GRANT v. MANFREDA

Filing 84

OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert Kirsch on 1/2/2025. (amv)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LOUIS S. GRANT, JR.,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 18-10672 (RK) (TJB)
v.
OPINION

JOHN MANFREDA, ESQ., former
Administrator C.T.A. of the Estate of Louis S.
Grant, Sr.,
Defendant.

KIRSCH, District Judge
THIS MATTER is before the Court by way of John Manfreda, Esq.'s ("Defendant")

Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 80 ("Def. Mot").) Plaintiff Louis S. Grant, Jr.
("Plaintiff' or "Junior") opposes this Motion. (ECF No. 80-3 at 15 1 ("Pl. Opp.").) This motion is
decided without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil
Rule 78 .1 (b ). The question before the Court is purely legal since the parties do not assert issues of
genuine of material fact. Instead, on summary judgment, Defendant asserts three affirmative
defenses: New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 2

1

Unless otherwise stated, all page references refer to the ECF PDF pagination located in the header of the
documents.
2

The Court notes for the record that out of these three defenses, only res judicata and collateral estoppel
were raised as affirmative defenses in Defendant's Answer. (See generally ECF No. 5.) However, given
that the issue of waiver was not addressed by Plaintiff in his Opposition, the Court considers this defense
given that-in addition to the fact that Plaintiff does not object to same-this litigation imposes other
considerations, which include: (1) a lengthy litigation without the filing of any dispositive motion; and (2)
the reassignment of this case to three different District Court judges. See Isko v. Engelhard Corp., No. A6588-04T3, 2006 WL 1716139, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 23, 2006) (in finding the trial court
had erred on other grounds in granting partial summary judgment on the entire controversy doctrine, noting
sua sponte that the defense had not been properly raised in defendant's answer).

Plaintiff is the son and a beneficiary to the estate of his deceased father, Louis S. Grant, Sr.
(“Senior”) who died in 2001. Defendant is a lawyer who was court-appointed as Administrator
and lawyer to Senior’s estate sometime in 2008, well-after much family strife and costly state court
litigation. See In re Estate of Grant. No. A-3658-11T3, 2013 WL 2300994, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. May 28, 2013) (appended to Defendant’s Motion at Ex. B) (“Grant III”). This latest
litigation—now in federal court—was commenced more than six years ago.
The litigation surrounding Senior’s estate can only be described as never-ending.
Plaintiff—previously against his seemingly-estranged siblings3—waged unrelenting legal
challenges at every turn, presumably because Plaintiff does not like the legal decisions which have
not gone his way. As but one example, in the subject Complaint, (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”)), Plaintiff
admits that he “contested each and every accounting, including the final accounting.” (Id. ¶ 11).
Plaintiff’s Complaint now asserts causes of action against Defendant in federal court relating to
Defendant’s administration of Senior’s estate, claiming (1) breach of fiduciary duties (Count I)
and (2) legal malpractice (Count II).
Regrettably, Plaintiff’s legal strategy can only be characterized as scattershot and
blunderbuss. Plaintiff’s Complaint is replete with alleged breaches by Defendant, including some
sixteen (16) separate but interrelated breaches of fiduciary duties and then some eighteen (18)
alleged bases of legal malpractice (which themselves are almost entirely duplicative of the alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty in Count I). (Compare Compl. ¶ 71, with id. ¶ 76.) All of these breaches

The Court makes this inference by virtue of the following two facts. First, Plaintiff’s sisters alleged
Plaintiff’s undue influence over Senior in the original will contest. See Grant III, at *1. Second, Plaintiff,
in the trial proceedings in Grant III, argued that Defendant improperly administered Senior’s estate because,
inter alia, Defendant had allowed one of Plaintiff’s sisters to live on one of the estate “without paying rent.”
See Grant III, at *2.
3

2

occurred more than a decade ago, for an estate where the decedent died some twenty-four years
ago. Most of these bases have been raised and rejected, sometimes repeatedly, in prior state court
litigations. See generally In re Estate of Grant, No. A-2014-04, 2007 WL 1284913 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. May 3, 2007) (“Grant I”); In re Estate of Grant, 2010 WL 4940031 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Dec. 7, 2010) (“Grant II”); Grant III. The series of state court decisions chronicle, in
some detail, the protracted litigations of this sad family saga. See generally id.
For the reasons below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.

I.

JURISDICTION
The Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 given that

Plaintiff is a resident of Pennsylvania, (Compl. ¶ 4), and Defendant is a resident of New Jersey,
(See ECF No. 82 ¶ 3; ECF No. 83 ¶ 3).4 The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Venue is
proper here pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

II.

BACKGROUND
A. FACTS
The below facts of this case are undisputed and surround Plaintiff’s continual

dissatisfaction with Defendant’s administration of Senior’s estate which commenced in 2008. On
February 13, 2001, Senior passed away. (ECF No. 80 at 4 (“DSUMF”) ¶ 1.) Protracted state court

4

The motion for summary judgment is the first dispositive motion before the Court. Upon its review of the
pleadings in deciding same, the Court was unable to ascertain the domicile of Defendant. (See ECF No.
81.) Accordingly, the Court administratively terminated the pending motion for summary judgment and
issued an order directing the parties to show cause as to why complete diversity exists. (See id.) The parties
submitted certifications that Defendant is domiciled in Somerville, N.J. and has “resided [there] since
March of 1984.”(ECF No. 83 ¶ 3.) The parties have shown complete diversity, and the Court now decides
the motion for summary judgment.
3

litigation ensued which involved both the period before Defendant’s appointment as Administrator
C.T.A. (pre-2008) and afterwards (post-2008). The Court describes the relevant state court
litigation below, divided by each time period.
B. PRE-2008 LITIGATION
a. Grant I
Senior executed a will on April 16, 1998. (Id.) Plaintiff initiated an action in state court
seeking to admit the 1998 will into probate.5 See Grant I, at *1. In answer and counterclaim, the
Grant I defendants—Plaintiff’s sisters—Virginia Liotta and Nancy Grant challenged Senior’s
testamentary capacity and Plaintiff’s alleged undue influence over Senior. Id. A nine-day trial
ensued, and ultimately, the Honorable John Pursel, J.S.C. upheld the validity of the 1998 will and
dismissed Plaintiff’s sisters’ counterclaim on November 8, 2004. See id.; see also Grant II, at *2.
Judge Pursel’s decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division on May 3, 2007. See Grant I.
There, the Appellate Division affirmed, inter alia, the trial court’s finding that there was no undue
influence in connection with the will executed on April 16, 1998. See id. The will was probated.
See id.
C. POST-2008 LITIGATION
a. Defendant’s Appointment as Administrator C.T.A. of Senior’s Estate
On March 18, 2008, an order disqualifying Plaintiff and his sisters as executors of Senior’s
will was entered, and Defendant was appointed as Administrator C.T.A. and attorney for Senior’s
estate. Grant II, at *1; (ECF No. 80-3 at 2 (“PASUMF”) ¶ 6.) Up until this point, Plaintiff was a

5

While Grant I and Grant II are not appended to the Motion to Summary Judgment as exhibits, Grant II is
referenced in Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. (See, e.g., DSUMF ¶¶ 4–5.) Both Grant
I and Grant II are referenced in Grant III, which itself is appended to the Motion to Summary Judgment as
Exhibit B. Accordingly, the Grant I and Grant II decisions are incorporated by reference into the summary
judgment record.
4

fiduciary of Senior’s estate. See Grant III, at *4.
b. Grant II
Two years later, the Appellate Division consolidated two appeals of Judge Pursel’s
decision that had been calendared back-to-back. Grant II, at *1. Specifically, these appeals
concerned the following: (1) funds Plaintiff wished to be declared an ademption by satisfaction
and (2) a decision by another judge which involved, inter alia, Plaintiff’s interests in a business
partnership. Id. The Appellate Division reversed in part and remanded in part. Id. at *6.
c. Grant III
In fighting amongst the siblings continued. (DSMUF ¶ 6); see also Grant III, at *1. As is
relevant to this litigation, on July 21, 2011, Defendant filed a third amended final informal
accounting of Senior’s estate, which covered the period of April 16, 2008 to June 30, 2011. (See
Ex. C to Def. Mot.); see also Grant III, at *5–6. At the time of the third amended final informal
accounting’s filing, Senior’s Estate had assets of $151,417.17, but it still owed $286,603 in federal
and state taxes, real estate taxes and counsel fees. (DSUMF ¶ 14.)
In response to Defendant’s third amended final informal accounting, Plaintiff filed
exceptions to the third amended final informal accounting. (DSUMF ¶ 16; see also Ex. D. to Def.
Mot.) These exceptions were as follows:
•

•
•
•

Point I: The Administrator’s application for approval of the accounting and recommended
distribution scheme was submitted in derogation of the comprehensive estate plan, inter
vivos distribution, testator’s intent, and the clear and ambiguous language of Senior’s last
will and testament;
Point II: Senior’s estate plan, together with his testamentary intent as expressed in his last
will and testament, (1) governed the payment and allocation of estate death taxes and (2)
the administration expenses were contrary to the recommendation of the Administrator;
Point III: Defendant’s determination that the insolvency of the Estate was caused by
Plaintiff was spurious, flawed, and contrary to the controlling material facts;
Point IV: The majority fiduciaries and Defendant failed to adhere to statutory duties
involving the administration and accounting of Senior’s estate in conformance with the
5

•
•
•

•
•

estate plan and testamentary intent of Senior and further failed to utilize ordinary care, skill,
and diligence;
o Defendant's assignment of a de facto fiduciary status with full authority over
Senior's estate, and Defendant's application of equitable estoppel, was specious
and without legal or factual support;
o The application of the doctrine of unjust enrichment was misapplied and in direct
derogation of the intent of Senior;
Point V: The accounting filed with the court contains errors requiring correction and
reformation by the court;
Point VI: The attorneys' fees proposed to be collected directly from Plaintiff, and not from
Senior's estate, was without authority and in violation ofR. 4:42-9;
Point VII: Attorneys' fees cannot be awarded for that portion of legal services performed
by Defendant for litigation which did not benefit Senior's estate and was not encompassed
for an award pursuant to R. 4:49-2;
Point VIII: Plaintiffs transfer of the Senior's annuity previously in his sole name should
satisfy any award of attorneys' fees to be apportioned to him;
Point IX: That the matter before the court could not properly proceed to adjudication in a
summary manner, but due to the assumption of facts and further material conflicting facts
mandated a hearing pursuant to the authoritative case law.

(Ex. D. to Def. Mot. at i-ii.) Thus, specifically during the course of the Grant 111 proceedings, the
trial court considered the contention that Defendant failed to "utilize ordinary care, skill, and
diligence" during the course of his administration of the Estate. (See id.)
The trial court determined that Senior's estate was insolvent and that the beneficiaries
would be required to pay Senior's estate's remaining estate taxes and expenses in proportion to
the assets they had received. See Grant 111, at *3. The judge reasoned that since Plaintiff received
most of the non-probate assets through inter vivas transfers-which resulted in the majority of
Senior's estate taxes-Plaintiff was responsible to pay his pro rata share of those taxes. See id.
The judge also found that Defendant was entitled to fees for representing Senior's estate as an
attorney and awarded Defendant's law firm fees totaling $125,392.50. (DSUMF ,r 19.) Plaintiff
moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court on March 5, 2012. Grant 111, at *1.
Plaintiff appealed both (1) the denial of his motion for reconsideration as well as (2) the trial court's
entry of the January 24, 2012 order which approved the third amended final informal accounting
6

by Defendant, which decided the amounts of estate taxes to be paid by each estate beneficiary, and
awarded counsel fees. Id. at *1. The Appellate Division made clear that Senior’s estate’s
considerable expenditures were due, in part, to Plaintiff’s (and his siblings’) litigation and
improper administration of Senior’s estate prior to Defendant’s retention, which led to insolvency.
Grant III, at *5. As further noted by the Appellate Division, it found the award of counsel’s fees
to be appropriate “for handling this extended and hotly-disputed probate matter.” Id. at *6. In
pertinent part, the Appellate Division wrote:
As is clear from [Defendant’s] accounting, the estate paid counsel fees
attributable to the extensive prior probate litigation, including
approximately $177,000 in fees to [Plaintiff’s] attorneys. The estate
also owed taxes and penalties, due in part to the three sibling
administrators’ failure to properly file returns prior to 2005, and in
part to mistakes that Junior made when he filed the 2005 tax return.
Finally, we will not disturb a trial court’s award of counsel fees . . . .
...
We find no abuse of Judge Rubin’s discretion in the award of a fee to
[Defendant’s] law firm for handling this extended and hotly-disputed
probate matter.
Grant III, at *5–6.
In its written decision affirming the trial court, the Appellate Division noted that “many of
[Plaintiff’s] arguments were asserted with no supporting citations to the record” and also
concluded “that they are all without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion”
pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Id. at *5. The Appellate Division noted that
Plaintiff had not established “by legally competent evidence, any material factual disputes, and
that an evidentiary hearing was not required. As is clear from [Defendant’s] accounting, the estate
paid counsel fees attributable to the extensive prior probate litigation, including approximately
$177,000 in fees to [Plaintiff’s] attorneys.” Id. Both the trial court’s decision denying Plaintiff’s
7

motion for reconsideration and the trial court's decision approving the third amended final
informal accounting were affirmed. Id. at *6.

d. Lawsuit in Federal Court
On June 15, 2018-around five years after the last dated decision in the state court litigation
was issued in Grant III-Plaintiff filed the subject Complaint against Defendant in federal court
in this District. (See ECF No. 1.) Invoking this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
Plaintiff sets forth two state law causes of action: Breach of Fiduciary Duties (Count I) and Legal
Malpractice (Count II). Defendant filed his Answer without filing a motion to dismiss on October
12, 2018. (See ECF No. 5.)
Litigation surrounding discovery ensued for several years, and this case was first
reassigned on April 11, 2022. (See ECF No. 61.) The case was later reassigned to the undersigned
on May 15, 2023. (See ECF No. 72.) After an unsuccessful mediation presided over by a retired
judge, (see ECF No. 76), Defendant filed the present motion for summary judgment, (see ECF No.
80), which was administratively terminated upon an Order of the Court in order that the parties
show the existence of complete diversity, (see ECF No. 81.) With the parties having shown the
existence of complete diversity, (see ECF Nos. 82 and 83), the Court now decides the motion for
summary judgment, which is fully briefed and ready for disposition.

Ill.

LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). "[T]he dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242,248 (1986). "A factual dispute is 'material' if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under
8

the governing law.’” Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
“The Court must view the facts and evidence presented on the motion in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Razak, 951 F.3d at 144 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); see
also Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 386 (3d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment “is inappropriate
when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.”
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999). While a “judge’s function is not . . . to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue
for trial[,]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, a non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and
by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’
designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (citations omitted). A non-moving party must “do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Court now turns to the motion for summary judgment and the three affirmative
defenses asserted by Defendant that he argues entitle him to summary judgment. Given that
Defendant relies on the same three defenses for dismissal of both Counts of the Complaint, the
Court recites the relevant legal standards before applying each of these doctrines.
a. Entire Controversy Doctrine
The entire controversy doctrine “reflects a ‘long-held preference that related claims and
matters arising among related parties be adjudicated together rather than in separate, successive,
9

fragmented, or piecemeal litigation.' .... " Schindel v. Feitlin, No. 2888-19, 2021 WL 2391583,
at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 11, 2021) (internal citations omitted). As codified in New
Jersey Court Rule 4:30A, the entire controversy doctrine "embodies the principle that the
adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court; accordingly,
all parties involved in a litigation should at the very least present in that proceeding all of their
claims and defenses that are related to the underlying controversy." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, the entire controversy doctrine "extinguishes any subsequent federal-court claim that
could have been joined, but was not raised in the prior state action .... " Siljee v. Atl. Stewardship
Bank, No. 15-1762, 2016 WL 2770806, at *7 (D.N.J. May 12, 2016).
The entire controversy doctrine precludes claims even when they are "separate and
independently cognizable cause[s] of action[.]" Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d
132, 137 (3d Cir. 1999). Importantly, the entire controversy doctrine is constrained in that "it 'does
not apply to unknown or unaccrued claims."' Schindel, 2021 WL 2391583, at *3. In addition, if a
party demonstrates that in the prior forum, he was not "afford[ed] 'a fair and reasonable
opportunity to have fully litigated' the claim[,]" the entire controversy doctrine "may [be]
avoid[ed]." Dimitrakopoulos v. Barrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 203 A.3d
133, 138 (N.J. 2019); see also Schindel, 2021 WL 2391583, at *3.
As stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in deciding whether multiple claims must
be asserted in the same action, a court's initial inquiry "is whether [the claims] 'arise from related
facts or the same transaction or series of transactions."' Dimitrakopoulos, 203 A.3d at 144 (quoting
DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 1995)). Further, '"the determinative consideration is
whether distinct claims are aspects of a single larger controversy because they arise from
interrelated facts."' Id. (citing DiTrolio, 662 A.2d at 504).
10

b. Res Judicata

"Under the doctrine of res judicata, 'the parties to a suit and their privies are bound by a
final judgment and may not relitigate any ground for relief which they already have had an
opportunity to litigate-even if they chose not to exploit that opportunity-whether the initial
judgment was erroneous or not."' Barnes v. Trenton State Prison Med Dep 't, No. 09-1604, 2010
WL 55488, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2010) (internal citations omitted). To determine whether a state
court judgment precludes subsequent federal court action, federal courts "must look" to the law of
the state that adjudicated the original action. Greenleafv. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 357 (3d Cir.
1999). New Jersey law, like federal law, requires three elements for the application res judicata:
(1) the judgment in the prior action must be valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the
later action must be identical to or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the
later action must grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one.
Watkins v. Resorts Int'! Hotel & Casino, Inc., 591 A.2d 592, 599 (N.J. 1991) (internal citations

omitted). However, if "a claim could not have been presented in the first action, then it will not be
precluded in a later action." Id
c. Collateral Estoppel

The doctrine of collateral estoppel "bars relitigation of any issue [] actually determined in
a prior action, generally between the same parties, involving a different claim or cause of action."
State v. Gonzalez, 380 A.2d 1128, 1131 (N.J. 1977) (internal citations omitted). Under New Jersey

law, the party asserting collateral estoppel must show:
(1) The issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the
previous proceeding ... (2) the issue was actually litigated in the
prior action . . . (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final
judgment on the merits . . . (4) the determination of the issue was
essential to prior judgment . . . and (5) the party against whom the
11

doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the
earlier proceeding.
In Re Dawson, 641 A.2d 1026, 1034-35 (N.J. 1994). 6

The Court's inquiry does not end with these five elements. Collateral estoppel is an
equitable judicial doctrine and as such is "not to be applied if there are sufficient countervailing
interests." Matter of Coruzzi, 472 A.2d 546, 551 (N.J. 1984). The Court will not preclude a party
litigating an issue when it would be "'unfair to do so.'" Allen v. V & A Bros., 26 A.3d 430, 444
(N.J. 2011) (internal citations omitted). While New Jersey's collateral estoppeljurisprudence does
not mandate that courts allow equitable considerations to "overcome the ordinary preclusive
effects of prior judgments[,]" Gannon v. Am. Home Prod., Irie., 48 A.3d 1094, 1107 (N.J. 2012),
courts regularly rely on fairness considerations to inform the collateral estoppel analysis. See
Olivieri v. Y.MF. Carpet, Inc., 897 A.2d 1003, 1009-10 (N.J. 2006).
B. COUNT I - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant-in his capacity as Administrator C.T.A of
Senior's Estate-breached his fiduciary duties which required Defendant to adhere to Senior's
Last Will and Testament and to discharge administrative duties related to Senior's estate. (Compl.

,r,r 69-70.) At summary judgment, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs claims are barred by New
Jersey's entire controversy doctrine, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Because Plaintiff could
have brought his breach of fiduciary duty cause of action in the underlying probate action-and
already did-Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims are barred under the entire controversy
doctrine, res judicata, and collateral estoppel doctrines. The claims in Count I are a mere recasting
of claims already litigated at the state court level. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment as
6

A federal court asked to give preclusive effect to a state court judgment applies that state's law. See
Greenleaf, 174 F.3d at 357.
12

to Count I is GRANTED.
First, the breach of fiduciary duties cause of action (Count I) is barred under the entire
controversy doctrine because these underlying claims were actually raised-and rejected-at the
probate court level. In this action, Plaintiff raises the following sixteen (16) allegations:
a. Failure to reasonably and properly adhere to the Last Will and
Testament of the decedent, together with the testator's estate plan,
including the proper administration of his inter vivas transfers;
b. Failure to reasonably and properly evaluate, address, and
administer the inter vivas transfer to the Plaintiff from the decedent;
c. Failure to reasonably address and administer the assets and
liabilities of the Estate to the detriment of the Estate and the
Plaintiff as an individual beneficiary;
d. Failure to reasonably and properly address federal estate taxes to
the detriment of the Estate and the Plaintiff as an individual
beneficiary;
e. Failure to reasonably, properly and timely file and remit payment
of federal taxes in order to avoid further accumulations of penalties
and interest to the detriment of the Estate and the Plaintiff as an
individual beneficiary;
f. Failure to reasonably and properly address and resolve the federal
estate tax liens filed against the Estate and the Plaintiff
individually;
g. Failure to reasonably and properly avoid the filing of a federal
tax lien, which tax lien was filed against the Estate and the Plaintiff
individually;
h. Failure to reasonably, properly and timely remit payment to the
State ofNew Jersey for estate
inheritance tax arrearages to the detriment of the Estate and the
Plaintiff as an individual beneficiary;
i. Failure to reasonably and properly prioritize payment of the
liabilities of the Estate;
j. Failure to reasonably and properly administer the Estate by
providing distribution advancement to beneficiaries Nancy Grant
and Virginia Liotta which resulted in the diminishment of liquid
assets of the Estate and further contributed to the insolvency of the
Estate;
k. Failure to reasonably and properly administer the Estate and
expeditiously market and sell the real estate owned by the Estate;
1. Failure to reasonably and properly prioritize and remit payment
upon the real estate taxes resulting in an accumulation of interest,
penalties, and further, the issuance of tax sale certificates;
13

m. Failure to reasonably and properly sell real estate property and
further address the federal tax liens and related legal issues relating
to the sale of the real property of the Estate;
n. Failure to reasonably and properly administer the Estate by
requesting and receiving an advancement of attorney's fees prior to
the full payment and satisfaction of federal and state estate taxes in
New further contributed to the insolvency of the Estate;
o. Failure to reasonably and properly administer the Estate to
preserve the Estate from insolvency in derogation of the Last Will
and Testament of the decedent, and his estate plan; and
p. Failure to reasonably and properly administer the Estate and
adhere to the Last Will and Testament of the decedent and his estate
plan, causing the assignment of 97. 8% of the Estate debt to the
Plaintiff.
(Compl. 171.) These same claims were raised in the probate proceedings in Grant III. Specifically,
Plaintiff argued in his appellate brief in the Grant III litigation that Defendant "failed to utilize
ordinary care, skill, and diligence[]" required of him in the administration and accounting of
Senior's estate. Grant III, at *5. More specifically, in his appellate brief to the Appellate Division,
Plaintiff further argued that:
the Court's adjudication of the accounting and distribution further
encompasses the evaluation and of the fiduciary duties in regard to
the administration of the Estate and, further, the accounting and
distribution recommendations . . . . Since the overwhelming
evidence in this matter reveals the abject failure of fiduciary duties
of the majority, and further, Defendant's failure to timely address
the estate taxes, and conform to the Testator's intent regarding his
Last Will and Testament and non-probate assets, failure to properly
collect rental fees, etc., all were factors instrumental in causing the
alleged insolvency of the Estate.
(Ex. A. to Def. Mot. at 134.) Plaintiff's claims were denied by the trial court, and Plaintiff filed a
motion for reconsideration which was also denied by same. See Grant III, at *1. The trial court
was subsequently affirmed. See Grant 111
The fact that these claims were also specifically raised on appeal by Plaintiff and addressed
by the Appellate Division further cements the uncontestable fact that these claims were fully and

14

fairly litigated and rejected by courts of competent jurisdiction. Instead, as is his apparent want,
Plaintiff is merely dissatisfied with the results he received in state court. The Appellate Division
in Grant III essentially rejected each of Junior's claims against Defendant-the de facto same
claims he attempts to re-litigate here in Count I.
Overall then, these claims not only could have been raised in the underlying state court
litigation, but they were raised. Both the trial and appellate courts in Grant III found that Plaintiff
failed to provide support for these claims and soundly rejected them. See id. Plaintiffs claims for
breach of fiduciary duties are therefore barred by the entire controversy doctrine. See Ehrlich v.
Mcinerney. No. 17-879, 2017 WL 6371300, at* 15 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2017) (at the motion to dismiss
stage, finding that plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim brought by an estate's heir against the
estate's temporary administrator was barred under the entire controversy doctrine, where inter alia,
the probate case involved explicit references to breach of fiduciary duty); Crane v. Crane, No. 231527, 2024 WL 1070284, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2024) (finding at the motion to dismiss stage that
plaintiffs claims would be barred by the entire controversy doctrine because they arose "from the
same transaction as the claims in the probate court[,]" and plaintiff had "the opportunity to litigate
his current claims at the state level and allowing his claims in this Court would undermine the
principles underlying the entire controversy doctrine: completeness in litigation, fairness to the
parties, and efficiency." (internal citations omitted)).
In addition, even if New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine did not apply, both the res
judicata and collateral estoppel doctrines similarly foreclose this re-litigation of Count I. In New
Jersey, three elements are required for the application res judicata: (1) the judgment in the prior
action must be valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action must be identical to
or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the later action must grow out of
15

the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one. Watkins, 591 A.2d at 598. While
Plaintiff disputes the applicability of all three elements of res judicata, he provides the Court with
scant arguments against its application. (See ECF No. 80-3 ("PL Rep.") at 23.) For example,
Plaintiff presents no arguments as to why the Appellate Division's decision in Grant III was not a
final decision on the merits, and this Court finds no basis to conclude otherwise.
The Appellate Division's judgment was final and on the merits-affirming the trial court
and its order which, inter alia, adopted the third amended final informal accounting, decided the
amounts of estate taxes to be paid by each estate beneficiary and affirmed the award of counsel
fees. See Grant III, at *1. To the second element, while Defendant was not a party to the previous
action, he was in privity as the Estate's executor since he was "the virtual representative" and
"actually control[ed] the litigation." Allen, 26 A.3d at 445 (further noting that New Jersey has left
the concept of privity as "necessarily imprecise"); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments §
39 ("A person who is not a party to an action but who controls or substantially participates in the
control of the presentation on behalf of a party is bound by the determination of issues decided as
though he were a party."). Again, Plaintiff makes no argument as to why Defendant was not in
privity for the purposes of these doctrines. Where the claims at issue in the underlying state court
actions involved Defendant's duties to Senior's estate and its beneficiaries and were explicitly
raised within the proceedings-and Defendant was able to respond and he did respondDefendant is in privity for the purposes of these doctrines. Third and finally-and as addressed in
great detail above with the Court's analysis of the entire controversy doctrine-the breach of
fiduciary claim grew out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in Grant III given that
it was a part of the same claim because it was actually raised in that prior proceeding. This issue
was previously litigated. Res judicata applies.
16

Collateral estoppel is equally applicable here. To assert the defense of collateral estoppel
in New Jersey, the movant must show:
( 1) The issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the
previous proceeding ... (2) the issue was actually litigated in the
prior action . . . (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final
judgment on the merits ... (4) the determination of the issue was
essential to prior judgment ... and (5) the party against whom the
doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the
earlier proceeding.
In Re Dawson, 641 A.2d 1026, 1034-35 (N.J. 1994). As noted above, not only is this issue identical

to an issue that was actually litigated by the parties and ultimately decided in the state court
proceedings-thereby satisfying elements one and two-but a final judgment on the merits was
issued by the Appellate Division in Grant III, consequently satisfying element three. As to element
four, the central thrust of the Appellate Court's affirmance in Grant III was a rejoinder of all of
Junior's claims which, at their essence, were claims that Defendant serially breached his fiduciary
duties to Senior's estate. 7 Turning to the final element, Defendant was in privity with the parties
to the earlier proceeding as an attorney to the Estate as well as the Administrator C.T.A. See Allen,
26 A.3d at 445; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 39. Given that these issues were
actually litigated, and the collateral estoppel jurisprudence does not mandate that courts allow
equitable considerations to "overcome the ordinary preclusive effects of prior judgments,"
Gannon, 48 A.3d at 1107, the Court does not find that any fairness considerations outweigh the

effect of a prior final judgment. Collateral estoppel therefore also applies and bars these claims.
Therefore, summary judgment as to Count I must be granted given that the claims are

7

Indeed, Plaintiffs appellate brief itself in Grant III appears to acknowledge this fact, noting that "the
Court's adjudication of the accounting and distribution further encompasses the evaluation and of the
fiduciary duties in regard to the administration of the Estate and, further, the accounting and distribution
recommendations .... "(Ex.A to Defs Mot. at 134.)
17

,,

barred by New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.Count I
is dismissed with prejudice.
C. COUNT II - LEGAL MALPRACTICE

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had a duty to the Estate-and to Plaintiff as a
beneficiary of the Estate-to perform Defendant's responsibilities adequately and reasonably
within the accepted standards of care, skill, and knowledge of an attorney.Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant's numerous acts and omissions caused Plaintiff various injuries, including Plaintiffs
incurring waste; the accumulation of debt via unpaid federal and estate taxes; penalties, and
interests; real estate tax arrearages; penalties; interest; tax certificate sales; loss of profits;
expenses; and individual indebtedness-all of which ultimately resulted in the Estate's insolvency.

(See Compl.,r,r 76-77).Again, at summary judgment, Defendant asserts the three affirmative
defenses ofNew Jersey's entire controversy doctrine, res judicata, and collateral estoppel that he
argues bar Count IL For the reasons below, the motion for summary judgment as to Count II is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
a. Entire Controversy Doctrine
While the entire controversy doctrine is not inapplicable to legal malpractice causes of
action per se, the Supreme Court ofNew Jersey has expressed its disfavor towards the application
of entire controversy doctrine in this context, stating that the application of the entire controversy
doctrine in this context "raises special concerns ...." Dimitrakopoulos, 203 A.3d at 144.
Accordingly, the Court is constrained to find that the entire controversy doctrine to Count II is
inappropriate.
In this decision, the Court finds guidance from the Supreme Court of New Jersey itself,
which addressed a similar factual scenario to that of the case at bar.See Higgins v. Thurbur, 14
18

A.3d 745 (N.J. 2011). Higgins involved a probate action arising from a settlement of an account
pursuant to R. 4:87-1 where plaintiff asserted legal malpractice against attorneys who had
represented the estate in probate action. Id. at 746. As summarized by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, the Appellate Division had found that although the potential legal malpractice claim "may
have been raised in a previous Bergen County probate proceeding ... [the Appellate Division] was
unable to conclude that plaintiffs had a 'full and fair opportunity to litigate those claims or that it
would otherwise be equitable to bar this subsequent suit [under the entire controversy doctrine].'"
Id. In affirming the Appellate Division, the Supreme Court ofNew Jersey held:

An action to settle an account on an estate trust is a formalistic
proceeding, unique to probate. See R. 4:87-l(a). Its stylized format
involves a line-by-line review on the exceptions to an accounting.
In the context of this and like proceedings in probate, the entire
controversy doctrine is out of place .... The Appellate Division in
the present case rightly detected that it would be anomalous to
assume that Thurber's intervention in the specialized probate
accounting proceeding that focused on the executor somehow
converted the proceeding into an action binding as to any and all
other potential actions in respect of other parties . . . .While it
certainly may be permissible for a chancery court to expand a
probate proceeding to encompass a claim of legal malpractice, that
was not done here.
Id.

Overall, the Court is constrained here-both by the special considerations required of the
entire controversy doctrine in the legal malpractice context and by the full and fair litigation
requirement of the entire controversy doctrine. Dimitrakopoulos, 203 A.3d at 138 (reversing and
remanding the Appellate Division where it applied the entire controversy doctrine, noting that no
findings as to when the claims accrued nor whether plaintiff was able to fully and fairly litigate
the legal malpractice claims in the underlying action were made); Schindel, 2021 WL 2391583, at
*4 (in distinguishing Schindel from Higgins, noting the importance of the difference between the
19

formalistic proceeding of an accounting and the "full-scale assault" on the 2016 will which
justified the application of the entire controversy doctrine because the underlying proceedings had
been fully and fairly litigated.) As the entire controversy doctrine "raises special concerns when
invoked in the setting of legal malpractice[,]" Dimitrakopoulos, 203 A.3d at 144, the entire
controversy doctrine does not apply to Count II. 8
b. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

i.

Underlying Claims in Count II

Prior to addressing the two preclusion doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the
Court notes that nearly all the claims asserted by Plaintiff in Count II are duplicative of Count I.
That is to say: in Count I, Plaintiff asserts sixteen (16) different specific bases for the purported
breach of fiduciary duties committed by Defendant. (Id. ,r 71.) In Count II, Plaintiff asserts eighteen
(18) different bases for the purported legal malpractice purportedly committed by Defendant. (Id.

,r 76.) Yet, the first sixteen (16) bases asserted in Count II are exact duplicates of the breaches
alleged within Count I that the Court has already dispensed with as precluded under all three
preclusion doctrines. While, as noted above, the entire controversy doctrine is not applicable to
these claims in the legal malpractice context of Count II, the Court's analysis for the preclusion of
these claims under the res judicata and claim preclusion doctrines within Count I remains. See

generally Middlebrooks & Shapiro, P.C. v. Esdale, No. A-3285-02Tl, 2005 WL 3691314, at *1
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 20, 2006) (describing the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel in the legal malpractice context); see also Crane, 2024 WL 1070284; Tadros v. City of

Union City, No. 10-2535, 2011 WL 1321980, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2011) (dismissing claims

8

Because the entire controversy doctrine is inapplicable, the Court need not address when the legal
malpractice cause of action accrued.
20

against defendants on res judicata, collateral estoppel, and entire controversy grounds and noting
that these claims were "an attempt to take a second bite of the apple as all claims were already
filed, or should have been filed, in state court because they arise out of the same controversy.")
Thus, the subset of claims within Count II remaining before the Court then are two general
claims for legal malpractice against Defendant. The Court therefore must determine if these two
remaining claims ("the Legal Malpractice Claims") are barred under either res judicata or
collateral estoppel. The Legal Malpractice Claims are as follows:
Failure to administer the Estate with a reasonable and proper
understanding and analysis of the laws and regulations
governing estate administration, including priority of decedent's
Last Will and Testament and testamentary intent, federal and
estate taxation and appeal procedures, federal tax liens, real
estate tax sale certificates and foreclosure, priority of federal
estate taxes and estate indebtedness, and inter vivos transfers;
Failure to reasonably and properly conform to the laws and
regulations governing estate administration including, but not
limited to, priority of decedent's Last Will and Testament and
testamentary intent, federal and estate taxation and appeal
procedures, federal tax liens, real estate tax sale certificates and
foreclosure, priority of federal estate taxes and estate
indebtedness, and inter vivos transfers[.]
(Compl. ilil 76(q)-76(r).) Thus, the Court now decides whether the Legal Malpractice Claims of
Count II survive summary judgment under these two preclusion doctrines.
ii.

Res Judicata

Res judicata applies to a subset of the Legal Malpractice Claims. Specifically, the Legal
Malpractice Claims are barred to the extent Plaintiff relitigates the issue of Defendant's
understanding and analysis of the laws and regulations governing estate administration,
testamentary intent, and inter vivos transfers in the federal court litigation. However, it does not

21

apply as it relates to Defendant's understanding and analysis of the laws and regulations governing
federal and estate taxation and appeal procedures; federal tax liens; real estate tax sale certificates
and foreclosure; the priority of federal estate taxes; and estate indebtedness.
To apply res judicata, (l) the judgment in the prior action must be valid, final, and on the
merits; (2) the parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with those in the prior
action; and (3) the claim in the later action must grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as
the claim in the earlier one. Watkins, 591 A.2d at 598. As noted above, there was a final judgment
on the merits in the probate proceedings. See Grant III. Additionally, the parties here are in privity.
See Allen, 26 A.3d at 445; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 39.
Thus, the question of the applicability of res judicata hinges on the following: whether the
claim in the federal court actions grows out of the same transaction or occurrence. To the extent
that Plaintiffs claims surround Defendant's legal expertise surrounding the estate administration,
testamentary intent, and inter vivas transfers, they do. These issues were litigated in the
proceedings in the pro bate part with Plaintiff raising the issues of estate administration,
testamentary intent, and inter vivas transfers. See Grant III; (see also Ex. D to Def. Mot.)
Specifically, Defendant raised issues regarding the third amended final informal accounting, the
amounts of estate taxes to be paid by each estate beneficiary, and counsel's fees. See Grant III, at

*1. Moreover, these issues were decided insomuch that the trial court made findings of fact and
issued judgments on same which the Appellate Division considered and affirmed. See Grant 111
While it is true that the remaining portions of the Legal Malpractice Claims-that is, issues
related to the administration of federal and estate taxation and appeal procedures; federal tax liens;
real estate tax sale certificates and foreclosure; priority of federal estate taxes and estate
indebtedness-grew out of the same transaction or occurrence at issue within the underlying state
22

court proceedings, in an abundance of caution and on this record, the Court cannot conclude that
Plaintiff was able to present these claims in that action. While the Grant III court divided the tax
liability amongst the beneficiaries-following the language of N.J.S.A 3B:24-6-Defendant's
administration up to that point that might have contributed to the imposition of the tax liability
arguably was not able to be presented. Thus, the Court is constrained to find that the imposition of

res judicata on the discrete subset of the Legal Malpractice Claims dealing with the administration
of federal and estate taxation and appeal procedures; federal tax liens; real estate tax sale
certificates and foreclosure; priority of federal estate taxes and estate indebtedness is inappropriate
as it relates to the post-2008 period given that these issues were arguably not able to be raised at
the state court level. See Watkins, 591 A.2d at 599 (stating that if "a claim could not have been
presented in the first action, then it will not be precluded in a later action.")
Accordingly, the Legal Malpractice Claims as they relate to Defendant's understanding
and analysis of the laws and regulations governing estate administration of federal and estate
taxation and appeal procedures; federal tax liens; real estate tax sale certificates and foreclosure;
and the priority of federal estate taxes survive Defendant's assertion of res judicata at summary
judgment. 9

iii.

Statute ofLimitations

Finally, the Court raises an issue not briefed on summary judgment. However, it is an
affirmative defense raised within Defendant's Answer: the affirmative defense of statute of
limitations. (See ECF No. 5 at 9.) Inexplicably, Defendant failed to brief this issue in the motion
presently before the Court.
9

As with the analysis of res judicata with respect to the Legal Malpractice Claims in Count II, because the
Court is unable to ascertain from the current record if Plaintiff was able to present the Legal Malpractice
Claims in the state court actions, collateral estoppel is similarly inapplicable.
23

The statute of limitations in New Jersey governing legal malpractice is six years. See
N .J. S.A. 2A: 14-1. Upon its review of the summary judgment record-but without deciding the
issue-the Court notes its serious reservations regarding the viability of the Legal Malpractice
Claims. However, because this issue has not been briefed, the Court is constrained in its ability to
examine these facts and decide this issue. The Court requests that the Honorable Tonianne J.
Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J. convene the parties to determine how the matter shall proceed.

24

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 80)
is GRANTED as to Count I and GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as to Count II in
manner consistent with this Opinion. An appropriate Order will ,ae'S()mp?y this Opi.n.wn.,
1/
I
\
/

I

,/

t /

)

I

/

?

I

I

f

ROBERT KIR?H
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: January 2, 2025

25

//

/'