SMITH v. BRANT BEACH YACHT CLUB et al
Filing
11
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 4/3/2018. (mmh)
..
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RECE~VED
SARAH SMITH,
APR 0 3 2018
AT 8:30
WILLIAM T. WALSH
CLERK
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 18-1856
v.
OPINION
BRANT BEACHYACHT CLUB AND
ALLAN EAGLESHAM, et al.,
Defendants.
THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion by Brant Beach Yacht Club to
dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff Sarah Smith ("Plaintiff')
opposes. (ECF No. 7.) The Court has decided this Motion based on the written submissions of
the parties without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.l(b). For the reasons stated
below, the Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
This case is a negligence action for injuries Plaintiff sustained in a boating accident. On
July 23, 2014, Plaintiff attended a large regatta hosted by Defendant Brant Beach Yacht Club in
Long Beach Township, NJ. (Compl., 1, ECF No. 1-L) Plaintiff was in a sailboat that capsized,
leaving her in nearby shallow water. (Id.,, 3-5.) While in the water, Plaintiff was struck by the
propeller of a boat operated by Defendant Allan Eaglesham, an employee of Defendant Brant
Beach Yacht Club. (Id.,, 5-6.) Plaintiff sustained various lacerations and injuries. (Id.,, 9,
12.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Eaglesham was negligent in his operation of the boat and
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failure to follow appropriate procedures following the accident. (Id.
,,-r 8, 9.)
At the time of the
accident, Plaintiff, a resident of Maryland, was sixteen years old. (Id., 2.)
On December 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed the present law suit in New Jersey Superior Court,
Law Division, Ocean County. Defendants timely removed to this Court on the basis of admiralty
or maritime jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, as well as diversity jurisdiction. (See Notice of
Removal,, 5-6, ECF No. 1.) On February 15, 2018, Defendant Brant Beach Yacht Club moved
to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint as barred by the statute oflimitations. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff
opposed, and Defendant Brant Beach Yacht Club replied. (ECF Nos. 7, 9.) This Motion is
presently before the Court.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a
complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1F.3d176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). The defendant bears the burden
of showing that no claim has been presented. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d
Cir. 2005). When considering a Rule l 2{b)(6) motion, a district court should conduct a threepart analysis. See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). "First, the court must
'take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim."' Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court must accept as true all of a plaintiffs well-pleaded
factual allegations and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fowler
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F .3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Connelly v. Lane Constr.
Corp., 2016 WL 106159 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2016). The court, however, may disregard any
conclusory legal allegations. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 203. Finally, the court must determine
whether the "facts are sufficient to show that plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief."' Id. at
211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). If the complaint does not demonstrate more than a "mere
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possibility of misconduct," it must be dismissed. See Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
The law of this Circuit permits a statute of limitations defense to be raised as a Rule
12(b)(6) motion if the "time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has
not been brought within the statute oflimitations." Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir.
2014) (internal citations omitted). A motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations
requires a court to consider: "(l) what law governs the statute oflimitations; (2) the length of
time provided for by the statute of limitations; (3) what law governs accrual of the cause of
action; and (4) when the statute began to accrue for Plaintiff's claim." Crisdon v. City of
Camden, 2012 WL 685874, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2012).
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed because it is barred by the
three (3) year Uniform Statute of Limitations applicable to all maritime tort actions and is not
subject to tolling. (See Def.'s Mot. at 2, ECF No. 4.) This presents two key issues: (1) whether
admiralty and maritime law applies such that the Uniform Statute supplies the statute of
limitations, and (2) whether the statute of limitations may be tolled for any reason. Plaintiff does
not dispute the first issue. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 1, ECF No. 7.) She only challenges on the ground that
the statute of limitations should be tolled for infancy pursuant to state law-appropriately filling
a gap in maritime law-and, when tolled, Plaintiff filed within three years of her 18th birthday.
(Id. at 1-2.) The Court, therefore, need only address whether this maritime statute of limitations
· may be tolled for Plaintiff's infancy. 1
1 For
the sake of completeness, the Court briefly notes that this cause of action is properly
governed by maritime law. Maritime law applies where a tort (1) occurred within or on
navigable waters of the United States, and (2) had a significant relationship to traditional
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The Uniform Statute of Limitations for Maritime Torts provides that: "Except as
otherwise provided by law, a civil action for damages for personal injury or death arising out of a
maritime tort must be brought within 3 years after the cause of action arose." 46 U.S.C.
§ 30106.2 Traditionally, where federal admiralty or maritime law governs, state law niay be used
to supplement, but only to the extent that it is neither inconsistent nor conflicts with.federal law.
See Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1996). Accordingly, where
there is conflict, "[g]eneral maritime law preempts state law to preserve the uniformity sought by
Congress and the judiciary." Anderson v. Varco Int'/, Inc., 905 S.W.3d 26, 28 (Tex. App. 1995)
(finding federal maritime statute of limitations, not Texas law, controlled); see also Foremost
Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 451 U.S. 668, 675 (1982) (noting that the federal interest in protecting
maritime commerce can only be met if "all operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject
to uniform rules of conduct" (emphasis in original)). "The very existence of a federal general
maritime statute oflimitations implies that it should be applied uniformly across the nation."
White v. Mercury Marine, Div. ofBrunswick, 129 F.3d 1428, 1431 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding
application of Florida's discovery rule would improperly contradict the general maritime statute
of limitations).
maritime activities. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972);
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. United States, 846 F.2d 888, 895-96 (3d Cir. 1988). This cause of
action arose from an incident in the navigable waters of the United States, off of Little Egg
Harbor, Beach Haven, NJ. (Compl., 1.) It involved a boating accident during a large regatta
(id. )-a traditional maritime activity. Accordingly, maritime law and the Uniform Statute of
Limitations for Maritime Torts governs this case.
2 This statute was formerly found within the United States Code at 46 U.S.C. § App'x 763a:
"Unless otherwise specified by law, a suit for recovery of damages for personal injury or death,
or both, arising out of a maritime tort, shall not be maintained unless commenced within three
years from the date the cause of action accrued."
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The First Circuit in Butler v. American Trawler Co., Inc., 887 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989),
undertook a significant examination of case law and legislative history to conclude that the
statute was designed to ensure uniformity and avoid forum shopping, and therefore, should
accommodate different provisions infederal law but not state law. Id. at 22 (citing statements of
members of House of Representatives and other commentary in house reports during the
implementation of section 763a); see also Minka v. Genmar Indus. Inc., 29 F.3d 1543, 1548
(11th Cir. 1994) (echoing Butler and discussing need for uniformity, which prompted a reverse-
Erie doctrine for the application of federal law over state law in maritime/admiralty actions);
Usher v. MIV Ocean Wave, 21F.3d370, 372 (9th Cir. 1994); Abdallah v. Int'/ Lease Fin. Corp.,
2015 WL 1263141, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2015) (similar discussion oflegislative history
with respect to section 30106); Konrad v. S.C. Elec. 7 Gas Co., 417 S.E.2d 557, 559 (S.C. 1992)
(embracing Butler to find 3 year federal, not 6 year state, statute of limitations applied).
With these federal goals in mind, other courts have concluded that "federal maritime,
rather than state law, governs whether the limitation period in a maritime tort action has been
tolled." Bourgeois v. Weber Marine LLC, 80 F. Supp. 3d 721, 726 (M.D. La. 2015) (citing
Louisiana Supreme Court for application of the federal statute of limitations, not a Louisiana
tolling provision, to determine ''whether the suit [was] timely filed, even when the suit was
commenced and remained in state court"); see also id. (collecting federal cases concluding that
maritime law "governs not only the length of the limitation period but also the circumstances
under which that period is, or is not, tolled or suspended"). To apply a state tolling statute
''would undermine the[] concerns for fairness and uniformity'' that Congress intended to achieve
with the Uniform Statute of Limitations. Ford v. Atkinson Dredging Co., 474 S.E.2d 652, 653
(Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (declining to apply Georgia's tolling statute for infancy); see also id. ("We
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believe that Congress would have contemplated the application of state law tolling provisions to
§ 763a, had it intended such.").
After conducting this survey of the law, the Court is satisfied that federal law governs this
issue in its entirety. The three year statute oflimitations is unaffected by New Jersey tolling
provisions, despite Plaintiffs infancy at the time of the accident, see Ro/ax v. Whitman, 175 F.
Supp. 2d 720, 726 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing N.J.S.A. provisions on tolling tort claims for infancy
until the plaintiff reaches the age of majority). Plaintiffs reliance on LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d
1066 (N.J. 2001), is misplaced. In LaFage, the New Jersey Supreme Court extended New
Jersey's infancy tolling provision to New Jersey's Wrongful Death Act, which included no such
minority tolling provision. Id. at 1073. The present case, however, is distinct. As discussed in
detail above, it involves a body of general federal law and codified federal statutes, cf id. at 1074
(citing case law from other states that similarly read tolling provisions into their own wrongful
death statutes that did not include express tolling provisions), designed specifically to produce
nationwide uniformity and prevent litigants from forum shopping to states with potentially more
favorable statutes oflimitations and related provisions. While section 30106 "is silent on the
rights of a minor" (Pl. 's Opp'n at 6), to use this tolling provision would impermissibly conflict
with maritime law rather than simply fill a gap.
In sum, the Court declines to toll the statute of limitations due to Plaintiff's infancy. This
accident occurred in July 2014. Although Plaintiff was 16 years old at the time, the statute of
limitations began to accrue then and not when she reached 18 years of age. The statute of
limitations expired in July 2017, but Plaintiff filed this lawsuit months later in December 2017.
Therefore, it is untimely and must be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to comply with the statute
of limitations.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Brant Beach Yacht Club's Motion to Dismiss is
granted. An appropriate order will follow.
Date:
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