CRAWFORD v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 19

OPINION filed. Signed by Chief Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 08/09/2019. (jmh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
THOMAS CRAWFORD,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 18-1735 (FLW) (DEA)
:
v.
:
:
SCO B. WHEELER et al.,
:
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
FREDA L. WOLFSON, Chief U.S.D.J.:
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Thomas Crawford (“Crawford” or “Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner incarcerated at
New Jersey State Prison, in Trenton, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with this civil rights
action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently before the Court is a motion by defendants SCO
B. Wheeler (“Wheeler”), Lt. Bundy, SCO E. Perez (“Perez”), SCO G. Christmas, COR J. Leek
(“Leek”), COR Patrick Jenson (“Jenson”), Sgt. S. Patterson (“Patterson”), Sgt. DeFazio
(“DeFazio”), the State of New Jersey, and the New Jersey Department of Corrections
(collectively, “Movants”) for judgment on the pleadings, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c). For the following reasons, the motion is granted insofar as described herein.
II.

BACKGROUND AND MOTION

The facts underlying this action are straight forward. Crawford alleges that, on
November 25, 2016, Leek, Jenson, and Perez, searched the cell of another prisoner, Michael
Martin (“Martin”), and placed legal materials, among other items found therein, in the garbage. 1
(Compl., ECF No. 1-3, ¶¶ 7–11.) Crawford explains that Martin is a prison paralegal and that
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Crawford alleges that other corrections officers also came at other times on the same day and
removed various other items from Martin’s cell. (See ECF No. 1-3 ¶¶ 12–17.)

some of Crawford’s legal documents were among those in Martin’s cell that the officers threw
away. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 11, 19, 23.) He alleges that Patterson and DeFazio had ordered the other
officers to search Martin’s cell and destroy legal material, and he contends that the search was an
act of retaliation for Martin’s filing of grievances regarding Wheeler. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6, 18.)
On September 19, 2017, Crawford filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County. (See id.) His single-count Complaint alleged that
Movants, as well as non-appearing defendants Major Steve Alaimo, SCO S. Clifton, and SCO
Amato, destroyed his legal materials as an act of retaliation. (Id. ¶¶ 19 & 21.) Crawford also
alleged the destruction of his legal materials would cause him to “be unable to pursue [his]
litigation and lose [his] case.” (Id. ¶¶ 20 & 31.) I construe the Complaint as asserting civil rights
claims for retaliation and denial of access to the courts, under the First Amendment, as well as
supervisory liability. (See id.) Crawford also seems to invoke state tort law. (See id. at ECF p.
11.)
Movants removed the action to this Court on February 7, 2018, and subsequently field an
Answer to the Complaint. (See ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) Magistrate Judge Douglas E. Arpert issued a
Discovery Scheduling Order, and he subsequently granted Movants leave to file a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. (ECF Nos. 3 & 9.)
Movants thereafter filed the present motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule
12(c). (ECF No. 10.) They argue that damages claims against them in their official capacities
must be dismissed, that Crawford’s claims are barred by qualified immunity, that Crawford has
failed to adequately plead constitutional claims, and that Crawford cannot recover damages
because he has not established physical injury. (Br. on Behalf of Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 10-3, at
8–26.) They additionally ask that discovery be stayed pending resolution of the motion. (Id. at

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14.) Crawford timely filed an opposition to the motion, (ECF No. 17), but Movants have filed
no reply brief. I note that Judge Arpert subsequently stayed all discovery in this action pending
decision on the motion. (See ECF No. 14.)
III.

ANALYSIS

“‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the defense that the plaintiff has
failed to state a claim is analyzed under the same standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.’” Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Revell v. Port Auth.
of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010)), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 2623 (2018); see also
Hoffman v. Nordic Naturals, Inc., 837 F.3d 272, 279 n.47 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied 137 S. Ct.
2296 (2017); Turbe v. Gov’t of V.I., 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991). In reviewing a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), “courts accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, “a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original). Thus, to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (or a Rule 12(c) motion asserting that Plaintiff has failed to plead a
claim), a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief
above the speculative level, so that a claim is “plausible on its face.” Id. at 570; Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

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plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
While the “plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that defendant had acted unlawfully.” Id.
Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). Nonetheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim,” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
As noted above, I construed the Complaint as asserting civil rights claims for retaliation,
denial of access to the courts, and supervisory liability, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as
invoking state tort law. Section 1983 states, in relevant part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the alleged deprivation was
committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp.
Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A. Claims Against Movants in Their Official Capacities
Section 1983 permits actions against a “person.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[A] state is not a
‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983 . . . .” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
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65–66 (1989). As a claim against a state official in his or her official capacity is essentially a
claim against the state, § 1983 claims are not permitted against state officials in their official
capacities, except to the extent that such claims seek prospective injunctive relief. (Id. at 71 &
n.10.)
It is not clear from Crawford’s Complaint whether he sues the defendant corrections
officers in their official or personal capacities, but he does allege damages claims against the
State and the New Jersey Department of Corrections. Such claims are clearly impermissible.
See Will, 491 U.S. at 65–66, 71 & n.10. Accordingly, the damages claims against the State and
the Department of Corrections and the damages claims against the other Movants, to the extent
asserted against them in their official capacities, are dismissed with prejudice.
B. Claim for Retaliation
An incarcerated plaintiff pleads a claim for retaliation by alleging that “(1) he engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct[,] (2) he suffered an adverse action[,] and (3) the
constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action.”
Brant v. Varano, 717 F. App’x 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330,
333–34 (3d Cir. 2001). “‘[G]overnment actions, which standing alone do not violate the
Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a desire
to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right.’” Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220,
224–25 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 386
(6th Cir. 1999)); see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003).
Once a plaintiff has shown evidence of protected conduct and an adverse action, the
question becomes showing a causal link between the two. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333. At that
stage, the plaintiff first bears the burden to show that the protected conduct was a substantial or

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motivating factor underlying the adverse action, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to
show that it would have taken the same action regardless of the plaintiff’s protected conduct. Id;
see also Watson, 834 F.3d at 831. Where a causal link cannot be shown with direct evidence, a
plaintiff may try to satisfy the initial burden by demonstrating “(1) an unusually suggestive
temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a
pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a causal link.” Watson, 834 F.3d at 422.
Here, Crawford’s retaliation claim is dismissed because he has failed to plead facts that
could support a plausible claim of retaliation. His allegations as to retaliation are either
superficial or simply do not concern him. While he alleges that the officers searched Martin’s
cell and took or destroyed much of the property therein as retaliation for Martin’s filing of
grievances, Crawford’s only mention of his own allegedly constitutionally protected conduct is
his conclusory: “as a direct result of my participation in and in particularly my involvement in
constitutionally protected activity I was retaliated by [defendants].” (ECF No. 1-3 ¶ 21.) At no
point does he allege that he engaged in any specific act that was constitutionally protected, and,
thus, he fails to plead this element of a retaliation claim.
Even if Crawford had pleaded constitutionally protected conduct (and assuming the
destruction of his unidentified legal materials could be found to constitute an adverse action), he
has failed to plead any causal link between his own conduct and the actions of defendants.
Instead, the Complaint alleges that defendants disposed of the property in Martin’s cell as
retaliation for Martin’s constitutionally protected conduct. (ECF No. 1-3 ¶¶ 5–6 (“Martin was
retaliated against for his involvement in constitutionally protected activity.” (emphasis added));
see also id. ¶ 21 (“I was retaliated by Defendants . . . , who entered into a conspiracy to harass
and retaliate against Michael Martin.”).) These allegations do not support a constitutional claim

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by Crawford for retaliation. Accordingly, the retaliation claim is dismissed for failure to plead a
claim.
C. Claim for Denial of Access to the Courts
An inmate has a constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821–28 (1977). A plaintiff pleading
such a claim must show actual resulting injury: “that they lost a chance to pursue a
‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir.
2008). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must describe the underlying, predicate claim with
sufficient specificity and must identify the lost remedy. Id. at 205–06. A plaintiff must further
show that there is no possible remedy for the claimed harm other than through an access-to-thecourts claim. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205–06.
Like his retaliation claim, Crawford’s claim that he was denied access to the courts is too
conclusory to survive this motion. Nowhere in his Complaint does Crawford identify what
underlying, nonfrivolous claim he lost the opportunity to pursue. Instead, he simply alleges,
“[w]ithout the return of my legal material I will incur great harm and injury, simply put, I will be
unable to pursue my litigation and lose my case.” (ECF No. 1-3 ¶ 20.) He additionally asserts
that he “was denied access to Court, and incurred harm and injury because he was unable to
pursue a valid legal claim.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Neither of these assertions includes sufficient specificity
to plead a lost chance to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. Nor does Crawford explain why an
access-to-the-courts claim is now his only possible remedy.
I note that, in his brief opposing the motion, Crawford asserts that the destruction of his
legal materials caused him to “lose [his] ability to pursue an appeal.” (ECF No. 17 at ECF p. 3.)
He does not include any factual allegations of the specific nature of the purported appeal. (See

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ECF No. 17.) In any case, this new assertion in Crawford’s opposition brief amounts to an
improper attempt to amend his Complaint through his motion briefing. See Pennsylvania ex rel.
Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that it is “axiomatic that the
complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss”).
Accordingly, Crawford’s claim for denial of access to the courts is dismissed for failure to plead
a claim.
D. Claim for Supervisory Liability
I have construed Crawford’s complaint as asserting claims for supervisory liability as he
references an alleged “policy, practice and custom of violating inmates[’] rights and for failure to
properly train and supervise.” (ECF No. 1-3 ¶ 30.) While, generally, personal involvement by
the defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is central to a § 1983 claim, a supervisory
defendant may bear liability premised upon some affirmative supervisory conduct, such as the
implementation or maintenance of a policy, practice, or custom that caused the plaintiff
constitutional harm. Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Santiago v.
Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010).
However, I conclude that Crawford has failed to allege any direct violation of his
constitutional rights, in the form of either retaliation or denial of access to the courts. Such a
predicate constitutional violation is, of course, necessary to establish supervisory liability for
such a violation. “[A]ny claim that supervisors directed others to violate constitutional rights
necessarily includes as an element an actual violation at the hands of subordinates. In addition, a
plaintiff must allege a causal connection between the supervisor’s direction and that violation . . .
.” Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130. Because Crawford has pleaded no constitutional violation, his

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claim for supervisory liability cannot survive. The supervisory liability claim is dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
E. Remaining Issues
As I have dismissed all § 1983 claims against movants for failure to state a claim, I do
not reach Movants’ other arguments seeking judgment on the pleadings. Similarly, as Judge
Arpert previously stayed discovery in this case, I need not address the portion of Movant’s brief
arguing in favor of such a stay. I note that Movants additionally argue that Crawford has not
sufficiently pleaded a claim concerning purportedly false disciplinary charges against him. (See
ECF No. 10-3 at 14–16.) The Complaint includes a mere passing reference to “bogus
disciplinary charges” in a list of purported misconduct engaged in by defendants and other
correctional officers. (See ECF No. 1-3 ¶ 28.) As this paragraph of the Complaint appears to be
included merely for context, and as Crawford makes no other mention of false disciplinary
charges, I do not construe him as asserting any claim on this basis.
I note that there are three defendants named in Crawford’s Complaint who have not
appeared in this action: Major Steve Alaimo, SCO S. Clifton, and SCO Amtao. (See ECF No.
1-3.) The analysis leading to the conclusion that the Complaint fails to plead any § 1983 claim
against Movants applies with equal force to the same § 1983 claims as asserted against the nonappearing defendants. Thus, I exercise my screening authority, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c), to dismiss the § 1983 claims as against those defendants for failure to state a
claim. See also Slater v. Skyhawk Transp., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 185, 202 (D.N.J. 1999) (“‘It is well
established that, even if a party does not make a formal motion to dismiss, the court may, sua

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sponte, dismiss the complaint where the inadequacy of the complaint is clear.’” (quoting
Michaels v. New Jersey, 955 F. Supp. 315, 331 (D.N.J. 1996))).
Finally, I note that Crawford’s Complaint also references state tort law. To the extent
that Crawford seeks to allege tort claims under state law, I decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over such claims in light of the dismissal of his § 1983 claims. Hedges v. Musco,
204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]here the claim over which the district court has original
jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state
claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties
provide an affirmative justification for doing so.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Movants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is granted insofar as described herein. Crawford’s claims
for damages against the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey Department of Corrections and
his claims for damages to the extent asserted against the other defendants in their official
capacities are dismissed with prejudice. Crawford’s claims for violation of his constitutional
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are dismissed without prejudice, for failure to state a claim. The
Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any claims under state tort law if
Crawford cannot state an adequate federal claim. In that regard, Crawford may submit a
proposed Amended Complaint that addresses the deficiencies identified herein within thirty (30)
days. If Crawford does not timely submit an Amended Complaint, the case will be remanded to
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County. An appropriate order follows.

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DATED: August 9, 2019

/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON
U.S. Chief District Judge

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