CRAWFORD v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 43

OPINION filed. Signed by Chief Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 3/21/2022. (mg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
THOMAS CRAWFORD,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. Action No. 18-1735(FLW)
:
v.
:
:
SCO B. WHEELER et al.,
:
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
FREDA L. WOLFSON, Chief U.S.D.J.:
Plaintiff Thomas Crawford (“Crawford” or “Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner incarcerated at
New Jersey State Prison, in Trenton, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with this civil rights
action filed, inter alia, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently before the Court is a motion for
summary judgment by defendants SCO B. Wheeler (“Wheeler”), Lt. Bundy, SCO E. Perez
(“Perez”), SCO G. Christmas, COR J. Leek (“Leek”), COR Patrick Jenson (“Jenson”), Sgt. S.
Patterson (“Patterson”), Sgt. DeFazio (“DeFazio”), the State of New Jersey, and the New Jersey
Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”) (collectively, “Movants”) pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons explained in this Opinion, the motion for summary
judgment is granted as to the federal claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
dismisses the remaining claims as to the State of New Jersey, the NJDOC, and the unserved
defendants pursuant to its screening authority, declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law tort claims, and remands this matter to state court.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
a. Factual Background
Plaintiff Thomas Crawford, AKA Thomas Cross, is currently confined at New Jersey

State Prison (“NJSP”) pursuant to a 1996 conviction in state court for murder and related
offenses. 1 Exhibit A, Transcript of Plaintiff’s Deposition, T10:8-20; see ECF No. 21, Amended
Complaint. Plaintiff’s civil rights action arises from the alleged confiscation and destruction of
his legal materials, which were located in the cell of Michael Martin, an inmate paralegal who is
not a Plaintiff in this matter.
It is undisputed that Martin works as a paralegal in the NJSP law library and assists
inmates with their legal challenges to their criminal convictions, among other duties. See Martin
Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. Prior to November 25, 2016, NJSP law library staff directed Martin to assist with
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration in connection with a postconviction relief petition (“PCR”)
Plaintiff filed in state court. See Plaintiff’s Dep., T11-12; T28:11-12; Martin Decl. ¶ 6.
According to Plaintiff, his motion for reconsideration related to the denial of a PCR in the New
Jersey Superior Court, Essex County, before the Honorable Judge Kamil. 2 See T12:6-9; T24:11

The indictment arose from defendant’s July 1995 involvement in three separate carjackings,
which resulted in the killing of a retired police chief and assaults upon several elderly victims.
State v. Cross, A-1329-12T2, 2014 WL 3763306, at *1 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Aug. 1, 2014).)

2

Neither party provides the record of Plaintiff’s prior PCR proceedings. The Court takes judicial
notice of the timeline provided by the New Jersey Appellate Division in its unpublished decision
on Westlaw, as it is largely consistent with Plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the Appellate
Division remanded his third PCR in 2011. See State v. Cross, A-1329-12T2, 2014 WL 3763306,
at *1 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Aug. 1, 2014) (explaining that the appellate court “previously
reversed and remanded another PCR judge’s earlier order denying defendant’s application for
assignment of PCR counsel and his petition” (citing State v. Cross, No. A–4278–09 (App. Div.
September 21, 2011)). On remand, the PCR court denied the third PCR, and, on August 1, 2014,
on appeal after remand, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s third PCR as
follows:
We have carefully considered defendant’s arguments and the
applicable law, and we conclude that the arguments advanced by
2

5; T36:24-37:2; T41-44. In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that the planned reconsideration
motion was based on the fact that his third PCR counsel provided ineffective assistance for
failing to address issues after the Appellate Division’s remand, and for relying on a brief that
Plaintiff had prepared. T19:7-12; T20:13-17; T44:22-46:16.
In order to assist Plaintiff with his motion for reconsideration, Martin had Plaintiff’s
personal legal materials and legal file in his cell. See Martin Decl. ¶ 7. These legal material
included transcripts and a brief. T27:22-28:10. In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he was
given a scheduling order on the motion for reconsideration, and his deadline to file his papers
was in September 2016, but he received several enlargements of time. See T37:3-12.

defendant are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11–3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the
reasons expressed by the PCR judge in his August 28, 2012 written
opinion. We are satisfied that defendant’s third petition, filed
fourteen years from the date of his conviction, is clearly timebarred. R. 3:22–12. We also agree that defendant’s claims of
cumulative error and counsel’s deficient performance are barred by
Rule 3:22–4, –5, as they were raised or could have been raised on
direct appeal and during his two prior PCR petitions. Even if
defendant’s claims were not procedurally barred, we agree with
Judge Cassini that they are meritless because defendant failed to
meet his burden under the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz
test.
State v. Cross, 2014 WL 3763306, at *4. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on
January 23, 2015. State v. Cross, 220 N.J. 269 (2015). The New Jersey’s Promis Gavel system
indicates that Plaintiff filed a fourth PCR in state court on or about September 22, 2015, and this
fourth PCR was denied on or about January 5, 2016. See New Jersey Promis Gavel System,
available at https://portal.njcourts.gov/webe4/ExternalPGPA/entry. Plaintiff testified that he
filed his reconsideration motion on March 29, 2016. See T43:5-19. Thus, based on the timing
and available record, it appears that Plaintiff was seeking reconsideration of the denial of his
fourth PCR, which asserted ineffective assistance of his third PCR counsel; however, as
explained in this Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim, see infra, Plaintiff
never clarifies what specific issues his third PCR counsel failed to raise, why he and Martin
believed those issues would have warranted relief in state court, or why his reconsideration
motion would have been successful in light of the prior decisions denying relief on PCR.
3

On November 25, 2016, Defendant DeFazio directed Defendants Leek and Jenson to
conduct a search of Martin’s cell. 3 Exhibit D; See ECF No. 21, Amended Complaint; T13:1719. The motive for the cell search, however, is disputed. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that
the cell search was conducted to retaliate against Martin for Martin’s filing grievances against
Defendant Wheeler. 4 T13:15-19; see ECF No. 21, Amended Complaint ¶¶ 9-18. In a
Declaration submitted with Plaintiff’s opposition papers, Martin contends that his cell was
searched because he acts as a prison paralegal assisting inmates and files grievances against
rouge correctional officers. 5 Martin Decl. ¶ 8. Moving Defendants concede that Defendants
Leek and Jenson conducted the search of Martin’s cell, but they deny that the search was
retaliatory, and they also deny that the officers confiscated or destroyed legal materials. See
Defendants’ SOMF ¶¶ 10-12. In their moving papers, Defendants rely on the Special Custody

3

The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Patterson also directed the search, and that
Defendant Patterson and DeFazio directed the destruction of legal material. See Amended
Complaint at ¶¶ 31. The Amended Complaint further alleges that Defendants Wheeler and
Amato took part in the search of Martin’s cell and the destruction of Plaintiff’s legal materials.
See id. at ¶¶ 26-28. The Amended Complaint also alleges that there is a policy of encouraging
retaliation and that Defendants Alaimo, Bundy, Patterson, and DeFazio failed to supervise and
train Wheeler and the other officers who conducted the search. See id. at ¶¶ 2, 34.
4

The Amended Complaint alleges that Martin was set up on false disciplinary charges by
Defendants, and, ultimately, was able to get the charges set aside and was awarded costs. See id.
¶¶ 37-42. The Amended Complaint also alleges that the Special Investigations Division (“SID”)
investigated the incident and determined that the supervisors violated NJDOC rules and
recommended that two of the supervisors be terminated. See id. ¶¶ 47-48. None of these
allegations, however, change the Court’s analysis of whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, and thus they are not material to the Court’s decision.
5

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also alleges that his legal materials were destroyed “as a
direct result of Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected activity (seeking legal help and assistance
from a paralegal assigned to work on his case by the New Jersey Department of Corrections).”
Id. at ¶ 43. As discussed below, however, there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s legal materials
were destroyed because he sought assistance from an inmate paralegal, and the Court is unable to
credit this bare allegation at summary judgment.
4

Reports, which were prepared by Defendants Leek and Jensen, and contend that Martin’s cell
was a routine search based on having items that were potentially prohibited. See Exhibit D.
After the search, Plaintiff filed grievances with the prison attempting to locate and have
any legal material found in Martin’s cell during the search returned to him. T14 to 15; Exhibits
B and C. In response to Plaintiff’s grievances, prison officials responded that all materials
confiscated in Martin’s possession were returned to Martin, and that if Plaintiff believed his
property was lost or stolen, Plaintiff should submit a property claim. Exhibit C. Subsequently,
on January 19, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an inmate property claim form to the prison, which was
denied on February 27, 2017. Prison Officials determined that there was no neglect by the prison
and further found and that the prison was not responsible for paperwork given to another inmate.
See Exhibits E and F.
On January 18, 2017, Plaintiff wrote to the Superior Court requesting the price for the
lost transcripts in his criminal matter. Exhibit G; T27:25-28:2. On January 23, 2017, the
Superior Court responded that it no longer had those transcripts in its records. 6 Exhibit H;
T28:2-3.
b. Procedural History
On September 19, 2017, Crawford filed his original complaint in the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County. Moving Defendants removed the action to this
Court on February 7, 2018, and subsequently filed an Answer to the original complaint. See
ECF Nos. 1 & 2. The Magistrate Judge granted Moving Defendants leave to file a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, ECF Nos. 9, and they thereafter filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c). ECF No. 10.
6

The $7,500 replacement cost for the transcripts was an estimate by Plaintiff. T29:3-6; T46:2023.
5

This Court construed the original complaint to assert civil rights claims for retaliation,
denial of access to the courts, and supervisory liability, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as tort
claims under state law. The Court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings on August
9, 2019, as to the federal claims, declined supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law
claims, and provided Plaintiff with leave to submit an Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 19-20.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 3, 2019. ECF No. 21. Defendants
answered the Amended Complaint on or about February 20, 2020, ECF No. 25, and discovery
commenced. Plaintiff was deposed on April 28, 2021, and the Magistrate Judge directed
Movants to file their dispositive motions by August 27, 2021. See ECF No. 37.
Defendants subsequently filed the instant summary judgment motion. Plaintiff submitted
his opposition brief and supporting exhibits, and Defendants submitted their reply brief. See
ECF Nos. 38, 41, 42. The matter is fully briefed and ready for disposition.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that “there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual dispute is
genuine only if there is “a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for
the non-moving party,” and it is material only if it has the ability to “affect the outcome of the
suit under governing law.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006); see
also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or
unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
“In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's

6

evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v.
Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 447 U.S. at 255)); see
also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Curley v.
Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276–77 (3d Cir. 2002).
The burden of establishing that no “genuine issue” exists is on the party moving for
summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330. “A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue
of material fact if it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor at trial.”
Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001).
The non-moving party must present “more than a scintilla of evidence showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005)
(quotations omitted). Thus, there can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” if a party
fails “to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322–23. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323; Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992).
A document filed pro se is to be “liberally construed” and “a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)). In addition, when considering a motion in a pro se plaintiff’s proceedings, a court
must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by
name.” Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247–48 (3d Cir. 1999). Nevertheless,
on a motion for summary judgment, “a pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under

7

Rule 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's
motion for summary judgment.” Ray v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 05-2507, 2007 WL 1377645, at *3
(E.D. Pa. May 10, 2007). “[M]erely because a non-moving party is proceeding pro se does not
relieve him of the obligation under Rule 56(e) to produce evidence that raises a genuine issue of
material fact.” Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F. Supp.2d 402, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
III.

ANALYSIS
a. Summary Judgment Motion
The Court once again construes Plaintiff to raise § 1983 claims for retaliation in violation

of the First Amendment, denial of access to the courts in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, supervisory liability, and state law tort claims. The Court begins with the federal
claims.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the alleged deprivation was committed or
caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635
F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Because Plaintiff asserts that Moving Defendants retaliated against Martin for Martin’s
First Amendment activities, the Court begins with the issue of whether Plaintiff has standing to
bring his First Amendment retaliation claims. 7 Although Defendants do not raise any prudential
limitations regarding Plaintiffs’ standing, the Court has an independent obligation to examine its

There are three types of standing: statutory, constitutional, and prudential. “Statutory standing is
simply statutory interpretation: the question it asks is whether Congress has accorded this injured
plaintiff the right to sue the defendant to redress his injury.” Graden v. Conexant Sys. Inc., 496
F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir.2007) (emphasis in original). “Constitutional and prudential standing are
about, respectively, the constitutional power of a federal court to resolve a dispute and the
wisdom of so doing.” Id; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). As explained in
this section, Plaintiff lacks prudential standing to bring the First Amendment retaliation claims.
7

8

own jurisdiction and address such issues sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings. See
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230–31 (1990)).
“Article III ... gives the federal courts jurisdiction over only ‘cases and controversies,’
and the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved
through the judicial process.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990). The
Standing doctrine distinguishes between “jurisdictional” and “prudential” rules of standing. The
three jurisdictional rules of standing sketch out the minimum requirements for a “case or
controversy” under Article III; they are “injury in fact ... causation, and redressability.” Id. at
155. By contrast, the prudential rules of standing are judicially created doctrines based on policy
judgments about the proper role of the courts.
One such rule is that a litigant “generally must assert his own legal rights and interests,
and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). In view of this rule, “courts have held consistently that an inmate
does not have standing to sue on behalf of his fellow prisoners.” 8 Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d
22, 27 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[A]n inmate does not have standing to sue on behalf of his fellow
prisoners. Rather, the prisoner must allege a personal loss and seek to vindicate a deprivation of
his own constitutional rights.”) (Citations omitted) (collecting cases); see also McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 (1961)(citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) (“[A]
litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities.”) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff lacks prudential standing to bring the First Amendment retaliation claims
against Moving Defendants, as he improperly asserts Martin’s constitutional right to be free of

8

Wilcox involved a plaintiff who sought injunctive relief with respect to conditions of
confinement after he was released from that facility in order to benefit other inmates. The
principle that a plaintiff may only vindicate his own constitutional rights applies equally here.
9

retaliation based on Martin’s protected activities (i.e., filing of grievances and/or his assigned
role as a prison paralegal). Martin is not a plaintiff in this action. And, as noted by Defendants,
there is no evidence whatsoever that Defendants confiscated Plaintiff’s legal materials from
Martin’s cell or destroyed those items to retaliate against Plaintiff for exercising his First
Amendment rights to file grievances, to challenge his criminal conviction, or because he sought
the assistance of an inmate paralegal, as Plaintiff briefly contends in his Amended Complaint.
Because Plaintiff lacks prudential standing to bring First Amendment retaliation claims asserting
violations of Martin’s constitutional rights, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims.
Even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s First Amendment
retaliation claims, those claims would also fail on the merits. “In order to establish illegal
retaliation for engaging in protected conduct, [Plaintiff] must prove that: (1) his conduct was
constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and
(3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to
discipline him. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Brant v. Varano,
717 F. App’x 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2017); Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333–34 (3d Cir. 2001).
“‘[G]overnment actions, which standing alone do not violate the Constitution, may nonetheless
be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an individual for
exercise of a constitutional right.’” Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224–25 (3d Cir. 2000)
(alteration in original) (quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 1999)); see
also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003).
Once a plaintiff has shown evidence of protected conduct and an adverse action, the
question becomes showing a causal link between the two. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333. At that

10

stage, the plaintiff first bears the burden to show that the protected conduct was a substantial or
motivating factor underlying the adverse action, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to
show that it would have taken the same action regardless of the plaintiff’s protected conduct. Id.
Where a causal link cannot be shown with direct evidence, a plaintiff may try to satisfy that
burden by demonstrating “(1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected
activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing
that suggests a causal link.” Watson, 834 F.3d at 422.
Here, even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff was engaged in protected conduct and
suffered an adverse action, he provides no evidence of causal connection. That is, there is no
evidence showing that any of the Moving Defendants sought to retaliate against Plaintiff for his
protected activities when they searched Martin’s cell and confiscated and/or destroyed Plaintiff’s
legal papers as part of that search. To the extent the Defendants were retaliating against Martin
for his First Amendment activities, i.e., Martin’s filing of grievances against Wheeler and/or
assisting inmates as part of his duties as a prison paralegal, Martin is the only litigant who can
seek redress for those alleged violations under § 1983. As such, Moving Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims even if
Plaintiff has standing to assert those claims.
Moving Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s access to the
courts claims. “Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prisoners retain a right of access to
the courts.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 346 (1996)). There are two (2) general categories of actionable access to the courts claims.
See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413 (2002). “In the first are claims that systemic
official action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff class in preparing and filing suits at the present

11

time.” Id. The second category “do[es] not look forward to a class of future litigation, but
backward to a time when specific litigation ended poorly, or could not have commenced, or
could have produced a remedy subsequently unobtainable.” Id.
“Where prisoners assert that defendants’ actions have inhibited their opportunity to
present a past legal claim, they must show (1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury’ – that they lost
a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; and (2) that they have no
other ‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the present
denial of access suit.” Id. (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415). Even at the pleading stage,
“[t]he complaint must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is
‘more than mere hope,’ and it must describe the ‘lost remedy.’” Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205-06. In
Monroe, for instance, “the defendants confiscated all of the plaintiffs’ contraband and noncontraband legal materials, including their legal briefs, transcripts, notes of testimony, exhibits,
copies of reference books, treatises, journals, and personal handwritten notes,” but dismissal of
the Complaint was affirmed because the plaintiffs “did not specify facts demonstrating that the
claims were nonfrivolous” and also failed to allege that they had no other remedy. Indeed, it is
well-settled that the lack of a meritorious underlying claim precludes a plaintiff from
subsequently pursuing a constitutional denial of access to courts claim. See, e.g., Prater v. City
of Philadelphia, 542 F. App’x. 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2013); Allen v. Ripoll, 150 F. App’x. 148, 150
(3d Cir. 2005).
At summary judgment, the allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint do not create a dispute as
to material issues of fact. Orsatti v. N. J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[A]
plaintiff cannot resist a properly supported motion for summary judgment merely by restating the
allegations of his complaint, but must point to concrete evidence in the record that supports each

12

and every essential element of his case.”). Here, Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that his
motion for reconsideration before the state PCR had merit or included an underlying “arguable”
or “nonfrivolous” claim. Indeed, other than generalized statements about the alleged
ineffectiveness of his PCR counsel, Petitioner provides no evidence that he lost the chance to
pursue a nonfrivolous or arguable claim in his motion for reconsideration. Nor has he explained
how the lost legal materials prevented him from presenting that claim to the state court on
reconsideration.
Finally, as argued by Moving Defendants, reconsideration is a high standard. Under New
Jersey law, reconsideration should be granted only in those rare instances when a court’s
decision is based upon a profoundly incorrect or irrational basis, or the court “either did not
consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.” Fusco v. Bd.
of Educ. of City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting D’Atria v.
D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)). Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that
his motion for reconsideration would have met this high bar for relief.
For all these reasons, Moving Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
access to the courts claims.
Moving Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on the supervisory liability
claims. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts there is a policy, practice, or custom of
encouraging and permitting staff to engage in retaliation against inmates who exercise their
constitutional rights. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Alaimo, Bundy, Patterson, and
DeFazio failed to intervene in the search of Martin’s cell and failed to supervise and train the
officers who conducted the search.

13

With respect to supervisors, the Third Circuit has recognized that “there are two theories
of supervisory liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if they established and
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm, and
another under which they can be liable if they directly participated in violating plaintiff’s rights,
directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in
their subordinates’ violations.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir.
2010) (quotation and alteration marks omitted); Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir.
2016); see also A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586
(3d Cir. 2004).
To the extent Plaintiff’s claims of supervisory liability are based on Defendants Alaimo,
Bundy, Patterson, and DeFazio’s direct participation in their subordinates alleged wrongs, those
claims fail because there is no underlying constitutional violation. See Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130
(reasoning that a claim for supervisory liability based on direct participation “necessarily
includes as an element an actual violation at the hands of subordinates”); see also Talley v.
Varner, 786 F. App’x. 326, 329 (3d Cir. 2019) (same).
The failure to supervise claims fail for similar reasons. In order to survive summary
judgment on a supervisory liability claim,
the plaintiff must identify a supervisory policy or procedure that
the supervisor defendant failed to implement, and prove that: (1)
the policy or procedures in effect at the time of the alleged injury
created an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the
defendant-official was aware that the policy created an
unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent to that risk;
and (4) the constitutional injury was caused by the failure to
implement the supervisory procedure.
Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 330 (3d Cir. 2014). Here, there is no
evidence regarding deficiencies in the policies or procedures that were in effect at the time of the

14

alleged search of Martin’s cell or that the supervisory Defendants were aware that such
deficiencies existed. And in a recurrent theme, Plaintiff has not shown that his constitutional
rights were violated by the failure to implement supervisory procedures to stop retaliation against
other inmates. Although Plaintiff allegedly lost his legal materials during the search of Martin’s
cell, that fact does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation in this case. 9
b. Claims Subject to Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c), and the State Law Claims
To the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint realleges § 1983 claims against the State of New
Jersey and the NJDOC, those claims are dismissed pursuant to the Court’s screening authority
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). 10 There are also three defendants named in
Crawford’s Amended Complaint who have not appeared in this action: Major Steve Alaimo,
SCO S. Clifton, and SCO Amtao. The Court’s analysis as to Moving Defendants applies with
equal force to the § 1983 claims asserted against these non-appearing defendants. The Court
therefore exercises it screening authority, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), to
dismiss the § 1983 claims as against those defendants. See Slater v. Skyhawk Transp., Inc., 187
F.R.D. 185, 202 (D.N.J. 1999) (“‘It is well established that, even if a party does not make a

9

Plaintiff has never framed the loss and/or destruction of his legal materials as a violation of due
process, presumably because that type of claim is barred unless Plaintiff was deprived of any
meaningful post-deprivation remedy. “[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property” by
prison officials does not violate the Due Process Clause “if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy
for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)(citing Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527(1981)). Pre-deprivation notice is not constitutionally required. See id. The Third
Circuit has consistently held that the availability of a prison’s grievance procedure is a
meaningful postdeprivation remedy. See, e.g., Tillman v. Lebanon Cty. Corr. Fac., 221 F.3d 410,
422 (3d Cir. 2000); Aulisio v. Chiampi, 765 F. App’x. 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2019)(same).
10

Section 1983 permits actions against a “person.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[A] state is not a ‘person’
within the meaning of § 1983 . . . .” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65–66
(1989).
15

formal motion to dismiss, the court may, sua sponte, dismiss the complaint where the inadequacy
of the complaint is clear.’” (quoting Michaels v. New Jersey, 955 F. Supp. 315, 331 (D.N.J.
1996))).
Finally, to the extent that Crawford seeks to allege tort claims under state law, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims in light of the dismissal of his §
1983 claims. Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]here the claim over
which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must
decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
IV.

CONCLUSION
Moving Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Crawford’s

claims for retaliation, denial of access to the courts, and supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 are dismissed with prejudice as to the Moving Defendants. The § 1983 claims against the
State of New Jersey, NJDOC, and the non-appearing individual Defendants are likewise
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the Court’s screening authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
remaining state tort law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), against any and all defendants
named in this case, and remands this matter to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division,
Mercer County. The Court also directs the Clerk of the Court to mark this matter as CLOSED.
An appropriate order follows.

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/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON
U.S. Chief District Judge

DATED: March 21, 2022.

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