JONES v. MURPHY et al

Filing 5

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 2/28/2019. (km)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
RICCO N. JONES,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 18-10189 (FLW) (LHG)
:
v.
:
:
OPINION
MATTHEW MURPHY et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
FREDA L. WOLFSON, U.S.D.J.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Ricco N. Jones (“Jones” or “Plaintiff”), is a pretrial detainee presently held at
the Somerset County Jail, in Somerville, New Jersey. He seeks to proceed pro se with a
Complaint asserting violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl., ECF No.
1.) The Court now screens the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. For the
reasons stated herein, the Complaint is dismissed.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint
Jones asserts various claims concerning criminal proceedings against him in 2012 and
2013. (See ECF No. 1.) Jones’s factual allegations are unclear, but he seems to allege that
defendant Joseph Walsh Jr. (“Walsh”), an officer with the Raritan police department, obtained a
warrant for Jones’s arrest, despite a lack of probable cause, from defendant Judge Robert Reed
(“Judge Reed”). (Id. at ECF p. 8–9.) Jones contends that Judge Reed subsequently let Walsh
present false testimony to secure an indictment against Jones and that Judge Reed conspired with
the prosecutor, defendant Matthew Murphy (“Murphy”), and with Jones’s public defender,

defendant Matthew Katzenbach (“Katzenbach”), to coerce Jones into accepting a guilty plea.
(Id. at ECF pp. 9, 11–14.) Jones alleges that Walsh arrested him and gave false testimony as
retaliation for Jones “not cooperating or giving information about crimes that Walsh Jr, thought
Plaintiff had.” (Id. at ECF p. 11.) Jones contends that Katzenbach, in order to get Jones to sign a
plea deal, misrepresented to him that all “false allegations” had been dismissed, when, in fact,
one remained. (Id. at ECF p. 14.)
I construe Jones’s complaint as attempting to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. He seeks declaratory judgment,
compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $2 million, as well as “nominal” damages
in the amount of $2 million. (ECF No. 1 at ECF p. 15.)
B. Jones’s Prior Action
As Jones acknowledges in his complaint, he previously filed another lawsuit before this
court concerning the same issues. See Jones v. Walsh, Civ. No. 15-2629 (FLW) (LHG). In that
action, which he filed on April 13, 2015, Jones first alleged § 1983 claims against Walsh,
Murphy, and John Doe defendants, which the Court construed as claims for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Civ. No. 15-2629, ECF Nos. 1 & 3. I permitted the
false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims to proceed as against Walsh only but dismissed the
other claims upon initial screening on the basis that the prosecutor’s office is not subject to §
1983 damages suits and a finding that Murphy’s actions as a prosecutor were shielded by
prosecutorial immunity. Civ. No. 15-2629, ECF Nos. 3 & 4.
Jones subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint alleging claims for false arrest, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, selective enforcement, and official misconduct under New
Jersey criminal law against Walsh. See Civ. No. 15-2629, ECF No. 16. On April 7, 2017, upon

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another sua sponte screening and accounting for arguments raised in a dismissal motion by
Walsh, I dismissed the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and selective-enforcement claims as
untimely, dismissed the malicious-prosecution claim for failure to show favorable termination,
and dismissed with prejudice Jones’s claim for official misconduct. Civ. No. 15-2629, ECF Nos.
31, 32.
Thereafter, Jones filed a Second Amended Complaint, which asserted claims against
Walsh for malicious prosecution and selective enforcement. Civ. A. No. 15-2629, ECF No. 33.
On March 8, 2018, I granted an unopposed motion by Walsh to dismiss the action. Civ. No. 152629, ECF Nos. 42, 48, 49. I dismissed the malicious-prosecution claim on the basis that Jones
had failed to plead the required favorable-termination element and dismissed the selectiveenforcement claim for failure to plead any personal involvement by Walsh. See ECF No. 152629, ECF No. 48 at 7–12. This dismissal was without prejudice to account for the possibility
that Jones could, theoretically, at some point attain a favorable termination for the purposes of
bringing a malicious-prosecution claim. Jones did not seek (nor receive) leave to file another
amended pleading in that action.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321-66
to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review prisoner complaints when the
prisoner (1) is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), (2) seeks redress
against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, or (3) asserts a claim
concerning prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The PLRA directs district courts to sua
sponte dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief

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may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (per
curiam); see also Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To survive the Court’s screening for
failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter to show that the
claim is facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v.
Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’
or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972); Glunk v. Noone, 689 F. App’x 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, “pro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown
Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
IV.

DISCUSSION

Jones’s Complaint suffers from fundamental timeliness problems. “Although the running
of the statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious

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from the face of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, a court may
dismiss a time-barred complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App'x 110, 111–12 (3d Cir. 2013); see also
Hunterson v. Disabato, 244 F. App'x 455, 457 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A] district court may sua sponte
dismiss a claim as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l) where it is apparent from the
complaint that the applicable statute of limitations has run.”).
Causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the same two-year statute of
limitations as claims for other personal injuries under New Jersey state law. See Patyrak v.
Apgar, 511 F. App’x 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181,
185 (3d Cir. 2010)); Evans v. Gloucester Twp., 124 F. Supp. 3d 340, 349 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing
Pittman v. Metuchen Police Dep’t, 441 F. App’x 826, 828 (3d Cir. 2011)). Jones’s Complaint in
this action mentions no events occurring at any time after May 13, 2013, more than five years
before he filed this Complaint. Thus, Jones’s claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are
facially untimely—just as they were when the Court dismissed very similar claims in April 2017.
See ECF No. 15-2629, ECF No. 31 at 8–11. Jones made no attempt, either in that action or in
this one, to demonstrate that his claims could be found timely under principles of statutory or
equitable tolling. Accordingly, his false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims in this action must
similarly be dismissed as untimely. 1
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I note that if Jones had filed his present pleading as a proposed amended complaint in his prior
action, he could argue that his claims should relate back to the date of the original pleading
therein. This argument would fail for several reasons. First, Jones has not sought nor been
granted to file an amended pleading in that action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Second, Jones has
now impleaded several new defendants, but has not made any showing that relation back would
be warranted as to them. Finally, and most importantly, even if his claims herein could relate
back to his original pleading in his prior action, I previously dismissed the false arrest and false
imprisonment claims in that proceeding as untimely. Thus, even treating the complaint in this
action as an amended complaint in the prior one and permitting relation back would not render
Jones’s false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims timely.
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I note that the limitations period for Jones’s malicious-prosecution claim could
theoretically be reset by a decision regarding Jones’s conviction or sentence that could be
construed as a favorable termination. See Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016).
As in his prior action, however, Jones has failed to allege any facts that could show a favorable
termination, which is a central element to a malicious-prosecution claim. See Kossler v.
Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009). Accordingly, his malicious-prosecution claim must
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint in this matter is dismissed upon initial screening
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Further attempts by Jones to raise the same
claims, in either this action or a subsequent one, will be dismissed as frivolous (unless Jones can
show changed circumstances demonstrating a favorable termination of the prosecution against
him).

DATED: February 28, 2019

s/Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON
United States District Judge

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