LEWIS v. JOHNSON et al
Filing
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OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Brian R. Martinotti on 6/18/2018. (km)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TIMOTHY M. LEWIS,
Civil Action No. 17-12797-BRM-LHG
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
JOHN JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants.
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court is the Complaint of Plaintiff Timothy M. Lewis (“Plaintiff”) raising civil
rights claims against his criminal defense attorney and two public defenders. (ECF No. 1.) Also
before the Court is Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1-1.)
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, the accompanying affidavit,
and the certified account statement setting forth Plaintiff’s financial status, the Court finds that
leave to proceed in forma pauperis is warranted in this matter. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1-1) is GRANTED.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen the
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, this Court must dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims if they are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek damages
from a defendant who is immune. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No.
1) is DISMISSED in its entirety.
I.
BACKGROUND 1
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The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1), and are
assumed to be true for the purposes of this Opinion.
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In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts his assigned criminal defense attorney, Michael G. Weiss,
refused to help him prepare his criminal case, refused to file Plaintiff’s pro se supplemental
motions, and subjected Plaintiff to verbal abuse and insults. (ECF No. 1 at 4-6.) Plaintiff also
asserts Weiss failed to meet with him to discuss his criminal case. (Id. at 6.) Because his attorney
refuses to assist him, Plaintiff reached out to the office of Defendant Krakora, the Public Defender
of the State of New Jersey. (Id. at 3-6.) Specifically, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant John Johnson,
one of Krakora’s deputy public defenders, who stated he would investigate the matter and “get
back” to Plaintiff. (Id. at 4.) Johnson thereafter failed to contact Plaintiff regarding his case and
his complaint about his assigned attorney.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat.
1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (the “PLRA”), district courts must review the complaints in
all civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
or seeks damages from a state employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The PLRA directs district courts
to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for
dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff has been granted in forma
pauperis status.
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232
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(3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x 159,
162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
district court is “required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [Plaintiff].” Phillips v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). “[A] complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
However, the Plaintiff’s “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is “not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286.
Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the complaint are true, those “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether the allegations in a complaint are
plausible is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Moreover,
while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in
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their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.
2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
III.
DECISION
Plaintiff seeks to bring claims against his defense attorney and two public defenders arising
out of his attorney’s apparent deficient performance, which he asserts violates his constitutional
right to counsel. “To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a
violation of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States that was committed
by a person acting under the color of state law.” Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000);
see also Woodyard v. Cnty. of Essex, 514 F. App’x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that § 1983
provides “private citizens with a means to redress violations of federal law committed by state
[actors]”). “The first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to ‘identify the exact contours of
the underlying right said to have been violated’ and to determine ‘whether the plaintiff has alleged
a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.’” Nicini, 212 F.3d at 806 (quoting County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998)).
In this matter, Plaintiff appears to be raising claims against his assigned attorney and the
public defenders based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel, including “public
defenders and court-appointed counsel acting within the scope of their professional duties are
absolutely immune from civil liability under § 1983.” Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 F. App’x 75,
78 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 320 (3d Cir. 1982), abrogated on other
grounds by D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1368 n.7 (3d Cir. 1992)).
In other words, defense attorneys who are employed by the government as public defenders enjoy
this immunity because defense counsel “does not act under color of state law when performing a
lawyer’s traditional functions.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981). All of Petitioner’s
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constitutional claims arise out of his allegation that he is receiving constitutionally defective
assistance from his criminal attorney and concern the performance of his criminal attorney.
Because Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the conduct of his assigned attorney, and because his
assigned attorney and the public defenders are immune for actions within the scope of their
professional duties, all the named Defendants are immune. Therefore, Petitioner’s federal claims
fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted and are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is not clear from the complaint whether Plaintiff also intends to raise state law claims,
such as legal malpractice claims, against any of the named Defendants. Even if Plaintiff did wish
to do so, however, the Court declines to extend supplemental jurisdiction over any nascent state
law claim, having dismissed all claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(ECF No. 1-1) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED in its
entirety. An appropriate order will follow.
Dated:
June 18, 2018
/s/ Brian R. Martinotti__________
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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