Parada v. Social Security Administration

Filing 29

ORDER by Magistrate Judge Gregory J. Fouratt denying 18 Motion to Remand to Agency. (sr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
ROBERT PHILLIP PARADA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civ. No. 16-373 GJF

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s “Motion to Reverse and Remand to
Agency for Rehearing, with Supporting Memorandum” (“Motion”) [ECF No. 18]. Having
meticulously reviewed the entire record, considered the parties’ arguments, and being otherwise
fully advised, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision to
deny benefits for a closed period and that the proper legal standards were applied. For the
following reasons, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion.
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 20, 2008, Plaintiff applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”)

benefits and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), alleging that his disability began on May
13, 2006. He based his application on the following impairments: (i) bilateral degenerative disc
disease, (ii) rheumatoid arthritis affecting his knees, and (iii) chronic diverticulitis.
Administrative R. (“AR”) 101-04. Plaintiff’s applications were initially denied on January 5,
2009 [AR 148-154], and upon reconsideration on July 31, 2009. AR 159-164. Plaintiff then
filed a written request for a hearing and on May 21, 2010, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Barbara Licha Perkins held a hearing in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Plaintiff testified at the
1

hearing and was represented by attorney Gary Martone.
On April 28, 2011, ALJ Perkins issued a partially favorable decision in which she granted
Plaintiff a closed period of benefits from May 13, 2006, to January 1, 2008. See AR 105-123.
Plaintiff requested ALJ Perkins’s decision be reviewed by the Appeals Council [AR 239-240],
and, on July 22, 2013, the Appeals Council remanded his case back to an ALJ for review on the
issue of whether Plaintiff’s medical condition had improved such that granting him only a closed
period of benefits was appropriate. AR 141-46.
On January 16, 2014, ALJ Myriam Fernandez Rice held a second hearing in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. Plaintiff testified at the hearing and was represented by attorney
Feliz Martone. The ALJ also heard testimony from Judith Beard, an impartial vocational expert
(“VE”). AR 71-100. On March 27, 2014, ALJ Fernandez Rice issued a partially favorable
decision in which she upheld ALJ Perkins’s decision to grant Plaintiff a closed period of
benefits.

See AR 8-28.

She also found that Plaintiff “once again became disabled for

supplemental security income benefits only under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security
Act beginning on his 55th birthday of December 16, 2013.” AR 28.
Plaintiff requested the ALJ’s decision be reviewed by the Appeals Council, and, on
February 25, 2016, the Appeals Council denied his request for review. AR 1-3. Consequently,
the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff timely appealed the
Commissioner’s decision to this Court on May 2, 2016. Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When the Appeals Council denies a claimant’s request for review, the ALJ’s decision

2

becomes the final decision of the agency. 1 The Court’s review of that final agency decision is
both factual and legal. See Maes v. Astrue, 522 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing
Hamilton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1497-98 (10th Cir. 1992)) (“The
standard of review in a social security appeal is whether the correct legal standards were applied
and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.”).
The factual findings at the administrative level are conclusive “if supported by substantial
evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Langley v. Barnhart, 373
F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2004); Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004);
Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003). An ALJ’s decision “is not based on
substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if there is a mere
scintilla of evidence supporting it.” Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118; Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1214.
Substantial evidence does not, however, require a preponderance of the evidence. See Lax v.
Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Zoltanski v. F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200
(10th Cir. 2004)).
“The record must demonstrate that the ALJ considered all of the evidence, but an ALJ is
not required to discuss every piece of evidence.” Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th
Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). “Rather, in addition to discussing the evidence supporting his
decision, the ALJ also must discuss the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon, as
well as significantly probative evidence he rejects.” Id. at 1010. “The possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s findings
from being supported by substantial evidence.”
1

Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084.

A court should

A court’s review is limited to the Commissioner’s final decision, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012), which generally is the
ALJ’s decision, not the Appeals Council’s denial of review. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (2017); O’Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d
855, 858 (10th Cir. 1994).

3

meticulously review the entire record but should neither re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner. Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118; Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1214.
As for the review of the ALJ’s legal decisions, the Court examines “whether the ALJ
followed the specific rules of law that must be followed in weighing particular types of evidence
in disability cases.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084. The Court may reverse and remand if the ALJ failed
“to apply the correct legal standards, or to show . . . that she has done so.” Winfrey v. Chater, 92
F.3d 1017, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996).
Ultimately, if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings and the correct legal
standards were applied, the Commissioner’s decision stands and the plaintiff is not entitled to
relief. Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118; Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1214, Doyal, 331 F.3d at 760.
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff advances two arguments.

His first argument focuses on the date the ALJ

determined he was last insured – that being March 31, 2012.

As a result of the ALJ’s

calculation, he argues there is an un-adjudicated period from March 31, 2012 to December 31,
2013. Pl.’s Mot. 8-9. Second, he argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in finding that
awarding only a closed period of benefits was appropriate because his medical condition had not
improved on January 1, 2008, such that he could return to work. Id. at 10-12.
The Commissioner responds by first arguing that the ALJ did use the correct date that
Plaintiff was last insured. She further states that using this date is most beneficial to Plaintiff.
Def.’s Resp. 4-5, ECF No. 24. Next, she argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision that Plaintiff’s medical condition had improved as of January 1, 2008, and therefore he
was able to work at that time. Id. at 5-8.

4

IV.

ALJ’S DECISION
On March 27, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision affirming Plaintiff’s closed period of

benefits ending January 1, 2008. She did, however, determine that Plaintiff once again became
disabled for supplemental security income benefits beginning on December 16, 2013. AR 28. In
doing so, the ALJ conducted the eight-step sequential evaluation process, as dictated by 20
C.F.R. § 404.1594, for determining whether a claimant’s disability has ended. AR 13. As a
preliminary matter, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through March 31, 2012. Moving then to the sequential evaluation process, the
ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity as of January
1, 2008, the date that his disability had ended. AR 15. Prior to step two, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the following medically determinable impairments: (i) degenerative joint disease of
the bilateral knees, status-post right knee arthroscopy and partial meniscectomy, (ii) lateral and
medial meniscal tears in the left knee, (iii) intermittent rash, (iv) osteoarthritis of the bilateral
fingers, (v) diverticulosis and a history of chronic diverticulosis, (vi) hypertension, (vii)
hyperlipidemia, (viii) a history of onychomycosis, status-post left great toenail removal, (ix)
bilateral foraminal stenosis at L5 and slipped discs, (x) left and right subacromial bursitis, (xi)
rheumatoid arthritis, and (xii) alcohol dependence. AR 15.
At step two, the ALJ concluded that, since January 1, 2008, Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed
impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.2 To reach this conclusion, the ALJ
evaluated Plaintiff’s impairments under Listings 1.02A, 1.02B, 14.09, 1.04, 5.06, and 12.09. AR
16-17.

The ALJ first evaluated Plaintiff’s knee condition under Listing 1.02A (major

2

The specific sections of the Code of Federal Regulations the ALJ referenced include: 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525,
404.1526, 416.925, and 416.926.

5

dysfunction of a joint(s) (due to any cause)) and found that there was no evidence to suggest that
Plaintiff could not ambulate effectively and therefore found that Plaintiff did not meet the
Listing. AR 16. The ALJ next evaluated Plaintiff’s osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis in his
hands under Listing 1.02B (major dysfunction of a joint(s) (due to any cause)) and Listing 14.09
(inflammatory arthritis), and found that there was no evidence that these conditions had resulted
in inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively. Therefore, Plaintiff did not meet
either Listing 1.02B or Listing 14.09. AR 16.
The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s back condition under Listing 1.04 (disorders of the
spine) and found that, since there was no evidence of nerve root compression or the spinal cord,
Plaintiff did not meet the criteria for Listing 1.04. The ALJ next assessed to evaluate Plaintiff’s
diverticulitis under Listing 5.06 (inflammatory bowel disease) and found that there was “no
evidence of obstruction of stenotic areas in the small intestine or colon requiring hospitalization
for intestinal decompression or for surgery and occurring on at least two occasions at least 60
days apart within a consecutive six-month period.”

AR 16.

Finally, the ALJ evaluated

Plaintiff’s alcohol dependence under Listing 12.09 (substance abuse disorders) and found that his
condition did not meet the criteria of Listing 12.09. AR 17.
At step three, the ALJ concluded that medical improvement had occurred as of January 1,
2008. At step four, the ALJ determined that, as of January 1, 2008, Plaintiff’s impairments at the
time that he was initially found to be disabled, April 28, 2011, had decreased in medical severity
such that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a limited range of light work. The ALJ determined
that this medical improvement was related to Plaintiff’s ability to work because it resulted in an
increase in Plaintiff’s RFC. AR 17.
Proceeding to step six, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff continued to have a severe

6

impairment or combination of impairments. A severe impairment is one that causes more than
minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. AR 18. At step
seven, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following RFC: “[t]o perform light work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that he is unable to climb ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds; he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and
crawl; and that he must avoid concentrated exposure to excessive vibration.” AR 18. Sections
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) define light work as:
Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting
or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted
may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking
or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and
pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or
wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these
activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do
sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine
dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b) (2017). In support of this RFC assessment, the ALJ found
that “[Plaintiff’s] medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce
the alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the
residual functional capacity assessment . . . .” AR 19.
The ALJ then determined that, as of January 1, 2008, Plaintiff was unable to perform his
past relevant work as an electrician, plumber, pool technician, cabinet builder, or roofer. AR 25.
However, at step eight, the ALJ determined after considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC that he was able to perform a significant number of jobs in the national
economy, including assembler of small products, electronics worker, and inspector/hand
packager. AR 26. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that, since January 1, 2008, Plaintiff “has been

7

capable of making a successful adjustment to work that existed in significant numbers in the
national economy.” AR 27. Subsequently, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled
under the meaning of the Social Security Act from January 1, 2008, through December 16, 2013.
AR 27. 3
V.

ANALYSIS
A. Date Last Insured
Plaintiff begins his challenge to the ALJ’s determination that he was not disabled as of

January 1, 2008, by taking aim at how the ALJ calculated the date Plaintiff last met the insured
status requirements. Pl.’s Mot. 8-9. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2012. AR 15. Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ improperly calculated this date and that, under the controlling regulations, his date last
insured should be either September 30, 2013, or December 31, 2013.

Pl.’s Mot. 9. The

Commissioner responds that the ALJ did use the correct date last insured and asserts that
Plaintiff’s argument is based on a misunderstanding of the way the agency calculates a
claimant’s date last insured following a prior period of disability. Def.’s Resp. 4.
In order to be eligible for Social Security benefits of any kind, including disability
benefits, a claimant must be insured under the Social Security program. See Insured Status
Requirements, Social Security, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/ProgData/insured.html (last visited
June 5, 2017). The Agency determines this date based on “quarters of coverage” an individual
has earned. Id. A quarter of coverage can also be thought of as a credit towards Social Security
insured status. Id. An individual has disability insured status if he: (i) has earned at least 20
quarters of coverage during the last ten years, and (ii) is fully insured. Id.
3

It is worth emphasizing that ALJ Fernandez Rice also concluded that Plaintiff again became disabled effective
December 16, 2013, a decision not challenged by the Commissioner. This appeal, therefore, focuses only on the
period between January 1, 2008-December 15, 2013.

8

The process for determining an individual’s disability insured status is governed by 20
C.F.R. § 404.130 (2017). An individual must meet one of four applicable rules and be fully
insured. See id. § 404.130(a). Only Rule I is applicable to Plaintiff’s case, which provides:
You must meet the 20/40 requirement. You are insured in a quarter for purposes
of establishing a period of disability or becoming entitled to disability insurance
benefits if in that quarter –
(1) You are fully insured; and
(2) You have at least 20 [quarters of coverage (“QCs”)] in the 40–quarter period
(see paragraph (f) 4 of this section) ending with that quarter.
§ 404.130(b). Section 404.132 governs when the period ends for determining the number of
quarters of coverage an individual needs to be fully insured. It provides that for:
[A] woman, or a man born after January 1, 1913, the period of elapsed years in §
404.110(b) used in determining the number of quarters of coverage (QCs) you
need to be fully insured ends of as the earlier of –
(1) The year you become age 62; or
(2) The year in which –
(i) Your period of disability begins;
(ii) Your waiting period begins; or
(iii) You become entitled to disability insurance benefits;
§ 404.132(a).
The Court finds no error in how the ALJ applied the regulations governing Plaintiff’s
insured status requirements. Upon careful review of those regulations and the record, the Court
is persuaded by the Commissioner’s response, which in relevant part states:

4

Paragraph (f) provides:
How we determine the 40–quarter or other period. In determining the 40–quarter period or other
period in paragraph (b), (c), or (d) of this section, we do not count any quarter all or part of which
is in a prior period of disability established for you, unless the quarter is the first or last quarter of
this period and the quarter is a QC. However, we will count all the quarters in the prior period of
disability established for you if by doing so you would be entitled to benefits or the amount of the
benefit would be larger.

§ 404.130(f).

9

[T]he recalculation Plaintiff requests would result in a much earlier DLI. The
reason the agency (and the ALJ) still used the March 31, 2013 DLI recalculation
for a prior period of disability should not be made if it would harm the claimant or
result in a denial of DIB. 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(f). Here, the ALJ properly used
the DLI that was most beneficial to Plaintiff (i.e., the later DLI), and the DLI was
calculated properly.
Def.’s Resp. 5. Notably, in reply, Plaintiff does not contest the Commissioner’s explanation of
the Government’s reasoning but instead offers only that “[a]s a general rule, the Social Security
Act is to be liberally construed in favor of applicants in order to effect the Act’s remedial
purpose.” Pl.’s Reply 2.
Because the ALJ complied with relevant law and administrative guidance to calculate the
date Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act, the Court will
deny Plaintiff’s first claim for relief.
B. Medical Improvement Standard
Plaintiff’s second and final challenge is directed at ALJ Fernandez Rice’s decision to
affirm his benefits only for the closed period of May 13, 2006 to January 1, 2008. Pl.’s Mot. 10.
In doing so, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following RFC: “[t]o perform light work
as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that he is unable to climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds; he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel,
and crawl; and that he must avoid concentrated exposure to excessive vibration.” AR 18.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in finding medical improvement
related to his ability to work and in the RFC finding. Pl.’s Mot. 10. Plaintiff assails the ALJ’s
finding that his medical condition had improved by highlighting the various evidence that the
ALJ did not consider in reaching this finding. Pl.’s Mot. 10-12. Specifically, Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ did not evaluate all of his impairments, and instead focused only on his abdominal
problems while ignoring his knee problems. Id. at 10. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that the
10

ALJ’s decision to attribute significant value to Dr. Michael Finnegan’s opinion was in error
because Dr. Finnegan did not have access to four years of medical records. Id. at 10-11.
Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Finnegan’s opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s
reported activities of daily living. Id. at 11. Overall, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to
properly apply the medical improvement standard and failed to make a supportable RFC finding.
Id. at 12.
The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that
Plaintiff experienced medical improvement on January 1, 2008, such that he could return to
work. Def.’s Resp. 5. She explains that, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did properly
evaluate all of his medical conditions, including both his abdominal problems and his knee
problems. Id. at 7. Furthermore, the Commissioner argues that the medical evidence and
Plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled during the time in question. Id. at 6-8.
The medical improvement standard, as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1) (2017),
applies in closed period cases. See Shepherd v. Apfel, 184 F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 1999). As
suggested by its name, a closed period case in one in which a disability claimant is determined to
be disabled only for a finite period of time. Id. Social Security regulations define “medical
improvement” as:
[A]ny decrease in the medical severity of [the] impairment(s) which was present
at the time of the most recent favorable medical decision that you were disabled
or continued to be disabled. A determination that there has been a decrease in
medical severity must be based on improvement in the symptoms, signs, and/or
laboratory findings associated with [the] impairment(s).
§ 404.1594(b)(1).
To apply the medical improvement test, an ALJ must first compare the medical severity

11

of a claimant’s current impairments to the severity of the impairments which were present at the
time of the most recent favorable medical decision finding the claimant disabled. See Shepherd,
184 F.3d at 1201. The ALJ must then determine if such medical improvement is related to
ability to work. Id. To do so, “the ALJ must reassess a claimant’s RFC based on the current
severity of the impairment(s) which was present at claimant’s last favorable medical decision.”
Id. Upon completion of these steps, the ALJ must compare the claimant’s new RFC with the
RFC that was assessed before the medical improvement occurred. Id. “The ALJ may find
medical improvement related to an ability to do work only if an increase in the current RFC is
based on objective medical evidence.” See id.; see also § 404.1594(c)(2). Based on the law
regarding the medical improvement standard, the main issue before the Court is whether
Plaintiff’s RFC as determined by ALJ Fernandez Rice was supported by substantial evidence.
The RFC is “an administrative assessment of the extent to which an individual’s
medically determinable impairment(s), including any related symptoms, such as pain, may cause
physical or mental limitations or restrictions that may affect his or her capacity to do workrelated physical and mental activities.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184
(July 2, 1996). The RFC is the individual’s maximum ability “to do sustained work activities in
an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” Id. The RFC assessment must be
based on all of the evidence in the record. 5 Id.
When assessing an individual’s RFC, “the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all
medically determinable impairments, whether severe or not.” Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061,
1069 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2)). Furthermore, “the

5

Evidence considered includes: medical history, medical signs and laboratory findings, the effects of treatment,
reports of daily activities, lay evidence, recorded observations, medical source statements, effects of symptoms
(including pain) that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment, evidence from attempts to
work, need for a structured living environment, and work evaluations. SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996).

12

RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each
conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence
(e.g., daily activities, observations).” See Hendron v. Colvin, 767 F.3d 951, 954 (10th Cir. 2014)
(citing SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996)).
The record reflects that the ALJ sufficiently considered all of the relevant evidence,
including evidence as it related to Plaintiff’s abdominal condition and his knee conditions. The
ALJ thoroughly reviewed the medical evidence, including Plaintiff’s multiple abdominal
surgeries and his knee condition. See AR 17. The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s own testimony
regarding his symptoms and reports of his daily activities. See AR 19. Importantly, Plaintiff’s
testimony about his knee pain contradicted other medical evidence in the record, including
multiple consultative reports indicating that Plaintiff had significant range of motion in his knee
joint and that he did not consistently exhibit joint instability. See AR 21. Plaintiff also reported
his ability to perform household chores and make minor household repairs. See AR 24.
The ALJ further described in detail the many medical opinions she considered while
evaluating Plaintiff’s case. See AR 19-25. Her decision makes clear that, though she did take
Dr. Finnegan’s opinion into account, it was not the sole basis for her decision to craft Plaintiff’s
RFC in the fashion that she did. In total, the Court can count 26 different medical professionals,
from radiologists to state consultants, whose notes and opinions the ALJ considered and
discussed. Additionally, the ALJ explicitly did not adopt some of Dr. Finnegan’s findings, most
notably how much Plaintiff could lift and carry. The Court therefore finds no fault in the ALJ’s
reliance on Dr. Finnegan, because the record indicates the ALJ’s RFC determination was derived
from multiple sources and was supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ’s assessments of the credibility of Plaintiff and the medical professionals were

13

hers to make. Those assessments were satisfactorily explained, are consistent with the medical
evidence in the record, and cannot be second-guessed by this Court when conducting its
substantial evidence review. For these reasons, the undersigned rejects Plaintiff’s assertion that
the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s RFC and failed to support her decision with substantial
evidence. Ultimately, Plaintiff’s arguments amount to an invitation to this Court that it should
re-weigh the relevant evidence, which it will not do. See Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1257
(10th Cir. 2007) (“We review only the sufficiency of the evidence, not its weight.”).
VI.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the undersigned finds that the ALJ’s decision was supported by

substantial evidence and the correct legal standards were applied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion be DENIED, the
Commissioner’s final decision be AFFIRMED, and this action be DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

________________________________________
THE HONORABLE GREGORY J. FOURATT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

14