Rogers v. Rivera et al

Filing 72

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 66 MOTION for Reconsideration by Chief Judge M. Christina Armijo. (vv)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

PAUL ROGERS,
Plaintiff
v.

1:15-cv-00007 MCA/SCY

MARTIN RIVERA, ERWIN YOUNG, and
RON SAAVEDRA, in their individual
capacities,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
[Doc. 66], in which Plaintiff requests that this Court reconsider its Order entered on
March 28, 2017 granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Res
Judicata [Doc. 43; Doc. 65]. The Court has considered the parties’ submissions and the
relevant law, and is otherwise fully informed. For the following reasons, the Court
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion.
I.

Background
The details of the underlying action and procedural history leading to this matter

are described more fully in this Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order filed on
January 25, 2016. [Doc. 15] In short, Plaintiff Paul Rogers (Plaintiff) filed a complaint
in state court against Defendants Martin Rivera, Erwin Young, and Ron Saavedra
(collectively, Defendants) in January 2014 alleging, among other things, violations of the
New Mexico Tort Claims Act. [Doc. 15] Plaintiff later filed an Amended Complaint
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(State Amended Complaint). [Doc. 15] Approximately a year later, in January 2015,
Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Violations of Constitutional and Civil Rights in this Court
(the Complaint). [Doc. 1; Doc. 15] After alleging facts which, for all relevant purposes,
are the same as those alleged in his State Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants used excessive and unreasonable force against him, thereby depriving him of
his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
[Doc. 1, ¶¶ 35, 39, 40] U.S. CONST. amend. IV. He further alleges that Defendants
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable and illegal seizure and
arrest because they lacked probable cause to arrest him. [Doc. 1; Doc. 15]
Five months after Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this Court, Defendants moved
for dismissal based on the Colorado River doctrine and the Younger abstention doctrine.
[Doc. 6] See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
818 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). In the Motion to Dismiss in Lieu
of Answer, Defendants argued that “the complaints are virtually identical with the
exception of the detailed [F]ourth [A]mendment claims which follow the fact allegation
section in the federal complaint,” and that this Court should abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over the matter under either the Colorado River or Younger doctrine in order
to preserve judicial resources. [Doc. 6, pg. 3] Defendants also explicitly stated that they
“bring this Motion pursuant to Rule 12 and therefore reserve this right to state available
affirmative defenses in an Answer, should one become necessary.” [Doc. 6, pg. 1, n.1]
Defendants went on, “However, Defendants without limitation state the following
affirmative defenses: Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under which relief may be
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granted; Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata, priority jurisdiction, and collateral
estoppel; . . . .” [Doc. 6, pg. 1, n.1] In January 2016, this Court held that the two suits
were not “parallel proceedings,” declined to apply either the Colorado River or Younger
doctrines, and denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of Answer. [Doc. 15]
Defendants then filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. [Doc. 18] In the
Answer, Defendants asserted that “plaintiff has filed this second duplicative complaint in
an effort to unnecessarily increase the cost of litigating this claim which is currently
be[ing] litigated in state court; therefore, the claim is filed for an inappropriate purpose”
[Doc. 18, pg. 9] and that “plaintiff’s state1 claims are barred by the doctrines of collateral
estoppel and res judicata.” [Doc. 18, pg. 10]
In May 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Case in state
court for dismissal of the State Amended Complaint with prejudice. [Doc. 43, ¶ 6; Doc.
52, pg. 5; Doc. 43-2] In the Motion for Voluntary Dismissal, Plaintiff stated that “[w]hile
Plaintiff . . . and Defendants have engaged in and completed discovery in this matter, that
discovery is directly applicable in the parallel federal proceeding involving the individual
defendants here and Plaintiff . . . concerning the incident in question.” [Doc. 43-2, pg. 1]
Plaintiff went on, “Plaintiff[] (and even the Defendants) understand[s] that the costs
concerning discovery in this matter are directly applicable to the federal matter, and
therefore Defendants will suffer no harm by the dismissal of the state case with
prejudice.” [Doc. 43-2, pg. 1-2] Plaintiff also stated that “[d]ismissal would actually
1

This statement refers to “state” claims. But since the statement is made as a defense
against Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court understands it to refer to Plaintiff’s federal
claims.
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work an advantage to Defendants since by pursuing only the federal matter, Plaintiff . . .
will forgo his municipal liability claim [and other claims].” [Doc. 43-2, pg. 2]
In an email to Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendants’ counsel wrote that “[w]hile my
clients disagree with some of the assertions made in the motion [to dismiss], they are
going to consent in the motion and have the case dismissed with prejudice.” [Doc. 52-5
(sent June 3, 10:13 a.m)] Shortly after this email, Defendants filed their response to
Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, in which they stated that “Defendants disagree with most of
the basis and argument contained in [P]laintiff’s motion. However, [D]efendants do not
oppose full dismissal with prejudice.” [Doc. 43-3, pg. 2 (filed June 3, 12:18 p.m.)]
Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss with prejudice was granted by the state court the same day.
[Doc. 43-7] In July 2016, forty-eight days after the state action was dismissed and
roughly eighteen months after Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, Defendants filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment Based on the Doctrine of Res Judicata [Doc. 43], arguing that
Plaintiff’s federal suit was barred by the entry of a dismissal with prejudice in the state
district court.
In September 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Substitute Order Granting
Dismissal, in which he requested that the state court “substitute an Order of Dismissal
Without Prejudice on the basis of mistake under Rule 1-060(b) NMRA.” [Doc. 63-1] In
his Motion to Substitute Order Granting Dismissal, Plaintiff argued that “while it was his
intent to dismiss the state claims in order to pursue the federal case, he did not realize that
dismissal ‘with prejudice’ would have a detrimental effect on the claims now pending in
federal court.” [Doc. 63-1] The federal case was stayed pending resolution of Plaintiff’s
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Motion to Substitute Order Granting Dismissal in state court and Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment in this Court, which depended upon the nature of the state court’s
dismissal. [Doc. 60]
In February 2017, the state court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute Order
Granting Dismissal. [Doc. 63-1] The state court held that “courts will not grant relief
when the mistake of which the movant complains is the result of an attorney’s deliberate
litigation tactics” and that “Rule 60(b)(1) relief is not available for a party who simply
misunderstands the legal consequences of his deliberate acts.” [Doc. 63-1] It concluded,
“It is clear to the [c]ourt that the decision to pursue the case only in federal court was a
strategic decision made by counsel with the consent of the Plaintiff.” [Doc. 63-1]
Based on the state court’s decision, on February 8, 2017, Defendants filed a notice
[Doc. 64] that briefing was complete on their Motion for Summary Judgment Based on
Res Judicata [Doc. 43]. Plaintiff did not dispute that the matter was ripe for decision at
that time. Instead, on February 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed an appeal of the state court’s
denial of his Motion to Substitute Order Granting Dismissal. [Doc. 66, Exh. 1] One day
after this Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on March 28, 2017,
and before final judgment was entered pursuant to Rule 58, Plaintiff moved for
reconsideration on the ground that the state district court’s order was not final because it
was pending appeal. [Doc. 66] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a) (stating that “[e]very judgment
and amended judgment must be set out in a separate document”).

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II.

Discussion
Plaintiff asserts that the Court should reconsider its order because “the underlying

legal issue that this Court rests its decision on has not been resolved by the [s]tate court
and the judgment dismissing the case would work a manifest injustice.” [Doc. 70, pg. 1]
He argues that he is entitled to a reconsideration of the judgment under Rule 59 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 70, pg. 2]
Rule 59(e) provides for motions to “alter or amend” a judgment if the motion is
filed within twenty-eight days of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Although a final
judgment consistent with Rule 58 has not yet been entered here, Plaintiff’s Motion is
properly considered under Rule 59(e) because the summary judgment order at issue
disposed of all claims. See Wagoner v. Wagoner, 938 F.2d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a motion that “questioned the correctness of the district court’s statute of
limitations analysis[] [wa]s properly deemed filed pursuant to Rule 59(e)” even though it
“was filed after the district court announced the action it would take but before formal
entry of a final judgment”); Hilst v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 725, 726 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating
that a motion to alter judgment may be filed under Rule 59 “before a formal judgment has
been entered” under Rule 58); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-591
CW, 2011 WL 5403368, at *2 (D. Utah Nov. 4, 2011) (stating that “[t]he court’s
summary judgment ruling, . . . did adjudicate all the claims in this case” and “a judgment
disposing of all claims is final under Rule 60(b)” and Rule 59(e)). Cf. Trujillo v. Bd. of
Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 212 F. App’x 760, 765 (10th Cir. 2007) (discussing

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standards applicable to motions to reconsider interlocutory orders where the motion was
filed before final judgment was entered).
Under Rule 59(e), “[g]rounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) an
intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and
(3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of Paraclete v.
Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000).

“[A] motion for reconsideration is

appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the
controlling law. . . . It is not appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or advance
arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.” Id.
The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is that claim preclusion does not apply because
the state district court’s judgment did not fully “resolve” the matter because Plaintiff
appealed that decision to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. [Doc. 70] Plaintiff’s
position is contrary to controlling New Mexico law. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984) (“It is now settled that a federal court must give to a
state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under
the law of the [s]tate in which the judgment was rendered.”). In New Mexico, for
purposes of claim preclusion, a district court judgment is final notwithstanding a pending
appeal. In Brunacini v. Kavanagh, 1993-NMCA-157, ¶¶ 34-35, 869 P.2d 821, 827–28,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals endorsed the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
which states that
There have been differences of opinion about whether, or in what
circumstances, a judgment can be considered final for purposes of res
judicata when proceedings have been taken to reverse or modify it by
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appeal. The better view is that a judgment otherwise final remains so
despite the taking of an appeal unless what is called an appeal actually
consists of a trial de novo; finality is not affected by the fact that the taking
of the appeal operates automatically as a stay or supersedeas of the
judgment appealed from that prevents its execution or enforcement, or by
the fact that the appellant has actually obtained a stay or supersedeas
pending appeal.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982) cmt. f (Emphasis added); see Casias v.
Sw. Med. Assocs., No. CIV. 04-0142 JB/ACT, 2005 WL 3662924, at *4 (D.N.M. Oct. 31,
2005) (stating that “[t]he Restatement rule has been adopted by the federal courts,
including the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and a majority of the
states” and collecting cases). Thus, the state district court order “resolved” the issue
sufficiently for claim preclusion purposes.
Plaintiff also argues that dismissal of the suit on the ground of claim preclusion
would constitute “manifest injustice.” [Doc. 70] Plaintiff does not elaborate on the
nature of the injustice he would suffer and the Court is not persuaded that such an
injustice is manifest here. See Tri-State Truck Ins., Ltd. v. First Nat. Bank of Wamego,
No. 09-4158-SAC, 2011 WL 4691933, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 6, 2011) (holding that
“[w]here reconsideration is sought due to manifest injustice, the moving party can only
prevail if it demonstrates that the injustice from the case is apparent to the point of being
indisputable” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Diaz v. King, No. CV 141086 KG/SCY, 2016 WL 8924933, at *2 (D.N.M. Apr. 22, 2016) (stating that “courts
have defined manifest injustice as more than just a clear and certain prejudice to the
moving party, but also a result that is fundamentally unfair in light of governing law.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, as Plaintiff acknowledges,
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should the state district court’s ruling be reversed on appeal, Rule 60(b)(5) provides
Plaintiff with an avenue for relief. Under that rule, “the court may relieve a party . . .
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [where] the judgment [is] . . . based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). A
judgment is “based on an earlier judgment” when it is based on the doctrines of claim or
issue preclusion. Manzanares v. City of Albuquerque, 628 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir.
2010). Thus, here, if the New Mexico Court of Appeals orders the state district court to
grant Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the state suit without prejudice, rather than with
prejudice, then Plaintiff may petition this Court for relief under Rule 60(b)(5). Id. at
1241 (stating that Rule 60(b)(5) relief “became available” to the plaintiff when the earlier
judgment was reversed on appeal); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (stating that a motion under
Rule 60(b)(5) “must be made within a reasonable time”).
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment should
not have been granted because Defendants intentionally “ran out the clock on Plaintiff’s
ability to file a Rule 59 motion in state court.” [Doc. 70] He states that “Defendants’
conduct, in intentionally waiting for weeks to file their motion for summary judgment in
the federal case, constitutes a waiver of the claim preclusion defense under Concerned
[Residents of S.F. N. v. Santa Fe Estates, Inc., 2008-NMCA-042, 182 P.3d 794] as the
defense was not raised at the earliest feasible moment.” [Doc. 70] For support of this
argument, Plaintiff relies on Defendants’ statements before this Court and the state
district court and argues that the statements are “new evidence” properly considered
under Rule 59. [Doc. 70] However, Plaintiff does not provide transcripts or other
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evidence of the referenced hearings and there is, therefore, no way for the Court to assess
Plaintiff’s argument.

Even if the Court accepts Plaintiff’s assertions, however,

reconsideration is not warranted.

In this Court’s grant of Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment Based on Res Judicata, the Court held that Defendants had not
waived the defense of claim preclusion because Defendants had first raised it five months
after the federal suit was filed and Plaintiff was on notice that Defendants objected to
simultaneous suits. [Doc. 65] The Court’s Order distinguished Concerned Residents and
the facts here, noting, inter alia, that Defendants’ initial objections were more substantive
than in that case. [Doc. 65] Thus, the Court’s ruling did not rest on the timing of
Defendants’ Motion.

The Court, therefore, declines to reconsider its order on this

ground.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration [Doc. 66].
SO ORDERED this 13th day of November, 2017.

M. CHRISTINA ARMIJO
Chief United States District Judge

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