FALLAS v. DIGERONIMO et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION Filed. Signed by Judge Georgette Castner on 3/26/2024. (jal, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DARYL FALLAS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 23-04100 (GC) (JBD)
MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUSTINE DIGERONIMO, ESQ., et al.,
Defendants.
CASTNER, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Justine Digeronimo, Esq., and South
Jersey Legal Services Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Daryl Fallas’s Complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (ECF Nos.
1, 8.) Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.) The Court has carefully
reviewed the parties’ submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Rule
78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, and other good cause shown,
Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Allegations

This is a legal malpractice action stemming from a probate case in the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Monmouth County, Docket No. MON-P-214-17. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.1) Plaintiff’s

1

Page numbers for record cites (i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the
Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.

bases for subject-matter jurisdiction are his “right to attorney/client privilege,” “due process,” and
“legal malpractice.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he hired Digeronimo, an attorney with South Jersey Legal Services,
Inc. (SJLS), “sometime in 2016 for work regarding financials, such as filing bankruptcy.” (Id. at
3; ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff then “put [Digeronimo] with [his] father to redo his will of 2004.” (ECF
No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff states that “the key part of the change [to the will] was giving me a life estate
so I couldn’t be forced out.” (Id.)
Plaintiff’s father died on January 18, 2017, and the will was filed with the probate court on
February 6, 2017. (Id.) Plaintiff appears to allege that in the state-court proceedings concerning
his father’s will, a dispute with an opposing party led to an unfavorable disposition of the estate
for Plaintiff, particularly as to the sale of property. (See id.) Plaintiff alleges that “they . . .
convince[d] the Court I had und[ue] influence over my father,” using “[Digeronimo] with her
transcribed phone conversations with me []as their star witness.” (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff was
evicted from his home of 50 years, causing him “embarrassment and shame” as his personal
property was forcibly removed. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff thus seeks “the minimum [he] would have been due [from] the estate upon my
determining sale price and date: . . . $775,168.21.” (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks $18 million to ensure
“a worry-free environment . . . for the next 30 years,” and punitive damages of an additional $18
million for “being ripped out of my home and away from family and friends.” (Id.)
B.

Procedural History

On August 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) Shortly after, this Court
sua sponte ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff responded that he has “evidence of violations

2

of [his] 14th Amendment right of due process” and “evidence of corruption, collusion, conspiracy
to commit fraud and obstruct Justice,” which he believes “may warrant action under the Federal
RICO Act.” (ECF No. 7 at 1.) Plaintiff added that prosecution of his case “will require Discovery
and Subpoena power.” (Id.)
On August 25, Defendants moved to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to raise a federal
question establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 8.)
Plaintiff submitted two opposition filings with additional details to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.) In the first, Plaintiff contends that because he is homeless, living
in hotels, and maintaining a permanent address at “a federal building called the United States Postal
Service” to “keep [his] driver’s license and . . . receive important letters and such,” he has “no
home jurisdiction; unless considering the post office my home address, in which case we can say
I live on Federal property and therefore this Court has Federal jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 9 at 1.)
Plaintiff also elaborates on his show-cause filing, describing his case as one of “corruption,
collusion and conspiracy to commit fraud and obstruct justice” arising from “two different cases
and two different judges” — one case concerning his bankruptcy and the other case concerning
his father’s will. (Id. at 1-2.) Given the implications of his claims, he says, Plaintiff “ha[s] every
reason to doubt that [he] could ever get Justice in the New Jersey Court System.” (Id. at 1.) In his
second filing, Plaintiff describes several of his negative experiences in state court,2 asking the

2

Specifically, Plaintiff describes an incident in 2007, when a state-court judge who
mistakenly answered Plaintiff’s call to chambers would not speak with Plaintiff about his case and
later ruled against Plaintiff; an incident in 2009, when a small-claims debt-collection suit against
Plaintiff ended in settlement, which Plaintiff believes evinces the fraudulent nature of the suit; an
incident in 2010, when a different state-court judge threatened Plaintiff with sanctions if he
continued filing motions in the trial court instead of proceeding to the appellate court; a state-court
case where the Presiding Judge of the Chancery Division ruled against Plaintiff and awarded
Plaintiff’s sister the proceeds of their late father’s life insurance policy; the decision of the judge
in the probate case denying Plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue from Monmouth County to
3

Court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction because “it would be unreasonable for [Plaintiff] to
expect fair treatment in New Jersey courts after what [he has] been through.” (ECF No. 10 at 4.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may bring a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). There are two types of subject-matter challenges under
Rule 12(b)(1): “either a facial or a factual attack.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d
Cir. 2016). On a facial attack, the court “accept[s] the complaint’s well pled allegations as true,
and review[s] ‘the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached
thereto[] in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Manivannan v. United States Dep’t of Energy,
42 F.4th 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176
(3d Cir. 2000)). On a factual attack, “the court ‘is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as
to the existence of its power to hear the case.’” Davis, 824 F.3d at 346 (quoting Mortensen v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)).
“Federal courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, have an obligation to establish subject
matter jurisdiction, raising it sua sponte if necessary.” United States v. Port Imperial Ferry Corp.,
Civ. No. 16-2388, 2023 WL 2535302, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 2023) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Ward Trucking Co., 48 F.3d 742, 750 (3d Cir. 1995)). If a court determines at any time that it
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action because subject matter jurisdiction
“call[s] into question the very legitimacy of a court’s adjudicatory authority.” Council Tree
Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 503 F.3d 284, 292 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d
193, 200 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[The court is] required to consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction,

Middlesex County, where Plaintiff lived, and refusing to replace the latest will with Plaintiff’s
newly found “handwritten will by [his] father dated many months prior to the will in question.”
(See ECF No. 10.)
4

even though neither party contends that it is lacking.” (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch.
Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986))). “Where a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, its
disposition of such a case will be without prejudice.” Siravo v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 256 F.
App’x 577, 580 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing In re Orthopedic “Bone Screw” Prod. Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d
152, 155 (3d Cir. 1997)).
III.

DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not raised a federal question, as Plaintiff has “pled a

claim for legal malpractice relating to state-law wills and estate administration.” (ECF No. 8-1 at
9.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s bases for subject-matter jurisdiction are that (1) Defendants’
divulging privileged communications in the probate proceedings violated of his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights (ECF No. 1 at 1); (2) Plaintiff’s homelessness and use of the U.S.
Postal Service as a permanent address either establishes diversity jurisdiction or otherwise confers
subject-matter jurisdiction on this Court (ECF No. 9 at 1); and (3) given his proffered evidence of
corruption in the state-court system, Plaintiff cannot get a fair hearing in state court (ECF No. 10
at 4). Based on the Court’s review of the record, Plaintiff has not pled an adequate basis for federal
subject-matter jurisdiction.
A.

Federal Question Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded
complaint rule, which provides that such jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is
presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,
482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “[T]o satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, ‘[a] right or immunity
created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one,
of the plaintiff’s cause of action.’” Highview Terrace Apartments v. Abulkhair, Civ. No. 20-2383,

5

2021 WL 825472, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2021) (quoting United Jersey Banks v. Parell, 783 F.2d
360, 365 (3d Cir. 1986)).
When the plaintiff is pro se, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally. Courts “tend
to be flexible when applying procedural rules to pro se litigants, especially when interpreting their
pleadings.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Higgs v.
Atty. Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011)); see also Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938
F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining courts’ obligation as to pro se complaints). Still, “there are
limits to our procedural flexibility”; “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim.” Mala, 704 F.3d at 244.
In Plaintiff’s form complaint, Plaintiff selected “Federal Questions” as the basis for federal
court jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) As to the “federal Constitutional, statutory or treaty right” at
issue, Plaintiff wrote “right to attorney/client privilege,” “due process,” and “legal malpractice.”
(Id.) Plaintiff has not, however, pled the essential element necessary to raise a federal question.
Plaintiff’s recourse for a breach of the attorney-client privilege is a legal malpractice claim,
and a legal malpractice claim does not give rise to a federal question. See Westcor Land Title Ins.
Co. v. Alicea, Civ. No. 19-8474, 2019 WL 6724311, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2019) (listing the
existence and breach of an attorney-client relationship as elements for a legal malpractice claim
under New Jersey law); see also Tidwell v. Bembry, 133 F. App’x 26, 28 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The
District Court correctly concluded that subject matter jurisdiction could not be premised on 28
U.S.C. § 1331 because [plaintiff’s] claims of legal malpractice did not give rise to a federal
question.”). Because Plaintiff has not identified a basis other than the divulgence of privileged
communications as support for his assertion of a due process violation, he has not asserted a
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that could raise a

6

federal question. See James v. Superior Ct. of New Jersey, Civ. No. 21-16769, 2023 WL 4669484,
at *3 (D.N.J. July 20, 2023) (discussing requirements for asserting due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
Nor can Plaintiff establish subject-matter jurisdiction with his passing mention of “the
Federal RICO Act,” or the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962. (ECF No. 7 at 1.) Indeed, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not plead or otherwise describe a
federal civil RICO claim.3 (See generally ECF No. 1.) Though courts reviewing a pro se pleading
must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name,”
Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002), the sum of Plaintiff’s filings indicates that he
does not assert a federal civil RICO claim against Defendants. The only time that Plaintiff
mentions “RICO” is in his show-cause filing, where he notes that he believes that “[his] evidence
may warrant action under the Federal RICO Act,” and that “before continuing with this case as a
Civil matter, [Plaintiff is] willing to share everything [he has] and know[s] about this with a federal
prosecutor.” (ECF No. 7 at 1.) Later, in his opposition papers, Plaintiff discusses the prospect of
“becom[ing] a witness for the prosecution” for a potentially forthcoming “case of corruption,
collusion and conspiracy to commit fraud and obstruct justice,” in which case he “won’t be able
to be the pro se litigant should that take place.” (ECF No. 9 at 1.)
The Court construes Plaintiff’s submission as his support for his assertion that he wishes
to proceed in federal court because he has been denied “fair treatment in New Jersey courts.” (ECF
No. 10 at 4.) Courts in this Circuit have rejected similar assertions as bases for subject-matter
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Turner v. Children’s Hosp. of Philadelphia, 378 F. App’x 124, 126 (3d Cir.

3

If Plaintiff wishes to state a federal civil RICO claim, he must allege “(1) the conducting
of, (2) an enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity.” Gunter v. Ridgewood
Energy Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 166, 173 (D.N.J. 1998).
7

2010) (holding that a pro se plaintiff’s claim that her state-court proceedings were unfair was
inextricably intertwined with state court’s judgment and thus barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine); Topfer v. Topfer, Civ. No. 18-01181, 2018 WL 8997509, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2018),
report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3778709 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2019) (rejecting a
plaintiff’s claim of injury “arising from any ‘unfair’ and final State Court orders entered against
him during the divorce proceedings” as barred under by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).4
To be sure, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction in
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the plaintiff’s loss in a state-court action resulted from a
conspiracy between the defendants and certain members of the state judiciary. Great W. Mining
& Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 172 (3d Cir. 2010).5 Indeed, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals has recognized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar a plaintiff’s
federal action arising from injuries suffered not from a state-court judgment, but from the
defendant’s wrongful conduct in a state-court proceeding. Id. at 167-68, 171-72 (discussing
McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2006); then Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003
(7th Cir. 1995), overruled by Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson, 62 F.4th 394 (7th Cir. 2023); then Brokaw
v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Vuyanich v. Smithton Borough, 5 F.4th 379,
386 (3d Cir. 2021) (“When . . . a federal plaintiff asserts injury caused by the defendant’s actions
and not by the state-court judgment, Rooker-Feldman is not a bar to federal jurisdiction.” (quoting

4

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars any such attempt to use a federal trial court as a court
of appeals from state-court judgments. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).
5

“[P]rivate parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with [an official
judicial act] are . . . acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.” Great W.
Mining, 615 F.3d at 176 (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980)) (alterations added in
Great W. Mining).
8

Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 167)). In that event, the plaintiff’s claim for damages must be “based
on an alleged independent violation of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights” — “the right to an
impartial forum.” Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 172 (citation omitted).
But here, Plaintiff has not shown that he wishes to plead such a claim. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants’ divulgence of privileged communications in the probate case violated his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights. (See ECF No. 7.) If Plaintiff attributes that violation to collusion
among state-court judges and Defendants to conspire against him, Plaintiff must say so. Indeed,
Plaintiff’s submissions include no facts or assertions from which the Court could infer that Plaintiff
intends to assert a claim against Defendants like the § 1983 claim asserted in Great Western Mining
& Mineral Company v. Fox Rothschild LLP, et al., discussed above. For instance, Plaintiff
provides no factual allegations of a conspiracy in the probate case that the Court could liberally
construe for Plaintiff. Nor does Plaintiff even mention § 1983. Rather, Plaintiff expresses his
desire to be in federal court based only on his general distrust of the Superior Court after years of
unpleasant experiences in the state-court system. That general distrust is not enough to establish
a federal question.
To be clear, the Court does not dismiss Plaintiff’s suit under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
jurisdiction due to merits-related defects. Although “[a] suit may sometimes be dismissed for want
of jurisdiction where the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to
be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is
wholly insubstantial and frivolous, [d]ismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not appropriate merely
because the legal theory alleged is probably false, but only because the right claimed is so
insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely
devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Davis, 824 F.3d at 350 (internal citations

9

and quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen a case raises a disputed factual issue that goes both to the
merits and jurisdiction, district courts must demand less in the way of jurisdictional proof than
would be appropriate at a trial stage.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).6
Here, the defect is not that Plaintiff’s claim is unsubstantiated, but that Plaintiff has not
made clear that he even wishes to assert a claim that might raise a federal question, like the one in
Great Western Mining. The Court does not read such a claim into Plaintiff’s suit.
Plaintiff also seeks damages of $775,168.21 as “the minimum [he] would have been due
[from] the estate upon [his] determining sale price and date.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) An award of those
damages, from what the Court can gather, would not require overturning the state court’s
disposition of estate property. See Vuyanich, 5 F.4th at 387 (“And importantly, the [plaintiffs] did
not ask the District Court to overturn the June 18, 2019 state-court order,” which the plaintiffs
asserted was “invalid,” “but rather sought damages for the actions Defendants took under the guise
of implementing that order.”); Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 173 (“[W]hile [plaintiff]’s claim for
damages may require review of state-court judgments and even a conclusion that they were
erroneous, those judgments would not have to be rejected or overruled for [plaintiff] to prevail.”).
But to recover more than nominal damages for a due process violation, Plaintiff “would have to
show that the adverse state-court decisions were entered erroneously.” Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d
at 173. Plaintiff alleges nothing to that effect.
In sum, Plaintiff’s complaint raises no federal question under § 1331.

6

Indeed, Defendants launch a facial attack — that Plaintiff does not allege subject-matter
jurisdiction — requiring the Court to “treat the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P. v. Cook, 866 F.3d
534, 538 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333,
341 (3d Cir. 2001)).
10