GUILLE v. JOHNSON et al
Filing
81
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 03/31/2020. (jdb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
ADRIAN GUILLE,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 18-1472 (PGS) (ZNQ)
:
v.
:
:
STEVEN JOHNSON, et al.,
:
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Adrian Guille (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Guille”) is a state inmate incarcerated
at the New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with an amended
civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Previously, this Court screened the
amended complaint and permitted several of Guille’s claims to proceed past screening against
numerous defendants. Among the claims proceeded were excessive force, conditions of
confinement, retaliation, and being deliberately indifferent to Guille’s serious medical needs.
Presently pending before this Court is Defendants’ Alexander Loizos, Sean Patterson, David
Richards, Erik Pedre, Brian Perkins, Amy Emrich, Gilbert Christmas, Rory Payne, Kyle Jenkins,
Joseph Piazza, Christopher Zetti, Frank Martinez, Ronald Walls, Robert Martini, Mark Valleau
and Frederick Harris (hereinafter the “Moving Defendants”) motion to dismiss Guille’s amended
complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For
the following reasons, Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied
in part.
II.
BACKGROUND
This Court discussed the proceeded claims in its May 13, 2019 opinion. (See ECF 10).
The claims proceeded were as follows:
1. Excessive force by Martini, Piazza and Smith against Guille in his cell.
2. Excessive force by Smith against Guille in the elevator.
3. Eighth Amendment violation when Smith and others refused to permit Guille to
decontaminate from pepper-spray.
4. Conditions of confinement claims against Mr. Johnson, Patterson, Smith, Martini, Piazza,
Brodzinski, Pedre and Jenkins.
5. Retaliation claim against Smith.
6. Claim against Smith and Steven Johnson arising from contaminated drinking water.
7. Condition of confinement claim against Steven Johnson, Richards, Royce and Emrich for
failing to remedy vermin situation.
8. Deliberate indifference to Guille’s serious medical needs against Smith.
9. Claim against “every officer” for failure to feed him over a six-week period.
10. Deliberate indifference to Guille’s serious medical needs against unknown medical
personnel and “pill-pass nurses.”
After receiving an extension of time to file a response to the amended complaint, Moving
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on October 15, 2019. (See ECF 61). Guille filed a response
in opposition to the motion to dismiss on December 13, 2019. (See ECF 69). Moving Defendants
did not file a reply. The motion is now ready for adjudication.
2
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts
accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff
may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). In other words, a
complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
A court conducts a three-part analysis to make this determination. See Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the
court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id. Additionally, it is
worth noting that “courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint,
exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record. See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Moving Defendants make three arguments in their motion to dismiss. First, they argue
that the official capacity claims against them should be dismissed because they are not “persons”
3
amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Second, Moving Defendants assert that the official
capacity claims against them must be dismissed because they are immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment. Finally, defendants Christmas, Payne, Zetti, Walls and Harris argue that
the individual capacity claims against them should be dismissed because Guille failed to allege
their personal involvement. Each of these arguments will be considered in turn.
A. “Persons” under Section 1983 and Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Guille’s claims against the Moving Defendants for monetary damages in their official
capacities will be dismissed with prejudice. Indeed, a state official sued in his official capacity
for monetary damages is not a “person” for purposes of Section 1983. See House v. Fisher, No.
14-2133, 2016 WL 538648, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2016) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-71 (1989)); Goode v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., No. 11-6960,
2015 WL 1924409, at *10 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2015) (state officials sued in official capacities for
monetary damages are not “persons” within meaning of Section 1983); Johnson v. Mondrosch,
No. 13-3461, 2013 WL 12085239, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2013) (same). Additionally,
“[i]ndividual state employees sued in their official capacity are also entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity because ‘official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of
pleading an action’ against the state.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)).
However, Guille’s complaint also seeks injunctive relief. (See ECF 7 at 51). Indeed, with
respect to the Moving Defendants, Guille makes clear in his response to the motion to dismiss
that he has claims for injunctive relief against Richards and Emrich in their roles as supervisors.1
(See ECF 69 at 1-2).
1
Guille states that he is also bringing his claims for injunctive relief against other defendants
besides Richards and Emirch. (See ECF 69 at 1-2). This Court though need not discuss Guille’s
4
“[O]fficial-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as
actions against the state.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10, 109 S. Ct.
2304 (quoting [Kentucky v.] Graham, 473 U.S. [159] at 167 n. 14,
105 S. Ct. 3099 [(1985)]); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
159–160, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908). A state official
against whom prospective injunctive relief is sought, then, does not
partake of the State's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, and is considered a “person” for purposes of Section
1983.
Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281 (D.N.J. 2013). Accordingly, this Court will not
dismiss Guille’s official capacity claims against Richards and Emrich requesting injunctive
relief.
B. Lack of Personal Involvement of Defendants Christmas, Payne, Zetti, Walls and Harris
With respect to Guille’s claims against the Moving Defendants in their individual
capacities, only Defendants Christmas, Payne, Zetti, Walls and Harris argue that the individual
capacity claims against them should be dismissed because Guille failed to allege their personal
involvement in any of his proceeded claims. Personal involvement of the defendants is necessary
to sustain a Section 1983 claim. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988);
see also In re Bayside Prison Litig., No. 97–5127, 2007 WL 327519, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 30,
2007). Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; see also Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50
F.3d 1186, 1190–91 (3d Cir. 1995); Jackson v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 12–7538, 2013
WL 1844636, at *3 n.1 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2013).
Guille alleges his amended complaint does allege personal involvement of these five
defendants because this Court permitted a claim to proceed that alleged that “every officer”
claims against those other supervisory defendants in this opinion as they are not parties to the
motion to dismiss.
5
failed to feed him over a six-week period. (See ECF 10 at 5). Guille’s alleges as follows in his
amended complaint:
Also, for several weeks plaintiff was denied the vast majority of
meals by each and every officer that worked on plaintiff’s housing
unit.
Plaintiff cannot recall exactly which meals or which days he was
deprived of food although plaintiff believes he received
approximately five meals over the span of six weeks.
At meal delivery times plaintiff was regularly given empty food
cartons.
(ECF 7 at 18).
This Court finds that the amended complaint fails to state the personal involvement of
defendants Christmas, Payne, Zetti, Walls and Harris. Indeed, the complaint fails to allege that
these five defendants worked on Guille’s housing unit during the six weeks he was purportedly
denied food. Furthermore, and most importantly, the complaint is silent that any of these five
defendants had any personal knowledge that Guille was being denied food. Accordingly, this
Court will dismiss Guille’s individual capacity claims against Christmas, Payne, Zetti, Walls and
Harris without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF 61) is granted in
part and denied in part. Guille’s claims against Defendants Alexander Loizos, Sean Patterson,
Erik Pedre, Brian Perkins, Gilbert Christmas, Rory Payne, Kyle Jenkins, Joseph Piazza,
Christopher Zetti, Frank Martinez, Ronald Walls, Robert Martini, Mark Valleau and Frederick
Harris in their official capacities are dismissed with prejudice. Guille’s claims against
Defendants David Richards and Amy Emrich in their official capacity for monetary damages are
dismissed with prejudice. Guille’s claims for injunctive relief against Defendants David Richards
6
and Amy Emrich are not dismissed. Guille’s claims against defendants Gilbert Christmas, Rory
Payne, Christopher Zetti, Ronald Walls and Frederick Harris in their individual capacities are
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. In light of the dismissal with prejudice of
Guille’s claims against Defendants Gilbert Christmas, Rory Payne, Christopher Zetti, Ronald
Walls and Frederick Harris in their official capacities and the dismissal of Guille’s individual
capacity claims against these five Defendants without prejudice, these five defendants are
terminated from this action.2 An appropriate order will be entered.
DATED: March 30, 2020
s/Peter G. Sheridan_____________
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
2
Because this Court presumes that Guille is proceeding with individual capacity claims against
the remaining eleven Moving Defendants (as well as the fact that Guille’s official capacity
claims against Richards and Emrich are not being dismissed), the remaining eleven Moving
Defendants remain in this case.
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?