TIMM v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM ORDER that Plaintiff's 4 Application for Emergent Relief is denied. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 6/13/2018. (mps)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RECEIVED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JUN 13 2018
AT 8;30

BRIAN ERIC TIMM,

M

WILLIAM T. WALSH
CLERK

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 18-9769 (MAS) (LHG)
v.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Brian Eric Timrn's ("Plaintifr') "Ex-parte
Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief." (ECF No. 4.) By way of background,
Plaintiff filed this Action on May 29, 2018 alleging: (1) "Un-Alienable Rights Re-Affirmed under
Public Law 39-26"; (2) "Plaintiffs tin-alienable rights re-affirmed under Public Law 39-26 are
violated by the repeat of robo signing scandal of 2010 now perpetrated by the court itself';
(3) "Unlawful Sale of Plaintiffs Property"; (4) "Freeholder's Failure to Supervise"; and (5) two
counts of "Involuntary Servitude." (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs Complaint seeks
seventy-five million dollars,1 plus "[a]ctual damages," an order declaring Plaintiffs note and
mortgage null and void, and an order restoring title to his property. (Cotnpl. 33.)
Factually, Plaintiffs Complaint appears to be based on conduct surrounding Plaintiffs
mortgage and, later, a foreclosure and Sheriffs Sale. Plaintiff claims that in connection with these
proceedings, there was "judicial robo signing" and "fabrication" of documents. (Compl. 8-9.)
Plaintiffs claim is based on the appearance of an "s/" signature on the Final Judgment and "making

1

Plaintiffs Emergent Application includes a Civil Cover Sheet that indicates a monetary demand
of nine hundred million dollars. (ECF No. 4-2.)

it appear as if a [Judge] has reviewed the case." (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff also argues that the Judge in
his foreclosure action was from a "different venue" and therefore "completely outside of his
jurisdictional authority." (Id. at 21.) 2 Plai~tiff claims he has been damaged in the loss of title, loss
of personal property, lost earnings, physical pain, mental anguish, property damage, and
"[d]isruption of family harmony ending in divorce." (Id. at 30.)
On June 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed Certificates of Service (ECF No. 3) and shortly thereafter,
on June 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant "Ex-Parte Emergency Motion" related to a pending
eviction currently scheduled for June 18, 2018. (Emergent Appl., ECF No. 4.) Plaintiffs Emergent
Application seeks a "Preliminary Injunction against Sheriff Shaun Golden [enjoining] him and the
Monmouth County Sheriffs Office to [sic] proceed ... on June 18, 2018." (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff
further seeks a state-wide injunction against all foreclosures "until such time that the state court
foreclosure plaintiffs can proof [sic] that they hold valid judgment and valid Writ of Possession."
(Id. at 9-10.)

Based on the documents provided with Plaintiffs submissions, it appears that Wells Fargo
initiated foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiff on or about September 24, 2012. (Id. at 2.) On
July 12, 2017, the Superior Court entered a Final Judgment, which contains an "s/" signature of
Judge Innes of the Superior Court of New Jersey. (Annex C, ECF No. 4-4.) Subsequently, a
Sheriffs Sale was held where Wells Fargo bid $1,000 and later assigned the bid to Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation. (Annex E, ECF No. 4-6; Compl. 23.) On April 4, 2018, a Writ of
Possession issued with "s/" signatures of counsel for Plaintiff and the Clerk of Court. (Annex D,

2

Plaintiff also alleges that the loan was never "consummated'' with Wells Fargo (id. at 13), the
loan's requirement to pay in cash, check, or money order is unlawful (id. at 14-15), and the contract
forced Plaintiff into involuntary servitude (id. at 16).

2

ECF No. 4-5.) On April 24, 2018, Plaintiff was provided a notice of eviction that requires him to
vacate the premises by June 18, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. (Compl. 23; Annex F, ECF No. 4-7.)3
As an initial matter, it is unclear whether this application can be made on an ex-parte basis.
In any event, to the extent the Application is properly before the Court, an abstention doctrine
applies as to the relief Plaintiff seeks. "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts
from hearing cases 'that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments."' Nest v. Nationstar
Mortg., LLC, No. 16-4282, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117199, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2016) (citing
Great W Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010)). "The
Third Circuit has specifically held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from
providing relief that would invalidate a state court foreclosure decision." Id. (citing Gage v. Wells
Fargo Bank, NA AS, 521 F. App'x 49, 51 (3d Cir. 2013)).
Rooker-Feldman applies where: "(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff
complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered
before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and
reject the state judgments." Great W Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 166; see also Otto v.
Judiciary Courts of NJ, No. 17-.3424, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8697, at *9 (Jan. 16, 2018)
(Rooker-Feldman prohibits federal courts from addressing federal claims "that (1) were previously
adjudicated in state court or (2) are inextricably intertwined with a prior state court decision.");
Anise v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 16-8125, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101084, at *9 (D.N.J. June

3

In support of his Emergent Application, Plaintiff also includes a transcript from an unrelated
foreclosure action; Ditech Financial v. Karen Bare!. According to Plaintiff, the April 2018
transcript demonstrates that Judge Innes "never reviews the motions for final judgment[,] never
sees them[,] and never signs them." (Emergent Appl. 5; Annex A, ECF No. 4-2.) Although not
material to the outcome of this Application, the Court notes its disagreement with Plaintiffs
characterization of the transcript.

3

29, 2017) ("The Rooker-Feldman doctrine strips federal courts of jurisdiction over controversies
that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments.'') (quoting Williams v. BASF Catalysts
LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014)). Here, a Final Judgment was entered in a state court action,

Plaintiffs property was sold pursuant to a Sheriffs Sale, and Plaintiff is being evicted from his
home as a result of the sale. The foreclosure and the Sheriffs Sale occurred in 2017 (Compl. 23;
Annex C, ECF No; 4-4), prior to Plaintiffs initiation of this action in May 2018, and Plaintiff
requests the District Court to enjoin the Sheriffs Office from completing the eviction. This
appears to be the exact situation where "a favorable decision in federal court would require
negating or reversing the state-court decision." Nest, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117199, at *4
(quoting Great W Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 170 n.4). The Court, therefore, finds that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the requested relief to the extent that it stems from the
foreclosure proceedings previously adjudicated in state court. 4 Any challenge to the order(s)
regarding the sale or eviction, therefore, must be raised in state court, not separately in federal
court.
Accordingly;

IT IS on this 13th day of June 2018, ORDERED that Plaintiffs Application for Emergent
Relief (ECF No. 4) is DENIED.

c
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4

To the extent Plaintiffs request for a state-wide injunction halting all state court foreclosures is
not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this is a drastic request and Plaintiff has failed to
establish entitlement to relief under the preliminary injunction standard. See Ecri v. McGraw-Hill,
Inc., 809 F .2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) .(discussing requirements for preliminary injunction).

4