REARDON et al v. HILLMAN et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Brian R. Martinotti on 4/6/2018. (jjc)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOHN E. REARDON, JOHN J. REARDON,
and JUDITH A. REARDON,
Civil Action No. 18-1296-BRM-DEA
Plaintiffs,
v.
NOEL HILLMAN, JAY SANCHEZ,
DESIREE RAMSEY, and RYAN
MERRIGAN,
OPINION
Defendants.
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court is the Complaint of Plaintiffs John E. Reardon, John J. Reardon, and
Judith A. Reardon (together “Plaintiffs”). (ECF No. 1.) The Court has screened the Complaint
pursuant to the 1994 Standing Order of Chief Judge John F. Gerry (“Standing Order”) because
Plaintiffs name a District Court judge as a Defendant. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’
Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Judge Hillman and WITHOUT
PREJUDICE as to all other Defendants based on defendants’ immunity.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs bring this action against Judge Hillman and Clerk’s Office employees Jay
Sanchez, Desiree Ramsey, and Ryan Merrigan, alleging violations of their First, Fifth, and Seventh
Amendments rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201, and 2202, and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the federal
analogue to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint arise from
two other civil actions they are pursuing in this District, see Reardon v. Segal, et al., No. 15-00244
(D.N.J., filed Jan. 13, 2015) and Reardon v. Officer Mondelli, et. al., No. 15-05520 (D.N.J., filed
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July 9, 2015), both of which were before Judge Noel Hillman. Plaintiffs claim Judge Hillman and
the Clerk’s Office employees “refuse[d] to enter default upon demand” in the two above mentioned
actions. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 13, 16, 18, 19, 23, 27, 28, 35, 48, 50, 51.) Plaintiffs further
argue the merits of their underlying cases. Plaintiffs seek over $100,000,000 in compensatory,
punitive, exemplary damages, loss of income, and emotional and psychological distress. (See id.
(Counts 1 through 9).)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
This matter is before this Court pursuant to the Standing Order because Plaintiffs name a
District Court judge as a Defendant. The Court’s Standing Order requires that in all cases where a
judge of this District is named as a party, the matter shall be assigned to a judge sitting in a different
vicinage of this District than the one in which the named judge sits. See Court’s Order of Jan. 13,
1994. Pursuant to the Standing Order, the Court need not recuse itself if the assigned judge
determines the matter to be patently frivolous or if judicial immunity is plainly applicable, but the
Court must reassign the matter for transfer outside of this District in the event the matter is neither
frivolous nor subject to immunity. Id. Because judicial immunity is applicable to the claims in this
case, the Court need not recuse under the Standing Order.
III.
DECISION
Plaintiffs bring this action against Judge Hillman and the Clerk’s Office employees alleging
they violated their First, Fifth, Seventh Amendments rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343,
2201, and 2202, and Bivens. (See ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiffs claim Judge Hillman and the
Clerk’s Office employees “refuse[d] to enter default upon demand” in Reardon v. Segal and
Reardon v. Officer Mondelli, both of which were before Judge Hillman. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 4, 6, 9,
10, 13, 16, 18, 19, 23, 27, 28, 35, 48, 50, 51.)
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“[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice
that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. 335, 347 (1872). Courts have therefore held that judges are not liable in civil actions, “even
when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously
or corruptly.” Id. at 351. The doctrine of judicial immunity has been determined to be “applicable
in suits under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the legislative record gave
no indication that Congress intended to abolish this long-established principle.” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)). See also
Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court long has
recognized that judges are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising
from their judicial acts.”). Because Bivens is the federal analogue to an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the doctrine of judicial immunity also applies to such causes of action. See Harvey v.
Loftus, 505 F. App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012).
This immunity, however, is not indefinite. Instead, it is “justified and defined by the
functions it protects and serves.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988). Immunity does not
extend to actions not within the judge’s official capacity, nor does it extend to actions taken in the
absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991). To determine whether an
act is “judicial,” the Court looks to whether the act performed by the judge “is a function normally
performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge
in his judicial capacity.” Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768-69 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362). In inquiring
as to whether an act was performed in the absence of all jurisdiction, and therefore not subject to
immunity, the Court must distinguish those acts that were merely performed “in excess of
jurisdiction,” to which the immunity extends. Id. at 769.
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Here, Plaintiffs sue Judge Hillman because he did not enter default judgment in their favor.
This is clearly “a function normally performed by a judge.” Id. at 768–69 (quoting Stump, 435
U.S. at 362); see, e.g., Bey v. Bruey, No. 09-1092, 2009 WL 961411, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2009)
(finding that “entering, refusing to enter, or failing to enter default” is a judicial function entitled
to immunity); Fischer v. United States, No. 02-691, 2003 WL 21262103, *4–*5 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(finding that court clerks were immune from claims that they had obstructed justice and
encouraged organized crime by not entering defaults, by entering motions to dismiss as answers,
by entering prohibited pre-trial motions, or by altering the sequence of events (numbers and entry
dates) while supposedly correctly docketing a case (citation omitted)). Because Plaintiffs allege no
facts suggesting Judge Hillman acted in the complete absence of jurisdiction, Judge Hillman is
immune from suit. 1 Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED in its entirety as to Judge Hillman
WITH PREJUDICE. Dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice as to Judge Hillman is warranted
here as any further amendment would be futile since Judge Hillman is immune from suit. 2
Judicial immunity may also extend to professionals who assist courts in their judicial
function. See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2001). “Court clerks have absolute quasi-
1
Indeed, Plaintiffs’ complaints in Reardon v. Segal, et al., No. 15-00244 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 13, 2015)
and Reardon v. Officer Mondelli, et. al., No. 15-05520 (D.N.J. filed July 9, 2015) are brought
pursuant to federal jurisdiction and admit Judge Hillman had jurisdiction.
2
In determining a motion for leave to amend, courts consider the following factors: (1) undue delay
on the part of the party seeking to amend; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive behind the amendment; (3)
repeated failure to cure deficiencies through multiple prior amendments; (4) undue prejudice on the
opposing party; and/or (5) futility of the amendment. See Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v.
Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 174 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)). An amendment is futile if it “is frivolous or advances a claim . . . that is legally insufficient
on its face.” Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck Imp., Inc., 133 F.R.D. 463, 468 (D.N.J. 1990)
(citations omitted). To evaluate futility, the Court uses “the same standard of legal sufficiency” as
applied to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.
2000).
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judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an
integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385,
1390 (9th Cir. 1987); Akins v. Deptford Twp., 813 F. Supp. 1098, 1102–03 (D.N.J.), aff’d, 995
F.2d 215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 981 (1993). Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
In Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993), in response to a court reporter
asserting a defense of absolute judicial immunity, the Supreme Court revisited the question of
when judicial or quasi-judicial immunity should be extended to persons who participate in the
judicial function. The Court found judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges
when “their judgments are ‘functional[ly] comparab[le]’ to those of judges—that is, because they,
too, ‘exercise a discretionary judgment’ as a part of their function.” Id. at 436 (citations omitted).
As such, under this “functional approach,” courts must look to the nature of the function performed
and not to the identity of the actor performing it. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269
(1993). The Third Circuit has applied this “functional approach” to hold that court-appointed
custody evaluators enjoyed absolute judicial immunity from civil rights liability because they acted
as “arms of the court,” “a non-judicial person who fulfills a quasi-judicial role at the court’s
request.” See Hughes, 242 F.3d at 126.
Courts have noted that “[a] court’s inherent power to control its docket is part of its function
of resolving disputes between parties. This is a function for which judges and their supporting staff
are afforded absolute immunity.” Bey, 2009 WL 961411, at *3 (quoting Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116
F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997)); see Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 622–23 (7th
Cir. 2002); In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, courts in this Circuit and
others have extended and continue to extend quasi-judicial immunity to court clerks who are
alleged to have acted incorrectly or improperly in the management of a court’s docket. See, e.g.,
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Fischer, 2003 WL 21262103, *4–*5 (finding that court clerks were immune from claims that they
had obstructed justice and encouraged organized crime by not entering defaults, by entering
motions to dismiss as answers, by entering prohibited pre-trial motions, or by altering the sequence
of events (numbers and entry dates) while supposedly correctly docketing a case (citation
omitted)); Davis v. Phila. Cty., 195 F. Supp. 2d 686, 688 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (finding the “Clerk of
Judicial Records” was entitled to immunity because he or she was a court staff member acting in
his or her official capacity).
In Bey, the plaintiff brought a civil action against three Clerk’s Office employees alleging
the Clerk’s Office did not enter default upon plaintiff’s request. Bey, 2009 WL 961411, at *2.
Ultimately, the Court found the entry of default to be a judicial function, warranting immunity. Id.
at 4. The Court, in analyzing whether or not entering default was a judicial function, stated:
In the present case, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure entrust to the
Clerk of Court and his deputies the function of determining whether
default should be entered. Rule 55(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides:
Entering a Default. When a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter default.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a).3 Under Rule 55(a), the Clerk is called upon to
ascertain, from the proofs submitted, whether the defendant has been
served with the summons and complaint in accordance with the rules
governing such service, when the service occurred, when the time to
answer or otherwise plead has expired, whether the time to answer has
been enlarged, and ultimately whether the defendant has failed to plead
or otherwise defend. These are highly fact-sensitive determinations of
a judicial nature, entrusted to the clerk and deputy clerks. Thus, as
stated by a leading commentator, “The clerk’s function [in deciding
whether to enter default] is not perfunctory. Before entering a default,
the clerk must examine the affidavits filed and find that they meet the
requirements of Rule 55(a).” 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2682 at p. 19 (citations omitted).
Id. at 4. Lastly, the Court noted “entering, refusing to enter, or failing to enter default, the clerk and
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deputy clerks of court are performing a function at the core of adjudication.” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs argue the Clerk’s Office employees refused to enter a default judgment
against the defendants in the other two civil matters. Therefore, like the Clerk’s Office employees
in Bey, the Clerk’s Office employees here are also entitled to immunity for the actions they took
in their capacities as employees of the United States District Court. The Complaint does not allege
the Clerk’s Office employees acted in their individual capacities and does not state a claim for a
violation of any clearly established constitutional rights so as to waive the Clerk’s Office
employees’ entitlement to immunity. See Person v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815
(2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, Judge
Hillman and the Clerk’s Office employees are immune from suit and this matter is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE in its entirety. As such, judicial immunity is plainly applicable to the
claims in this case and the Court need not recuse under the Standing Order.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
as to Judge Hillman and WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the Clerk’s Office employees. An
appropriate order follows.
Date: April 6, 2018
/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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