HUBBARD v. LANIGAN et al
Filing
3
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 4/23/2018. (mmh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
FRANK HUBBARD,
HONORABLE ANNE E. THOMPSON
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 18-2055 (AET-DEA)
v.
GARY LANIGAN, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Frank Hubbard, Plaintiff Pro Se
47656/997956
New Jersey State Prison
PO BOX 861
Trenton, NJ 08625
RECEIVED
APR 2ii 2018
THOMPSON, District Judge:
I .
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Frank Hubbard's ("Plaintiff") civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1. At this time, the Court must review the complaint,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) (2) and 1915A to determine
whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Cburt
concludes that the complaint will proceed in part.
I I .
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against New
Jersey Department of Corrections ("NJDOC") Commissioner Gary
Lanigan, New Jersey State Prison ("NJSP") Administrator Steven
Johnson, Administrative Director Mary Lang, and Dr. Ralph
Woodward. The following factual allegations are taken from the
complaint and are accepted for purposes of this screening only.
The Court has made no findings as to the truth of Plaintiff's
allegations.
Plaintiff, a convicted and sentenced prisoner at NJSP, has
Hepatitis C and has been recommended for treatment with Harvoni
by a specialist in 2015.
Complaint·~
8. However, he was told
during a chronic care appointment in January 2017 that he was
not on NJSP's treatment list.
Id.
~
9. In September 2017, Dr.
Hussein entered into Plaintiff's record "you are a candidate for
harvoni, waiting for administrative approval." Id.
~
10. He was
confirmed to be on the treatment list on September 26, 2017. Id.
~
11.
On December 2, 2017, Plaintiff requested treatment in
accordance with the contract between NJDOC and its treatment
provider. Id.
~
12. He filed a grievance after being told to
discuss his concerns with the provider. Id.
~
13; Exhibit B.
Plaintiff spoke with a nurse practitioner and was informed that
it was policy not to treat patients until a particular numher
2
reached 1.6 "which means [the patient's] liver is effectively
destroyed. That [he] should be treated but the administration is
working with a budget." Id.
~
14.
Plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. He also raises violations of state law and the
contract between NJDOC and its medical provider.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Standa~ds
for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S. C.
§
1915 ( e) ( 2) ( B) , seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.
§
1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.
§
1997e. The
PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject
to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§
1915 (e) (2) (b) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, "a pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
3
not do . ' " 5 5 6 U . S . 6 6 2 , 6 7 8 ( 2 0 0 9 )
( quoting Be 11 At 1 antic Corp .
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte
screening for failure to state a claim, 1 the complaint must
allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). "A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93-94
(2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. pay, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). Although
pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiffs "still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim."
1
"The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) ." Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x
120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220,· 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App'x 230,
2 3 2 ( 3 d Cir . 2 0 12 ) ( discus s in g 4 2 U . S . C . § 19 9 7 e ( c ) ( 1 ) ) ;
Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App'x. 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
4
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,
704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who,
under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper ~roceeding for redress ....
§
1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second,
that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48
(1988); Malleus v. George,
641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.
2011); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994) .
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges denial of medical care claims under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. As Plaintiff is a convicted
and sentenced state prisoner, his claims shall proceed, if at
all, under the Eighth Amendment.
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A. Official Capacity Claims
Defendants are immune from suit for monetary damages in
their official capacities. "[A] suit against a state official in
his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official
but rather is a suit against the official's office." Will v.
Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The
Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Plaintiff may not
bririg a suit against the State in federal court unless Congress
has expressly abrogated New Jersey's sovereign immunity or the
State has consented to being sued in federal court. Will,
491
U.S. at 66. Neither exception applies here as there is no
indication New Jersey has consented to be sued, nor has Congress
abrogated sovereign immunity in enacting
Maenza,
614 F. App'x 42, 44
Jordan,
§
(3d Cir. 2015)
1983. See Gromek v.
(citing Quern v.
440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979)).
B. Denial of Medical Care
Plaintiff alleges he has been denied medical care in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment requires that
prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care.
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See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); Afdahl v.
Cancellieri,
this claim,
463 F. App'x 104, 107 (3d Cir. 2012).
"To prove
'evidence must show (i) a serious medical need, and
(ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate
deliberate indifference to that need.'" Parkell v. Danberg, 833
F.3d 313, 337 (3d Cir. 2016)
(quoting Natale v. Camden Cty.
Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582
(3d Cir. 2003)). Hepatitis C
qualifies as a serious medical need.
The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference "'where
the prison official (1)
knows of a prisoner's need for medical
treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it;
(2) delays
necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or
(3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended
medical treatment.'" Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 337
Cir. 2016)
(quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197
(3d
(3d
Cir. 1999)). Construing the complaint liberally and giving
Plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences, Plaintiff
has sufficiently alleged defendants "established or enforced
policies and practices directly causing the constitutional
violation." Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d
210, 223 (3d Cir. 2015)
(citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099,
1118 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges defendants have final
policy-making authority and created a policy refusing to treat
7
inmates with Harvoni for budgetary reasons until they had a 1.6
score, which Plaintiff alleges means significant liver damage.
This claim shall therefore be permitted to proceed. See also
Allah v. Thomas,
679 F. App'x 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2017)
(holding
plaintiff stated § 1983 denial of medical care claim based on
allegations that he did not receive Hepatitis C treatment
because it was cost-prohibitive).
C. State law claims
Plaintiff also alleges defendants violated state law and
their contractual obligation to provide him with treatment. The
Court will dismiss his breach of contract claim for lack of
standing.
Other courts in this district have held that prisoners have
no standing to sue for any alleged breach of contract between
the State and its medical care providers; the only party with
standing to sue for a breach of contract would be the State
itself. See, e.g., Ali v. Univ. Corr. Health Care, No. 17-1285,
2017 WL 3736652, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2017); Garcia v. Corr.
Med. Serv., No. 13-1250, 2014 WL 346625, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 30,
2014); Maqbool v. University Hosp. of Medicine & Dentistry of
N.J., No. 11-4592, 2012 WL 2374689, at *4 (D.N.J. June 13,
2012); Green v. Corzine, No. 09-1600, 2011 WL 735745, at *4
(D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2011). The Court agrees and will dismiss the
breach of contract claim.
8
The Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's state law claim based on N.J. Stat. Ann.
§
26:2T-1,
et seq.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the complaint will proceed in
part.
An appropriate order
~2~,-;orcl
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Date
U.S. District Judge
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