WILLIAMS v. ANN KLEIN FORENSIC CENTER et al
Filing
37
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 02/06/2020. (jmh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JONATHAN D. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 18-9606 (PGS) (DEA)
:
OPINION
v.
ANN KLEIN FORENSIC CENTER, et al.,
Defendants.
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee proceeding with this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§
1983. In
July, 2019, this Court consolidated this action with the allegations plaintiff alleged in Civ. No.
19-8930. Therefore, this Court will analyze the allegations raised in both actions as if they were
filed in one.1
Previously, this Court granted plaintiff’s application to proceed informapauperis. (See
Civ. No. 18-9606, ECF 3; Civ. No. 19-8930, ECF 4). Thereafter, counsel was appointed to
represent plaintiff. (See No. 18-9606, ECF 5, 15, 16). Appointed counsel was given the
opportunity to file an amended complaint on behalf of plaintiff. (See Id., ECF 19). However, if
no amended complaint was filed, this Court would proceed to screen plaintiff’s original
complaint. (See id.). Having not received a proposed amended complaint from plaintiff’s
‘The Clerk will be ordered to combine the original complaint in this action along with the
complaint in 19-8930 as an all-inclusive amended complaint as a new docket entry in 18-9606.
Also, it is worth noting that plaintiff filed numerous letters after submitting his complaint in 198930. Nevertheless, this Court will not consider those in this opinion as plaintiff cannot file
amended complaint piecemeal, but instead must file one all-encompassing amended complaint.
See L. Civ. R. 15.1(a).
appointed counsel, this Court will now screen plaintiffs allegations in his original complaints
filed in both actions that have been consolidated.
This Court must screen the allegations pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A to determine whether they are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or whether the allegations seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from suit. For the following reasons, plaintiffs action will be permitted to proceed in
part. More specifically, as outlined below, plaintiffs excessive force claim against defendant
Aguirre will be permitted to proceed. Additionally, plaintiffs retaliation claims against
defendants Aguirre and Jenkins will be permitted to proceed. Finally, plaintiffs condition of
confinement claim related to food (or lack thereof) will proceed against defendant Roth.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104-134,
§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66
to 132 1-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding informapauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.
§
§
§
1915(e)(2)(B),
1915A(b), or brings a
1997e. The PLRA directs district courts
to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B).
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure l2(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x
2
230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C.
§
1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F.
App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C.
§
1915A(b)). That standard is set forth in
Ashcrofi v. Jqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To survive the court’s
screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege ‘sufficient factual matter’ to
show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed.2 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972). Nevertheless, “prose litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§
1983 for certain violations of
constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
2
While plaintiff is now proceeding through counsel, given that this Court is reviewing his
complaints which he filed pro Se, they will be liberally construed.
3
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
Thus, to state a claim for relief under
§
1983, a plaintiff must allege first, the violation of
a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v.
Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
III.
PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs allegations will be construed as true for purposes of this screening opinion.
Plaintiff names the following defendants in No. 18-9606: (1) Ann Klein Forensic Center;
(2) Dr. Glenn Ferguson
Psychiatrist
—
—
Chief Executive Officer Ann Klein Forensic Center; (3) Dr. Moisey
Ann Klein Forensic Center; (4) Dr. Douglas Smith
Forensic Center; (5) Dr. Paul
—
—
—
Psychiatrist Ann Klein
Psychiatrist Ann Klein Forensic Center; (6) Dr. Strathern
—
Psychologist Ann Klein Forensic Center; (7) Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office; (8) Timothy
Ward, Esq.
—
Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office; (9) Angelo J. Onofri, Esq.
Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office; (10) Judge Thomas Brown
Sergeant Giovani
Christie
—
—
Center; (14) Paul R. Adezio
—
Top Prosecutor
Superior Court Judge; (11)
Correctional Sergeant Mercer County Correctional Center; (12) Christopher
Old Governor; (13) Mr. Aguirre
John Doe # 1
—
—
—
—
Medical Security Officer Ann Klein Forensic
Former Record Custodian McDade Administrative Building; (15)
President of Homeware Video Visitation Services; (16) Jane Does 1-3
Nurses Mercer County Correctional Center; (17) S.A. Moon
—
—
Triage
Sergeant Law Enforcement
Adjudicator Mercer County Correctional Center; (18) Almeen Jenkins—Medical Security
Officer Ann Klein Forensic Center; and (19) Dr. Robert Roth
4
—
Psychiatrist Ann Klein Forensic
Center. In addition to these defendants that plaintiff expressly names, this Court also construes
plaintiff as attempting to bring a claim against his deputy public defender, Jessica Lyons, based
on allegations in the body of the complaint.
In No. 19-8930, plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Ann Klein Forensic
Center; (2) D. Kessler, CEO; (3) Dr. Robert Roth; (4) K. Green (M.S.O.); (5) L. Hargis
(M.S.O.); (6) Dr. Darivsz Chacinski; (7) Justyna Oberschmidt; (8) Silas Odaa; (9) Dr. Singh; and
(10) Dr. Ricardo Grippaldi. In addition to these defendants, this Court also construes the
complaint as attempting to bring a claim against H. Pica based on allegations in the body of the
complaint.
While plaintiff’s allegations are not always the definition of clarity, plaintiff appears to be
bringing claims arising from his detainment at both the Mercer County Correctional Center
(‘MCCC”) as well as the Ann Klein Forensic Center (“AKFC”).
1. AKFC
Plaintiff seeks to sue AKFC. However, AKFC is not a “person” amenable to suit under
Section 1983. See Walker v. Ctv. of Gloucester, No. 15-7073, 2018 WL 1064210, at *3 (D.N.J.
Feb. 27, 2018) (collecting cases and stating that County Correctional Facility is not a “person”
under Section 1983); see also Boomer v. Lewis, 541 F. App’x 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against this defendant will be dismissed with prejudice for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
2. Dr. Paul and Sergeant Giovani
Dr. Paul is a psychologist who works at AFKC. (See No. 18-9606, ECF 1 at 8). Dr. Paul
apparently came to evaluate plaintiff while he was incarcerated at MCCC. (See id. at 13). Dr.
Paul stood by plaintiffs door. (See id.). Plaintiff was nude sitting on his toilet. (See id). Plaintiff
5
states Dr. Paul was there to conduct an evaluation of him. (See id.) Plaintiff asked Dr. Paul to
leave numerous times. (See id.) Dr. Paul eventually did so. (See id).
Plaintiff asserts that Sergeant Giovani, a correctional sergeant at MCCC, knew that
plaintiff was not dressed when she permitted Dr. Paul to begin his evaluation. (See Id. at 10, 25).
Plaintiff also states that Giovani purportedly entered false reports against plaintiff into his record.
(See id. 26). He states that these false reports directly related to plaintiff being pushed down a
flight of stairs as Giovani was escorting plaintiff from a clinic area in MCCC. (See Id.).
Pretrial detainees have a right to bodily privacy consistent with the security needs of a
prison. See Byrd v. Maricopa Cnly. Bd. ofSupervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2017);
O’dell’bey v. Semple, No. 19-304, 2020 WL 127698, at *7 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2020). In the
context of allegations regarding viewing plaintiff on the toilet, courts typically look to whether
incident(s) were regular/frequent and how close the viewing was in determining whether a
plaintiff has stated a Fourth Amendment constitutional claim. See Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d
491, 494-95 (9th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff’s allegations consist of an isolated incident. Plaintiff does not indicate in the
complaint that the incident was prolonged. Indeed, he states that Paul eventually left upon
plaintiffs repeated requests. Accordingly, plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim against Paul and
Giovani arising from Paul’s view of plaintiff on the toilet will be dismissed without prejudice.
Accord Patrick v. McDermott, No. 16-3 18, 2019 WL 3213750, at *6 (C.D. Cal. April 2,2019)
(factual allegations consisting of brief isolated incident where defendant looked at plaintiffs
exposed penis and did nothing more does not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief).
Plaintiffs allegation of Giovani entering false reports about him also fails to state a
claim. This allegation is entirely devoid of facts, does not state what the reports said or in what
6
way they were false. Thus, this Court need not decide with respect to Giovani whether such
allegations could sustain a claim, as such a conclusory allegation fails to state a claim under the
Iqbal standard at the outset. See, e.g. Sanchez v. Poag, No. 11-3824, 2016 WL 1134536, at *3
(D.N.J. March 22, 2016) (allegation that defendant overlooked the filing of reports was
conclusory and failed to state a claim because it was devoid of facts and did not state what the
reports were or in what way they were false). Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against defendants
Paul and Giovani will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.3
3. Dr. Strathern, Dr. Moisey & Dr. Smith
Plaintiff states that he was defamed by Dr. Strathern in an evaluation of plaintiff. (See
No. 18-9606, ECF 1 at 17). Plaintiff also notes a report from Dr. Moisey in which he “literally
lied on the incoming reports and stated that plaintiff reported auditory hallucinations where a
little green man was talking to him.” (See id. at 28). He claims that Dr. Smith also falsified
medical records. (See id. at 45).
Plaintiffs claims against Strathern and Smith fail to state a claim for similar reasons as
discussed with respect to Giovani. More specifically, plaintiffs complaint is completely devoid
of any facts with respect to the purportedly falsity of their reports. Thus, this Court finds that
such allegations fail to satisfy the Iqbal standard to state a claim. Therefore, plaintiffs claims
against Strathern and Smith will be dismissed without prejudice.
It is true that plaintiffs allegations with respect to Moisey are more specific in that
plaintiff explains what portion of his medical report he claims is false. Plaintiffs claims for
Plaintiff alludes to the fact that Giovani’s purported false report related to him being pushed
down a flight of stairs. However, plaintiff does not allege who pushed him down the stairs and
certainly does not state that Giovani pushed him down the stairs. Therefore, this Court will not
construe the complaint as attempting to bring an excessive force claim against Giovani based on
factual allegations that are not alleged.
7
deliberate indifference to his medical care is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment as
plaintiff is a pretrial detainee. See Tapp
V.
Brazill, 645 F. App’x 141, 145 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016).
Nevertheless, the Eighth Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” standard provides a guide to
what, at a minimum, is owed to pretrial detainees. See id. (citing Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 58 1-82 (3d Cir. 2003)).
For the delay or denial of medical care to rise to a violation of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, a prisoner must demonstrate “(1) that defendants were
deliberately indifferent to [his] medical needs and (2) that those
needs were serious.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.
1999). Deliberate indifference requires proof that the official
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.” Natale v. Camden Cniy. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582
(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994)). We have found deliberate indifference where a prison
official: “(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but
intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical
treatment based on a nonmedical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner
from receiving needed or recommended treatment.” Rouse, 182
F.3d at 197. Deference is given to prison medical authorities in the
diagnosis and treatment of patients, and courts “disavow any
attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular
course of treatment (which) remains a question of sound
professional judgment.” Inmates ofAllegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce,
612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551
F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)). Allegations of negligent treatment or
medical malpractice do not trigger constitutional protections.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).
...
Pierce v. Pitkins, 520 F. App’x 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2013). Deliberate indifference can also be found
“where the prison official persists in a course of treatment in the face of resultant pain and risk of
permanent injury.” See McCluskey v. Vincent, 505 F. App’x 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “A medical need is serious if it ‘has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment,’ or if it ‘is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” See Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 236 (3d Cir.
8
2012) (quotingAtkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Monmouth
Cniy. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987))).
This Court finds that plaintiffs allegations against Moisey also fail to state a
constitutional claim. See, e.g., Rivera v. Tennis, No. 09-888, 2010 WL 2838603, at *7 (M.D. Pa.
May 20, 2010) (filing false medical report insufficient to state a constitutional claim as it
amounted to disagreement in medical treatment), report and recommendation adopted by, 2010
WL 2838605 (M.D. Pa. July 19, 2010); see also Moore v. Casselberry, 584 F. Supp. 2d 580, 582
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). Indeed, this Court notes that plaintiff fails to allege how the purported falsity
through the one statement in plaintiffs intake medical report by Moisey constituted Moisey’s
deliberate indifference to plaintiffs serious medical needs.
4. Ferguson
Plaintiff alleges Ferguson is Strathern’s employer as CEO of AKFC. (See No. 18-9606,
ECF I at 8, 17). Plaintiff claims that violations of the criminal code have taken place under the
leadership of Ferguson at AKFC and that he failed to notify proper authorities who could have
taken preventive action. (See id. at 18).
A
§
1983 plaintiff cannot rely solely on a respondeat superior theory. See Alexander v.
Gennarini, 144 F. Appx. 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Section 1983 liability cannot be found solely
on the basis of respondeat superior”). Instead, a plaintiff must allege that a supervisor had a
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. See Rode v. Dellaciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d
Cir. 1988). “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of
actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
9
With respect to supervisors, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
recognized that “there are two theories of supervisory liability, one
under which supervisors can be liable if they established and
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the
constitutional harm, and another under which they can be liable if
they participated in violating plaintiffs rights, directed others to
violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and
acquiesced in their subordinates’ violations.” Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation
and alteration marks omitted).
Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); see also A.M ex rel. IMK. v. Luzerne
Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).
In this case, plaintiff does not allege a policy, practice or custom specifically related and
tying them to allegations associated with Ferguson, nor does he allege that Ferguson participated
in or directed others to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Thus, plaintiff fails to state a
Section 1983 damages claim against Ferguson.
It is worth noting that a claim for prospective injunctive relief has a different legal
standard. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that a lack of
personal involvement does not preclude a plaintiff from obtaining prospective injunctive relief
for ongoing violations. See Parkell, 833 F.3d at 332 (citing Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. &
Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013)); Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th
Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Argueta v. US. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70,
77 (3d Cir. 2011); Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 88—89 (2d Cir. 1996). Rather, the focus is
remedial; a defendant must be an appropriate person to implement injunctive relief, should it be
ordered.
This Court notes that plaintiff is no longer detained at AKFC. (See No. 19-8930, ECF
19). Instead, he is now at MCCC. (See id.) “A prisoner’s transfer from the prison complained of
10
generally moots his claims for prospective injunctive relief.” See Alsop v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 17-2307, 2019 WL 1437606, at *3 (M.D. Pa. March 1, 2019) (citing Sutton v.
Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (other citations omitted)), report and
recommendation adopted by, 2019 WL 1429534 (M.D. Pa. March 29, 2019). Therefore,
plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief against Ferguson will also be dismissed without prejudice
for failure to state a claim.
5. Jessica Lyons
Next, plaintiff sues Jessica Lyons, deputy public defender. She is alleged to be assisting
defendant Timothy Ward in securing a wrongful conviction against plaintiff “by deliberately
refusing to assist or participate in defense efforts.
.
.
.“
(See No. 18-9606, ECF 1 at 22). Plaintiff
states that he has asked Lyons for grand jury minutes, but that his requests have been denied.
(See Id.)
A public defender does not “act under color of state law” within the meaning of § 1983
and cannot be subject to liability under that statute. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318
(1981). Nevertheless, where a public defender conspires with the state to deprive an individual of
his rights, the public defender is not immune from civil liability under
§
1983. See Tower v.
Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 916-20 (1984) (finding public defender who allegedly conspired with
judges and state attorney general to obtain criminal defendant’s conviction was acting under
color of state law). However, to plead conspiracy under
§
1983, a plaintiff “must provide some
factual basis to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted
action.” Capogrosso v. Supreme Court ofN.i, 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009). A bare
allegation of an agreement is insufficient to sustain a conspiracy claim. See Brown v. Deparlos,
492 F. App’x 211, 215 (3d Cir. 2012).
11
Plaintiff does not present any facts to suggest a conspiracy besides his cone lusory
allegation that Lyons is actively assisting the prosecutor. Such conclusory and unsupported
allegations are insufficient to sustain a claim against the Lyons, the deputy public defender
representing plaintiff in his criminal action. Accord Bayette v. Vanamburgh, No. 19-13424, 2019
WL 6888408, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2019). Therefore, plaintiffs claims against Lyons will be
dismissed without prejudice.
6.
Mercer County Prosecutor ‘s Office, Timothy Ward & Angelo I Onofri
Plaintiff states that Ward is attempting to secure a wrongful conviction against plaintiff.
(See No. 18-9606, ECF 1 at 22). Furthermore, he asserts that Ward is improperly using the
shortened form of his first name, “Tim,” on court records. Onofri is purportedly Ward’s
supervisor.
The Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office is not a person amenable to suit under Section
1983. See Es/ate ofLagano v. Bergen Cniy. Prosecutor’s Qffice, 769 F.3d 850, 854-55 (3d Cir.
2014). Thus, the claims against this defendant will be dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, ‘a state prosecuting attorney who act[s] within the scope of his duties in
initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution” is not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C.
§
1983.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976). Similarly, “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in
preparing for the initiation ofjudicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of
his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.”
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); see also B.S. v. Somerset County, 704 F.3d
250, 269 (3d Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs claims for monetary damages against defendants Ward and
Onofri will be dismissed.4
It may be that plaintiff is also attempting to bring a malicious prosecution claim against these
two defendants. “To prove malicious prosecution under [] 1983 when the claim is under the
‘
12
Nevertheless, prosecutors are not immune from requests for injunctive relief. See
Blakeney v. Marsico, 340 F. App’x 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s
requests for injunctive relief relate to his detainment at the AKFC. Indeed, he seeks to stop his
commitment to that facility. (See 18-9606, ECF 1 at 50). However, as previously noted, plaintiff
is no longer detained at that facility, but is now incarcerated at MCCC. This transfer moots his
claims for injunctive relief arising from his detainment at AKFC in the complaint against Ward
and Onofri. See Vaughn v. Cambria County Prison, 709 F. App’x 152, 155 (3d Cir. 2017)
(citations omitted). Accordingly, all of plaintiff’s claims against these three defendants will be
dismissed, albeit against the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office with prejudice.
7.
Judge Brown
Plaintiff next claims Judge Brown refused to launch an investigation into Ward who is an
alleged criminal. He also claims that Judge Brown ordered an assault on plaintiff to stop plaintiff
from speaking during court proceedings in violation of his First Amendment free speech rights.
Additionally, plaintiff asserts that Judge Brown signed “illegal orders” for a psychological
evaluation of plaintiff.
At the outset, it is unnecessary for this Court to decide whether plaintiff can bring a claim
against Judge Brown for his purported failure to bring a criminal investigation against Ward.
Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding;
(2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without
probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the
plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept
of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 8 1-82 (3d
Cir. 2007) (citing Estate ofSmith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)). Here, of course,
plaintiff cannot sustain a malicious prosecution claim as he has not alleged that the criminal
proceedings have ended in his favor. Furthermore, as explained previously in discussing Lyons
and Ward’s purported conspiracy, those allegations are conclusory and fail to state a claim.
13
Indeed, plaintiff fails to indicate the criminality of Ward in his complaint with any facial
plausibility.
Next, a judicial officer has immunity in the performance of his duties. See Mire/es v.
Waco, 502 U.s. 9, 11(1991). The immunity is absolute and cannot be overcome by allegations
of bad faith or malice. See id. There are two exceptions: (1) for non-judicial actions, not taken in
the judge’s official capacity; and (2) for actions which, although judicial in nature, were taken in
the complete absence ofjurisdiction. See id. at 11—12. Whether an act is judicial relates “to the
nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the
expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978); see also Gal/as v. Supreme Court ofPa., 211 F.3d 760,
768 (3d Cir.2000) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs allegations relate to court proceedings which are judicial acts subject to
judicial immunity. Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff alleges that Judge Brown ordered an
assault on plaintiff, such allegations are conclusory lacking any facial plausibility. Accordingly,
plaintiffs claims for monetary damages against Judge Brown are dismissed.
Judicial immunity though only extends to monetary damages. See Larsen v. Senate of the
Commonwealth, 152 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, to the extent plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief from Judge Brown, “in any action brought against ajudicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C.
§
1983.
Plaintiff does not allege that such exception applies in this case. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims
against Judge Brown will be dismissed without prejudice.
14
8.
Christopher Christie
Plaintiff next states that former Governor Christopher Christie failed to take appropriate
actions to stop rapes that occurred on females housed at AKFC. (See No. 18-9606, ECF I at 30).
Plaintiff claims that he became emotionally distraught when he read in the newspaper that
Christie had been informed of the rapes a year prior to this occurrence. (See id. at 31).
The PLRA prohibits recovery for damages for mental and emotional injuries absent a
showing of physical injury. See 42 U.S.C.
§
1997e(e); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 535-36
(3d Cir. 2003). Plaintiff alleges no physical injury arising out of his allegations against Christie.
Therefore, his claims against the former governor will be dismissed without prejudice.5
9.
Jane Doe Triage Nurses
Next, plaintiff alleges that due to a calorie deficiency in his diet while detained at MCCC
(see No. 18-9606, ECF 1 at 24), his immune system weakened resulting in frequent respiratory
infections. (See id.) When it was determined that the infection was viral, he received many
different congestion medications, but “Triage Nurses” purportedly failed to properly order a
corresponding increase in his caloric intake. (See id. at 39).
Plaintiff admits that he was given medication for his ailments by the “Triage Nurses.”
Thus, his complaint with respect to the “Triage Nurses” relates to a disagreement as to how best
to treat his respiratory ailments. Such allegations are insufficient to state a claim for deliberate
indifference. Indeed, “when medical care is provided, [courts] presume that the treatment of a
prisoner is proper absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.” Pearson v.
Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added); accord Brown v.
As noted previously, to the extent that plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief from the former
Governor, and Williams is no longer incarcerated at AKFC, thus mooting his injunctive relief
claims.
15
Borough of Chainbersburg, 903 F.2d 274. 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“it is well established that as long
as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner’s
constitutional rights”); Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326. 346 (3d. Cir. 1987)
(“mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” does not “support a claim of an eighth
amendment violation”); Inmates ofAllegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir.
1979) (“the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment... remains a question of
sound professional judgment.”). Thus, neither a plaintiffs personal, subjective dissatisfaction
with the care he has been provided, nor his disagreement with the professional judgment of
trained medical staff, in and of itself, is sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See
Hairston v. Director Bureau of Prisons, 563 F. App’x. 893. 895 (3d Cir. 2014); White v.
Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990): Andrews v. Camden Cly., 95 F. Supp. 2d 217, 228
(D.N.J. 2000). Accordingly, plaintiffs claims against the “Triage Nurses” will be dismissed
without prejudice.
10. S.A. Moon
Besides stating that S.A. Moon is a Sergeant/Law Enforcement Adjudicator at MCCC,
plaintiff fails to state any specific factual allegations with any facial plausibility that this
individual violated plaintiffs constitutional rights. Accordingly, any claims plaintiff is seeking to
raise against S.A. Moon will be dismissed without prejudice.
11. Dr.Roth
Plaintiff alleges he was given extremely small portions of food to the point of starvation
while detained at AFKC. He states that he made Dr. Roth aware of the food portions he was
receiving, but that Dr. Roth told him to “shut the f*k up.” (No. 18-9606, ECF 1 at 44).
16
As a pretrial detainee, plaintiffs condition of confinement claim is analyzed under the
Fourteenth Amendment as opposed to the Eighth Amendment. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d
229, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that Fourteenth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees’
conditions of confinement claim). “The Constitution mandates that prison officials satisfy
inmates’ ‘basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.”
Duran v. Merline, 923 F. Supp. 2d 702, 719 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 32 (1993)) (remaining citation omitted). The plaintiff must allege that the defendant
knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health. See Wilson v. Burks, 423 F.
App’x 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
Considering plaintiffs allegations regarding his food, or lack thereof, and Roth’s
knowledge but purportedly lack of action upon plaintiff notifying Roth about the issue, plaintiffs
claim against Roth related to plaintiffs inadequate food portions will be permitted to proceed
past screening.
Plaintiff also attempts to raise claims against Roth in his complaint initially filed in No.
19-8930. Plaintiffs explains that Roth walked onto plaintiffs housing unit and exclaimed that
plaintiff was suing for $400 million and that people should “lie on him.” (No. 19-8930, ECF 1 at
14).
This Court liberally construes these allegations as attempting to bring a retaliation claim
against Roth. “A prisoner alleging retaliation must show (1) constitutionally protected conduct,
(2) an adverse action by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from
exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal connection between the exercise of his
constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.” Mack v. Yost, 427 F. App’x 70,
72 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003)). With respect to
17
the third element, the plaintiff must allege that the constitutionally protected conduct was a
substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action to sufficiently state a retaliation claim. See
Velasquez v. Diguglielmo, 516 Fed.Appx. 91, 95 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Cater v. McGrady, 292
F.3d 152, 157, 158 (3d Cir. 2002)); Rauser [v. Horn, 241 F.3d [330,] 333 [(3d Cir. 2001)].
Furthermore:
To establish the requisite causal connection for a retaliation claim
predicated on the First Amendment, the plaintiff (here, a prisoner)
usually has to prove one of two things: (1) an unusually suggestive
time proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly
retaliatory action; or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with
timing to establish a causal link. Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v.
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007). If neither of these
showings is made, then the plaintiff must show that, from the
evidence in the record as a whole, the trier of fact should infer
causation.” Id.
DeFranco v. Wolfe, 387 F. App’x 147, 154 (3d Cir. 2010). While temporal proximity is relevant
in First Amendment retaliation cases, see Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, Pa., 303 F.3d 488, 494
(3d Cir. 2002) (citing Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334), “[t]he mere passage of time is not legally
conclusive proof against retaliation.” Marra v. Phila. Housing Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 302 (3d Cir.
2007) (quoting Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auih, 982 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1993))
(other citation omitted).
Without more allegations as it relates to Roth specifically, this Court finds that plaintiff
has failed sufficiently allege an adverse action to sustain a retaliation claim against him past the
screening stage. See Chruby v. Kowaleski, 534 F. App’x 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding that
verbal threat to write plaintiff up for misconduct charge if he wrote a letter defendant deemed
inappropriate or impolite was not enough to deter plaintiff from exercising his constitutional
rights). Accordingly, plaintiffs condition of confinement claim against Roth regarding food will
proceed but plaintiffs retaliation claim against Roth will be dismissed without prejudice.
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12. Adezio/John Doe #1 Homeware Video Visitation Systems
Plaintiff sues Adezio in his role as “Record CustodianlMercer County Counsel.” He also
sues John Doe #1 as the President of Homeware Video Visitation Systems. He states that he,
along with other inmates, were improperly up charged in violation of state law for using video
visitation monitors.
These allegations fail to state a constitutional claim. See, e.g., Ruhi v. Hardy, No. 166 123, 2016 WL 9711034, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2016) (noting request for refund seeking
enforcement of state law limiting amount of upcharges for commissary items does not itself
implicate the Constitution) (citing Tenny v. Blagojevich, 659 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 2011))
(other citation omitted). Accordingly, plaintiffs claims against these defendants will be
dismissed without prejudice.
13. Aguirre
With respect to plaintiffs allegations against Aguirre as it relates to plaintiff
specifically6, he alleges that Aguirre purportedly inserted a magic marker in plaintiffs rectum
during a forced drugging of plaintiff. (See No. 18-9606, ECF 1 at 31). This caused plaintiff to
bleed. (See id.) Plaintiff also asserts that Aguirre threatened to kill plaintiff if he did not remove
him as a defendant in his complaint in 18-9606. (See No. 19-8930, ECF 1 at 15). This Court
construes these allegations as attempting to bring both an excessive force and retaliation claim
against Aguirre.
6
Plaintiff also alleges that Aguirre threw an Asian patient down the steps. (See No. 18-9606,
ECF 1 at 31). However, as these allegations do not relate to a purported injury suffered by
plaintiff, such allegations fail to state a claim as it relates to plaintiffs seeking relief.
19
This Court will permit plaintiffs claims related to Aguirre’s purported pushing a magic
marker up plaintiffs rectum to proceed past screening. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct.
2466, 2473 (2015) (holding “that a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or
knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable”).
This Court finds the complaint has sufficiently alleged the first and third elements of
sufficiently stating a retaliation claim through his filing of a civil complaint, see Anderson v.
Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 1997) (filing of civil complaint is constitutionally protected
conduct under the First Amendment) and the casual connection that Aguirre made in referencing
that complaint when he threatened plaintiff. The issue then becomes though whether Aguirre’s
verbal threats that he would kill plaintiff if he did not remove Aguirre as a defendant constitute
adverse action.
The Third Circuit has noted some of the types of actions in the prison context that are
sufficient to establish adversity: “several months in disciplinary confinement, denial of parole,
financial penalties, and transfer to an institution whose distance made regular family visits
impossible; and placement in administrative segregation that severely limited access to the
commissary, library, recreation, and rehabilitative programs.” Dunbar v. Barone, 487 F. App’x
721, 723 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523 530 (3d Cir. 2003); Rauser v.
Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225-26 (3d Cir.
2000)). Additionally, some District Courts have noted that “to state a constitutional claim, verbal
threats must be accompanied by some reinforcing act that escalated the threat beyond more
words.” Boydv. Larson, No. 16-1789, No. 16-1789, 2017 WL 1904278, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21,
2017) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted by, 2017 WL 1862346 (M.D. Pa.
May 9, 2017). Indeed, one District Court within this Circuit held last year that a single incident
20
where prison guards threatened to kill a plaintiff, absent any physical contact, was insufficient to
constitute adverse action. See Green v. Wetzel, No. 18-93, 2019 WL 1426955, at *7 (W.D. Pa.
March 29, 2019). However, in this case, plaintiff has alleged that Aguirre on several occasions
threatened to kill him on several occasions during a two-week period. Furthermore, this Court is
also aware of other cases where threats to kill, if specific enough, could constitute an adverse
action. See, e.g., Stow v. McGrath, 2019 WL 1208810, at *3 (D.N.H. March 14, 2019) (finding
that threat of taking a clean shot against plaintiff was sufficient to satisfy adverse action element
or retaliation claim); Williams v. Hesse, No. 16-1343, 2018 WL 1363759, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.
2, 2018) (finding threats to have plaintiff “fucked up real bad” to kill plaintiff, telling plaintiff he
was “gonna show you how I deal with your kind,” and spitting tobacco in plaintiffs face
plausibly alleged adverse action); cf Gibson v. Jean-Baptiste, No. 17-42, 2018 WL 8807651, at
*3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2018) (noting that threatening to kill a plaintiff to her face would
perhaps suffice as an adverse action). Given the early stages of these proceedings and based on
plaintiffs allegations of Aguirre’s several threats to kill plaintiff over a modest two-week period
between March 1, 2019 and March 15, 2019, this Court finds that proceeding this claim against
Aguirre is the more prudent course at this time. Accordingly, plaintiffs excessive force and
retaliation claims against Aguirre will proceed past screening.
14. Almeen Jenkins
Plaintiff alleges that Almeen Jenkins is a Medical Security Officer at AFKC. (See No. 189606, ECF 1 at 12). He alleges that he is litigating a civil action against her. He further states
that:
21
he nearly died as a result of a negative reaction to chemical
psychotropic drugs that were illegally and brutally stabbed/injected
into Plaintiffs body for non-emergency reasons while he was
punitively held at the Ann Klein Forensic Center, in an attempt to
“break his spirits” as it was described by Medical Security Officer
Almeen Jenkins.
(Seeid. at43).
This Court will permit a retaliation claim against Jenkins to proceed past screening.
Plaintiff has alleged protected activity by asserting his filing of a civil complaint against Jenkins.
Further, he has alleged an adverse action. He claims that he was illegally forced to take drugs.
Finally, Jenkins comments regarding “breaking his spirits” satisfies a causal connection at least
at this early stage of the proceedings to warrant proceeding this claim.
15. H. Pica, M Cheek, M Green
Plaintiff next attempts to bring claims against H. Pica, M. Cheek and M. Green for their
role in purportedly fabricating (or in Mr. Green’s case, hearing that Cheek fabricated), incident
reports against him. (See No. 19-8930, ECF 1 at 14-15). This Court finds such allegations against
these three defendants fail to state with enough factual support and facial plausibility any
constitutional claim. Instead, the allegations are merely conclusory which is insufficient to state a
claim under Jqbal. Therefore, the claims against these three defendants will be dismissed without
prejudice.
16.
Dariusz Chacinski
Next, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Chacinski lied on records before an IMAR panel in a
different patient’s case that plaintiff was working on. (See No. 19-8930, ECF 1 at 16). Plaintiff
fails to allege how such allegations amount to a constitutional violation against him. Thus,
plaintiffs claims against this defendant will be dismissed without prejudice.
22
17. Riccardo Grippaldi, J. Wilkins, Silas Odaa
Plaintiff next alleges that defendants Grippaldi, Wilkins and Odaa are being employed
illegally and/or do not possess the requisite degrees for their positions. (See No. 19-8930, ECF I
at 17-18). This Court fails to see how such allegations by themselves without more amount to a
violation under the constitution. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims against these three defendants
are dismissed without prejudice.
18. Juslyna Oberschmidt
Like the three defendants cited above, plaintiff also alleges that Oberschmidt does not
possess a nursing degree. (See No. 19-8930, ECF 1 at 17). Again, this Court fails to see how
such an allegation, without more, rises to the level of a constitutional violation. However, it is
worth noting that plaintiffs allegations against this defendant do go a bit further as plaintiff does
allege that Oberschmidt gave plaintiff Tylenol for a 104 degree temperature. (See id. at 20). To
the extent that plaintiff is attempting to bring a medical care claim against Oberschmidt based on
this allegation, it fails to state an action given that plaintiffs allegations amount only to a
disagreement as to how his fever was treated, not that Oberschmidt was deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical needs. Accordingly, the claims against this defendant will also be
dismissed without prejudice.
19. L. Hargis
Plaintiff also names L. Hargis as a defendant. However, the caption appears to be the
only place Hargis is named in the complaint. (See No. 19-8930, ECF 1 at 9). Accordingly,
without any personal involvement alleged, plaintiffs claims against Hargis will be dismissed
without prejudice. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
23
20.
Dr. Singh
Plaintiffs allegations against Dr. Singh are as follows:
Plaintiff asserts that elderly Dr. Singh was brainwashed by
Defendant Dr. Robert Roth, and did proceed to tell me false,
slanderous statements that Dr. Singh claim was told to him by
illegally employed Dr. Robert Roth who cleverly instilled fear and
apprehension in the elderly Dr. Singh.
(No. 19-8930, ECF I at 18). This Court fails to see how these allegations against Dr. Singh
amount to a constitutional violation. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims against Dr. Singh will be
dismissed without prejudice.
21. D. Kessler
Plaintiff alleges that D. Kessler is the CEO of AKFC. For similar reasons as to why
plaintiffs claims against Ferguson in 18-9606 fail to state a claim, so too does plaintiffs attempt
to bring Section 1983 claims against Kessler in No. 19-8930 also fail to state a claim.
Accordingly, the claims against this defendant will also be dismissed without prejudice.
22. Remaining Allegations
Plaintiff also makes several other factual allegations in his consolidated complaints.
Among them are the following:
1. Not being feed sufficiently while detained at MCCC (see No. 18-9606, ECF 1 at 23-24);
2. Medical co-pays at MCCC (see id. at 24);
3. Being held at AKFC beyond the time permitted by state court (see id. at 27);
4. Developing Parkinson’s Disease as a result of an overdose of psychotropic drugs (see Id.
at 29);
5. Being illegally strip searched at MCCC (see Ed. at 33);
24
6. Performing slave labor while detained at MCCC by not being compensated for jobs
within the facility (see id. at 42); and
7. Side-effects he is feeling from taking his medications (see No. 19-8930, ECF I at 19-22).
This Court need not determine whether such allegations would constitute stating a claim as all
these allegations have one overarching pleading defect; namely they fail to state with any facial
plausibility how any of the defendants were personally involved in these purported
actions/inactions. Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a claim related to these allegations.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs excessive force claim against defendant Aguirre will
be permitted to proceed. Additionally, plaintiffs retaliation claims against defendants Aguirre
and Jenkins will be permitted to proceed. Finally, plaintiffs condition of confinement claim
related to food (or lack thereof) will proceed against defendant Roth. The remainder of plaintiffs
claims will be dismissed without prejudice, except for plaintiffs claims against AFKC and the
Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office, which will be dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate
order will be entered.
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
February 6, 2020
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