Schueller v. Wells Fargo & Company

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Karen B. Molzen granting in part 39 Wells Fargo's MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs. (KBM)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
NORBERT A. SCHUELLER,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIV 16-0107 MV/KBM

WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, d/b/a
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., d/b/a
WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 39) filed on April 9, 2018. Having considered the record,
submissions of counsel, and relevant law, the Court finds that Defendant’s motion
should be granted in part.1
I.

Procedural History
District Judge Marth Vazquez laid out the full procedural and factual background

of this matter in her March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and Order (see Doc. 36 at 17), and I will recite only those facts relevant to the motion at issue here.
2011 Lawsuit
Plaintiff filed his first lawsuit against Wells Fargo & Company (Wells Fargo) in
2011 in federal court. Id. at 2; see also Schueller v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., et al., No.
11-cv-00955 MCA/LFG, Compl. (D.N.M. Oct. 25, 2011). Plaintiff asserted several claims
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Judge Vazquez entered an Order of Reference Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) on April
12, 2018, referring this motion to the undersigned Magistrate Judge “to hear and determine” the
motion. Doc. 40.

against Wells Fargo in the 2011 lawsuit, including defamation and conversion claims, as
well as claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). See Doc. 36 at 2. Plaintiff
alleged that Wells Fargo had unlawfully and fraudulently continued to withdraw money
from Plaintiff’s bank account for mortgage payments for certain real property, even after
Plaintiff’s personal liability for the mortgage was discharged during 2010 bankruptcy
proceedings. See id. at 1-2.
On July 30, 2012, the court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss. See id. at 2.
“[T]he Court explained that Plaintiff’s bankruptcy discharge only discharged his personal
liability for the debt, not the mortgage lien . . . .” Id. at 3. Because the bankruptcy
discharge included an explanation that Plaintiff could opt to “voluntarily pay any debt
that [had] been discharged[,]” and because there was evidence that Wells Fargo
withdrew the payments “from Plaintiff’s bank account at his direction[,]” Plaintiff had
failed to state a claim for conversion. Id. at 3-4. The court found, however, that because
there was a chance Plaintiff could allege additional facts to demonstrate that these
payments were not voluntary, the claim should be dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 4.
The court also held that the record did not support Plaintiff’s defamation or FCRA claims
and dismissed those claims with prejudice. Id.
Wells Fargo filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs, which the court granted
in part on March 27, 2013. See Schueller, No. 11-cv-00955, Mot. for Attys’ Fees &
Costs (Aug. 29, 2012); Mem. Op. & Order (D.N.M. Mar. 27, 2013) (“2011 Schueller
Mem. Op. & Order”). “The Court described Plaintiff as a ‘law-trained pro se litigant and
frequent filer of various and sundry lawsuits . . . .’” Id. at 4 (quoting 2011 Schueller Mem.
Op. & Order, at *1). The court held that Plaintiff’s 2011 lawsuit was frivolous, but it did

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not conclude that Plaintiff acted in bad faith. Id. at 4-5 (discussing 2011 Schueller Mem.
Op. & Order, at *9). The court therefore declined to award fees to Wells Fargo up to the
filing of the motion to dismiss. Id. at 5. After Plaintiff was apprised of the relevant law
through Wells Fargo’s motion and the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,
however, Plaintiff “stubbornly, and without any legal basis for doing so, persisted in
pursuing his claims in bad faith.” Id. (quoting 2011 Schueller Mem. Op. & Order, at *10).
Thus, the court awarded Wells Fargo fees “from that point forward in replying to
Schueller’s bad-faith response to the motion to dismiss . . . .” Id. (quoting 2011
Schueller Mem. Op. & Order, at *10). Plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which
upheld the district court’s decisions. See id.; see also Schueller v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
559 F. App’x 733 (10th Cir. 2014). “Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, which was denied on October 6, 2014.” Doc. 36 at 6
(citing Schueller v. Wells Fargo & Co., 135 S. Ct. 275 (2014)).
2016 Lawsuit
Undaunted, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Wells Fargo in state court on
January 15, 2016, and Wells Fargo promptly removed the action to federal court. See
Docs. 1; 1-1. As Judge Vazquez noted in her March 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order, Plaintiff’s 2016 claims “are based on the same conduct that was at issue in
the 2011 Action . . . .” Doc. 36 at 6 (emphasis in original). Not surprisingly, then, Wells
Fargo moved to dismiss on the basis “that Plaintiff’s claims are barred under the
doctrine of res judicata, and that, even if res judicata does not apply, Plaintiff’s claims
are subject to dismissal because he has failed to properly state a claim upon which
relief can be granted for either defamation or conversion.” Id. at 8. Judge Vazquez

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ultimately found “that Plaintiff’s defamation claim is barred by claim preclusion” and
dismissed it with prejudice. Id. at 11. Plaintiff failed to plead any additional facts to
support his conversion claim, so Judge Vazquez dismissed that claim with prejudice as
well. Id. at 12-14.
Directly relevant to this motion, Judge Vazquez also granted Wells Fargo’s
motion for Rule 11 sanctions. See id. at 14-18. Wells Fargo asked for attorney’s fees
and costs due to the fact that Plaintiff’s claims and legal theories were identical in both
his 2011 and 2016 lawsuits. See id. at 16. Noting that “Plaintiff has been on notice of
the baselessness of his claims” at least since the award of fees in his 2011 lawsuit,
Judge Vazquez found that “no ‘reasonable and competent attorney would believe in the
merit’ of the arguments on which” Plaintiff bases his current lawsuit. Id. at 17 (quoting
Dodd Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.3d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 1991)
(internal citations omitted)). Thus, by “continuing to pursue the instant action, Plaintiff is
in violation of Rule 11(b)” and the requested sanctions are proper. Id. at 18. Judge
Vazquez directed “Wells Fargo to file an application for attorney’s fees and costs,
including supporting affidavits and documentation,” which is now before the
undersigned magistrate judge. See id.; Doc. 39.
Motion for Attorney’s Fees
Wells Fargo now seeks $24,584.062 in attorneys’ fees for 78.70 hours of legal
services, $160 in paraprofessional fees for 1.60 hours of paraprofessional services, and

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Mr. Marshall states in his affidavit that “Wells Fargo’s attorneys’ fees in this case are
$24,782.76.” Doc. 39-1 at 3 ¶ 7. I have calculated a different total. 11.20 hours x $386.97 =
$4,334.06 for Mr. Marshall; 54.00 hours x $300 = $16,200 for Ms. Stevens; 8.10 hours x $300 =
$2,430 for Ms. Gambill; and 5.40 hours x $300 = $1,620 for Ms. Brown, for a total of

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$410 in costs to cover the filing fee. See Doc. 39-1 at 2-3; see also Doc. 39-1, Ex. 1, at
6-7. Plaintiff failed to file a response to Wells Fargo’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, which
pursuant to our District’s Local Rules “constitutes consent to grant the motion.” See
D.N.M.LR-Civ. 7.1(b).
II.

Legal Standard
“To determine the reasonableness of a fee request, a court must begin by

calculating the so-called ‘lodestar amount’ of a fee, and a claimant is entitled to the
presumption that this lodestar amount reflects a ‘reasonable’ fee.” Auge v. Stryker
Corp., No. 14-CV-1089 KG/SMV, 2017 WL 4355974, at *1 (D.N.M. Sept. 28, 2017)
(quoting Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal
citations omitted)). “The lodestar is ‘the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate,’ which produces a presumptively
reasonable fee that may in rare circumstances be adjusted to account for the presence
of special circumstances.” Id. (quoting Anchondo v. Anderson, Crenshaw & Assocs.,
LLC, 616 F.3d 1098, 1102 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted)).
“‘The party requesting attorney fees bears the burden of proving’ the two
components used to calculate the fee award: (i) ‘the amount of hours spent on the
case,’ and (ii) ‘the appropriate hourly rates.’” Id. quoting (United Phosphorus, Ltd. v.
Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1233 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted)).
“Once the Court makes these two determinations, the fee ‘claimant is entitled to the
presumption that this lodestar amount reflects a “reasonable” fee.’” Id. (quoting
Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1281) (internal and subsequent citations omitted).
$24,584.06. Even adding in the requested paraprofessional fees at $160, I calculate a total of
$24,744.06. I presume, then, that there was an error in Mr. Marshall’s calculations.

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The movant must provide sufficient information for the Court “to evaluate
prevailing market rates.” Id. (citing Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1225 (10th Cir.
2006)). The movant “must also demonstrate that the rates are similar to rates for similar
services by ‘lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation’ in the
relevant community and for similar work.” Id. (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
895 n.11 (1984) (alteration in original); citing Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157
F.3d 1243, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 1998)). “Only if the district court does not have adequate
evidence of prevailing market rates for attorney's fees may it, ‘in its discretion, use other
relevant factors, including its own knowledge, to establish the rate.’” Id. (quoting Case,
157 F.3d at 1257) (internal and subsequent citations omitted).
III.

Analysis
Wells Fargo seeks $24,584.06 in attorneys’ fees. Doc. 39-1, Ex. 1, at 6-7. This

request includes legal services rendered by Mr. Gregory Marshall (a 1999 law school
graduate, partner of the law firm, and co-chairperson of the financial services litigation
group), Ms. Sandra Brown (a 2005 law school graduate and staff attorney with the
financial services group), Ms. Jennifer Stevens (a 2006 law school graduate and former
staff attorney with the financial services group), and Ms. Allison Gambill (a 2008 law
school graduate and former staff attorney with the financial services group). See
Doc. 39-1, ¶¶ 1, 4(a)-(d). Wells Fargo also requests $160 in fees for 1.6 hours of
paraprofessional services at a rate of $100.00 per hour. Id. ¶ 4(e). Finally, Wells Fargo
asks for $410.00 in costs to cover its filing fee. Id. ¶ 8. I will begin by examining the
requested hourly rates.

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A.

The Lodestar Calculation
1.

Reasonable Hourly Rate

“To determine what constitutes a reasonable rate, the district court considers the
prevailing market rate in the relevant community.” Auge, 2017 WL 4355974, at *3
(quoting Lippoldt, 468 F.3d at 1224) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“The rate must reflect rates that are reasonable in light of: (i) the attorney’s level of
experience; and (ii) the work the attorney performed.” Id. (quoting XTO Energy, Inc. v.
ATD, LLC, No. 14-cv-1021 JB/SCY, 2016 WL 5376322, at *10 (D.N.M. Aug. 22, 2016)).
“In general, the ‘relevant community’ is ‘the area in which the court sits . . . .’” Id.
(quoting Gottlieb v. Barry, 43 F.3d 474, 485 n.8 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations
omitted)). The court looks first “to the parties’ evidence of the prevailing market rate[,]”
which is “typically established through the affidavits of local attorneys who practice in
the same field as the attorneys seeking the fees.” Id. (citations omitted). “If the court
lacks adequate evidence to determine the prevailing market rate, it may use other
factors, including its own knowledge, to establish the rate.” Id. (citing Case, 157 F.3d at
1257).
Here, Wells Fargo did not submit affidavits from any other local attorneys,
instead citing to three cases in an effort to support its position that the requested “hourly
rate [is] commiserate with” the experience of its attorneys. Doc. 39 at 4. First, Wells
Fargo cites Payne v. Tri-State Careflight, LLC, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1298 (D.N.M.
2017), in which Judge Browning approved a $350 per hour rate for the lead counsel and
a $300 per hour rate for a partner in a class action suit. Wells Fargo next cites Lane v.
Page, 862 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1257 (D.N.M. 2012), another class action lawsuit wherein

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Judge Browning noted that $200 per hour is a “relatively low rate” for attorney’s fees.
The case at hand, however, is not a class action suit, and both of these cases are
inapposite.
Finally, Wells Fargo cites Valdez v. Herrera, No. 09-CV-0668 JCH/DJS, Order
Granting Attorneys’ Fees, at *3 (D.N.M. Mar. 21, 2011), for the proposition that the court
approved a rate of $350 per hour in that case. Doc. 39 at 4. This citation does not,
however, provide a complete picture. In Valdez, plaintiffs sought “declaratory and
injunctive relief to redress ongoing violations of New Mexico’s obligations under the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 . . . .” See Valdez, No. 09-CV-0668, Compl. at
*2 (D.N.M. July 9, 2009). After the court granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
judgment and the parties subsequently reached a settlement agreement, the plaintiff
applied for attorneys’ fees pursuant to that settlement agreement. See Valdez, No. 09CV-0668, Order Granting Attys’ Fees, at *2 (D.N.M. Mar. 21, 2011). Noting “the
complexity of the litigation involved,” Judge Herrera granted the motion and approved a
rate of “$350 per hour for attorneys who graduated from law school before 1996[,]” or
who had over 15 years of experience at the time of the opinion; “$300 per hour for
lawyers who graduated between 1996 and 2000[,]” or who had between 11 and 15
years of experience; “$225 per hour for lawyers who graduated between 2001 and
2006[,]” or who had between 5 and 10 years of experience; and $150 per hour for
lawyers who graduated in 2007 and afterwards[,]” or who had approximately 4 years or
less of experience. See id. at *3, *4. Again, the current case is distinguishable, as it is
not a civil rights action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, nor is it complex.

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Surveying more recent decisions, Judge Browning awarded $375 per hour in a
case that “was headed toward a class action, but for the [plaintiffs’] desire to settle” and
noted that this “rate approaches the upper end of what the local market would currently
bear for the hourly rate of a very experienced partner engaged in complex, multi-party
commercial litigation.” Fallen v. Grep Sw., LLC, 247 F. Supp. 3d 1165, 1182, 1198
(D.N.M. 2017) (citations omitted). I note that Mr. Marshall has requested an hourly rate
above that which Judge Browning approved in Fallen.
In Copar Pumice Co. v. Morris, No. CIV 07-0079 JB/ACT, 2012 WL 238667
(D.N.M. June 13, 2012), a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Judge Browning awarded $235 per hour for partners, $200 per hour for senior
associates, $150 per hour for other associates, and $75 per hour for paralegals. See
Copar Pumice Co., 2012 WL 2383667, at *5, 20 (citing Avendano v. Smith, No. 110556, 2011 WL 5822733, at *2 (D.N.M. Nov. 3, 2011) (“finding rates of $180.00 per hour
reasonable”); Mountain Highlands, LLC v. Hendricks, No. 08-0239, 2010 WL 1631856,
at *9-10 (D.N.M. Apr. 2, 2010) (“approving an hourly rate of $170.00 to $210.00 per
hour as reasonable for commercial litigation”); Allahverdi v. Regents of Univ. of N.M.,
No. 05-0277, 2006 WL 1304874, at *2 (D.N.M. Apr. 25, 2006) (“finding hourly rate of
$225.00 reasonable in a public-employment dispute”); Kelley v. City of Albuquerque,
No. 03-0507, 2005 WL 3663515, at *15-17 (D.N.M. Oct. 24, 2005) (“finding $250.00 per
hour to be a reasonable rate in an employment dispute”)). This included work done for
legal research, administrative matters, and drafting responses to motions for summary
judgment, for abstention, and to dismiss. See id. at *6.

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In another case involving allegations of four causes of action arising under New
Mexico state law, Judge Browning awarded $200 per hour to an Assistant Attorney
General with 13 years of experience. See New Mexico v. Valley Meat Co., LLC, No. CIV
14-1100 JB/KBM, 2015 WL 9703255, at *2, 23-24 (D.N.M. Dec. 14, 2015).
In Chavez v. Stomp, Civ. No. 10-205 JCH/ACT, Memo. Op. & Order, at *3, 7
(D.N.M. Feb. 27, 2014), the Court awarded $210 per hour in a case involving Title VII
and discrimination claims under federal law, where the attorney “failed to provide the
Court with information on his experience in civil cases of [that] type and his usual hourly
rate . . . .”
Judge Armijo, in a removal case brought pursuant to the New Mexico Minimum
Wage Act, awarded $250 per hour to an attorney with 18 years of experience, and $150
per hour to an attorney with 3 years of experience. McCoy v. LTD Driving Sch., Inc., No.
15-CV-00639 MCA/LAM, Mem. Op. & Order, at *10-11 & 11 n.5 (D.N.M. Feb. 21, 2017).
Judge Browning has found $350 per hour reasonable for the Rodey law firm to
charge for “high-end commercial work.” XTO Energy, Inc., 2016 WL 5376322, at *13
(D.N.M. Aug. 22, 2016). Similarly, Judge Vidmar relied on XTO Energy in finding $350
per hour appropriate for lead counsel and $150 for an associate attorney in a “complex
commercial” case. Coll v. Stryker Corp., No. 14-cv-1089 KG/SMV, Mem. Op. & Order
Awarding Atty’s Fees, at *10 (Apr. 11, 2017).
The case at hand is not an example of a “high-end” or “complex” commercial
case, nor is it a class action as the cases are above that authorized fees of $300 per
hour or more. I believe that the work performed in this action, a lawsuit Wells Fargo
describes as “identical” to Plaintiff’s 2011 action (see Doc. 39 at 2), is closer to the work

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performed in either Copar Pumice, Valley Meat Company, or McCoy. In fact, in her
2013 opinion awarding attorneys’ fees to Wells Fargo against Mr. Schueller, Judge
Armijo specifically noted that it “was not a complex case, and . . . [a]part from its motion
to dismiss and reply brief, all of the Defendant’s counsel’s work involved normal
procedural activities which required no specialized skills of any kind, like working on
joint-status reports and producing Rule 26 disclosures, together with responding to a
run-of-the-mill motion for sanctions and a motion to recuse, an 11-page stipulated
motion to stay discovery, and paragraph-long stipulated notices of extension.” 2011
Schueller Mem. Op. & Order, at *15. In the present action, the attorneys researched and
drafted removal documents (Doc. 1), a motion to dismiss and reply brief (Docs. 10; 17),
a motion for Rule 11 sanctions and reply brief (Docs. 11; 18), a motion for attorney’s
fees (Doc. 39), and responses to Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 9) and motion to
reconsider (Doc. 25), along with various other minor filings (see Docs. 4; 19; 20; 28; 32;
34; 41). While I cannot say that the attorneys’ work in this action did not require any
specialized skill, neither may I conclude that it was complex or filled with unique legal
issues.
More importantly, Wells Fargo “had the burden of proof on this issue.” See Coll,
No. 14-cv-1089 KG/SMV, Mem. Op. & Order Awarding Atty’s Fees, at *10 (citing Blum
v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984); Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d
1186, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998)). Wells Fargo “could have established” a reasonable rate
“by submitting affidavits from other experienced attorneys familiar with the prevailing
rate. He did not do so, and I consider any such argument waived.” See id. As a result,
the Court will reduce the requested hourly rates to $250 per hour for Mr. Marshall and

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$200 per hour for Ms. Brown, Ms. Gambill, and Ms. Stevens. These hourly rates are
reasonable in light of the attorneys’ experience, the work performed, and the rates in
this community.
Wells Fargo also requests $100 per hour for the paraprofessional work (reduced
from $165.00 per hour), but provides no authority for a rate that high. Doc. 39 at 5.
Wells Fargo only cites to Payne, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 1284, 1298, where the court
approved the requested $90 per hour rate for paralegal work in a class action lawsuit
but also reduced the time billed “by $2,500.00, because their block billed time entries
[did] not allow the Court to distinguish how much time was spent on non-compensable
administrative tasks.” In Copar Pumice, the court awarded $75 per hour for paralegal
work. See Copar Pumice Co., 2012 WL 238667, at *20-21. The Court finds that an
appropriate award for paraprofessional work in this case should be closer to that in
Copar Pumice, at $80 per hour for a total of $128.
2.

Time Expended on Motion

“Courts have an obligation to exclude hours not ‘reasonably expended’ from the
lodestar calculation.” Auge, 2017 WL 4355974, at *2 (quoting Malloy v. Monahan, 73
F.3d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1996)). To find that hours are reasonably expended, the
court determines: (1) “whether the attorney has exercised billing judgment and deleted
excessive, unnecessary, or redundant fees from his or her fee application, and”
(2) “whether the fee award is reasonable in light of the success obtained.” Id. (citing
Hensley v. Ekerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). The moving party has the burden to
show the hours were reasonably expended. Id. “With respect to legal research
performed, the party requesting fees must provide enough information to determine

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whether the research was related to successful issues and reasonably necessary.” Id.
(citing Case, 157 F.3d at 1252). “An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees may include
compensation for work performed in preparing and presenting the fee application.” Id.
(quoting Case, 157 F.3d at 1254 (internal quotation and citations omitted)).
Here, because the Court found Plaintiff violated Rule 11(b) simply by filing this
lawsuit (see Doc. 36 at 18), Wells Fargo requests attorney’s fees for all of the hours it
expended successfully defending the suit. The fees requested include: (1) 29 hours for
reviewing the complaint and researching and drafting the removal documents,
researching and drafting a motion for Rule 11 sanctions, drafting a corporate disclosure
statement and a motion to extend; (2) 17.9 hours for researching and drafting
responses to Plaintiff’s motions to remand and reconsider; (3) 26.7 hours for
researching and drafting the motion to dismiss, including res judicata issues, and the
reply thereto; and (4) 5.1 hours for researching and drafting this motion for fees. See
Doc. 39-1, Ex. 1. There is no question that Wells Fargo successfully defended this suit.
In comparison, the Court notes that the defendant in Gallup Med Flight, LLC v.
Phoenix Insurance Co., Civ. No. 16-01197 KG/KBM, Mem. Op. & Order at *10 (D.N.M.
Jan. 9, 2018), claimed 182.7 hours for work “preparing and filing a notice of removal,
answering Plaintiff’s Complaint,” engaging in certain pretrial and discovery procedures,
responding to two substantive motions (a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a
motion to dismiss), and traveling for a hearing. The Gallup Med Flight Court found the
hours were reasonable. Id. at *11. I also note that Judge Armijo allowed Wells Fargo to
claim 13 hours for legal research/drafting of the motion for attorney fees in the 2011
lawsuit. See 2011 Schueller Mem. Op. & Order, at *17-18.

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Wells Fargo has meticulously detailed how the requested hours were spent, and
I can find no instances of excessive, incomplete, or inappropriate billing. See Doc. 39-1,
Ex. 1. Thus, the Court finds that the hours requested are reasonable under the
circumstances.
Wherefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Motion for Attorney’s
Fees (Doc. 39) is granted in part as follows:
(1) Wells Fargo’s legal fees are approved, but at lower rates than requested:
$250 per hour for Mr. Marshall, and $200 per hour for Ms. Brown, Ms. Gambill, and Ms.
Stevens. Mr. Marshall spent 11.20 hours on the case, Ms. Brown 5.4 hours, Ms.
Gambill 8.10 hours, and Ms. Stevens 54.00 hours. Thus, the Court approves a total of
$16,300 in legal fees ($250 x 11.20 = $2,800; $200 x 5.4 = $1,080; $200 x 8.10 =
$1,620; $200 x 54.00 = $10,800).
(2) Wells Fargo’s paraprofessional fees are approved, but a lower rate than
requested: $80 per hour at 1.6 hours for a total of $128.
(3) The Court also approves Wells Fargo’s request for $410 in reasonable costs,
for a total award to Wells Fargo of $16,838 in reasonable legal fees and costs.

________________________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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