WHITEHEAD v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION Filed. Signed by Judge Robert Kirsch on 1/7/2025. (jal, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LAMOR WHITEHEAD,

Civil Action No. 24-11430 (RK)

Petitioner,

ME1VIORANDUM OPINION

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

Petitioner Lamor Whitehead ("Petitioner" or "Whitehead") is a federal prisoner currently
incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution Fairton. He is proceeding pro se with a Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Federal district courts are required under

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, which is
applicable to § 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule l(b), to screen and summarily dismiss a habeas
petition prior to the answer when the petition "appears legally insufficient on its face." McFarland
v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994); see also United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 437 (3d Cir.
2000) (explaining habeas petitions may be dismissed where "none of the grounds alleged in the
petition would entitle [the petitioner] to relief). For the reasons stated in this Memorandum
Opinion, the Court dismisses the Petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and without

prejudice to Whitehead's filing of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Southern District of
New York.
On March 11, 2024, a federal jury in the Southern District of New York found Petitioner
guilty of two counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, one count of attempted wire fraud under
18 U.S.C. § 1349, one count of making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and one count of

attempted extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951. (See S.D.N.Y. Crim. Dkt.No. 22-692, No. 180.) On
June 17, 2024, the District Court sentenced Petitioner to 108 months' imprisonment on Counts
One, Two, Three, and Five, and 36 months' imprisonment on Count 4 to mn concurrent with the
108-month sentence. (Mat No. 232.) Petitionerfiledanoticeofappealon June 27, 2024. (Id, at
No. 234; see also ECF No. 1, Petition at 3.)
Petitioner is currently sendng his sentence at Fairton FCI and is confined within this
district. (See Petition at 3.) On December 23, 2024, he filed the instant Petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, which alleges violations of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
and his Fifth Amendment due process rights and seeks to set aside his conviction. (ECF No. 1.)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), a prisoner or detainee may receive habeas relief only if he "is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488,490 (1989). Nevertheless, "[mjotions pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their
convictions or sentences." Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). A federal
prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must generally bring his collateral challenge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court, which is "already familiar with the facts of the case." See
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774-75 (2008); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). The "savings clause"
contained in § 22 5 5 (e) provides an exception to this general rule and permits federal prisoners to
proceed under § 2241 only when a § 2255 motion would be "inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of [the petitioner's] detention." 28 U.S.C. § 225 5 (e). Specifically, the savings clause in §

2255(e) states that a habeas petition "shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has
failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such a court has
denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by the motion is inadequate or ineffective

to test the legality of his detention."
Here, Petitioner has not provided any reasons why he is unable to file a motion under §
2255 in the Southern District of New York. Notably, in Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023),
the Supreme Court sharply curtailed the use of the savings clause for collateral attacks under §
2241. As explained by the Supreme Court in Jones:
Traditionally, courts have treated the saving clause as covering
unusual circumstances in which it is impossible or impracticable for
a prisoner to seek relief from the sentencing court. The clearest such
circumstance is the sentencing court's dissolution; a motion in a
court that no longer exists is obviously "inadequate or ineffective"
for any purpose.
Id. at 474. The Court also noted that "[t]he saving clause might also apply when "it is not
practicable for the prisoner to have his motion determined in the trial court because of his inability
to be present at the hearing, or for other reasons." Id. Post-Jones, the saving clause only "preserves
recourse to § 2241 in cases where unusual circumstances make it impossible or impracticable to
seek relief in the sentencing court, as well as for challenges to detention other than collateral
attacks on a sentence." Id. at 478. These concerns are not present here.

For these reasons, the Court dismisses the Petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and declines to transfer the Petition to the Southern District of New York. The Petition is dismissed
without prejudice to Petitioner's filing of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Southern District of New York subject to the time limits set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).1 An appropriate Order follows. /"\ /

ROBERT KIRSCH
United States District Judge
1 Timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) does not appear to be a concern because Petitioner was
sentenced less than a year ago and his direct appeal is still pending.

3