OSHRI v. PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION et al

Filing 40

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Brian R. Martinotti on 2/1/2019. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_______________________________________
:
:
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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:
PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
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et al.
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Defendants.
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_______________________________________ :

YOEL OSHRI,

Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-11594-BRM-DEA

OPINION

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Yoel Oshri’s (“Oshri”) Motion to Set Aside the “Fraudulent”
Sheriff’s Sale. (ECF No. 23.) Defendants PNC Bank, National Association, Tanisia Richardson, and
Betty Harrison’s (collectively “Defendants”) oppose the Motion. (ECF No. 24.) Having reviewed the
parties’ submissions filed in connection with the Motion and having declined to hold oral argument,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below, and for good cause
shown, Oshri’s Motion is DENIED. 1
I.

BACKGROUND
The facts are set forth at length in the Court’s August 29, 2018 Opinion. (ECF No. 19.) In

the interest of judicial economy, the Court refers the parties to that Opinion for a full recitation of
the factual and procedural background of this dispute. However, the Court notes that since that
Opinion. On October 16, 2018, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, denied
Oshri’s appeal from a series of orders and final judgment in the Foreclosure Action. (ECF No. 29.)

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Oshri also filed two Letter Requests (ECF Nos. 30-31) to Strike Defendants’ Letter informing the
Court of a recent decision by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division (ECF No. 29) as
untimely and for filing a copy of the Appellate Opinion instead of the true and original Opinion. The
Court will in its discretion accept Defendants’ Letter and copy of the Appellate Division Opinion.
See Connolly v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (Am.), Inc., No. 04-5127, 2007 WL 4207836, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov.
21, 2007) (utilizing its discretion in accepting the plaintiff’s untimely filing of its opposition brief).
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The Appellate Division affirmed a series of orders from the Superior Court, specifically, granting
summary judgment to PNC Bank; striking Oshri’s answer and affirmative defenses; entering default
against Oshri; returning the case to the Office of Foreclosure to proceed as an uncontested matter;
dismissing Oshri’s counterclaim and third-party complaint; denial of reconsideration; dismissing
Oshri’s order to show cause; and entering final judgment against Oshri. (Id.)
III.

DECISION
This matter is before the Court via Oshri’s Motion to Set Aside the Fraudulent Sheriff’s

Sale. (ECF No. 23.) Essentially, Oshri contends the Sheriff’s Sale should be set aside because it was
conducted illegally and/or fraudulently. (See id.) Defendants argue Oshri cannot bring this Motion
for several reasons. First, “the Motion is seeking relief that has already been dismissed in this
action,” as the Court dismissed Oshri’s wrongful foreclosure claim in its August 29, 2018 Opinion.
(ECF No. 24 at 2.) Second, the Motion is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Id.) Lastly, the
Motion is barred by res judicata and the entire controversy doctrine. (Id.)
The Court agrees with Defendants. In essence, Oshri’s Motion is yet another attempt at
invalidating the Foreclosure Action and an attempt to regain his home. (See ECF No. 23-1 at 2 (“The
house belongs to the Plaintiff, the Defendants intentionally defrauded the Plaintiff and then failed to
prove the default on the mortgage as they have to.”); ECF No. 23-1 at 3 (“This Case is only about
saving the Plaintiff’s only home he has and wants to keep.”).) As set forth in the Court’s August 29,
2018 Opinion, claims as to the Foreclosure Action are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Pursuant to Rooker-Feldman, federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review
and reverse state court judgments. In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 580 (3rd Cir. 2005). Rooker–
Feldman serves to bar a claim when: (1) the federal claim was actually litigated in state court before
the plaintiff filed the federal action or, (2) “if the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the
state adjudication, meaning that federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state
court was wrong.” Id. The Third Circuit has held a federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with
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an issue adjudicated by a state court when: “(1) the federal court must determine . . . the state court
judgment was erroneously entered in order to grant the requested relief, or (2) the federal court must
take an action that would negate the state court’s judgment.” In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d
Cir. 2009) (quoting Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 330 (3d Cir. 2004)). Significantly,
[f]our requirements must be met for the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine to
apply: (1) the plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of
injury caused by the state court judgment; (3) the state court judgment
was rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff
invites the district court to review and reject the state court judgment.
Gage v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA AS, 521 F. App’x 49, 50–51 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Great Western
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010)). Where, on the
other hand, the federal plaintiff presents “some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal
conclusion that a state court has reached,” the doctrine does not apply. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005), quoted in Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III,
L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547–48 (3d Cir. 2006). In such an instance, jurisdiction is confirmed and the
court should then consider “whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.” Exxon
Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is a narrow doctrine that applies only in limited
circumstances.” Shibles v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 17-2386, 2018 WL 1448670, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar.
23, 2018) (citations omitted); In re Philadelphia Entm’t & Dev. Partners, 879 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir.
2018) (“[F]ederal courts had been applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine too broadly and
consequently it clarified that the doctrine is confined to ‘limited circumstances’ where ‘state-court
losers complain[] of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commend and invit[e] district court review and rejection of those judgments.”) (citation
omitted). The four requirements “must be met for the doctrine to apply.” Gage, 521 F. App’x at 50–
51.
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This court has concluded that all factors of the doctrine are satisfied, as final judgment was
entered in the Foreclosure Action against Oshri on July 19, 2016, prior to the initiation of this action
in federal court. (ECF No. 10-3.) Further, a decision vacating the final judgment in the Foreclosure
Action or granting Oshri the right to the property would require the Court to overrule the Foreclosure
Action’s Judgment. Therefore, Oshri’s Motion is DENIED.
Even if the foreclosure judgment and the Sheriff’s Sale were “two different and separate
issues,” as Oshri contends, this Motion is barred by New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine. The
entire controversy doctrine is “an extremely robust claim preclusion device that requires adversaries
to join all possible claims stemming from an event or series of events in one suit.” Chavez v. Dole
Food Co., 836 F.3d 205, 228 n.130 (3d Cir. 2016). The doctrine
requires a party to bring in one action all affirmative claims that it
might have against another party or be forever barred from bringing a
subsequent action involving the same underlying facts. The central
consideration is whether the claims arise from related facts or the same
transaction or series of transactions.
Opdycke v. Stout, 233 F. App’x 125, 129 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Ricketti v.
Barry, 775 F.3d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 2015). “The purposes of the doctrine are threefold: (1) the need
for complete and final disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to
parties to the action and those with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the
avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay.” Ditrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 1995).
The Third Circuit has ruled that “[a] federal court hearing a federal cause of action is bound by New
Jersey’s Entire Controversy Doctrine, an aspect of the substantive law of New Jersey, by virtue of
the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).” Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369, 400 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Rycoline Prods. v. C & W Unlimited,
109 F.3d 883, 887 (3d Cir. 1997)).
The entire controversy doctrine applies to foreclosure proceedings but encompasses only
“germane” counterclaims. N.J. Ct. R. 4:64–5 (“Only germane counterclaims and cross-claims may
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be pleaded in foreclosure actions without leave of court.”); see also In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215,
228 (3d Cir. 2008). The word “germane” is construed very narrowly in this context. “The use of the
word ‘germane’ in the language of the rule undoubtedly was intended to limit counterclaims in
foreclosure actions to claims arising out of the mortgage transaction which is the subject matter of
the foreclosure action.” Leisure Technology-Northeast v. Klingbeil Holding Co., 349 A.2d 96, 98
(N.J. 1975). “Courts have viewed several types of claims as germane to a New Jersey foreclosure
action, including those challenging the circumstances surrounding origination of the loan,
challenging the validity of the loan itself, and arising out of the mortgage transaction.” Guaba v.
World Sav. Bank, No. 14-2408, 2014 WL 6870995, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2014).
Here, Oshri’s claims are barred by the entire controversy doctrine. The claims Oshri asserted
in its Motion could have been raised in the Foreclosure Action. Oshri claims that numerous things
throughout the Sheriff’s Sale were conducted fraudulently and/or illegally. “[C]laims for . . . fraud,
quiet title, and declaratory relief from [] Sheriff’s Sale[’s] are [] the sort of claims that have been
deemed germane by courts, in that the claims challenge the validity of the mortgage and foreclosure
proceeding.” Guaba, 2014 WL 6870995, at *2. Accordingly, Oshri’s Motion to Set Aside the
Sheriff’s Sale is DENIED.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Oshri’s Motion to Set Aside the Sheriff’s Sale is DENIED

with prejudice.
Date: February 1, 2019

/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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