CRAFT v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 8/28/2018. (km)

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

NATHAN CRAFT,
Civil Action No. 18-8620 (PGS)
Petitioner,
v.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIE BONDS, et al.,
Respondents.

SHERIDAN, District Judge:
Petitioner Nathan Craft, confined at the South Woods State Prison in Bridgeton, New
Jersey, files the instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

2254,

challenging his conviction for second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.
STAT. ANN.

§

2C:35-5(b)(2) after pleading guilty in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Monmouth County. At this time, the Court must screen the Petition in accordance with
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, to determine if the Petition should be dismissed
because Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
The petition raises one claim: that certain evidence acquired by the police was obtained in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Attached to the Petition as exhibits are a partial
transcript of the motion to suppress the results of the search, ECF No. 1-3; the decision by the New
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division on direct appeal affirming the denial of the motion to
suppress, ECF No. 1-4; and the order from the New Jersey Supreme Court denying the petition for
certification, ECF No. 1-5. The appellate court summarized the facts as follows:

The arresting officer testified he was driving south on Hope Road in Tinton Falls
when he noticed a tan Buick with tinted windows traveling in the same direction.
The officer checked the Buick’s license plate and learned the registered owner had
a suspended license. The officer pulled the car over and approached the driver, later
identified as defendant Nathan Craft.
In the course of speaking to the driver, the officer noticed the smell of marijuana,
and asked defendant whether he had been smoking the drug. Defendant admitted
he had smoked marijuana an hour or two earlier. The officer asked defendant to
step out of the car and radioed his sergeant. The officer asked defendant whether
he was armed, and if the officer could pat him down. Defendant said he was not
armed and consented to a pat down. Noticing a bulge in one of defendant’s pockets,
the officer discovered a large wad of cash but no weapon. In response to the officer’s
question as to why he was carrying so much cash, defendant told the officer it was
about $8000, which he had to pay bills. The officer returned the cash to defendant,
and spoke to the sergeant who had arrived on the scene.
The officer approached defendant with a consent to search form, reviewed it with
him and requested defendant’s consent to search the car. The officer testified
defendant refused to sign the form but told him he could search the car. The officer
testified he spoke to defendant for about three to five minutes, making sure he had
defendant’s consent to search the car and trying to understand why, if defendant
was consenting to the search, he was unwilling to sign the form.
The officer testified defendant took issue with the language of the form authorizing
the police “to remove and retain any items of evidential value which they consider
pertinent to their investigation.” Specifically, defendant told the officer he had no
objection to the officer searching his car, he just did not want the police to take his
money.
After confirming with defendant that he understood he had the right to refuse the
search, and that he was consenting to the search but would not sign the form, the
officer signed and dated the form, noting that defendant “[rjefused to sign 11—1—11
5:54pm.” Underneath the space provided for defendant’s signature, the officer
wrote, “gave permission[;] verbal consent[;] didn’t want us to take money.” The
sergeant also signed and dated the form. On cross-examination, the officer
conceded that although he was without basis to seize the cash when he handed it
back to defendant after the pat-down, he knew if drugs were discovered in the car,
he would seize the cash for forfeiture.
Following completion of the form, the officer searched the car and found part of a
plastic bag sticking up between the cushions of the backseat. Inside was eighty-five
grams of cocaine packaged in smaller bags. Defendant was arrested, his cash was
seized, and he was transported to the police station where he was processed and
released on his own recognizance after giving a statement.

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The detective who took defendant’s videotaped statement also testified at the
suppression hearing. He explained he was directed to conduct the interview,
“because it’s not every day that you have somebody say hey, search my car but
I’m not going to sign the consent.” After defendant executed the Miranda form, the
detective asked him what had occurred during the course of the stop, whether he
had consented to have his car searched, and why he refused to sign the form.
...

On the videotape, which was played in court and authenticated by the detective,
defendant described the stop very similarly to the way the officer had described it
in his testimony. Defendant several times conceded he gave the officer permission
to search his car. He explained he refused to sign the form, which he reviewed with
the detective, because he “[did not] know the law,” and the language of the form
“was subject to interpretation.” Defendant told the detective he did not understand
the full ramifications of the clause that allowed the police to seize evidence, and he
did not want the officer to take his $8000.
When the detective pressed defendant as to why then had he consented to the
search, knowing he had a right to refuse, defendant expressed the view that the
officer was going to search no matter what defendant said. When the detective
asked whether the Tinton Falls officer had said or done anything during the stop to
indicate he was going to search defendant’s car regardless of whether he got
consent, defendant explained he based his belief on his and others’ prior
experiences. That comment led to an exchange in which the detective stressed that
officers have to stop a voluntary search upon request and defendant expressing
skepticism that any officer would ever do so. Defendant, who is black, told the
detective, who is white, that their views on whether the police respected the rights
of people pulled over in traffic stops likely differed because “we walk two different
lives.”
ECF No. 1-4 at 2-6 (alterations and omissions in original) (footnotes omitted); see also State v.
Craft, No. A-1219-14T2, 2017 WL 1927864, at *l_2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 10, 2017).
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s motion to suppress,
holding that:
Although there is no question but that “the scope of a consent search is limited by
the terms of its authorization,” State v. Santana, 215 N.J. Super. 63, 72 (App. Div.
1987), we cannot find that defendant somehow limited his unequivocal consent to
search his car by his unwillingness to surrender the cash the detectives had already
found in his pocket and returned to him. Neither are we aware of any requirement
that would have the officer explain that if they found drugs in the car, they could
lawfully seize the cash in his pocket, as well as his car, on the theory it was integral
to or utilized in furtherance of illegal drug distribution, see N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:64—la(2)-(3), even though aware he did not want police to take his money.
3

Although defendant’s consent ultimately led to the seizure of the cash, the cash was
not seized pursuant to defendant’s unequivocal consent to search his car.
As for defendant’s statement to the detective that he only consented because of his
belief that the police would have searched anyway, we do not find it undermined
defendant’s objective acknowledgement “that he had a choice in the matter.” State
v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354 (1975). We are mindful of his concession to the
detective that the Tinton Falls officers treated him with respect and made no attempt
to coerce his compliance. A defendant’s subjective perception that his consent was
coerced will not vitiate an otherwise valid given consent to search
ECF No. 1-4 at 10-11; 2017 WL 1927864, at *34
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.s.c.

§

2254, “a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§

2254(a).

“Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally
insufficient on its face.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). Habeas Rule 4 requires a
district court to examine a habeas petition prior to ordering an answer and “[i]f it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 Rule 4. See also Mayle v.

Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005) (“Under Habeas Corpus Rule 4,

if ‘it plainly appears from the petition

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.

.

that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district

court,’ the court must summarily dismiss the petition without ordering a responsive pleading.”).
Petitioner raises one ground for relief, asserting that “[b]ecause the state failed to establish that
consent to search was freely and voluntarily given, the state court erred in denying [the] motion to
suppress.” ECF No. 1

¶

12. As such, he argues “[j]udgment should be vacated on grounds that

consentless search violated

Amendment.” Id. at 15.

4

Federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims is barred where state prisoners had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims in state court. Stone v. Powell, 248 U.S. 465, 494
(1976). The record submitted with the petition clearly shows that Petitioner had a full and fair
review in the state courts of his Fourth Amendment claim. “An erroneous or summary resolution
by a state court of a Fourth Amendment claim does not overcome the bar.

.

.

.

[Petitioner] is at

most alleging that the Fourth Amendment claims were decided incorrectly.. by the New Jersey
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courts, allegations which are insufficient to surmount the Stone bar.” Marshall v. Hendricks, 307
F.3d 36, 82 (3d Cir. 2002).
AEDPA provides that an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order
in a

§

2254 proceeding unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability on the ground that “the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§

2253(c)(2). The United States Supreme Court held in Slack v. McDaniel that “[w]hen the district
court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying
constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). This Court denies a certificate of appealability
because jurists of reason would not find it debatable that dismissal of the petition as barred by
Stone is correct.
An appropriate order follows.

Peter G. Sheridan, U.S.D.J.
Date:

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