex. A, Final Redacted Video
Surveillance (“Video”) at 55:37-55:38.) The video shows that Sheriff’s Officer
Restuccia did not “tackle [Plaintiff] [] on the table,” nor did the sheriff’s officers
ever have Plaintiff “under control when they had [him] [] on the table,” or have him
“bent over the table forwards.” The video shows, Plaintiff punch his attorney in the
face at 3:48:06 p.m. (Id. at 55:37.) Officer Restuccia physically engaged Mr.
Washington one (1) second after. (Id. at 55:38.) Mercer County Sheriff’s Officer
Joel Adams engaged with Plaintiff one second (1) after Officer Restuccia. (Id. at
55:39.) At no time is Plaintiff bent over the table and under control. Plaintiff was
taken to the floor five (5) second after the punch by both officers. (Id. at 55:42.)
The video of the hallway outside of the courtroom also contradicts Plaintiff’s
version of events. Plaintiff can be seen being led out of the courtroom and held in
the hallway. (Id. at 1:02:52-1:05:33.) The video shows officers place Plaintiff against
the wall and hold him there. (Id. at 1:03:22-1:05:33.) It does not show Plaintiff being
“slammed” against the wall. You cannot clearly see Plaintiff’s hands or handcuffs.
While the video does not appear to show officers twisting or tightening Plaintiff’s
handcuffs, it does not clearly show that they did not. (Id.)
Plaintiff argues that Scott is inapposite and inapplicable to the instant case.
Plaintiff relies upon Rossi v. City of Trenton, Civ. No. 18-12708, 2023 WL 1361390,
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at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2023), where the court addressed the applicability of Scott and
found that it did not apply where the video was “in low-quality resolution,” and it
was “unclear as to Plaintiff's allegations that officers punched him in the face while
he was laying on the floor.” Id. Plaintiff argues that the video quality is poor and
there is no audio. Plaintiff argues that the video in fact depicts various officers
jumping in to take Plaintiff down and these same officers are on top of Plaintiff for
several minutes. (ECF No. 241, citing Video at 55:35-1:02:52.) Plaintiff argues that
the video:
shows that Plaintiff was indeed briefly hunched over the
desk before being taken down by the officers. Def’s Ex. B,
Final Redacted Courthouse Video, 59:17-59:18. The video
also confirms Plaintiffs’ testimony that his hands were
behind his back as a sign of surrender because he knew
that there could be consequences for his actions. Def’s Ex.
B, Final Redacted Courthouse Video, 59:38-59:41.
However, after Plaintiff surrenders, the officers performed
a takedown as though there was an ongoing threat to their
or others’ safety, which the video shows was not the case.
Id.
(ECF No. 241 at 16.)
The Court notes that Plaintiff cites to improper video timestamps. However,
the video does not show Plaintiff “briefly hunch over the desk”, nor does it show
Plaintiff’s hands were behind his back. (Video at 55:33-55:42.)
Even viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the video evidence shows
that two officers took Plaintiff to the ground within five seconds of the unprovoked
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punching of his attorney, once on the ground he was restrained there until he could
be taken from the courtroom, and once taken from the courtroom there is no clear
evidence of excessive force. There is no evidence in the record that show that within
the five second take down an officer sadistically and maliciously came down on
Plaintiff’s hand to break it. While it is not totally clear if an officer’s knee landed
Plaintiff’s hand at any point or if an officer tightens Plaintiff’s handcuffs in the
hallway, it does not appear as though the video evidence would permit a reasonable
jury to conclude that Defendants utilized excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
Additionally, considering the relevant factors the court must consider in
determining whether force was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,
there was an immediate need for the application of force, as Plaintiff had just
punched his attorney; the need for force was based on Plaintiff’s unprovoked
punching of his attorney and the video shows the forced used was two officers
immediately taking Plaintiff to the ground and holding him there until he could be
escorted from the courtroom; and the officers reasonably perceived Plaintiff has a
threat in that moment. Giles, 571 F.3d at 328. Considering the facts and evidence in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants’ use of force was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776-77 (3d
Cir.2004) (noting that summary judgment for a defendant proper on an excessive
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force claim where use of force objectively reasonable under circumstances).
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to this issue.
2. Deliberate Indifference
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference to his medical needs
claim is negated by the medical records. (ECF No. 221-3 at 10-20.)
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the states from inflicting “cruel and unusual
punishment” on those convicted of crimes. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344–
46 (1981). This proscription against cruel and unusual punishment requires prison
officials to provide inmates with adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 103-04 (1976). In order to set forth a cognizable claim for a violation of his right
to adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious medical need; and (2)
behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to that
need. Id. at 106.
To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle inquiry, the inmate must demonstrate
his medical needs are serious. Serious medical needs include those that have been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or are so obvious a lay person would
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention, and those conditions which, if
untreated, would result in lifelong handicap or permanent loss. Monmouth Cty. Corr.
Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

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The second element of the Estelle test requires an inmate to show prison
officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. “Deliberate
indifference” is more than mere malpractice or negligence; it is a state of mind
equivalent to reckless disregard of a known risk of harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994). A plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference “where the
prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally
refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical
reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical
treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Furthermore, a prisoner’s subjective dissatisfaction with his medical care does
not in itself indicate deliberate indifference. Andrews v. Camden Cty., 95 F. Supp.
2d 217, 228 (D.N.J. 2000). Similarly, “mere disagreements over medical judgment
do not state Eighth Amendment claims.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d
Cir. 1990). “Courts will disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or
adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . [which] remains a question of sound
professional judgment. Implicit in this deference to prison medical authorities is the
assumption that such informed judgment has, in fact, been made.” Inmates of
Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). Even if a doctor’s judgment concerning the proper course of
a prisoner’s treatment ultimately is shown to be mistaken, at most what would be
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proved is medical malpractice and not an Eighth Amendment violation. Estelle, 429
U.S. at 105–06; White, 897 F.2d at 110.
Defendants Sergeant Friel and Sergeant Grier

Defendants Sergeant Friel and Sergeant Grier move for summary judgment
on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against them, arguing Plaintiff was being
treated by medical professionals and Defendants Friel and Grier did not control the
medical decisions made for Plaintiff.
Plaintiff testified that, upon the arrival of MCCC officers at his holding cell,
he asked Sergeant Palmer for medical treatment and showed Sergeant Palmer his
hand. (Pl. Depo. 35:21-24.) At no time in the video does Plaintiff “show” any officer
his hand. (Video at 1:51:27-1:55:40.) However, there is no audio on the video
recording, so it is unclear if Plaintiff told any of the officers about an injury to his
hand. Defendants argue that the video evidence post-punch does not support
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his pain level as it shows “Plaintiff utilizing his right
hand while unbuttoning his sleeve and shirt; pulling an item out of his pants pocket;
pulling off his dress socks; folding his dress pants; removing his undershirt;
adjusting his clothes; pulling his orange jumpsuit quickly over his shoulder;
adjusting his skullcap; zipping up his jumpsuit; pulling up his socks and tucking his
pantlegs into same; putting on his shoes, etc.” (ECF No. 221-3, citing Video 1:52:201:55:13.)
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Defendants note that Sergeant Palmer and three corrections officers who were
involved in Plaintiff’s transport from the courthouse back to his correctional facility
after the incident all completed incident reports and that none of the incident reports
indicate that Plaintiff suffered an injury. (See ECF No. 221-1 at ¶ 15-19, citing ECF
212-6 at 2-6.)
Plaintiff testified that after his return to MCCC, his injury to his right hand
was so severe that he “almost passed out from the pain.” (Pl. Depo. at 39:9-10.) He
stated that his right hand “looked like two hands put together with a baseball on it
and [that] you could actually see the bone right there, like, it’s pushed in.” (Id. at
39:21-23.) He described the hand as “[m]ore than swollen. You see the bones going
and the whole hand just it looked like before a boxer put the boxing gloves on.” (Id.
at 40:4-6.) However, after saying it was “swollen,” Plaintiff stated that “[i]t wasn’t
swollen. I know what swollen looks like, but it was, it was more of a - - I do know
the hand, like, if you broke a bone, you would see your bone out of place.” (Id. at
40:8-15.)
Plaintiff testified that as soon as he was back in his cell, he requested
Defendant Friel take him for medical treatment but Defendant Friel “didn’t want to
hear nothing.” (Id. at 37:7-12.) Plaintiff testified Defendant Friel did not take him to
medical until sometime later. (Id. at 38:17-21.) However, according to Defendant
Friel’s June 29, 2017 incident report, Plaintiff complained of injury at 6:00 p.m. and
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was taken by him to the medical department 6:15 p.m. (ECF No. 212-6 at 19.)
Defendant Friel indicated that Plaintiff was seen by medical staff and refused all
treatment offered. (Id.)
Plaintiff was seen by Nurse “Rita” [Margarita Sheynberg]. (Pl. Depo. at 38:24
to 39:1.) Plaintiff alleges that he told Nurse Rita that he needed to go to the hospital,
and she was “about to say[] something and then Friel, you know, he did his little
thing, cut her off, told her to shut up.” (Id. at 39:8-14.) Plaintiff testified that
Defendant Friel said “we don’t do that no more, we don’t take to the hospital.” (Id.
at 40:18-23.) Plaintiff testified that he was told they could give him ice, but he
refused because did not need ice, he needed to go to the hospital. (Id. at 41:2-11.)
Defendant Friel answered Plaintiff’s deposition questions, and certified that:
[Plaintiff] was secured in his cell and then taken to the
medical department . . . I do not recall exactly when I saw
his hand . . . I do not recall what my thoughts about his
hand were while we were in the medical department.
Additionally, I am not a medical expert and cannot
evaluate or diagnose such an injury [broken hand]. I recall
the nurse evaluating [Plaintiff’s] hand, offering him ice,
and stating that she was ordering an x-ray be conducted at
the facility. . . Also, I did not give him ice. The medical
staff offered him ice after examining and evaluating him
on the medical unit.
(ECF No. 212-6 at 8-9.) Defendant Friel indicated that he did not know why
Plaintiff was not sent to the hospital, that it was a “medical decision made by
medical staff after examination and evaluation.” (Id. at 9.)
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Nurse Sheynberg’s medical chart note indicates that Plaintiff was in no acute
distress when he was seen, and he refused ice and pain medication. (Id. at 21.) Nurse
Sheynberg noted that she placed a doctor’s call for the following day and ordered
an x-ray. (Id.)
Defendants note that MCCC’s Policy E-08: Emergency Services, provides
that medical staff make the determinations of whether an inmate needs off-site
medical services based on the clinical assessment, and the priority level of medical
services, i.e., immediate transport (Stat Run), one (1) hour transport (Emergency),
one (1) to three (3) hours (Urgent), or today (by the end of tour). (ECF No. 221-1 ¶
23, citing 212-6 at 11-17.)
With regard to Defendant Grier, Plaintiff alleges:
when she came on I asked Sgt. Grier I need to go to the
hospital. And she said Sgt. Friel said you refuse. I told her
I refuse ice my hand is broken. What is ice gonna do. I
showed her she came back and said go get some ice to stop
the swelling. When I got there the ice was up there ready.
I asked the nurse look at my hand it’s broken. Sgt. Grier
just said let’s go. And give me that look it’s out of her
hands. I was not going to the hospital. And no one give me
any pain pills for my hand and finger.
(ECF No. 38 at 8.) Plaintiff admits that when he complained of pain to Defendant
Grier, Defendant Grier returned Plaintiff to the medical department. In her answers
to Plaintiff’s deposition questions, Defendant Grier certified that she “recall[ed]
him saying something about his hand being injured,” that she saw his hand, that she
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had “no medical training or certification to make” an assessment as to whether
Plaintiff’s hand was broken. (ECF No. 212-7 at 7.) When asked by Plaintiff why he
was not sent to the hospital, Defendant Grier explained that “inmates are sent to the
hospital based on the directives of qualified medical personnel.” (Id.) Defendant
Grier indicated that there was nothing she could do for Plaintiff, “any medical
treatment would have been administered by medical staff.” (Id.)
As discussed below Plaintiff did receive medical treatment, and it does not
appear that Defendants Frier and Grier controlled the decisions of the medical staff
treating Plaintiff. Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d. Cir. 2001) (holding that
prison administrators were not “deliberately indifferent” by failing to respond to
complaints of a prisoner being treated by a prison medical doctor); see also Smith v.
O’Boyle, 251 F. App’x 87, 89 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim
against prison officials because “[p]rison officials who are not physicians are entitled
to defer to the medical judgment of staff physicians”). Absent a “belief or actual
knowledge that medical personnel mistreated or failed to treat a prisoner,”
Defendants Frier and Grier, as non-physicians, cannot be charged with the Eighth
Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference. Innis v. Wilson, 334 F.
App’x 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s deliberate
indifference claim against non-medical prison officials). Based on the record, it does

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not appear that Defendants Friel and Grier had actual knowledge that medical
personnel failed to treat Plaintiff.
Additionally, the evidence of record does not show that based on the facts
alleged Defendant Friel and Grier were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical
condition. Plaintiff testified that both Defendants took him to the medical department
after he complained of pain. Although, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Friel told the
nurse that the prison no longer takes inmates to the hospital, the medical records
show that Nurse Sheynberg indicated that Plaintiff was in no acute distress when he
was seen, and she placed a doctor’s call for the following day and ordered an x-ray.
(ECF No. 212-6 at 21.)
The evidence of record does not show that Defendants Grier and Friel refused
Plaintiff medical treatment or delayed Plaintiff’s treatment for non-medical reasons.
Nor, did Defendants prevent Plaintiff from receiving recommended treatment.
Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
346-47 (3d Cir. 1987). Instead, Defendants Friel and Grier took Plaintiff to the
medical department, who then took over and decided the proper course of action for
Plaintiff. The record does not show that Defendants Friel and Grier acted with
deliberate indifference. Therefore, Defendants’ Friel and Grier motion for summary
judgment will be granted.

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Defendants Warden Ellis and Deputy Warden Oliver
Regarding Defendant Deputy Warden Oliver, Plaintiff alleges that the day of
incident, his mother spoke to Defendant Oliver on the phone about Plaintiff’s hand.
(ECF No. 38 at 11.) Regarding Defendant Warden Ellis, Plaintiff alleges Defendant
Ellis and Defendant Oliver discussed Plaintiff’s hand and informed Plaintiff that he
needed to get an x-ray first and see if it was broken. (Id. at 9-11.)
In Defendant Ellis’s answers to Plaintiff’s deposition questions, he indicates
that he has no recollection of seeing Plaintiff’s hand or having conversations with
Plaintiff about his injury. (ECF No. 212-7 at 26.) Defendant Oliver answered that
she was never informed of Plaintiff’s injury and never saw his hand. (Id. at 28.)
It is reasonable for prison administrators, who are aware that a particular
inmate is receiving medical treatment from the prison medical staff, to defer to the
treatment and diagnosis decisions of such staff members even after receiving
complaints from the inmate suggesting that he disagrees with the treatment decisions
or believes them to be inadequate. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 (holding that prison
administrators could not “be considered deliberately indifferent simply because they
failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already
being treated by the prison doctor”). Defendants Oliver and Ellis may have had
general supervisory authority over the medical defendant and other members of the
prison staff, but Plaintiff fails to provide evidence that they were directly involved
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in Plaintiff’s medical treatment, nor does it appear that they participated in making
the diagnosis and treatment decisions or caused the delays that underlie the amended
complaint. Based on the record, there is no evidence that Defendants Ellis and Oliver
had actual knowledge that medical personnel failed to treat Plaintiff. Matthews v.
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 613 F. App’x 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Spruill v.
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)) (“[a]bsent a reason to believe (or actual
knowledge) that prison doctors . . . are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a nonmedical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment
scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.”) Accordingly, Defendants’ Ellis
and Oliver motion for summary judgment is granted and Plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference claims against them are dismissed.
Defendants MCCC Medical Staff
Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that when he returned to MCCC on
June 29, 2017, from the courthouse, MCCC medical staff failed to come see him,
and when he was taken to the medical department, the medical staff did not provide
treatment or transfer him to a hospital. (ECF No. 38 at 9.)
Deliberate indifference requires proof that the official “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Natale v. Camden Cnty.
Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). If there is a dispute over the adequacy of the received
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treatment, courts have consistently been reluctant to second guess the medical
judgment of the attending physician. Little v. Lycoming County, 912 F. Supp. 809,
815 (M.D. Pa.), aff’d, 101 F.3d 691 (3d Cir. 1996).
As explained above, when Plaintiff was brought to the medical unit, Nurse
Shenyberg noted that Plaintiff was not in acute distress, and he refused ice and pain
medication. Nurse Shenyberg placed Plaintiff on the doctor’s call list for the next
day and indicated an x-ray was ordered. (ECF No. 212-6 at 21.) Defendants
summarized the following course of treatment Plaintiff received:
The next day, Friday, June 30, 2017, Dr. Petrillo reviewed
the notes and placed an order for an x-ray to be done.
Defs.’ Exhibit I. The next available x-ray date was
Tuesday, July 4, 2017, and Plaintiff underwent an x-ray.
See Defs.’ Exhibits J, at 2 ¶ 5, and K. On Wednesday, July
5, 2017, after receiving and reviewing the radiologist’s
report, Dr. Neal submitted a referral to Skylands. Defs.’
Exhibit K, L and M.
Senior Medical Records Clerk Karla Ramsey explained
the process as follows:
“When an orthopedic appointment is
required, the MCCC's Health Services
Administration (HSA) at the MCCC will call
Skylands with a referral and seek to make an
appointment. Skylands will then request xrays and all other diagnostic information.
Once that documentation is received by
Skylands, Skylands sets up the appointment
date and time. Unfortunately, everything is a
process. Once Dr. Neal signed the order on
July 5th, a Wednesday. He would put the
order in a basket to be processed by HSA
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staff. Most likely, HSA would have gotten
the order the next day and made a call, which
would have been July 6th, a Thursday. As
explained, Skylands would request all the
medical documentation and the x-rays be sent
to them. MCCC’s HSA would then comply.
This could take a day or so. Skylands would
then receive and review the documentation
and then contact the MCCC to inform them
of the scheduled date and time for the
appointment.”
Defs.’ Exhibit J, at 2-3, ¶ 7-8.
Per
Skylands’
records,
Plaintiff’s
first
evaluation/appointment for July 25, 2017 with Skylands,
was initially scheduled by Skylands on Tuesday, July 11,
2017. Defs.’ Exhibit N, at 1. As per the notation in
Skylands’ appointment detail record, the original
appointment set up by Skylands was pushed back a day by
Skylands. Id. Plaintiff’s surgery was scheduled for, and
performed on Wednesday, August 2, 2017. Defs.’ Exhibits
O and P, at 1-2. MCCC’s documentation, Skylands’
records and Ms. Ramsey’s certification make clear that
once the referral was made to Skylands, and the medical
records and reports were provided to that orthopedic
group, the scheduling of all further orthopedic treatment
was beyond the purview of MCCC’s Medical Department.
See Defs.’ Exhibits J, L, M, and N. Additionally, Plaintiff
was seen by MCCC nurses in the interval between his
initial complaint and his surgery. Defs.’ Exhibit M, at 2.
He voiced no complaints and never asked for medications.
Id.
(ECF No. 221-3 at 15-16.)
The record before the Court demonstrates that Plaintiff received substantial
medical treatment. It appears that the attention Plaintiff received lacks the requisite
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deliberate indifference to support a Section 1983 claim. Plaintiff was seen by prison
medical staff the day of the incident. Nurse Sheynberg put Plaintiff on the doctor
call list for the next day and ordered an x-ray. (ECF No. 212-6 at 34.) The following
day, June 29, 2017, Dr. Petrillo ordered an x-ray. (Id. at 23.) The next available day
for an x-ray was July 4, 2017, and Plaintiff received an x-ray on that day. (Id. at 30.)
On July 5, 2017, after receiving the radiologists, report, Dr. Neal submitted a referral
to Skylands. (Id. at 35.) Six days later, on July 11, 2017, Skylands scheduled Plaintiff
for July 25, 2017 appointment, but Skylands ended up pushing the appointment back
one day, to July 26, 2017. (Id. at 32, 37.) Plaintiff’s surgery was scheduled for and
performed on August 2, 2017. (ECF No. 212-7 at 4-5.) The medical records in
evidence show that during the time period between Plaintiff’s x-ray and surgery,
Plaintiff was seen by MCCC medical staff for medical rounds on July 7, 2017 and
July 21, 2017, and the medical records indicate that Plaintiff “voiced no concerns”
at those visits. (ECF No. 212-6 at 35.)
Plaintiff has failed to show that MCCC medical staff refused him treatment.
Instead, as shown above, it appears Defendants MCCC medical staff promptly
scheduled Plaintiff for the tests necessary. The record also does not support
Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants delayed Plaintiff’s medical treatment. Rather,
the evidence shows Skylands was responsible for scheduling and performing
Plaintiff’s surgery. Additionally, the Plaintiff’s medical notes from the time he was
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waiting for surgery indicate that Plaintiff did not voice any concerns to MCCC
medical staff. Plaintiff did not submit any medical reports to the contrary. Plaintiff
has failed to present evidence to show that Defendants were aware of a serious risk
to Plaintiff and failed to provide the care needed. See Andrews v. Camden Cty., 95
F. Supp. 2d 217, 228 (D.N.J. 2000) (noting that a prisoner’s subjective
dissatisfaction with his medical care does not in itself indicate deliberate
indifference); see also White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990) (“mere
disagreements over medical judgment do not state Eighth Amendment claims.”)
Therefore, Defendants’ MCCC medical staff motion for summary judgment is
granted as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to provide medical care claim.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 221) and will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. An
appropriate order follows.
Dated: July 25, 2024

s/Peter G. Sheridan
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.

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