MUELLER v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Robert Kirsch on 11/22/2024. (kht)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TIMOTHY M.,

Plaintiff,
V.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Civil Action No. 24-4592 (RK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant.

KIRSCH, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Timothy M.'s ("Timothy")1 appeal from the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's (the "Commissioner") final decision, which
denied Timothy's request for disability insurance benefits. (ECF No. 1 .) The Court has jurisdiction
to review this appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) and reaches its decision without oral argument
pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons below, the Court AFFIRMS the
Commissioner's decision.

I.

BACKGROUND
In this appeal, the Court must answer the following question. Does substantial evidence

support Administrative Law Judge Sharon Allard's ("Judge Allard") determination of Timothy's
residual functional capacity?

1 The Court identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial only. See D.N.J. Standing Order 2021-10.

A. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Timothy filed an application for a period of disability insurance benefits on November 3,
2020, alleging an onset date of March 17, 2020. (Administrative Record ("AR") at 223-38.)2 The
Social Security Administration (the "Administration") denied the request both initially and on
reconsideration. (Id. at 103-07, 115-19.) Timothy requested a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Id. at 125.) At a telephonic hearing on March 10, 2022, Judge Allard heard
testimony from Timothy, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert. (Id. at 55-74.)
Due to technological difficulties, the hearing could not be completed. (Id. at 14.) The hearing
continued on July 26, 2022, where Plaintiff, who was still represented by counsel, and an impartial
vocational expert, testified. (Id. at 33-54.) On April 28, 2023, Judge Allard issued a written
decision finding Timothy was not disabled. (M at 14-27.) The Administration's Appeals Council
denied Timothy's request to review Judge Allard's decision. (Id. at 1-6.) This appeal followed.

(ECF No. 1.) The Administrative Record was filed on June 10, 2024 (ECF No. 4), Timothy filed
his moving brief challenging Judge Allard's decision on July 31, 2024 (ECF No. 7), the
Commissioner filed an opposition brief on August 30, 2024 (ECF No. 9), and Timothy filed his
reply on September 13, 2024 (ECF No. 10).
B. JUDGE ALLARD'S DECISION
In her April 28, 2023 opinion, Judge Allard found that Timothy was not disabled under the
prevailing Administration regulations. (See generally AR at 14-27.) To reach this decision, Judge
Allard applied the five-step process for determining whether an individual is disabled as set forth
in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). {Id. at 16-17.) At Step One, Judge Allard found that Timothy had not

2 The Administrative Record ("Record" or "AR") is available at ECF No. 4-1 through 4-7. This Opinion
will reference only page numbers in the Record without the corresponding ECF numbers.

engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, March 17, 2020. (Id. at 17
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571 et seq.).) At Step Two, Judge Allard found that Timothy suffered
from three severe impairments: degenerative disc disorder, lumbar radiculopathy, and obesity. (Id.

at 17-18 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).) At Step Three, Judge Allard determined that Timothy
did not have "an impairment or combination of impairments" that qualified under the
Administration's listed impairments. {Id. at 18-19 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525,
404.1526).) As a precursor to Step Four, Judge Allard concluded that Timothy had the residual
functional capacity ("RFC") to perform "light work" with the following limitations: he could
never work around hazards, including moving mechanical parts or at unprotected heights," and
could occasionally "climb ramps/stairs, kneel, stoop, crouch, [ ] crawl, balance on wet, moving or
uneven surfaces [,]" and have "occasional exposure to temperature extremes of heat and cold,
wetness, humidity, fumes, odors, dusts, gases and poor ventilation." (M at 19-25.) At Step Four,
Judge Allard found that Timothy "is capable of performing past relevant work as a Police
Detective." {Id. at 25 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565).) Finally, at Step Five, Judge Allard heard
testimony from a vocational expert and concluded that "there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy" that Timothy could perform. (Id. at 25-26 (citing 20 C.F.R.
404.1569, 404.1569a).) The impartial expert testified that representative jobs Timothy could
perform, consistent with Judge Allard's RFC, included a police detective, police officer for safety
instruction, internal affairs investigator, and a police clerk. {Id. at 25-26, 42-43.)

3 Light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. 4042.1567(b), means in an eight-hour workday, "sitting up to six hours;
standing/walking up to sbc hours; and lifting/canying up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently." 20
C.F.R. 4042.1567 (b).

This appeal concerns Judge Allard's RFC determination, specifically whether she
adequately examined all relevant record evidence and explained how state agency medical
consultant opinions ("SAMC Opinions") were supported and consistent with such evidence.
Regarding the RFC determination, Judge Allard first reviewed Timothy's self-reported
symptoms and claimed functional limitations. (Id. at 19-20.) The ALJ considered Timothy's
treatment history—mainly relating to his back pain and degenerative disc disorder—and
determined that Timothy's severe impairments could be expected to produce the symptoms he
alleged {id. at 19-24), but "the symptoms do not cause the degree of limitation alleged" (id. at 24).
Judge Allard considered Timothy's medical treatment history. {Id.) Timothy visited Dr. Xialoing
Li in February 2020 following a fall at work and complained of low back pain. (Id. at 19.) X-rays
from that time showed mild multilevel degenerative change of the lumbosacral spine. {Id. at 19)
(citing Ex. 5F at 48-49.) During multiple subsequent neurosurgical evaluations with Dr. Alfred
Steinberger in 2020, it was reported that Timothy had an antalgic gait, mild distal right leg
weakness, and significant low back pain with radicular component on mostly the right leg. {Id. at
20 (citing Ex. 4F).) Dr. Steinberger diagnosed Timothy with lumbagodisogenic disease with disc
hemiations, but he maintained "full weight bearing ambulation." (Id.) Dr. Steinberger
recommended physical therapy and that Timothy refrain from working "for at least eight weeks."
(M) Despite these symptoms of pain, Timothy continued working at this time. Additional MRI's
of Timothy's lumbar spine showed mild results of foraminal narrowing due to an annular disc
bulge and mild canal stenosis. (M)
In May 2020, Timothy attended a telehealth physical therapy session due to the
extraordinary circumstances presented by the COVID-19 Pandemic. {Id.) Timothy's range of

motion improved; however, his pain symptoms had not, and a discussion ensued regarding
Timothy's "weight reduction and the importance of regular physical activity." (Id. (citing Ex. 2F
at 29^1-3).) Timothy visited Dr. Naimish Baxi, a pain management specialist, who reported
Timothy had generally normal findings except his "lumbar range of motion was painful and limited
in forward flexion and extension," and "there was diffuse tenderness to palpation over bilateral
lumbar paraspinals." {Id. at 21 (citing Ex. IF).) Dr. Baxi diagnosed Timothy with lumbar
radiculitis and midline low back pain with right-sided sciatica, and recommended he continue the
course of steroid injections and physical therapy, as well as refraining from working. (M) Timothy
repeated this treatment pattern, but his chronic low back pain persisted. (Id. at 22.) In total, two
steroidal injections did not in the long-term significantly reduce Timothy's claimed back pain. {Id.
at 21-22.)
By June 2021, Timothy had "retired because he could not do his job" as a police detective
given his pain. {Id. at 22.) At this point, Dr. Steinberger recommended surgery for decompression,
fusion, and instrumentation at L4-5 to Timothy to relieve his back pain, but Timothy did not wish
to proceed with surgery. {Id. (citing Ex. 4F-5F).) Lastly, Dr. Deepinder Arora conducted a
consultative examination of Timothy, finding generally normal results (i.e. "neurological
examination was normal, with power and strength 5/5 all over and grip strength 5/5 in the hands
bilaterally, [and Timothy] could walk on his toes heels and do tandem walk") with a slight limp
when walking on his heels, "mild restriction to anterior and later al flexion of the spine" and
decreased range of motion in the lumbar spine. {Id.)
Lastly, Judge Allard considered the medical opinions in the record. The state agency
medical consultants, Drs. Bilenker and Bustos, opined that Timothy could perform light exertional

work with certain postural and environmental limitations. (Id. at 25 (citing Exs. 1A, 3A, 5A).)
Judge Allard found "these opinions persuasive because they are supported by and consistent with
the medical evidence of record." (Id.) Judge Allard noted that various treating physicians
recommended that Timothy remain out of work; however, she found these statements not
persuasive "as they are conclusory" and "without a function by function assessment." (Id. (citing
Exs. IF, 2F, 5F, 8P).)4

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews the "final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security" to determine
whether the Commissioner's findings are "supported by substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
In the event that the Appeals Council denies a claimant's request for review, "the ALJ's decision
is the Commissioner's final decision." Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less
than a preponderance of the evidence." Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Rutherford v. Bamhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)). Put differently, "[i]t means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Plummer v. Apfel,
186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)). This evidentiary threshold "is not high." Biestek v. Berryhill,

139 S. Ct. 1148,1154(2019).
The scope of the Court's review of the ALJ's decision is "quite limited." Id. On review the
Court may not "re-weigh the evidence or impose [its] own factual determinations." Chandler v.

4 Judge Allard also considered Timothy's non-severe impairments in her determination of his RFC (see

AR at 23-24), but this aspect of her opinion is not at issue on appeal. (See generally ECF Nos. 7 and 10.)

Comm'r of Soc. See., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971)). "Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are
bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently." Fargnoli

v. Massanari, 247 K3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.

1999)).
B. ESTABLISHING ELIGIBILITY FOR DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS
A claimant may establish disability under the Social Security Act by proving they are
unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A).
The ALJ applies a well-established "five-step sequential evaluation process," which requires
considering whether the claimant:

(1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) suffers from an
impairment or combination of impairments that is "severe"; (3)
suffers from an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) is able to perform his or her
past relevant work; and (5) is able to perform work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy.
McCrea v. Comm'r of Soc. See., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R.
?§ 404.1520(a)-(f), 416.920(a)-(f)). The claimant bears the burden at the first four steps, at which
point it shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five. Hess v. Comm'r Soc. See., 931 F.3d 198, 201

(3d Cir. 2019).

HI. DISCUSSION
Timothy appeals the Appeals Council's affirmance of Judge Allard's decision. He argues
that Judge Allard committed legal error by failing to adequately discuss how the SAMC Opinions

were supported by and consistent with the record evidence, thereby precluding meaningful judicial
review. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees.
For claims filed after March 27,2017, like those in the instant matter, the regulations dictate
that the Commissioner will consider the following factors when considering all medical opinions:

(1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant, including the length of the
treating examination, the frequency of examinations, and the purpose of the treatment relationship;
(4) the medical source's specialization; and (5) other factors, including, but not limited to,
"evidence showing a medical source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an
understanding of our disability program's policies and evidentiary requirements." 20 C.F.R. §'
404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c). The regulations emphasize that "the most important factors [that the
ALJ and Commissioner] consider when [ ] evaluating] the persuasiveness of medical opinions"
are the factors of supportability and consistency. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Further, the
regulations require the ALJ to "discuss [the] supportability and consistency [factors]" when
articulating her "consideration of medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings" in
her opinion. Lee Ann M. v. O'Malley, No. 22-1104, 2024 WL 4184486 at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 13,

2024) (citations omitted).
When an ALJ evaluates a medical opinion, the ALJ is not required "to use particular
language or adhere to a particular format in conducting [her] analysis." Jones v. Bamhart, 364
F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Bumett v. Comm'r ofSoc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112,11920 (3d Cir. 2000)). Instead, the Court must "ensure that there is sufficient development of the
record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review." (Id.) This requirement governs
the Court's review of each Step of the ALJ's analysis, including her RFC determination. An ALT's
finding of a claimant's RFC must "be accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication of the

basis on which it rests." FargnoU, 247 F.3d at 41 (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d
Cir. 1981) (the Court "need[s] from the ALJ not only an expression of the evidence s/he considered
which supports the result, but also some indication of the evidence which was rejected")).
However, the Court "examine[s] the ALJ's conclusions as to a claimant's RFC with 'the deference
required of the substantial evidence standard of review.'" Martin v. Comm'r ofSoc. See., 547 F.

App'x 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Substantial evidence does not require highly detailed explanations, "[t]o the contrary, a reviewing
court must 'uphold' even 'a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably
be discerned.'" Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357 at 368 (2021); see also Cotter, 650 F.2d at 482 ("[T]he
ALJ is not required to supply a comprehensive explanation for the rejection of evidence; in most
cases, a sentence or short paragraph would probably suffice.")
Timothy argues that Judge Allard's RFC determination is not supported by substantial
evidence because her discussion of the SAMC Opinions on which she relies to determine
Timothy's RFC lacks the required "minimum level of articulation" required by the Regulations.
(See ECF No. 7 at 8-10; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (requiring the ALJ to "discuss
supportability and consistency" in their "consideration of medical opinions").) Further, Timothy
contends that Judge Allard failed to explain why she discounted evidence from the Kessler
Rehabilitation Center Findings stating Timothy had limits to the amount he could push, pull, stand,
and sit that are inconsistent with Judge Allard's RFC determination of light work. (Id.) The
Commissioner responds that when viewed as a whole, Judge AllarcT s opinion adequately considers
all the relevant medical evidence and substantial evidence supports her finding that the SAMC
Opinions were consistent and supported by the record. (ECF 9 at 13.) This Court finds that
substantial evidence supports Judge Allard's RFC determination.

In determining Timothy's RFC, Judge Allard considered the subjective, medical, and
opinion evidence related to Timothy's lumbar spine, which forms the core of Timothy's treatment
history and complaints. Judge Allard considered Timothy's claims of back pain. (AR at 19-23
(citing Exs. IF, 2F, 4F, and 5F).) Judge Allard reviewed the medical records showing Timothy's
treatment history which included several stints of physical therapy, two steroid epidural shots, xrays and an MRI. (Id.) Judge Allard considered the SAMC Opinions which found Timothy capable
of performing "light exertional work activity with postural and environmental limitations." (Id. at
25 (citing Exs. 1A, 3A, and 5A.) Judge Allard noted that recommendations in the record that
Timothy remain out of work were not persuasive "as they are conclusory statements, without a
function-by-function assessment," and that the consultative examiner, Dr. Arora, did not give an
opinion regarding Timothy's ability to perform work related activities. (Id. at 25 (citing IF, 2F,
5F, 6F, 8P).) Judge Allard concluded that due to Timothy's "degenerative disc disorder, lumbar
radiculopathy, and obesity," he retains the capability to perform "light exertional work activity,
with postural and environmental restrictions." (Id.)
Judge Allard's conclusion was based in part on finding that despite Timothy's claims that
his pain precluded him from work, he was able to take care of his personal needs and could do
light housework. (Id. (citing Ex. 5E).) Further, Timothy was able to continue working as a police
detective until 2021, some time after the alleged onset date. {Id. at 20, 22 (citing 4F, 6F).) While
Judge Allard recounted a decrease in Timothy's range of motion of the lumbar spine; she noted
that Timothy maintained a normal gait and station, the ability to move his knees and hips normally,
5/5 power and strength in his grip and hands, and total range of motion in his shoulders. (Id. at 22
(citing Ex. 6F).) Given the functional assessments perfomied by the state agency medical
consultants, who opined that Timothy was capable of light work subject to certain limitations, and

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in conjunction with the above referenced evidence, the ALJ Grafted an RFC that limited Timothy
to "light work" with an ability to "occasionally climb ramps/stairs, kneel, stoop, crouch and
crawl..., balance on wet, moving or uneven surfaces...," but "never climb ladders, ropers or

scaffolds, work around hazards, including moving mechanical parts or at unprotected heights."
{Id. at 19.)
Timothy complains that the ALJ did not adequately address the factors of supportability

and consistency in regard to the SAMC Opinions. (ECF No. 7 at 11 (citing AR at 25).) Timothy
argues that Judge Allard's analysis was incomplete and improper by stating in a summary fashion
that she found the SAMC Opinions "persuasive because they are supported by and consistent with
the medical evidence of record." (Id. at 11 (citing AR at 25).) While the Court agrees with Timothy
that Judge Allard's discussion of the SAMC Opinions could benefit from some additional
elaboration, this Court finds that Judge Allard's decision, when "read as a whole, illustrates that
the ALJ considered the appropriate factors" to permit meaningful review of Timothy's RFC
determination. See Jones, 364 F.3d at 505; see also Diaz v. Comm'r ofSoc. See., 577 F. 3d 500,
504 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that an ALJ "need not employ particular 'magic' words" or "adhere to
a particular format" rather, the decision need only contain a sufficient discussion of the evidence
and explanation of the ALT's reasoning to enable "meaningful judicial review.") As established
above, Judge Allard's RFC determination is consistent with the vast majority of the treatment
records and objective medical findings referenced in her opinion, which document persistent low
back pain but otherwise generally normal findings. Accordingly, while perhaps a more fulsome
written analysis might have been helpful and clearer, Judge Allard's entire opinion enables this
Court to discern her reasoning for why substantial evidence supports her RFC detennination. See
Garland, 593 U.S. at 369 (citation omitted) (the substantial evidence standard does not require

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highly detailed explanations, "[t]o the contrary, a reviewing court must 'uphold' even 'a decision
of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned'")
Timothy also argues that Judge Allard did not explicitly state why she rejected certain
contradictory evidence in the Kessler Rehabilitation Findings regarding Timothy's abilities to
push, pull, sit, and stand. (ECF No. 7 at 11.) However, Judge Allard did reference the Kessler
Rehabilitation Findings in her opinion, noting that they documented some improvement in
Timothy's range of motion in the lumbar spine but that his pain symptoms remained unchanged.
{Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 2F/29^1-3).) Further, Judge Allard noted that she considered the Kessler
Rehabilitation Findings along with the opinions from the state agency medical consultants in
Grafting Timothy's RFC. (Id. at 20, 25.) Lastly, Judge Allard adequately explained why she found
the contradictory medical opinion testimony that Timothy should refrain from work unpersuasive.
(AR at 20, 25 (citing noting despite his pain, Timothy continued to work during a portion of the
relevant time period).)

While the Court agrees with Timothy that Judge Allard did not explicitly state why she
rejected certain limitations articulated in the Kessler Rehabilitation Findings, such a specific
articulation is not required. See Camille C. v. O'Malley, No. 23-1033, 2024 WL 1328132 n.8
(D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2024) ("[W]hile Plaintiff argues ALJ Allard did not explicitly reference a few
specific statements from these two doctors, that does not mean ALJ Allard did not consider those

5 Timothy also argues that the record is unclear as to whether the state agency medical consultants, in preparing their
opinion, reviewed the Kessler Rehabilitation Findings. (ECF No. 10 at 6.) Thus, Timothy contends that Judge Allard's
reliance on these opinions is flawed and leaves the Court to guess "how the ALJ arrived at her conclusion to completely
accept theu- opinions." (Id.) However, Judge Allard explicitly cited to the Kessler Rehabilitation Findings, indicating
she reviewed them, and it is of no import whether the state agency medical consultants did not review this evidence
because the ultimate RFC determination is reserved for the ALJ. See Roger D. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-1806, 2021 WL
4191434, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2021) ("it is the ALJ—not treating or examining physicians or state agency
physicians—who makes the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.") (citing Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361.)

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statements. ALJs are not required to list or discuss every piece of evidence in the record.") (citing
Jose L. v. Comm'r of Soc. See., No. 20-9749, 2022 WL 603001, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2022);
Frederick F. v. Comm'r of Soc. See., No. 20-11500, 2022 WL 445538, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 14,
2022). Additionally, "an ALJ is not required to cite every piece of evidence in the record." Pintal
v. Comm'r ofSoc. See., 602 PAppx 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing FargnoU, 247 F.3d at 42) (stating
there is no requirement that an ALJ refer to every piece of relevant medical evidence so long as
the reviewing court can discern the basis of the decision).
Lastly, Timothy argues that Judge AllarcTs error is not harmless because it leaves the
"ALJ's decision unsupported by substantial evidence." (ECF No. 7 at 11.) However, the harmless
error rule in Social Security appeals is whether the ALJ's error affects the outcome of the case.
See Rutherford, 399 P.3d at 553 ("[W]e . . . conclude that a remand is not required here because it
would not affect the outcome of the case.") A procedural error like the one Timothy alleges Judge
Allard committed (i.e. failing to adequately discuss the consistency and supportability of medical
opinions) is harmless "if the Court can 'glean' how the ALJ considered the consistency [or
supportability] of the opinion and if a 'searching review' of the record confirms that the ALJ did
not violate the applicable regulations." Glenn W. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-2724, 2023 WL 238823, at
*7 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2023) (quoting Loucks v. Kijakazi, No. 21-1749, 2022 WL 2189293, at *2 (2d
Cir. June 17, 2022) (stating that "the ALJ committed procedural error by failing to explain how it
considered the supportability and consistency of medical opinions in the record[,]" but that
"[djespite the ALT's procedural error, we could affirm if 'a searching review of the record' assures
us 'that the substance of the [regulation] was not traversed'") (quoting Estrella v. Berryhill, 925
P.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019)) (cleaned up). Accordingly, on appeal, Timothy must show not merely
that Judge Allard erred, but the error changed the determination of disability. See Michael D. v.

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Comm'r Soc. Sec, 2023 WL 6795125 at *4 (citing Romero v. Comm'r ofSoc. See., No. 18-16806,

2020 WL 2301444, at *2 (D.N.J. May 8, 2020).
In the alternative, if the Court did not agree with Judge Allard's RFC determination of light
work, Judge Allard nonetheless posed hypothetical questions to the vocational expert ("VE") at
the ALJ hearing that included more severe limitations consistent with a sedentary exertional level
and the functional limitations expressed in the Kessler Rehabilitation Findings. (AR at 26, 46-53;
see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (defining sedentary work as "lifting no more than 10 pounds at
a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles" and "mvolve[ing] sitting" with a "certain
amount of walking and standing"). The VE testified that even if Judge Allard had found Timothy
limited to a sedentary exertional level (i.e. consistent with the Kessler Rehabilitation Findings),
sufficient jobs existed in the national economy for him to do. (Id.) As such, Timothy cannot show
that Judge Allard's alleged error was harmful since it would not have changed the outcome in the
instant matter.6

6 Timothy relies on Glenn v. Kijakazi to support his argument that Judge Allard failed to include the adequate level of
articulation in her opinion. (ECF No. 7 at 10 (citing Glenn, 2023 WL 238823 at *7).) However, the instant matter is
easily distinguished from Glenn, where the court was unable to determine if the ALJ's error was harmless. See Glenn,

2023 WL 238823 at *7.

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CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the record as a whole, the Court affirms the affirmance of Judge Allard's
decision by the Administration's Appeals Council. The Court will issue an order consistent with
this Memorandum Opinion.

ROBERT KlRSCH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: November 22, 2024

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