WILSON v. MURPHY et al
Filing
30
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Brian R. Martinotti on 11/30/2020. (jdb)
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 1 of 16 PageID: 283
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
GREGORY T. WILSON,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Case No. 3:20-cv-2272 (BRM) (ZNQ)
:
v.
:
:
PHILIP D. MURPHY, et al.,
:
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
____________________________________:
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court is pro se Plaintiff Gregory T. Wilson’s (“Plaintiff” or “Wilson”) civil
rights complaint removed by Defendants from state court. Presently pending is Defendants’ motion
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 7) and Plaintiff’s request for a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”)/preliminary injunction (ECF No. 13). For the following
reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice in part and without prejudice in part. Plaintiff’s request for a TRO/preliminary injunction
is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
The allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint are construed as true for purposes of deciding
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff is a state inmate incarcerated at the New Jersey State
Prison (“NJSP”) in Trenton, New Jersey. 1 (See ECF No. 2-1 at 4.) He names as Defendants the
following individuals: (1) Governor Philip D. Murphy; (2) Marcus O. Hicks – Commissioner of
New Jersey Department of Corrections (“NJ DOC”); (3) Bettie Norris – Deputy Commissioner of
Plaintiff filed his complaint on behalf of himself and others “similarly situated.” However,
Plaintiff makes clear he is proceeding solely on his behalf individually and not trying to proceed
this case as a class action.
1
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 2 of 16 PageID: 284
NJ DOC; (4) Bruce Davis – Administrator of NJSP; and (5) David Richards – Associate
Administrator of NJSP.
Plaintiff’s Complaint centers upon what will become of his body upon his death. Pursuant
to state regulations cited by Plaintiff, if his deceased body is unclaimed by next of kin upon his
death, the responsibility of respecting his religious burial rights is left to NJ DOC. (See ECF No.
2-1 at 13.) Plaintiff follows the Islamic faith. (See id. at 12-13.) Plaintiff submitted his last will and
testament to NJ DOC which indicates his Islamic faith and its religious tenants do not permit
cremation. (See id. at 38.) Plaintiff is concerned this religious burial belief will not be followed by
NJ DOC upon his passing. He claims Defendants, by their policies and customs, have: (1) deprived
Plaintiff from being free from cruel and unusual punishment; (2) deprived Plaintiff of equal
protection and due process under the law; and (3) violated public policy and Plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights. He seeks to enjoin Defendants from denying Plaintiff his right to practice his
religion by being buried in a fashion that comports with his religious beliefs.
Plaintiff filed his complaint in New Jersey Superior Court in late 2019. In March 2020,
Defendants removed Plaintiff’s complaint to this Court. (See ECF 1.) In April 2020, Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (See ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion to
dismiss (see ECF No. 12), and Defendants filed a reply. (See ECF No. 16.) Additionally, Plaintiff
separately filed a request for a TRO/preliminary injunction. (See ECF No. 13.) This request relates
to purported interference with Plaintiff’s mail, not Plaintiff’s underlying concern in his complaint
about his burial. Defendants filed a response in opposition to the request for a TRO/preliminary
injunction (see ECF No. 15), and Petitioner filed a reply. (See ECF No. 18 & 19.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
2
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 3 of 16 PageID: 285
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts accept
all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled
to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cty.
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). In other words, a complaint survives a motion to
dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. This “plausibility standard” requires that the complaint allege “more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it “is ‘not akin to a probability requirement.’” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Detailed factual allegations” are not required, but “more
than an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation” must be pleaded; it must include “factual
enhancements” and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the elements of a cause of
action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
However, courts are “not compelled to accept ‘unsupported conclusions and unwarranted
3
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 4 of 16 PageID: 286
inferences,’” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Schuylkill Energy
Res. Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997)), nor “a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allian, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
A court conducts a three-part analysis in analyzing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must
“tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
675). Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
680). Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.
Additionally, it is worth noting that “courts generally consider only the allegations contained in
the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.” See Pension Ben.
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendants make several arguments in their motion to dismiss; most notably:
1. Plaintiff lacks standing and/or the case is unripe.
2. Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution and under Article 1, Sections 1 and 12 of the New Jersey
Constitution.
3. Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under the First Amendment.
4
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 5 of 16 PageID: 287
4. Plaintiff’s assertion that a portion of the New Jersey Administrative Code is void for
vagueness fails in light of his admitted notification to NJ DOC of his last will and
testament. 2
The Court will address each in turn.
A. Standing/Ripeness
Defendants first argue the entire complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff lacks
standing and/or the complaint is unripe. New Jersey Administrative Code § 10A: 16-7.5 is at the
heart of this case and states as follows:
(a) In accordance with internal management procedures, when an
inmate’s body is determined to be unclaimed or the next of kin has
indicated an unwillingness or inability to claim the body of an
inmate, the appropriate correctional facility staff member shall
arrange for the burial or cremation. The county medical examiner’s
office shall be contacted for assistance in such cases.
(b) An unclaimed body shall be cremated where it is reasonably
believed that it would not violate the religious tenets of the deceased
inmate.
(c) The Social Security Administration, Veteran’s Administration
and Public Welfare shall be contacted by the correctional facility for
any possible death benefits.
(d) Money remaining in the account of a deceased inmate may be
used for burial or cremation expenses.
N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:16-7.5. As noted, Plaintiff is concerned his burial will not conform to his
Islamic beliefs, notably no cremation. Defendants assert Plaintiff lacks standing because he has
pled no facts to indicate his next of kin will not claim his body upon his passing. Therefore,
according to Defendants, Plaintiff fails to allege § 10A:16-7.5(b) will even apply to Plaintiff.
2
As described infra, Plaintiff’s complaint is being dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a
claim. Accordingly, this Court will not address Defendant Murphy’s argument the claims against
him solely should be dismissed because of Plaintiff’s failure to allege a “special relationship” to
the regulation at issue for purposes of judicial economy as it only affects one of the five named
defendants.
5
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 6 of 16 PageID: 288
Standing requires a plaintiff demonstrate that he or she has “(1) suffered an ‘injury in fact’
that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Clark v.
Burger King Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 334, 341 (D.N.J. 2003). When a plaintiff seeks prospective
injunctive relief, he or she must show a “real and immediate threat of injury in order to satisfy the
injury in fact requirement.” Id. at 342; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103-104
(1983).
Plaintiff attaches his last will and testament to his complaint which has been received by
NJ DOC. (See ECF No. 2-1 at 37-40.) As previously noted, this Court can consider exhibits
attached to the complaint in analyzing a motion to dismiss. See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 998
F.2d at 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Plaintiff specifically acknowledges there are no living relatives which
need be notified upon his passing. (See ECF No. 2-1 at 37.) Relying on this document attached to
Plaintiff’s complaint, this Court rejects Defendants’ argument Plaintiff fails to plead next of kin
will not claim his body upon his death.
Nevertheless, Defendants also argue Plaintiff lacks standing because he has provided his
will to NJ DOC, which acknowledged its receipt. Therefore, according to Defendants, Plaintiff has
failed to allege a real and immediate threat to satisfy the injury in fact requirement. According to
Defendants, there is no indication NJ DOC will not follow through on Plaintiff’s burial wishes to
conform with his Islamic faith – namely no cremation. This Court agrees with Defendants. Plaintiff
alleges in his Complaint (albeit in conclusory fashion) inmates who follow Islam have been
cremated. However, he does not allege inmates who follow Islam who die, and who have also
submitted a specific document indicating their religious faith proscribes cremation, have been
6
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 7 of 16 PageID: 289
cremated by NJ DOC. Accordingly, the complaint can be dismissed due to a lack of standing for
failure to plead an injury in fact.
B. Eighth Amendment
Despite Plaintiff failing to properly allege an injury in fact, and for purposes of
completeness, this Court will also address many of the other arguments raised in Defendants’
motion to dismiss. Plaintiff alleges in Count One of his complaint Defendants have deprived him
from being free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide humane conditions of
confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter,
and medical care, and must “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27
(1984)). A prisoner asserting a condition of confinement claim must show that the alleged
deprivation is “sufficiently serious” and that he has been deprived of the “minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities.” Id. at 834 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
The plaintiff must also allege that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to the
prisoner's health or safety. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1991). Therefore, “the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.” Wilson v. Burks, 423 F. App’x 169, 173 (3d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Plaintiff’s complaint does not state he has been deprived of the minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities. Indeed, his complaint involves what will happen to his body when he is already
deceased. Accordingly, he fails to state a cruel and unusual punishment claim under the Eighth
Amendment as the allegations do not touch upon a life necessity.
7
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 8 of 16 PageID: 290
Plaintiff also attempts to bring a claim under Article I, Section 12 of the New Jersey
Constitution within Count One of the Complaint. That provision of the New Jersey Constitution
states as follows:
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not be
imposed, and cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.
It shall not be cruel and unusual punishment to impose the death
penalty on a person convicted of purposely or knowingly causing
death or purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury
resulting in death who committed the homicidal act by his own
conduct or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the
offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary
value.
N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 12. Article I, Section 12 is interpreted analogously to the Eighth Amendment,
See Szemple v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 493 F. App’x 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2012). Accordingly,
Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under that provision of the New Jersey Constitution for cruel
and unusual punishment. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and
New Jersey Constitution Article I, Section 12 claims as stated in Count One of the Complaint is
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
C. First Amendment
Plaintiff next asserts Defendants have violated his right to practice his religion under the
First Amendment. (See ECF 2-1 at 20.) The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S.
Const. amend. I. ‘“Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, . . .
including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” DeHart v. Horn, 227
F.3d 47, 50 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S. Ct.
2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). Nevertheless, “[t]he mere assertion of a religious belief does not
automatically trigger First Amendment protections, however. To the contrary, only those beliefs
8
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 9 of 16 PageID: 291
which are both sincerely held and religious in nature are entitled to constitutional protection.” Id.
at 51.
Plaintiff identifies as a practitioner of Islam. “The Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment is violated when the government has ‘placed a substantial burden on the observation
of a central religious belief or practice’ and no ‘compelling governmental interests justifies the
burden.” Torres v. Davis, 506 F. App’x 98, 101 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’'r,
490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989); see also Chavis v. United States, No.
14–2578, 2014 WL 3547851, at *5 (D.N.J. July 17, 2014). “In order to establish a substantial
burden, [a plaintiff] must . . . allege state action that is either compulsory or coercive in nature.”
Anspach ex rel. Anspach v. City of Phila. Dep't of Public Health, 503 F.3d 256, 272 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 621, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992)) (remaining
citations omitted).
Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege his First Amendment free exercise rights will be
violated. Indeed, he set forth in his will in receipt by NJ DOC Islam does not permit cremation.
There is no indication or facts stated with any facial plausibility which allege NJ DOC has placed
a substantial burden on the observation on one of Plaintiff’s central religious beliefs. Indeed, the
Administrative Code specifically states an unclaimed deceased inmate will only be cremated when
it is only reasonably believed it would not violate the inmate’s religious beliefs. Plaintiff has made
clear in his will to NJ DOC cremation would violate his religious beliefs. Accordingly, Plaintiff
fails to state a First Amendment free exercise claim. 3 This claim is dismissed without prejudice
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
3
This Court does not construe the complaint as containing any claim under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq. (“RLUIPA”)
9
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 10 of 16 PageID: 292
D. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff next attempts to bring a claim against the Defendants for violating his Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
The elements of a substantive due process claim are (1) the
deprivation of a fundamental property interest, Nicholas v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2000); and (2)
governmental deprivation of that property interest in a manner that
is arbitrary or shocks the conscience. See United Artists Theatre
Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399 (3d Cir.
2003) (“‘[T]he substantive component of the Due Process Clause is
violated by executive action only when it can properly be
characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a
constitutional sense.’” (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 847 (1998)) (internal quotations omitted)).
Harmon v. Sussex Cty., No. CV 17-1817-RGA, 2019 WL 4344635, at *6 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2019),
aff'd, 810 F. App’x 139 (3d Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff fails to allege facts related to the deprivation of a fundamental right. Plaintiff
submitted his will to NJ DOC. There are no allegations stated with any facial plausibility that NJ
DOC will cremate Plaintiff in violation of his Islamic faith given this knowledge by NJ DOC.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to allege a Fourteenth Amendment violation. This claim is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
E. Article 1, Section 1 of New Jersey Constitution
In Count Three of his complaint, Plaintiff asserts his right to fundamental fairness has been
offended by Defendants. Plaintiff expressly relies on Article 1, Section 1 of the New Jersey
Constitution in support of this claim. That section states as follows:
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain
natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying
and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness.
10
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 11 of 16 PageID: 293
N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1.
Defendants do not expressly address in the body of their motion to dismiss whether
Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim under this state constitutional section. Nevertheless,
pursuant to this Court’s screening powers under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this claim can be analyzed by
this Court sua sponte to determine whether Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim. 4 As at least
one court in this District has aptly noted:
The standard for an equal protection claim under the U.S.
Constitution is analogous to the standard for an equal protection
claim under the New Jersey Constitution. Article I, paragraph 1, of
the New Jersey Constitution provides: “All persons are by nature
free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of
pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.” Although the term
“equal protection” does not specifically appear in the New Jersey
Constitution, Article I, paragraph 1 has been interpreted to confer an
analogous right to that available under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. Secure Heritage, Inc. v. City of Cape May,
825 A.2d 534, 545 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (citing Doe v.
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J 1995)).
Davis v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-6898, 2018 WL 4179462, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2018).
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Therefore,
to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must allege: (1) he is a member of a
protected class; and (2) he was treated differently from similarly situated inmates. See id. Where
the plaintiff does not claim membership in a protected class, he must allege arbitrary and
4
The legal standard for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is the same as under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008).
11
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 12 of 16 PageID: 294
intentional discrimination to state an equal protection claim. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,
528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Specifically, he must state facts showing that: “(1) the defendant treated
him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there
was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,
239 (3d Cir. 2006). Prison inmates in and of themselves though are not members of a protected
class. See Abdul–Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that prisoners are
not a suspect class).
As a practitioner of Islam, Plaintiff is a member of a protected class. See Allison v. New
Jersey Transit Corp., No. 12-2493, 2014 WL 6474088, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2014) (citing
Saunders v. Apothaker Assocs., Inc., No. 10-3170, 2012 WL 1332602 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2012)). As
best this Court can extrapolate from the complaint with respect to trying to allege differences in
treatment, Plaintiff alleges:
There are many docketed cases of those of the Jewish faith,
Christian faith, and Islamic faith, who died in custody under the
New Jersey Department of Corrections with no one to claim their
bodies, and their bodies were cremated, or their organs were
removed for medical research, as opposed to a proper funeral
according to their religious tenants. . . .
If we go back a decade (10-years) we will discover a large number
of inmates who have died in custody in the State of New Jersey,
whose bodies were not claimed by family members were cremated
as opposed to a proper funeral according to that persons religious
affiliation.
(ECF No. 2-1 at 11, 12.)
The complaint fails to state an equal protection claim in at least two respects. First, the
allegations assert other deceased inmates from non-Islamic religions also faced instances where
they were cremated contrary to their religious beliefs. By so alleging then, Plaintiff alleges other
religions were treated no differently than practitioners of Islam. Furthermore, if one were to extend
12
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 13 of 16 PageID: 295
the “protected class” to all religious persons whose religious beliefs outlaw cremation, the
allegations still fail to state an equal protection claim. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege that atheists
and/or agnostics are not cremated.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Plaintiff does not allege with any facial
plausibility inmates who have expressly stated their religious beliefs outlaw cremation to NJ DOC
(as Plaintiff has in this case through his will) are in fact cremated by NJ DOC if no next of kin
collect their remains. Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to allege similarly situated
inmates are treated differently. Therefore, he does not properly state an equal protection claim
under the New Jersey Constitution. This claim is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
F. Vagueness
Plaintiff also appears to claim N.J. Admin Code § 10A:16-7.5(b) is unconstitutionally
vague. To reiterate, the regulation states: “[a]n unclaimed body shall be cremated where it is
reasonably believed that it would not violate the religious tenets of the deceased inmate.” N.J.
Admin Code § 10A:16-7.5(b). Plaintiff asserts “reasonably believed” in the regulation is too
ambiguous and full of uncertainty.
As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:
In a void-for-vagueness challenge, we must ensure that a statute or
standard is fair in that it is not so vague that a party would not know
what conduct is prohibited. San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d
1125, 1136 (3d Cir.1992). Thus, a statute is unconstitutionally vague
when “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning.” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607, 93 S. Ct. 2908 (quoting
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70
L. Ed. 322 (1926)). The inquiry is completed on a case-by-case
basis, and the party opposing the statute or standard must show that
it is vague as applied to him. San Filippo, 961 F.2d at 1136. In
completing this analysis, it is important to note that, in the civil
context, statutes need not be as precise as in the criminal context and
13
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 14 of 16 PageID: 296
are, therefore, less likely to be invalidated under a void-forvagueness challenge. Id. at 1135.
Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 166–67 (3d Cir. 2008).
The regulation is purportedly vague as argued by Plaintiff because members of his religion
and others have been cremated against their respective religious faiths. However, Plaintiff fails to
indicate whether these inmates expressly notified NJ DOC (through a will for example) about their
religious beliefs as it relates to cremation. Plaintiff admits his will was submitted and received by
NJ DOC. The document includes Plaintiff’s statement that he is a member of the Islamic faith
which bars cremation. Given Plaintiff has taken advantage of providing NJ DOC with a will, and,
more importantly, makes no allegation NJ DOC cremated deceased Islamic inmates who provide
NJ DOC with such information in a submitted will, this Court finds the regulation is not void for
vagueness as applied to and argued by Plaintiff.
G. Request for TRO/Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiff has requested a TRO/preliminary injunctive relief seeking to prevent Defendants
from interfering with his mail. (See ECF No. 13.) A preliminary injunction requires that a plaintiff
demonstrate that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) denial will result in irreparable harm
to the plaintiff; (3) granting the injunction will not result in irreparable harm to the defendant; and
(4) granting the injunction is in the public interest. See Maldonado v. Houston, 157 F.3d 179, 184
(3d Cir. 1988). Essentially the same standard applies to temporary restraining orders. See Ballas
v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537 (D.N.J. 1999). As one court has aptly noted in this District:
It is axiomatic that a preliminary injunction does not provide relief
for a new or different claim than the claims in the complaint. See,
e.g., Bronson v. Houdeshell, 2007 WL 1098962, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
Apr. 11, 2007) (citing 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 8 (1978)). Courts in
this circuit have denied emergent relief when the “request for
injunctive relief is [ ] targeted at potential conduct that bears no
relation to his underlying claim.” Martin v. Keitel, 205 Fed. Appx.
925, 929 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Schwartz v. United States DOJ,
14
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 15 of 16 PageID: 297
No. 06-5581, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74608, 2007 WL 2916465
(D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2007) (denying injunctive relief because plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that the “preliminary injunction relates to the
subject-matter of the underlying complaint”); Glazewski v. Corzine,
2008 WL 2915482, at *1 (D.N.J. Jul. 25, 2008) (denying motion for
a preliminary injunction where the nature of the claims were similar
to those asserted in the underlying complaint but involved different
defendants and different facilities).
Malcolm v. Bray, No. 19-11734, 2020 WL 1694604, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2020).
Plaintiff’s complaint involves purported federal and state constitutional violations related
to what will happen to his body when he is deceased. The circumstances concerning Plaintiff’s
mail involve potential claims and facts not related to the complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
request for a TRO/preliminary injunction is denied. Furthermore, given the complaint is being
dismissed in its entirety, any request for preliminary injunctive relief is also not warranted at this
time. See, e.g., Luellen v. Luellen, No. 12-496, 2013 WL 1182958, at *5 n.9 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21,
2013) (denying motion for preliminary injunction where complaint is dismissed in its entirety). It
is also worth noting Plaintiff’s complaint about purported interference with his mail has not
prevented Plaintiff from responding to Defendants’ motion to dismiss in this case.
15
Case 3:20-cv-02272-BRM-ZNQ Document 30 Filed 11/30/20 Page 16 of 16 PageID: 298
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and New Jersey constitutional claim under Article 1, Section 12 are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim. The remainder of the complaint is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim. To the extent Plaintiff could
correct any of the deficiencies outlined in this opinion in a proposed amended complaint, he may
do so by filing an all-encompassing amended complaint within thirty days. Plaintiff’s request for
a TRO/preliminary injunction is DENIED. An appropriate order will be entered.
/s/Brian R. Martinotti
BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?