GUILLE v. JOHNSON et al

Filing 166

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 116 Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order; 123 Motion for Order to Show Cause is denied; 127 Motion for Default Judgment is denied ; 137 Motion to add parties and to enter default judgment is denied ; 153 Motion for Leave to amend is denied. Copy of Memorandum & Order and docket sheet mailed to plaintiff via regular mail. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 3/29/2022. (abr, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ADRIAN GUILLE,
Civil Action No.:
3:1 8-cv- 01 472-PGS-TJB

Plaintiff
V.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STEVEN JOHNSON, et al.,

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Adrian Guille’s five
pending motions: (1) motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order (ECF No. 116); (2) motion for order to show cause for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order (ECF No. 123); (3) motion for default judgment
(ECF No. 127); (4) combined motion to add parties, produce docket sheet, and for
default judgment (ECF No. 137) and; (5) combined motion for clarification, class
certification, leave to amend, service of USM-285 forms, and renewed request for
appointment of counsel (ECF No. 153). The Court heard oral argument on the
motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order on June 15,
2021 (ECF No. 125) and oral argument for all five motions on February 15, 2022
via telephone (ECF No. 163).

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I.
By way of background, Plaintiff is an inmatecurrently incarcerated at the
New Jersey State Prison (“NJSP”) who filed a civil rights complaint with this
Court on February 1, 2018. (Complaint, ECF No. 1). On April 18, 2018, Plaintiff
filed an amended complaint against numerous New Jersey State Department of
Corrections employees, and alleging assorted constitutional violations. (Amended
Complaint, ECF No. 7). On May 13, 2019, the Court screened Plaintiff’s claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B), and issued a memorandum and order

dismissing select defendants from the case while allowing a portion of Plaintiff’s
claims to proceed. (Memorandum and Order, ECF No. 10). Notably, all proposed
class claims were dismissed. Id. at ¶2.
II.

On March 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed the first pending motion, seeking a
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. He alleges that in the
preceding six months, prison officials placed an “administrative block” on the
prisoners’ Lexis Nexis research terminal which prevents him from saving or
printing documents. He therefore seeks a declaration that he (Plaintiff) “has a right
to save, copy, and print his legal documents and research from the legal computer.”
(ECF No. 116). Further, he claims that Officers Green and Mottley, who are not

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parties to this action, improperly confiscated his floppy disks containing legal
research in the past.
On May 6, 2021, Defendants filed timely opposition which relies upon
certifications from Major Craig Stevens and Associate Administrator David
Richards of the NJSP. In substance, the certifications state:
1.
NJSP Major Craig M. Sears certifies that no NJSP staff confiscated
Plaintiff’s floppy disks as it would otherwise have appeared in the prison’s
evidence log and confiscation report. (Certification of Major Craig M. Sears
at ¶J5-6, ECF No. 12 1-2).
2.
Defendant NJSP Associate Administrator David Richards certifies
that there is no administrative block in place and that Plaintiff’s
incarceration in a “highly secured unit” still entitles him to legal research at
the legal terminal and further access through inmate paralegals and paper
requests is permitted. (Certification of David Richards at ¶5-7, ECF No.
121-1).
To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must demonstrate:
(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury if the
requested relief is not granted; (3) the granting of preliminary injunction will not
result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) the public interest weighs
in favor of granting the injunction. Reilly v. City ofHarrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176
(3d Cir. 2017); GJJM Enters., LLC v. City ofAtl. City, 293 F. Supp. 3d 509, 517
(D.N.J. 2017). The Third Circuit has explained
a movant for preliminary equitable relief must meet the
threshold for the first two ‘most critical’ factors: it must
demonstrate that it can win on the merits (which requires
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a showing significantly better than negligible but not
necessarily more likely than not) and that it is more likely
than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief.

Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179.
These two factors serve as a “gateway” for the remaining two factors. Id.
Furthermore, preliminary injunctive relief is not appropriate where there are
disputed issues of fact. See Gruntal & Co. v. Steinberg, 843 F. Supp. 1, 16 (D.N.J.
1994) (citation omitted).
Because the facts here are in dispute, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits. Defendants’ two certifications directly
contradict Plaintiff’s assertion that he “has absolutely no access to New Jersey
state law[.j” (ECF No. 116 at

5).1

Due to prior disruptive conduct,2 Plaintiff is

housed in a highly secured unit with additional restrictions beyond those of other
units. Despite this, Plaintiff is still permitted access to Lexis Nexis research on the
unit legal terminal and may request further assistance through inmate paralegals,
satisfying the duty imposed on prison authorities to assist inmates in their access to

1

At oral argument on February 15, 2022, Plaintiff expanded on the allegations within the
motion, alleging that Lexis Nexis had in fact since been removed from the legal terminal
entirely. (Feb. 15, 2022 Hearing T. 4:21-5:8). In response, Defendants denied the allegation that
Plaintiff was barred from legal research in the newly alleged manner. Id. at 6:2-7.
2
As part of Plaintiff’s prior requests for injunctive relief, there was evidence that Plaintiff
routinely made knife-like instruments from everyday materials, and on one occasion allegedly
assaulted and severely injured a corrections officer with said weaponry. (Memorandum and
Order at 3, ECF No. 109).
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T

the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). Plaintiff has simply not
established a “relevant actual injury” that arose from the “alleged shortcomings in
the library or legal assistance program [that] hindered his efforts to pursue a legal
claim” which might otherwise substantiate an access to the courts claim. See Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351. (1996) (noting that an inability to file a complaint
would constitute sufficient injury). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order (ECF No. 116) is denied.
III.

On May 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed the second pending motion, seeking an
order to show cause for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
(ECF No. 123). In it, Plaintiff raises new allegations of general harassment, food
tampering, and obstruction of his phone privileges against non-parties Sergeant
Morgan and Officers Kovacs and Nwachuku, occurring generally between May 1,
2021 and May 10, 2021. He also raises new claims against non-parties Marcus
Hicks, Jonathan Gramp, and Defendant Raymond Royce, seeking “[ajnything
[m]ore [tjhan [n]othing” as relief. (ECF No. 123-1 at 19). Because these
allegations depart from the underlying claims of Plaintiff’s amended complaint and
include non-party individuals, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
Within this District:

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It is axiomatic that a preliminary injunction does not provide relief for
a new or different claim than the claims in the complaint. See,
e.g., Bronson v. Houdeshell, 2007 WL 1098962, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr.
11, 2007) (citing 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 8 (1978)). Courts in this
circuit have denied emergent relief when the “request for injunctive
relief is [] targeted at potential conduct that bears no relation to his
underlying claim.” Martin v. Keitel, 205 Fed. Appx. 925, 929 (3d Cir.
2006); see also Schwartz v. United States DOJ, 2007 WL 2916465
(D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2007) (denying injunctive relief because plaintiff failed
to demonstrate that the “preliminary injunction relates to the subjectmatter of the underlying complaint”); Glazewski v. Corzine, 2008 WL
2915482, at *1 (D.N.J. Jul. 25, 2008) (denying motion for a preliminary
injunction where the nature of the claims were similar to those asserted
in the underlying complaint but involved different defendants and
different facilities).

Malcolm v. Bray, 2020 WE 1694604, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2020). In Malcolm, the
court denied a prisoner’s request for injunctive relief where new allegations of
improper shackling were distinct from the claims of deliberate indifference and
conditions of confinement that he raised in his original complaint. See id. at *5..6.
Further, the prisoner had asserted the new allegations against individuals not
named as defendants in the original complaint. Id. Here, the motion is denied
because: (1) it asserts new allegations against non-party individuals;3 (2) at a
different time from other events asserted in the amended complaint; and (3) it
concerns issues not addressed in the current amended complaint.

Although Raymond Royce was named as a defendant in the amended complaint, the docket
indicates that he has yet to be properly served after the issued summons was returned unexecuted
on June 28, 2019. (ECF Nos. 19, 23).
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Iv.
In Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 127), Plaintiff argues
that Defendants failed to file a timely response to the motion for preliminary
inj unction (ECF No. 163) that was dismissed above. As the Court recalls, the
Court held a telephone conference with the parties on April 6, 2021 and issued a
scheduling order wherein Defendants’ opposition was due by May 6, 2021 and
Plaintiff’s reply was due by June 7, 2021. (ECF No. 118). On May 6, 2021,
Defendants filed timely opposition, and as such, the motion is denied.
V.
On September 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed a fourth motion, seeking leave to
amend his complaint by adding as defendants the New Jersey Department of
Corrections, Officer Green, and Defendant Raymond Royce. (ECF No. 137).
Plaintiff also requests a copy of the docket sheet and again seeks default judgment
on his prior motion (ECF No. 116). Plaintiff argues that because the Court heard
oral argument on June 15, 2021 and had not yet issued a decision, the Court had
“essentially abdicated its jurisdiction” and that default judgment is appropriate. Id.
at 3.
With regard to Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, the Court did not
“abdicate its jurisdiction,” and the requested relief is denied.

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Next, the Court considers Plaintiff’s request for leave to add parties.
“Generally, district courts should grant leave to amend ‘freely

...

when justice so

requires.” Laspina v. SEJUPa. State Council, 985 F.3d 278, 291 (3d. Cir. 2021)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). “In the absence of unfair prejudice, futility of
amendment, undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, the court must grant a
request for leave to amend.” Bejarano v. Hotel Exec. Suites, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 163963, *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2015) (citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)). Further, it “is well known that the courts have
an obligation to construe the filings ofpro se litigants liberally.” Lazar v. Town of
W. Sadsbury, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113363, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2021)
(citing Giles v. Kearny, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009)).
This case was initiated on February 1, 2018. It is four years old with no trial
date in sight. To add parties will require additional time for discovery and motion
practice. Under the circumstances, granting a motion to add parties will
unreasonably delay the litigation, and prejudice the Defendants. As such, the
motion is denied.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks a copy of the docket sheet, I will direct my
Court Clerk to forward one together with a copy of this Memorandum and Order.

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VI.
On November 10, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion to certify class.4
In its original screening order, the Court found that Plaintiff lacked standing
to assert claims on behalf of other prisoners and that Plaintiff had not demonstrated
that he would be an adequate class representative under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. For a
pro se litigant to represent a class is not viable. The Court thereafter dismissed all
claims brought on behalf of the proposed class without prejudice. (ECF No. 10 at
¶2) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Maldonado v. Terhune, 28
F. Supp. 2d 284, 288 (D.N.J. 1998)). Here, the Court sees nothing in the record
warranting a different decision. Plaintiff may proceed on his individual claims, but
his motion seeking certification of a class is denied.
ORDER
This matter having come before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Adrian Guille’s
five motions; and the Court having considered the submissions of the parties; and
for good cause having been shown;
IT IS on this 29th day of March, 2022;

“

This motion and several requests including (a) clarification of the Magistrate Judge’s

scheduling order; (b) appointment of counsel; (c) service of USM 285 forms, were addressed by
Judge Bongiovanni. (ECF No. 152, 160).
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ORDERED, that the motion for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order (ECF No. 116) is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that the motion for order to show cause for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order (ECF No. 123) is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that the motion for default judgment (ECF No. 127) is denied;
and it is further
ORDERED that combined motion to add parties, and to enter default
judgment (ECF No. 137) is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that the combined motion for clarification, class certification,
leave to amend, service of USM-285 forms, and renewed request for appointment of
counsel (ECF No. 153) is denied.
The Clerk is directed to send by first class mail a copy of this Memorandum
and Order together with a complete docket sheet.

fL
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J

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