METROPOLITAN GROUP v. ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 5/29/2018. (mmh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

METROPOLITAN GROUP PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintifj

)
Civil Action No:
17-cv-11865 (PGS)(DEA)

)

V.

)

ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS, INC.,

)

MEMORANDUM
AND
ORDER

)
Defendant

)
)
)

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Electrolux Home Products, Inc.’s Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff Metropolitan Group Property and Casualty Insurance Company’s (hereinafter,
“Metlife”) Complaint pursuant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 2(b)(2) for lack of personal
jurisdiction. (ECF No. 12). For the reasons discussed herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is
granted.
BACKGROUND
Metlife, as subrogee to the rights of Carol Russell, brings this products liability case against
Electrolux Home Products, Inc. (hereinafter, “Electrolux”), a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in North Carolina, based on a fire purportedly caused by a dryer it
manufactured. (Complaint at

¶ 3). Electrolux is a global company that manufactures home

appliances, such as the gas fired clothes dryer at issue in this case. (Id. at

“Miller Affidavit” at

¶ 4; ECF No. 12-1 at 4

¶ 5). Electrolux is registered to do business in New Jersey, as well as 27

other states. (Miller Affidavit at

¶ 7). Of its 56,000 employees, only 8 are located in New Jersey,

none of whom make strategic corporate-level decisions. (Id. at

¶ 5). Moreover, Electrolux does

not have any manufacturing facilities, offices, or warehouses in New Jersey. (Id. at ¶ 6).

On November 14, 2016. a “hostile fire” occurred at Russell’s residence in Nyack, New
York, which resulted in Metlife, as Russell’s insurer, remitting “substantial payment” to her.
(Complaint at

¶

5).

Apparently, Russell owned a gas-fired clothes dryer manufactured by

Electrolux, which purportedly caused the fire. (Id. at

¶

8). According to the Complaint, while the

dryer was in operation, an accumulation of lint caught fire, which caused the dryer to ignite and
burn Russell’s residence. (Id. at ¶11 9. 17). The fire caused significant property damage to Russell’s
residence, in excess of$1 00,000. (Id. at ¶ 17). Thereafter, Russell subrogated her rights to Metlife,
who now brings the present cause of action.
LEGAl. STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). a complaint may be dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction. “If an issue is raised as to whether a court lacks personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that personal jurisdiction exists.”
Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2007). “[C]ourts reviewing a motion to dismiss
a case for lack of in personam jurisdiction must accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as true and
construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Carteret Say. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141,
142 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992).

“The plaintiff must sustain its burden of proof through sworn affidavits

or other competent evidence.” North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Natural Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687,
689 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, “the plaintiff must
establish either that the particular cause of action sued upon arose from the defendant’s activities
within the forum state (‘specific jurisdiction’) or that the defendant has ‘continuous and
systematic’ contacts with the forum state (‘general jurisdiction’).” Provident Nat? Bank v.
CalUornia Fed. Sm’. & Loan Ass ‘ii., 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k), “a federal district court may assert personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident of the state in which the court sits to the extent authorized by the
law of that state.” Marten, 499 F.3d at 296 (quoting Provident Nat? Bank, 819 F.2d at 437).
Pursuant to the New Jersey long-arm rule, N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(c), personal jurisdiction in New Jersey
“extends to the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protection.” Carteret Say. Bank,
FA, 954 F.2d at 145. Therefore, this Court is “constrained, under New Jersey’s long-arm rule, only
by the ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,’ inhering in the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution.” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Those
notions require that a defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state based upon
the defendant’s own purposeful availment “of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
ANAIYSIS

Plaintiff contends that general personal jurisdiction exists based on Electrolux’s
registration to do business in New Jersey and its “systemic and continuous” contacts with the state.
Electrolux responds that registration does riot create general personal jurisdiction.
‘Genera1 jurisdiction is based upon the defendant’s ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts
with the forum and exists even if the plaintiffs cause of action arises from the defendant’s non
forum related activities.” Rernickv. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
“For a corporate defendant, the main bases for general jurisdiction are (1) the place of
incorporation; and (2) the principal place of business.” Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, 182 F.
Supp. 3d 166, 173 (D.N.J. 2016) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014)).
However, Daimler also noted that ‘[aj corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be

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deemed at home in all of them.” Daiinler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20. After Daimler, courts have
recognized that “it is ‘incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction [over a corporationj in a
forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business.” Chavez v. Dole Food
Co.. 836 F.3d 205. 224 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Monkton Ins. Sen’s., Ltd. v. Ruler, 768 F.3d429, 432
(5th Cir. 2014)).
Here, under Daimler, the Court lacks general jurisdiction over Electrolux. Electrolux was
not incorporated in New Jersey, nor is its principal place of business in this state. ‘Aside from
these exemplar bases, general jurisdiction may arise in the ‘exceptional case’ where ‘a
corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place
of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that
State.” Display Works, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 173 (quoting Dai,nler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19). Of
Electrolux’s 56,000 employees, only 8 are located in New Jersey, none of whom make strategic
corporate-level decisions. (Miller Affidavit at

¶

5).

While Plaintiff asserts that Electrolux’s

advertisements and commercials create general jurisdiction, it is well-established that advertising
within a state “does not constitute ‘continuous and substantial’ contacts with the forum state.”
Gehling v. St. George’s Sch. of Medicine, 773 F.2d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 1985). Therefore, because
Electrolux’s contacts with New Jersey are not so substantial or continuous or systematic, it cannot
be found that it is essentially home in this state.
Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that Electrolux consented to general jurisdiction, based on
its registration to do business in New Jersey. In Display Works, the district court noted that New
Jersey’s registration statutes do not expressly state that a corporation’s registration with the state
constitutes consent to personal jurisdiction. 182 F. Supp. 3d at 174-75 (citing N.J.S.A.

§‘

14A:4-

1(1); 4-2(1), (3); 13-3(1); N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(6)). Therefore, the court concluded, “the New Jersey

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statutory scheme does not permit jurisdiction by consent by virtue of registration to do business
here or actually doing business here.” Id. at 175, 178-79; Horowitz, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69191,
at *3537; Boswell, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100708, at *1315; see also Dutch Run-Mays Draft,
LLC v. WolfBlock, LLP, 164 A.3d 435, 438 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2017). As discussed above, to

conclude that a corporation consents to personal jurisdiction based solely on registration would be
inconsistent with Daimler, which reiterated the precedent set forth in Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, LA. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924-25 (2011) that generaljurisdiction over a corporation

is generally limited to its place of incorporation and principal place of business. Daimler, 571 U.S.
at 137. More importantly, the Supreme Court also noted that early twentieth century decisions,
which followed Pennoyer ‘s approach to addressing general jurisdiction over corporations, “should
not attract heavy reliance today.” Id. at 137 n.18. As such, for the reasons discussed above, the
Court finds that Electrolux’s registration to do business in New Jersey does not create general
jurisdiction.
Finally, relying on Chavez, 836 F.3d at 222-24, Plaintiff asks the Court to transfer the case
“to another district court where personal jurisdiction would actually be present.” (Plaintiff’s Brief
in Opp. at 6). In Chavez, the Third Circuit held that the district court erred in refusing to transfer
the case, where the plaintiff identified another venue where jurisdiction exists. Id. at 223-24. Here,
however, Plaintiff has not requested that the Court transfer the matter to any specific district;
instead, it asks the Court to make that decision for it. However, under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1406(a), “[tjhe

district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall
dismiss, or if it be in the interest ofjustice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it
could have been brought.” “[T]he Court has discretion to transfer the case to a district where the
suit could have been brought.” Auto. Rentals, Inc. v. Keith Huber, Inc., No. 09-6186, 2010 U.S.

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Dist. LEXIS 77385, at *4..5 (D.N.J. July 29, 2010) (citing Urrittia v. Harrisburg Cnty. Police
Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 462 (3d Cir. 1995)). The burden of establishing that an action should be
transferred is on the party seeking it. See Roberts Bros., Inc. v. Kurtz Bros., 231 F. Supp. 163, 165
(D.N.J. 1964).

Here, being that Plaintiff has not presented any alternative venues for which

transfer may be appropriate, the Court finds that dismissal is warranted. Plaintiff remains free to
refile its suit in the district of its choice.
ORDER

Having carefully reviewed and taken into consideration the submissions of the parties, as
well as the arguments and exhibits therein presented, and for good cause shown, and for all of the
foregoing reasons,
ITlSonthis

—c3i

dayoflJ.,2018,

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED

1ETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.

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