Mehaffey v. Social Security Administration

Filing 26

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION re 18 Motion to Remand by Magistrate Judge Gregory J. Fouratt. Objections to PFRD due by 5/10/2017. (kdj)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
DEBRA LYNN MEHAFFEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civ. No. 16‐78 MV/GJF

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s “Motion to Reverse and Remand for a
Rehearing with Supporting Memorandum” (“Motion”), filed on September 6, 2016. ECF No.
18. The Commissioner responded on December 2, 2016. ECF No. 23. Plaintiff replied on
December 21, 2016. ECF No. 24. Having meticulously reviewed the entire record and the
parties’ briefs, the Court RECOMMENDS 1 that Plaintiff’s Motion be DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on November 15, 1958, and graduated high school in 1976.

Administrative R. (“AR”) 229, 234. Upon graduation, Plaintiff enlisted in the U.S. Army, where
she completed basic and advanced individual training in 1977. Pl.’s Mot. 3. Plaintiff was
honorably discharged in 1979. AR 59.
From 1979 to 2006, Plaintiff maintained semi-continuous employment. AR 219-26. For
example, between 1998 and 2000, she worked two years at Bigelow Components Corporation in

1

On March 10, 2016, U.S. District Judge Martha Vazquez referred the above-captioned cause to the undersigned for
proposed findings and recommended disposition. See Order of Reference Relating to Social Security Appeals, ECF
No. 9.

1

New Jersey as a supervisory quality control inspector. AR 41-43. 2 Plaintiff then moved to
California, where she resumed employment as a quality control inspector with Mosey’s
Production Machinists, Inc., from 2000 to 2002. Pl.’s Mot. 4. From there, Plaintiff worked
approximately six months in customer service at a dry cleaning business and several months at a
casino as a maintenance worker before returning to factory work in 2002 and 2003. Id. Plaintiff
was last employed as a home health provider from 2005 to 2006. Id.
Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security
Income on August 6, 2012. Id. at 3. Plaintiff claimed disability beginning on February 1, 2006,
based on emphysema, esophageal spasms, osteoporosis, and high blood pressure. AR 228. The
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s application initially on March 19,
2013, and upon reconsideration on September 13, 2013. AR 75, 76. At her request, Plaintiff
received a de novo hearing before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Eric Weiss on May 13,
2015, at which Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”) appeared. AR 37-74. On
June 5, 2015, the ALJ issued his decision, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). AR 18-29. Plaintiff appealed to the SSA
Appeals Council, but it declined review on December 4, 2015. AR 1-4. As a consequence, the
ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a) (2016).
Plaintiff timely filed her appeal with the U.S. District Court on February 3, 2016. ECF
No. 1.
II.

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
Plaintiff advances two grounds for relief. First, she argues that the ALJ erred by finding

that her past work as a customer service representative constituted substantial gainful activity.

2

Records also demonstrate that Plaintiff worked at Bigelow Components Corporation from 1992-95, but they do not
specify her job title during that period. Administrative R. (“AR”) 221.

2

Pl.’s Mot. 10-12. In addition, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to resolve a conflict between
the VE’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) concerning the
environmental limitations that would attend her return to employment as an inspector. Id. at 1214.
III.

APPLICABLE LAW
A. Standard of Review
When the Appeals Council denies a claimant’s request for review, the ALJ’s decision

becomes the final decision of the agency. 3 The Court’s review of that final agency decision is
both factual and legal. See Maes v. Astrue, 522 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing
Hamilton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1497-98 (10th Cir. 1992)) (“The
standard of review in a social security appeal is whether the correct legal standards were
applied and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.”).
The factual findings at the administrative level are conclusive “if supported by
substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012). “Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Langley v.
Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2004); Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1214
(10th Cir. 2004); Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003). An ALJ’s decision
“is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if
there is a mere scintilla of evidence supporting it.” Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118; Hamlin, 365
F.3d at 1214.

Substantial evidence does not, however, require a preponderance of the

evidence. See Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Zoltanski v. F.A.A.,

3

A court’s review is limited to the Commissioner’s final decision, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012), which generally is the
ALJ’s decision, not the Appeals Council’s denial of review. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (2016); O’Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d
855, 858 (10th Cir. 1994).

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372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004)). A court should meticulously review the entire record
but should neither re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118; Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1214.
As for the review of the ALJ’s legal decisions, the Court reviews “whether the ALJ
followed the specific rules of law that must be followed in weighing particular types of
evidence in disability cases.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084. The Court may reverse and remand if the
ALJ failed “to apply the correct legal standards, or to show . . . that she has done so.” Winfrey
v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996).
Ultimately, if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings and the correct legal
standards were applied, the Commissioner’s decision stands and the plaintiff is not entitled to
relief. Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118; Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1214, Doyal, 331 F.3d at 760.
B. Sequential Evaluation Process
The SSA has devised a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine disability.
See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)
(2016). At the first three steps, the ALJ considers the claimant’s current work activity, the
medical severity of the claimant’s impairments, and the requirements of the Listing of
Impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4), & Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1. If
a claimant’s impairments are not equal to one of those in the Listing of Impairments, then the
ALJ proceeds to the first of three phases of step four and determines the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”).
416.920(e).

See Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1023; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),

In phase two, the ALJ determines the physical and mental demands of the

claimant’s past relevant work, and in the third phase, compares the claimant’s RFC with the
functional requirements of her past relevant work to determine if the claimant is still capable of
4

performing her past work. See Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1023; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).
If a claimant is not prevented from performing her past work, then she is not disabled. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the question of
disability for the first four steps, and then the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step
five. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987); Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1460
(10th Cir. 1987). If the claimant cannot return to her past work, then the Commissioner bears
the burden, at the fifth step, of showing that the claimant is capable of performing other jobs
existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See Thomas, 540 U.S. at 24-25; see
also Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing the five-step
sequential evaluation process in detail).
IV.

THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ issued his decision on June 5, 2015. AR 29. At step one, he found that Plaintiff

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date of February
1, 2006. AR 20. Because Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity for at least
twelve months, the ALJ proceeded to step two. AR 20-23. There, he found that Plaintiff
suffered from the following severe impairments: (1) chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(“COPD”); (2) moderate degenerative disc disease at L4-L5 with moderate lumbar facet
arthropathy; and (3) mild degenerative osteoarthrosis of the hips. AR 20. Along with these
findings, the ALJ found the following impairments to be non-severe (and provided substantiation
for doing so): (1) hypertension; (2) gastroesophageal reflux disease with dysphagia including a
solid bolus food impaction due to diffuse esophageal spasm; (3) gastropathy; (4) chronic liver
disease; (5) osteopenia; and (6) varicose veins. AR 20.

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At step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in
combination, met or medically equaled the severity of a Listing. AR 23-24. 4 Thus, he turned to
step four, where he began by crafting Plaintiff’s RFC. “[A]fter careful consideration of the
entire record,” the ALJ found that Plaintiff possessed the residual functional capacity to perform
light work with the following restrictions:
[Plaintiff] is able to lift, carry, push, and pull twenty pounds occasionally and ten
pounds frequently; is able to stand or walk up to six hours in an eight-hour
workday with normal breaks; and is able to sit for up to six hours in an eight-hour
workday with normal breaks. [Plaintiff] can never climb ladders, ropes, and
scaffolds. [Plaintiff] can occasionally climb ramps and stairs and crawl.
[Plaintiff] can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch. [Plaintiff] must avoid
more than occasional[ ] exposure to extreme cold, heat, and wetness as well as
unprotected heights. [Plaintiff] must avoid all exposure to irritants such as fumes,
odors, dust, and gases.
AR 24.
In the second phase of step four, the ALJ identified three instances of past relevant work 5
in Plaintiff’s employment history, including inspector (DOT #619.381-010), customer service
clerk (DOT #279.357-054), and inspector supervisor (DOT # 609.131-010). AR 27-28. At
Plaintiff’s administrative hearing, the VE defined the first of these – the position of inspector - as
a “light, skilled job with a specific vocational profile of 6, meaning it takes anywhere from one
year to two years to learn.” AR 28. The ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff worked as an inspector
“from 2000 to 2001,” and as a consequence, had “worked at [this] substantial gainful activity . . .
for a sufficient amount of time to learn the skills to return to this job.” AR 28. Therefore, he
found that Plaintiff’s “past work as an inspector qualifies as past relevant work.” AR 28. The
4

The ALJ did provide extensive reasoning for his findings, including discrete examinations of both Plaintiff’s
mental and physical impairments. AR 20-27. Nevertheless, because Plaintiff’s challenges sound entirely in step
four, a more thorough summary of the ALJ’s findings is unnecessary.

5

“Past relevant work” is a term of art defined by regulation as “work that [a claimant has] done within the past 15
years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1) (2016).

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VE also described the position of customer service clerk during Plaintiff’s hearing, stating it was
a “light, semiskilled job with a specific vocational profile of 3, meaning it takes anywhere from
thirty days to three months to learn.” AR 28. In his decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had
“worked as a customer service clerk in 2002 for about six months . . . [and] [h]er earnings
records indicated that she worked at or above substantial gainful activity.” AR 28. These facts,
coupled with the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff “worked as a customer service clerk for a sufficient
amount of time to learn the skills to return to this job” led the ALJ to find that Plaintiff’s “past
work as a customer service clerk qualifies as past relevant work.” AR 28. Lastly, the ALJ
turned to Plaintiff’s previous employment as an inspection supervisor. Of this position, he
stated:
The record additionally reflects [Plaintiff] worked as inspection supervisor from
1992 to 1995 and 1998 to 2000. Her earnings records indicated that she worked
at or above substantial gainful activity during this time. The vocational expert
testified and defined the job of inspector supervisor, as a light, skilled job with a
specific vocational profile of 8, meaning it takes anywhere from four to ten years
to learn. However, the vocational expert testified that [Plaintiff] performed the
job of inspector supervisor at the heavy exertional level. I find that [Plaintiff]
worked at substantial gainful activity and worked as an inspector supervisor for a
sufficient amount of time to learn the skills to return to this job. Therefore, I find
that [Plaintiff’s] past work as an inspector supervisor qualifies as past relevant
work.
AR 28.
At the third and final phase of step four, the ALJ compared Plaintiff’s RFC with the
functional requirements of her past relevant work to determine if she was still capable of
performing that work. See AR 28-29. First, he recalled that “[a]t the hearing, the [VE] testified
that a hypothetical person with the same vocational profile and limitations as [Plaintiff] could
return to past relevant work as an inspector and customer service clerk as actually and generally
performed in the economy.” AR 29. Based on that testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was

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able to engage in both these occupations “as actually and generally performed.” AR 28. The ALJ
also relied on the VE’s testimony “that a hypothetical person with the same vocational profile and
limitations as [Plaintiff] could return to past relevant work as an inspector supervisor as generally
performed in the national economy.” AR 29. That testimony led the ALJ to find that “[i]n
comparing [Plaintiff’s] residual functional capacity with the physical and mental demands of an
inspector supervisor I find [Plaintiff] is able to perform this work as generally performed.” AR
29.
Because the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not prevented from performing her past work,
regulations compelled the ALJ to find that Plaintiff was not disabled. See AR 29; 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(f), 416.920(f). See also 20 C.F.R. § 1560(b)(3) (“If we find that you have the residual
functional capacity to do your past relevant work, we will determine that you can still do your
past work and are not disabled.”).

This he did, finding that Plaintiff had not been under a

disability, as defined by the Act, during the relevant time period. AR 29. Accordingly, he
denied the claim. AR 29.
V.

ANALYSIS
The parties’ briefing has left the Court in a peculiar reviewing posture.

Although

Plaintiff raises two allegations of error in her Motion, see Pl.’s Mot. 10-14, both are effectively
conceded and wholly unrebutted by the Commissioner in her response. See. Def.’s Resp. 3-4.
Indeed, the Commissioner has assumed the position that “this Court must affirm the ALJ’s
decision even if it sustains Plaintiff’s two challenges.” Id. at 4.
A. The Evolution of the Parties’ Arguments
The Commissioner premises her concessions on the VE’s testimony that “Plaintiff could
perform three of her past relevant jobs; inspector, customer service representative, and inspection

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supervisor.” Id. She reasons that the ALJ found “that Plaintiff was not disabled because she
could perform all three of these jobs as they are generally performed in the national economy.”
Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b)(2) (2016)). Furthermore, she notes that “Plaintiff has not
challenged the ALJ’s RFC finding, his hypothetical question to the vocational expert, or the
vocational expert’s testimony that she could perform her inspection supervisor job.”

Id.

Therefore, she argues, “even if Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ could not rely on her past jobs as
an inspector or customer service representative, the ALJ could rely solely on the inspection
supervisor job to find that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work.” Id. (emphasis added).
In her Reply, Plaintiff advances – for the first time – the position that Plaintiff never
actually worked as an inspection supervisor. Pl.’s Reply 2-3, ECF No. 24. Rather, she argues
that despite having supervised six workers during her time at Bigelow from 1990 to 2000, she
“also fulfilled the normal job duties of an inspector.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff contends that the manner
in which she supervised her crew, which included “inspect[ing] material throughout the process,”
“lifting up to 100 pounds, eight to ten times a day,” and not being involved in “scheduling,
[paying], hiring, firing, or reviewing employees” supports this argument. Id. Fundamentally,
Plaintiff believes that the VE “failed to recognize that her role did not meet the role of a true
supervisor,” thereby rendering the ALJ’s finding that she could return to a position of inspection
supervisor unsupported by substantial evidence and in need of remand. Id. at 3.
B. Live Questions for Review
Following the transition in the parties’ arguments, two questions remain for this Court’s
review. First, the Court must examine whether Plaintiff may argue – for the first time in her
reply brief – that her time as an inspection supervisor does not qualify as past relevant work.
Next, if she may do so, the Court must determine if her argument undercuts the ALJ’s finding

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that she could return to work as an inspection supervisor as that position is generally performed
in the national economy. A discussion of these issues follows below.
C. Arguments First Raised in a Reply Brief Are Waived
The Tenth Circuit follows the general rule that an argument raised for the first time in a
reply brief is deemed abandoned or waived. See, e.g., United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727,
738 n.4 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Hanh Ho Tran v. Trustees of State Colls. in Colo., 355 F.3d
1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Issues not raised in opening brief are deemed abandoned or
waived.”) (citations omitted)). In social security cases, “the district court acts as a first-tier
appellate court.” Hamilton, 961 F.2d at 1501 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). This Court is
not, therefore, required to consider any issues raised for the first time in Plaintiff's reply brief.
See Guidry v. Astrue, Civ. No. 08–1846, 2009 WL 4884282, at *5, n.8 (D. Colo. Dec. 10, 2009)
(citing M. D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 565 F.3d 753, 768 n.7 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting
that “the general rule in this circuit is that a party waives issues and arguments raised for the first
time in a reply brief”). Accord Wheeler v. C.I.R., 521 F.3d 1289, 1291 (10th Cir. 2008) (issues
raised for the first time in a reply brief are generally deemed waived).
Plaintiff first argues that she never served as a “true” inspector supervisor in her Reply.
See id. at 2-3. This position was only one of three instances of prior employment discussed by
the ALJ at step four of his decision. See AR 27-29. Yet, while Plaintiff advanced allegations of
error concerning the other two previous positions, she neglected to propound any challenge to
the ALJ’s finding that she could return to third position of inspector supervisor. See Pl.’s Mot.
10-14. Moreover, since the time of that omission, Plaintiff has provided neither case support nor
evidence of any exceptional circumstance to move this Court to deviate from the Tenth Circuit’s
general rule of waiver. As a consequence, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the presiding

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judge deem this argument waived.

Should the presiding judge adopt this position, the

undersigned further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion be denied, as in the absence of this
argument, Plaintiff has conceded her ability to return to at least one prior form of past relevant
work, thereby mandating a finding of nondisability under the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §
1560(b)(3).
D. Even When Considered, Plaintiff’s Argument Fails
Even if this Court were to disregard the Tenth Circuit’s general rule on waiver, Plaintiff’s
argument that she never “truly” worked as an inspection supervisor would be unavailing.
Plaintiff directs this Court to the DOT, where the duties of inspector supervisor are described as
follows:
Supervises and coordinates activities of workers engaged in inspecting materials,
tools, workpieces, and products, such as metal stock, cutting tools, gauges,
machine parts, and assembled units for conformance to specifications, products,
inspection instruments, and procedures. May compute relative production and
repair costs to determine salvageability of rejected products. Performs other duties
as described under SUPERVISOR (any industry) Master Title.
DOT § 609.131-010, 1991 WL 684890 (Jan. 1, 2016). Plaintiff contends that this job description
“consists solely of supervisory tasks and does not include duties related to performing the work
that is being supervised.” Pl.’s Reply 2. Thus, because she also inspected materials throughout
the manufacturing process and lifted up to 100 pounds routinely, Plaintiff argues that “her role
did not meet the level of a true supervisor.” Id. at 3.
Unfortunately for Plaintiff, her desire to elude the title of inspector supervisor at the reply
stage cannot be reconciled with her testimony before the ALJ. When asked directly by the ALJ
what her job was at Bigelow Components, Plaintiff explained, “I supervised around six people
and I also inspected all the material that came in the door and through the whole process and then
everything that was finished material that went out.” AR 42 (emphasis added). She further
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explained that as part of her supervisory duties, “there [were] different departments so I had to
make sure all the departments were running correctly.” AR 42. If her employees “saw a
problem,” she related that “they would bring it to me and I would tell them if it was okay or if
they should stop the machines.” AR 42. During Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ noted that
Plaintiff was not involved in scheduling, payroll, or hiring and firing of employees, and
attempted to steer Plaintiff into agreeing she was more of a “crew leader.” AR 43. This
exchange followed:
Q: Okay. So you were more like a crew leader, is that what you would say?
A: Yeah, a crew, but they really, really depended on me, you know, I could - Q: Okay.
A: - - stop the machines just by pressing a button and, you know, I didn’t have to
go run to anyone else.
AR 43.
Clearly, Bigelow Components invested a higher degree of responsibility in Plaintiff than
it did in its line inspectors. In keeping with the DOT description of inspector supervisor,
Plaintiff supervised and coordinated the activities of workers engaged in inspecting materials for
conformance to specifications. See DOT § 609.131-010, 1991 WL 684890; AR 42-44. She also
ensured that multiple departments were running correctly.

AR 42.

When an issue arose,

Plaintiff possessed authority superior to that of the line inspectors to stop the machines without
additional approval from those higher up the chain of command. AR 42-43.
Plaintiff’s performance of duties beyond those cited in the DOT definition does not
disqualify her past relevant work as an inspection supervisor.

In fact, the regulations

contemplate this situation, and call for the ALJ to consider evidence of a claimant’s past relevant

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work “as the claimant actually performed it or as generally performed in the national economy.”
20 C.F.R. § 1560(b)(2). Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 82-61 6 further clarifies that an ALJ may
find a claimant capable of performing her past relevant work if her residual functional capacity is
coextensive with the demands of the job either as generally performed in the national economy
or as the plaintiff actually performed it. See SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2 (1982).
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “could return to past relevant work as an inspector
supervisor as generally performed in the national economy.” AR 29. In doing so, the ALJ
obviated the need to scrutinize the additional duties performed by Plaintiff as an inspection
supervisor in the 1990s.

It suffices that Plaintiff met the DOT definition of inspection

supervisor, and that she could return to the position of inspection supervisor as that position is
generally performed in the national economy. See Andrade v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1052 (10th Cir. 1993) (overruling a challenge to SSR 82-61, and also
finding that a claimant operating as a general contractor, who also performed manual labor
beyond that of a general contractor, was still “primarily a general contractor, even though his
particular job involved some actual labor”).
In sum, Plaintiff has offered neither sufficient facts nor any case support for the
proposition that her additional lifting and hands-on inspections somehow converted her obvious
inspector supervisor position into something outside the DOT description. To the contrary, the
ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff performed past relevant work as an inspector supervisor was both
6

The Ruling provides:
A former job performed by the claimant may have involved functional demands and job duties
significantly in excess of those generally required for the job by other employers throughout the
national economy. Under this test, if the claimant cannot perform the excessive functional
demands and/or job duties actually required in the former job but can perform the functional
demands and job duties as generally required by employers throughout the economy, the claimant
should be found to be “not disabled.”

SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2 (1982)

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supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.

See id.

Therefore, even if the

presiding judge were to consider this argument not to have been waived, the undersigned
RECOMMENDS denying the claim, as Plaintiff’s ability to return to her past relevant work as
an inspection supervisor mandates a finding of nondisability. See SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 31387,
at *2.
VI.

CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Reverse or Remand

[ECF No. 18] be DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s final decision be
AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

________________________________________
THE HONORABLE GREGORY J. FOURATT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
THE PARTIES ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT WITHIN 14 DAYS OF
SERVICE of a copy of these Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition they may
file written objections with the Clerk of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(c). Any request for an extension must be filed in writing no later than seven days
from the date of this filing. A party must file any objections with the Clerk of the
District Court within the fourteen-day period if that party wants to have appellate
review of the proposed findings and recommended disposition. If no objections are
filed, no appellate review will be allowed.

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