KUPERSMIT v. IRS/CIR et al

Filing 53

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 50 Motion to Reopen Case. Signed by Chief Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 6/4/2021. (mg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_______________________________________
BARBARA KUPERSMIT,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-17580 (FLW)

v.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

IRS/CIR, et al.,
Defendants.

THIS MATTER having been opened to the Court by pro se Plaintiff Barbara Kupersmit
on September 3, 2019, see ECF No. 1; it appearing that, on May 18, 2020, the Court granted
Motions to Dismiss from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., see ECF No. 10, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, see ECF No. 13, Citizens Bank, see ECF No. 17, Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company, see ECF No. 18, Verizon, see ECF No. 29, and Allstate Insurance Company, see ECF
No. 33; it appearing that Kupersmit named two other Defendants in her Complaint, the “IRS/CIR”
and “Commonwealth Bureau of Individual Taxes,” see Compl., ¶¶ 24-25; it appearing that the
Court dismissed the claims against these two defendants on January 28, 2021, for failure to serve
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), see ECF No. 46; it appearing that Katchen appealed the first dismissal
to the Third Circuit on June 8, 2020, see Case No. 20-2151; it appearing that the Third Circuit
denied Katchen’s appeal for failure to prosecute on October 23, 2020, see ECF No. 43; it appearing
that Kupersmit moved to reopen this case on May 27, 2021, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), see ECF
No. 50; the Court having considered Kupersmit’s motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 makes the
following findings:
(1)

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) allows a court to grant relief from a final judgment. Id.
Kupersmit’s Rule 60(b) motion is cursory and incoherent, making it unclear on what

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basis she seeks to reopen this case. See, e.g., Pl. Br., ¶¶ 9-14 (“Additionally, FRCP
60(b) comes into play[.] Further, FRCP 60(b)(1) Mistake, inadvertence[.] In addition,
FRCP 60(b)(2) Newly discovered evidence. Also, FRCP 60(b)(3) Fraud. And FRCP
60(b)(4) the Order is void. More so, FRCP 60(b)(6).”). However, cognizant of my
duty to liberally construe pro se pleadings, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007), I will consider her motion under all subsections of Rule 60(b). Accord Duran
v. Cohen, No. 07-3589, 2016 WL 4155009, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2016) (concluding
same).
(2)

Kupersmit does not identify a mistake or surprise which might justify relief under
Rule 60(b)(1), beyond simply declaring that both exist. Neither does Kupersmit point
to any new evidence that would entitle her to relief under Rule 60(b)(2),
notwithstanding her assertion that such unidentified evidence must be out there. The
same is true for fraud under Rule 60(b)(3), which she never specifically charges
against any entity. And Rules 60(b)(4)-(5) do not apply. That leaves Rule 60(b)(6),
under which Kupersmit moves based on far-fetched accusations against various
government actors. See, e.g., Pl. Br., ¶¶ 2-3, 7, 14 (“The U.S. Department of Justice
involvement in the refusal to investigate the IRS/CIR’s corruption will shortly be
made a part of New York’s probe into Trump’s failure to act in good faith in defense
of the IRS . . . . There has been a refusal to investigate the U.S. Supreme Court for
ethical violations under HR 1057 . . . . The IRS/CIR has utilized a strategy of terror,
delay and official corruption in their dealings with the Kupersmits . . . . This entitles
the Deponents for a Default Judgment in the amount of $750 million.”).

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(3)

“[A] movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) [must] show ‘extraordinary
circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” Gonzalez v.
Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005). A Rule 60(b) motion will not be granted unless
the movant demonstrates that, “without relief . . . , an extreme and unexpected
hardship will result.” Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quotations and citation omitted); Pabon v. Lemaster, 408 Fed. App’x. 508, 509 (3d
Cir. 2010) (concluding same); see also Crawford v. United States, 611 Fed. App’x.
47, 49 (3d Cir. 2015); Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2014). Such a motion
“must be fully substantiated by adequate proof and its exceptional character . . .
clearly established.” Muhammad v. New Jersey, No. 10-213, 2012 WL 4191915, at
*3 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2012) (quoting FDIC v. Alker, 234 F.2d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir.
1956)). As the Third Circuit has long held, “[a] healthy respect for the finality of
judgments demands no less.” Marshall v. Bd. of Ed. Bergenfield N.J., 575 F.2d 417,
426 n.28 (3d Cir. 1978) (quotations and citation omitted).

(4)

Kupersmit has not come close to meeting this stringent burden. Accord Howard Int’l,
Inc. v. Cupola Enterprises, LLC, No. 01-1205, 2006 WL 625210, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar.
10, 2006); Barrett v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., No. 96-3165, 2013 WL 4042455, at
*3 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2013). In fact, Kupersmit has not offered a single comprehensible
reason to reopen this action. Certainly, “extraordinary circumstances rarely exist
when a party seeks relief from a judgment that resulted from the party’s deliberate
choices,” such as Kupersmit’s decision not to serve various Defendants despite
repeated warnings, instructions, and extensions from this Court, or her failure to
prosecute her Third Circuit appeal. Budget Blinds, 536 F.3d at 255; United States v.

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Zoebisch, 2013 WL 5719246, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2013), aff’d, 586 Fed. App’x.
852 (3d Cir. 2014). Kupersmit simply seeks to escape the consequences of this
Court’s Orders through Rule 60(b), which is improper. See, e.g., Martinez-McBean
v. Government of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 911 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[C]ourts must
be guided by the well established principle that a motion under Rule 60(b) may not
be used as a substitute for appeal.”) (quotations and citations omitted).
IT IS on this 7th day of June, 2021,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen is DENIED.
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Hon. Freda L. Wolfson
U.S. Chief District Judge

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